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The principal object of this work is the appraisal of fiscal
and monetary policy in Nigeria over the period 1960 - 81. The
thesis concentrates on the use of these policies to achieve the
objectives of macroeconomic management with particular emphasis
on the financial objectives, namely, inflation and the balance
of payments.
Chapter One sets out criteria by which to judge fiscal and mon¬
etary policy in the country, given the institutional framework
within which policy-making takes place.
The substantive analysis is divided into two parts. The first
(and main) part is concerned with the evaluation of macroeconomic
policy in general terms. In the field of fiscal policy, the
relevance of mainstream theory to Nigeria is examined. In the
analysis which follows, essentially microeconomic considerations
(such as changes in the tax rates) are specifically ignored.
Instead, the focus of attention is on broad aggregates such as
the budget balance. Indeed, the overall budgetary policy forms
the core of the discussion. Another aspect of fiscal policy
that is considered is the determination of total government
revenues and expenditures. With respect to the latter, some
expenditure hypotheses (for example, 'Wagner's Law' and the
'displacement effect' hypothesis) are tested. In addition, the
government's prices and incomes policy is examined.
The analysis of monetary policy is based on the premise that
money exerts some influence on the economy and that it is nec¬
essary to control its behaviour. Given that an understanding
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of the money market is a sine qua non of an effective monetary
policy, this market is investigated at length from both the
demand and supply sides. The discussion of the actual operation
of monetary policy in the country itself centres on the appropr¬
iate use of the weapons of monetary management open to the
authorities, given the results of the empirical analysis of
the money market.
The second part of the analysis singles out the objectives of
economic policy with respect to inflation and the balance of
payments and discusses policy measures taken in attempting to
achieve them.
The general conclusion is that over the review period, macro-
economic policy has been less than successful and that there
is room for improvement.
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introduction
This study is concerned with fiscal and monetary policy in Nigeria
between 1960 and 1981. The analysis v/ill show that macroecon-
omic policy in Nigeria over this period met with limited success.
In particular, the balance of payments and inflation have not
responded significantly to policy. Moreover, the influence of
external factors on the rate of growth of the economy appears
to have dominated that of domestic policy. Three reasons for
the relative ineffectiveness of policy are advanced in the thesis.
The first is that the structure of the economy inhibits the effect¬
iveness of policy. Secondly, even some tools of policy which
could have been utilized with a reasonable degree of success were
misapplied. Finally, the country does not appear to have had an
overall, consistent macroeconomic policy. These are explained
in the text. The remainder of this introductory chapter sets out
the objectives of the study, relates it to existing ones, and
explains the sequence of the topics treated.
Dramatic changes have taken place in the Nigerian economy since
1960. Predominantly an agriculture - based economy, Nigeria is
now highly dependent on import for food and industrial raw mat¬
erials. From being a leading exporter of palm oil the country
is now a net importer of the product; it was once the largest
exporter of groundnut but the product ceased to be exported from
1978. These changes were part of a more general transformation
of the economy. In 1960, five products - cocoa, groundnut, palm
produce, raw cotton and natural rubber - accounted for 74% of
the value of the country's exports. By 1981 their share had
fallen to 1%. By contrast the ratio of petroleum to total
exports rose from 2.6% in 1960 to 98.2% in 1981. Output also
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also shows similar striking structural changes.
These changes were accompanied by a number of economic crises.
In 1964, the level of foreign reserves fell below the equivalent
of four months import bill which was officially regarded as the
minimum tolerable level. But in the 1970's it was to fall even
lower. The current account was in fact in deficit continuously
between 1955 and 1972 inclusive. The balance of payments crisis
reached a climax in 1982 when the President sought and obtained
the power to ban all categories of imports temporarily - a power
which he used immediately in May of the same year. In addition,
there was the perennial problem of inflation which averaged an
annual rate of 33.7% in 1975. By historical standards, this
was a catastrophic figure.
In spite of these developments, few studies exist inside or out¬
side the country on its macroeconomic policy. To some extent,
the sparsity of work on Nigeria's macroeconomic policy in the
world academic press is understandable: until the late 1970's
the country did not have any economic malaise on a scale as large
as, say, inflation in Latin America or unemployment/overpopulation
in South East Asia. Within the country itself, research topics
often take the form of 'the role of this or that in economic
development'. In recent years, there is a tendency towards
concentration of research efforts in certain fieldi^^) . Even
the few studies that relate to macroeconomic policy deal only
with highly specific aspects of the problem. The econometric
estimation of relationships is particularly common. Thus, there
are a handful of studies on the demand for money which have been
described as being in the main amateurish excursions into the
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realm of empirical economics (Okigbo 1981, p. 53). Formal studies
on important aspects of macroeconomic policy such as interest
rate policy are conspicuous by their absence in published form.
These observations serve to highlight a void which this study
attempts to fill. The primary objective of the study then is
to present a balanced appraisal of macroeconomic policy in
Nigeria since independence in a more general framework than
hitherto available. Specifically, the study seeks to identify
the factors which have constrained or facilitated the effective¬
ness of fiscal and monetary policy in the country during the review
period.
The methodology adopted in this thesis, that is, the analysis of
macroeconomy policy in its totality, is superior to the alter¬
native one of a piecemeal approach (which is typical of current
research on the country's economic policy) in one important
respect. In general there is no one - to - one correspondence
between macroeconomic objectives and policy instruments. This
is, of course, an obvious fact but it is one that can affect
significantly the conclusions of the type of study undertaken in
this thesis. A partial approach to policy analysis can take
many forms. It may be the examination of particular objectives
(e.g. inflation) or of particular policies (e.g. exchange rate
policy) or, as is more common in Nigeria, the investigation of
particular relationships (e.g. the price elasticity of the demand
for import; the effect of government policy on industrial
development). The first type ignores the fact that governments
typically pursue many objectives simultaneously and that the
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achievement of one objective may necessitate the sacrifice of
another one (e.g. price stability and growth). The second,
on its part, fails to take account of the fact that one policy
instrument usually affects more than one objective as well as
other instruments. It will in fact be argued in this study
that one specific instrument - fiscal policy- influences almost
all the objectives of economic policy in Nigeria, including those
relating to the balance of payments, inflation and growth.
Finally, the third is even more limited than the other two.
Industrialization, for instance, is an intermediate objective.
Industrialization is often linked to growth or diversification
of the economy. The latter objective (the reduction of the
dependence of the country on one or a few commodities mainly
for foreign exchange or government revenue) is in turn aimed at
reducing fluctuations in income which is only one of many object¬
ives of economic policy.
Now that the objectives of the thesis have been clearly delineated
one may relate it to existing work.
RELATIONS TO EXISTING STUDIES
Many issues investigated here have been raised elsewhere as the
following examples show. The balance of payments has been con¬
sidered by Onitiri (1970) while inflation has been discussed by
Oyejide (1972). Similarly, Phillips (1967, 1968 and 1969) has
examined the influence of fiscal incentive schemes on industrial
growth; Ajayi (1972, 1974) and Ojo (1976) have done some work on
money supply determination; and Tomori (1972), Teriba (1974,
1975), and Akinnifesi and Phillips (1978) have all studied
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the demand for money in Nigeria. As such, the present study has
got many antecedents. Yet it is fundamentally different from
the earlier ones in many respects. First, the earlier studies
were conducted in a considerably narrower context than the present
one. Onitiri's work on the balance of payments, for example,
was a paper presented at a conference on reconstruction and
development in Nigeria held in 1968 and was principally concerned
with the constraint imposed by the balance of payments on growth.
In the same way, Oyejide's emphasis was on the effect of inflation
on capital formation. The limited scope of the other examples
is self-evident. This work is therefore differentiated by being
the first to look at macroeconomic policy in Nigeria in a general
context. Thus, the implications of fiscal policy for monetary
policy and the balance of payments, the relation between interest
rate and monetary policy, and the link between money and the price
level are some of the relationships that will be investigated in
the study.
Second, the results of the empirical analysis are invariably more
reliable than those of earlier ones. There are two reasons for
this. First, previous models have been extended by using diff¬
erent or additional variables which has resulted in improved
performance of the models considered. Second, there are few,
if any, studies that relate to the recent period. This is easily
illustrated with the demand for money studies. The latest such
study as at the time of writing (Akinnifesi and Phillips 1978)
uses data covering the period 1962 - 1975 while many important
developments (to be charted in the text) occurred as from that
year. Their influence is therefore not captured by the study.
In other areas (e.g. import demand), the review period is even
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less recent. In addition to the more recent cut-off date, the
present study covers a longer review period than earlier ones,
thus making possible some econometric tests which were not poss-
(2)
ible before
Finally, the study contains a number of novel investigations.
In this connection, one may mention the following cases. To
the best of the knowledge of the author, no-one has ever tested
for Nigeria the directions of the causal relationship between the
stock of money and the price level. A similar observation applies
to the influence of income on government expenditure and the dis¬
placement hypothesis.
Having set out the objectives of the thesis and its relationship
to earlier studies the final task that remains is to explain its
organization.
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
In appraising the performance of an entity - be it an individual,
firm or government - it is helpful to have some points of refer¬
ence that is, some standards for judging how far the entity has
been successful. In the present case, this entails setting
yardsticks by which to evaluate the performance of macroeconomic
policy in Nigeria. Chapter 1 is devoted to the development of
such criteria. Two sets of criteria are proposed. The first
relates to the objectives of macroeconomic policy declared by
the government. This, of course, requires specifying those
objectives. However, it is possible for the government to declare
its commitment to one set of objectives while it pursues a totally
different one. As a result, an attempt is made to identify the
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objectives actually pursued (as implied by tbe measures taken).
The second set of criteria concerns the feasible objectives of
macroeconomic policy in the country. Whether or not an object¬
ive is feasible depends on the constraints within which policy
making and execution take place. It is therefore necessary
to examine the limitations on macroeconomic policy in Nigeria.
These have been classified into three: statistical, institutional
and political. It is on the basis of these constraints that
the feasible objectives are determined.
Following conventional practice, macroeconomic measures are
divided into two broad categories viz., fiscal and monetary
policy. Fiscal policy is taken up first (in Chapter 2). Like
most branches of economic theory, the theory of fiscal policy
has been developed within the context of Western, industrial
societies (3). However, Nigeria is a prototype of developing
countries (Appendix 1). Since it is common knowledge that the
two groups of countries - developed and developing - are struct¬
urally different, the straightforward grafting of fiscal (or
any other) theory from the former onto the latter is inappro¬
priate (Seers 1963 Myint 1964). This provides the rationale
for the review of the relevance of conventional or mainstream
shortrun stabilization policy to the Nigerian situation as a
prelude to the discussion of fiscal policy in the country. An
equally important factor that needs to be taken into consider¬
ation when evaluating fiscal policy is the influence of the
existing political system. The significance of the political
system for the present purpose arises from the fact that Nigeria
is a federation in which the power of the central and regional/
state governments are enshrined in the constitution. With
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respect to fiscal policy, it is these constitutional provisions
which distinguish a unitary from a federal State. As Adarkar
(1933, p. 1) put it, half a century ago, 'A purely administrative
province of a unitary system differs from an autonomous or semi-
autonomous province of a federation in that the latter has,
while the former has not, a more or less untrammelled power of
independent legislation in regard to financial matters falling
within its competence'. Theoretically then, federalism may
produce one of the following situations: the actions of the
sub-national governments reinforce federal actions thus making
the latter more effective; the fiscal decisions of the lower-
level governments run counter to central government decisions
and therefore exert a negative influence on the attainment of
fiscal policy goals; and, the effects of central government
decisions are invariant with respect to the actions of the other
governments in the federation. For these reasons, the impact
of federalism on fiscal policy is examined by discussing the
fiscal system. Also, for various reasons given in the text,
the analysis of fiscal policy which follows the fiscal system is
confined to the fiscal activities of the Federal Government.
Monetary policy is treated in the following two chapters.
Chapter 3 deals mainly with the theory of monetary policy.
This deals with the mechanism mechanism of monetary
- 9 -
policy in the country. Following standard practice, the channels
of monetary policy are traced by analysing the market for money
through the demand side first and then the supply side. The
analysis in this part of the study is inevitably empirical, with
Nigerian data being used to investigate money demand and supply
functions. Finally, given the indeterminate results of the supply
side of the exercise, an alternative approach to money supply
determination - the balance sheet approach - is used to isolate
the various factors which influence the supply of money in
Nigeria. The exercise should provide valuable information
that will facilitate the actual appraisal of policy which is
the subject matter of Chapter 4.
As in the case of fiscal policy, the institutional background
plays a central role in the conduct of monetary policy. In
the first instance, the monetary authorities can use only those
powers conferred on them by the law. Secondly, the structure of
the financial system affects the efficacy of these weapons.
Consequently, the financial system is described in some detail.
The evaluation of monetary policy is organized around the tech¬
niques of monetary control conferred on or employed by the Central
Bank of Nigeria. The advantage of this approach is that it
pinpoints the causes of the success or failure of the particular
technique involved. Furthermore, it indicates what measures
should be taken to improve the performance of the techniques.
However in order to present a balanced picture of the conduct of
monetary policy, a critical survey of monetary problems and policy
in terms of three phases is undertaken. The conclusion also
contains a general assessment of monetary policy over the review
period.
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So far the evaluation of policy has been approached from the side
of the measures taken to achieve the desired objectives. But
as indicated earlier, a given measure typically affects more than
one objective, just as one objective may be attained with
more than one instrument. This suggests that it is possible to
reverse the current approach, that is, appraise policy from the
side of the objectives. For this purpose, two objectives have
been selected on the basis of the discussion in Chapter 1. These
are the objectives relating to price stability and the balance
of payments. Inflation is the subject of Chapter 5. First
the facts to be explained are set out. Then two competing
theories of inflation and their relevance to Nigeria are reviewed.
The two theories are the monetary and institutional (or socio¬
logical) explanation of inflation. Inflation policy in Nigeria
is then reviewed in the light of the preceding discussion.
Chapter 6 is concerned with the balance of payments. The
balance of payments problem-of the country are set out (in the
form of the behaviour of some key balances) before presenting
the measures taken to solve them. Following the approach
developed in earlier chapters, the theory of the balance of
payments policy is reviewed. Given that most of the measures
taken by the government make some implicit assumption about the
income and particularly the price elasticity of the demand for
import, an import demand function is estimated in order to shed
some light on the appropriateness of these measures. A critique
of the authorities balance of payments policies then follows.
The final chapter contains the main conclusions of the study.




1. In particular, studies on the financial system have become
a favourite pastime c.f. the strikingly similar studies by
Ojo (1976), Nwankuo (1980), Okigbo (1981) and Ojo and
Adewunmi (1982).
2. For instance, many earlier studies did not report the
Durbin-Watson statistics on the grounds that the number
of observations was less than the minimum of 15 for which
critical values are tabulated.
3. Marxian economic analysis is still of limited relevance
to Nigeria which is more capitalist than some West
European or North American countries.
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CHAPTER ONE
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING MACROECONOMIC POLICY
INTRODUCTION
In order to facilitate the appraisal of a policy, it is necessary
to have some points of reference or benchmarks. Consequently,
the principal objective of this Chapter is to derive some yard¬
sticks for measuring the performance of macroeconomic policy in
Nigeria over the review period.
The discussion is organized along the following lines. One
of the simplest ways of assessing a policy is to confront its
performance with the objectives set for it. In this sense, a
policy is judged to be effective if it achieves its objectives.
Using this approach, one may evaluate the performance of macro-
economic policy in Nigeria on the basis of how far it has achieved
the objectives set by the government. It is therefore necessary
to articulate those objectives. This is the task undertaken in
Section 1. Like any other government, the Nigerian Government
is under pressure from various interest groups in the society.
It has to take account of these pressures when setting its objectives
In its attempt to satisfy as much of the demands on it as possible,
it may declare its commitment to objectives which (a) it has no
intention of pursuing or (b) are beyond its means. Consequently,
in Section '2, an attempt is made to identify its real objectives
by considering some of the measures taken over the years in part¬
icular circumstances. Then, in Section 4, the suitability of
these objectives as criteria for assessing macroeconomic policy
in the country is examined. Of course, for an objective to be
suitable for this purpose, it must be feasible in the first
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instance. In turn, what is feasible depends on the institutional
settings in which policy is formulated and executed. In part¬
icular, the constraints within which the authorities operate
affect to a great extent their power to realize specific objectives.
Such constraints are reviewed in Section 3 before determining
the suitable objectives in Section 4.
It will be argued that the use of objectives to appraise policy
alone is inadequate, hence the examination of possible alter¬
native criteria in Section 5 which is followed by a summary of
the discussion.
1. DECLARED OBJECTIVES OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN NIGERIA
The normal objectives of macroeconomic policy are normally thought
to be concerned with employment, prices, the balance of payments,
and growth. Nigeria appears to have adopted all four as the
following account will show.
On the recommendation of the World Bank economic mission to
Nigeria whose report was published in 1955 (IBRD, 1955), the
National Economic Council was set up late in 1955 to provide a
forum for the various governments to discuss development policies
and common economic problems (Nigeria, 1970 p. 7). Early in
1959 this Council decided that 'a national development plan be
prepared for Nigeria with the objective of the achievement and
maintenance of the highest possible rate of increase in the stand¬
ard of living and the creation of the necessary conditions to
this end, including public support and awareness of both the
potentials that exist and the sacrifices that will be required'
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(Nigeria, 1970 p. 10). In his independence budget speech of
1960, the Federal Minister of Finance reaffirmed that all the
financial and economic policies of the Federal Government would
be directed at this objective. He then went on to frame a
ten-point programme towards its realization. The relevant
items for the present purpose are to: (i) maintain confidence
in the value of the Nigerian currency and to maintain reasonable
stability in wages and prices; (ii) continue to encourage the
growth of industry and further development of Niegeria's internal
resources, and (iii) make effective arrangements for the provision
of the funds required to finance development in Nigeria both by
mobilizing domestic savings and by attracting capital from
overseas. (CBN Report 1960, pp 13 - 14). The First National
Development Plan, 1962 - 68 (FNDP) accepted this objective by
declaring that in preparing the Plan one of the goals of the
government was to make the economy 'grow as fast as possible'
(Nigeria, 1962, p. 21).
It can be seen from these statements that right from its inception
as an independent nation, the country has made growth, price
stability, and the balance of payments the objectives of its
economic policy. The third objective arises from the following
consideration. The level of external reserves 'is in many ways
the very heart and core of confidence in our currency for that
confidence will only be maintained so long as we, as a nation,
maintain a level of external reserves which inspires confidence,
both internally and overseas, in our ability to meet our oblig¬
ations'. (1962 Budget, p. 8). Foreign exchange reserves, as
is well known, depend on the balance of payments.
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Subsequent official documents re-iterated government's commit¬
ment to these objectives while adding a fourth-full employment.
Until the last years of the review period, particular emphasis
was placed on growth and price stability. For instance, the
Second National Development Plan (SNDP) 1970 - 74 (subsequently
extended by a year), endorsed the growth objective when it
stated that 'Nigeria must bend its energies towards the achieve¬
ment of the most rapid rate of economic development possible'
(Nigeria 1970, p. 32). It regards this as one of the five
principal national objectives of the country. In accepting
this objective, the Third National Development Plan 1975 - 80
(TNDP) states that 'In Nigeria as in most other developing
countries, development policy must perforce be directed at three
fundamental objectives: (a) economic growth and development;
(b) price stability, and, (c) social equity'. (Nigeria, 1975,
p. 33). But 'The primary objective of economic planning in
Nigeria is to achieve a rapid increase in the standard of living
of the average Nigerian'. (Nigeria, 1975, p. 29).
On inflation one is told in the SNDP and TNDP that 'Since
independence, Nigeria's monetary policy has been geared towards
three main objectives' one of which is the 'maintenance of
confidence in the Nigerian currency through measures to stabilize
domestic wages and prices'. (Nigeria, 1970 p. 68; Nigeria, 1975
p. 18). The two plans also identify three objectives of fiscal
policy, one of which is to 'maintain reasonable economic and price
stability in the face of inherent inflationary pressure' (Nigeria,
1970, p. 68; Nigeria, 1975, p. 16). In the mid-1970's the
price objective seemed to have been elevated to the top of
government's scale of declared objectives as both monetary and
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fiscal policies were assigned to this objective: 'The main
objective of monetary policy during the Third Plan will be to
control inflation' and 'fiscal policy should seek mainly to reduce
inflationary pressures' (Nigeria, 1975, p. 34).
The full employment objective was formally adopted for the first
time in 1970 as one of the five national objectives. This
objective sought to make Nigeria 'a land of bright and full
opportunities' which is interpreted as 'an atmosphere of expanding
opportunities for full employment' because 'Full employment of
resources, especially of the labour force, is the necessary
policy objective for an economy dedicated to rapid growth'
(Nigeria, 1970, p. 32). The complete set of the principal
national objectives as enunciated in the SNDP (p. 32) and re¬
affirmed in the TNDP (p. 29) are 'to establish Nigeria firmly
as (i) a united, strong and self-reliant nation; (ii) a great
and dynamic - economy; (iii) a just and egalitarian society; (iv)
a land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens; and
(v) a free and democratic society'.
In order to achieve these long-term objectives, specific short-
run objectives were set for fiscal and monetary policy. These are
(a) increase in per capita income, (b) more even distribution
of income, (c) reduction in the level of unemployment, (d)
increase in the supply of high level manpower, (e) diversification
of the economy (f) balanced development and (g) indigenization of
economic activity (Nigeria, 1975, p. 29). From these are derived
the conventional objectives of macroeconomic policy set out
above. But other less orthodox objectives that are peculiar
to developing countries can be derived. These include the
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diversification of the economy, balanced development and indig-
enization. Others which have been pursued over the years are
the provision of development finance and the strengthening of
the financial system through the operations of the central
bank (-*-).
In principle, it should not be difficult to apply the suggested
criterion of comparing performance with objectives. This is
because the government usually expresses its objectives in
quantitative terms (Those for the four traditional objectives
are given in Section 4). Even for apparently non-quantifiable
objectives, proxies can be found. Diversification of the
economy easily comes to mind in this respect. Officially, the
term refers to the structure of exports, and measures of export
(2s)
concentration or diversification are available . Similarly,
one may use number of pupils per teacher, per capita hospital
beds, number of kilometres of tarred roads per square kilometre
and so on in each state as proxies for even development. But
there are two reasons why the use of this criterion alone is
inadequate. There are practical difficulties in measuring
the performance of the economy, i.e., reasonably accurate measures
of the relevant macroeconomic aggregates do not always exist.
Furthermore, the criterion is silent on whether the set objectives
are attainable, given the circumstances surrounding policy making
and execution. This suggests that it is necessary to distin¬
guish between desired and feasible objectives. This is done
after discussing the limitations of policy making. Also, one
may want to know if declared objectives diverge from actual
objectives - the subject of the next section.
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2. OBJECTIVES IMPLIED BY THE POLICY MEASURES
It is possible for the government to pay lip service to one object¬
ive while it is not really interested in it. This may be done
in order to placate some pressure group. To a certain extent,
the objectives actually pursued by the government can be inferred
from its policy measures in given circumstances. This is,
however, not an easy task. In the first instance, economic
theory does not provide unambiguous, universally valid measures
for securing any given objective^) - Also, there is the
possibility of a conflict between the objectives (e.g. price
stability and growth) which arises when a particular policy
affects more than one objective in the opposite directions.
Given the absence of consensus on the set of policies necessary
to achieve a given objective, it is difficult to rank the govern¬
ment's objectives by merely examining the policies pursued.
As a result, the following exercise is tentative.
2.1 GROWTH
This is one objective which one can say with confidence was
pursued by the government in earnest. This is evident in the
various development programmes executed since 1955. The planned
capital expenditure of the Federal Government alone rose from
N825 million under the First Plan 1962 - 68 to N42,000 million
under the Fourth Plan 1981 - 85. Moreover, as the table below
shows, a large fraction of the expenditure is on economic services.
This fraction has been rising since 1970. In Ch. 2 it will be
shown that actual capital expenditure displays a similar trend.
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TABLE_1 : SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF PLANNED CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UNDER THE NATIONAL PLANS
PLAN
SECTOR FIRST SECOND THIRD FOURTH
ECONOMIC 72. 3 63 . 7 66. 8 69 . 6
SOCIAL 16. 5 13.0 17 . 8* 19.9
DEFENCE & ADMINISTRATION 10.7 21. 6 15 . 4 10 . 5
TRANSFERS (FINANCIAL
OBLIGATIONS) 0.5 1 . 7 - -
TOTAL % 100. 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0
TOTAL (N MILLION) 825 1,100 26,165 42,000
SOURCES: FNDP, p. 51; SNDP, PP 273, 274; TNDP, pp 348, 349;
and Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report, 1981, p. 4
* includes environmental development, i.e. water supply, sewerage,
drainage and refuse disposal, town and country planning, and
co-operative and community development
Another indication of the commitment of the government to growth
is the shift in the composition of imports in favour of producer
goods - capital equipment and raw materials. The policy of
stilupating what percentage of total bank credit should go to
the various sectors, with the production sector being given
the lion share is an additional indicator(^) _
2.2 THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Again, one may say that this is an objective that was pursued
vigorously by the government. For instance, when, in 1964,
the level of foreign reserves fell below the minimum set by
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official policy, the government took positive steps towards
rectifying the situation (5) These included increases in the
customs duties on a wide range of imports; other quantitative
restrictions on imports (e.g. quotas); and the setting up of
the Official Committee on Balance of Payments to study the
problems of the balance of payments and to make recommendations
The balance of payments crisis also prompted the Central Bank of
use for the first time its main instrument of monetary control:
credit guidelines. Other measures taken by the Central Bank in
that year with the ultimate objective of correcting the balance
of payments problem include the exclusion of some assets from the
list of reserve-eligible assets (thus effectively raising the
reserve requirements) and the upward revision of interest rates
(CBN, Report, 1965, p. 10; also Ch. 4).
Again, as the level of reserves approached the official minimum
in 1978, the authorities took certain drastic actions to curtail
the reserve drain. Many items of import were banned while
others were placed on licence and a comprehensive import super¬
vision scheme was introduced, all with the aim of reducing the
flow of imports (CBN, Report, 1978, p. 6 and see Ch. 6). In
the same year, the government succeeded in reducing the level
of its expenditure for the first time in many years (see Ch. 2).
Finally, as a last resort, all categories of imports were temp¬
orarily suspended in May 1982 under the Stabilization Bill of
that year when foreign reserves in relation to the flow of
imports fell to their lowest level ever following a record
deficit in the balance of payments sustained a year earlier.
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Having demonstrated the degree of the Federal Government's
commitment to the balance of payments objective, it is also
necessary to point out that the objective differs from the
others in one respect : it also serves as a constraint on the
government. There is a limit on the extent to which the balance
of payments can deteriorate without reducing international
confidence in the ability of the government to run the affairs
of the country. It is unlikely that any rational government
would allow its country's balance of payments seriously to
deteriorate before taking corrective measures. Consequently,
the government does not have much choice as far as the balance
of payments is concerned. It must either deflate or permit
its currency to depreciate.
2.3 PRICE STABILITY
The government appears to have adopted an ambivalent attitude
towards this objective. On the one hand, its statements on
policy give the impression that it is dedicated to achieving
a reasonable degree of price stability. On the other hand, its
actions indicate that price stability is an incidental objective.
An indication of this came in the first few years of the First
Plan. It was expected that 50% of the total projected public
sector investment would be financed by foreign capital (CBN,
Report, 1964 p. 11, also FNDP). In the event, this expectation
proved to be too optimistic. Foreign capital accounted for only
6.7% of the total capital expenditure in the first two years (CBN,
Report, 1964, pp. 11 - 12) and the situation did not. improve even
in later years when the country was thrown into a political
turmoil. As current and capital expenditures grew rapidly while
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revenue grew at a much slower rate, a widening overall budget
deficit emerged. This deficit was 'financed by drawing upon
past and current savings of the economy, foreign assistance, and
increasingly, by borrowing from the banking system ... At the
end of 1964, internal public debt totalled N200.6 million as
against N89.2 m at the beginning of 1962. More than 75% of
these borrowings was derived from inflationary sources ... it
is dangerous for the rate of monetary expansion to out-pace
that of economic growth as it has in the past three years' (CBN,
Report, 1964, pp. 12 - 13).
The policy of deficit-financing through inflationary means was
continued until 1971 and resumed in 1975. In order to achieve
this, the Treasury Bill Act was amended a number of times. The
original (1959) Act had fixed the limit of Treasury bills as
a percentage of estimated Federal Government revenue at any
point in time at 10% (CBN, Report 1960 ). By 1970, the
limit had been raised to 150% of the estimated revenue retained
by the Federal Government plus the gross revenue of the states
(CBN, Report, 1970, p. 54). In addition, a short term government
debt instrument called Treasury certificates was introduced in
1968, thus enhancing the borrowing ability of the government.
Despite the warnings from the Central Bank in the 1960's about
the potential inflationary consequences of the Federal Government's
fiscal operations, and even when the annual rate of inflation
reached two digits in the 1970's, the government persisted in
expanding its expenditure at a rapid rate (7 X Furthermore,
it objected to the use of a potentially effective anti-inflation
weapon by resisting increases in the rates of interest (8). Thus,
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'the monetary measures in use since 1960 have been the provision
of "cheap money" to finance government capital expenditure and
the aiding of investment financing in the private sector' (Nigeria,
1970, p. 14). From this one may infer that the growth objective
is ranked higher than the price objective.
A similar observation applies to the relationship between the
price and balance of payments objectives. The relative insig¬
nificance of the problem of inflation vis-a-vis that of the
balance of payments was demonstrated in the early and late 1970's.
In the two periods the balance of payments was in deficit while
the inflation rate, at 10% or higher, was considered unaccept¬
able (9). Yet, the government took steps to restrict the
availability of goods and services by imposing quantitative
controls on imports and introducing or maintaining foreign
exchange controls. Finally, given that the balance of payments
is a form of constraint on the government, it has to be ranked
higher than the price objective.
To some extent, the relative insignificance of the price stability
objective, especially in the earlier years of the review period,
is understandable. In many countries of the world, there has
been a marked change in emphasis within the goals of macro-
economic policy since 1960. Excluding countries in the Western
Hemisphere, inflation did not pose a serious problem in any
major country in the 1960's. Nigeria is not an exception to
this general observation. Until 1969, the annual rate of
inflation was below 10%. In those circumstances, it was possible
for the government to relegate the price stability objective
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which has no intrinsic value to the background. But the 1970's
witnessed the acceleration of the inflation rate to heights
previously unknown. The earlier comments about inflation
being an incidental objective therefore apply more to the period
since 1970 than to the preceding one.
But even in the later period some measures were taken to achieve
some degree of stability in prices. Some of these measures
will be reviewed in Ch. 6. Here, it will be noted that a price
control board was set up in 1970 to fix and enforce the prices
of a wide range of commodities. Then, in 1975, an Anti-Inflation
Task Force was established. Also, between 1973 and 1976 when
inflation was the only major problem in the economy, most of
the measures were directed at reducing the rate of increases
in prices. Nevertheless, the general conclusion that the
price stability objective occupied a subordinate position to
that relating to the balance of payments and growth still stands.
2.4 EMPLOYMENT
It is tempting to think that since the government was dedicated
to accelerating the rate of growth of the GDP it accorded the
employment objective a high priority. This is not necessarily
so. The view prevalent in less developed countries that a
nation cannot be regarded as developed unless it has a large
industrial base ( Ekundare , 1973, p. 260) ensures that emphasis
is placed on industrialization. In Nigeria this has been given
practical expression in the adoption of an import-substitution
development strategy which is described briefly in Ch. 6. The
effect of this is that expenditure on the industrial sub-sector
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dominates all other categories of expenditure on the economic
sector.But it will be explained in App. 1 that the industrial
subsector is relatively insignificant with respect to employment.
Agriculture which employs the bulk of the labour force was
relatively neglected. Moreover, over the years, few measures
explicitly designed to increase employment were taken. Finally,
the magnitude and changes in the employment problem are not
known (see Section 3.1 below). For these reasons, one may
say that employment was not a paramount objective of macro-
economic policy in Nigeria.
2.5 OTHER OBJECTIVES
These other objectives are sometimes referred to collectively
as the development objectives. They are different from those
considered above in the sense that the former are not regarded
as the ultimate objectives. Rather, the belief is that the
attainment of these intermediate objectives will aid the achieve¬
ment of the desired, final ones. This is implicit in the
assertion that 'The basic objective of all monetary and financial
policies must at all times be directed to facilitate the economic
development desired' (Nigeria, 1965, p. 4). As such, the develop¬
ment objectives may be illustrated with reference to the functions
expected to be performed by the institution primarily charged
with the responsibility for monetary and financial policies, viz,
the Central Bank of Nigeria.
Realizing the undesirable consequences for policy of the under¬
development of the financial structure, the Centre Bank of
Nigeria, like many African central banks (10), has been given
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the responsibility for promoting the growth of financial instit¬
utions. The Bank is expected to play a leading role in creating
and nurturing a market for government and private debt instru¬
ments (for example, through the issue of government securities
and the establishment of stock exchanges). The Bank is also
expected to set up development finance institutions (e.g. the
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank).
The Central Bank was also required to aid the 'development of the
banking habit' through a number of measures. These include the
proper supervision of the commercial banks to ensure that they
behave in a way that is consistent with government policy, includ¬
ing the strengthening of public confidence in them. Apart from
the routine examination to eradicate malpractices, the Central
Bank: can refuse any commercial bank to open new or close exist¬
ing branches; determines the minimum number of rural branches a
bank must open before expanding banking facilities in urban areas;
and encourages non-price competition among banks.
Finally, the Central Bank is expected to provide development
finance to the government by issuing and underwriting long-term
government stocks.
These objectives, together with those relating to growth and the
balance of payments may be said to have ranked high on the govern¬
ment ' s scale of priorities. But given these stated and implied
objectives, it still remains to be determined whether they are
appropriate for use as criteria for assessing policy. A nec¬
essary condition for any objective to be suitable as a criterion
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is that it must be set at a realistic level, i.e. it must not be
impossible or too easy to achieve, given the prevailing conditions.
In Nigeria, the policy maker is faced with a number of constraints
which help to reduce the effectiveness of any policy measure.
In the next section, some of these limitations on policy are reviewed.
3. CONSTRAINTS ON MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN NIGERIA
For analytical purposes, these constraints may be divided into
three types. These are statistical, structural and political
and are considered in that order.
STATISTICAL DEFICIENCIES
Like most developing countries, Nigeria suffers from lack of
reliable, timely data on many economic aggregates. For the
present purpose, the worst affected are employment and growth
although price and balance of payments statistics are also
faulty.
There is no measure of total employment or unemployment in
Nigeria. In the first instance, the population of the country
is not known in spite of the fact that six censuses have been
conducted since 1911. The first normal census was held in 1962
but it was scrapped because of the controversy which it generated.
In 1963 another census was held. Although the results were
finally accepted by the Federal Government the academic opinion
is that the figures were inflated for political reasons (Aluko,
1965; Ekanem, 1972; Adepoju, 1983). The last census was held
in 1973 but it was cancelled because the nation could not agree
on the distribution of the population. If the total population
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is not known, it is then not surprising that the size of the
labour force is also unknown. Consequently expressions such as
'the rate of unemployment' are meaningless. Besides, the concept
of unemployment in Nigeria is very vague because of the existence
of 'disguised' unemployment in which labour is permanently
engaged in low-productivity, low - remuneration activities such as
subsistence farming and street hawking (Kirkpatrick and Nixson
1976, p. 176). Thus, meaningful measures of unemployment do
not exist.
The valuation of output of Nigeria is a particularly difficult
task. The sources of this problem are well documented in Prest
and Stewart (1953), Okigbo (1962 and 1963) and Eke (1966) and
surveyed in Appendix 1. In a nutshell, the problem centres
around agricultural production other than for exports (i.e.
crops grown mainly for home consumption) which, by definition, is
not traded. Estimates of agricultural output in general are
based on an assumed output per man or marketing board purchases.
Clearly, the former estimates are subject to a wide margin of
error because output per man is highly subjective, its rate of
growth over time is not known and the population itself is not
known for certain. Yet, the contribution of this subsistence
production to total agricultural output is thought to be well over
90% (Aboyade, 1969). In turn, agriculture has accounted for
between 25 to 70% of total output. Apart from the financial
and mining sectors of the economy, the contributions of other
sectors to total output are more or less difficult to measure.




problems concern the weighting system used in their compilation
and their coveraged both in terms of the products covered and
geographical spread. Food, for instance, accounts for 45.5%
of total weights of the items covered. Similarly, the data
relate mainly to nine urban centres, with Lagos being given a
weight of 543 out of 1000. Although weighting and coverage are
universal problems of the construction of index numbers, the solu¬
tions adopted in Nigeria tend to lead to a higher than normal
degree of error because of the bias in favour of food on the one
hand and Lagos on the other.
Finally, records of many aspects of government fiscal operations
are unavailable. These and other statistical limitations in
Nigeria are elaborated on in Appendix 1.
A direct implication of these problems is that the government
cannot tell with a reasonable degree of confidence the position
of the economy at a point in time with respect to many key macro-
economic variables. This situation renders the formulation and
appraisal of policy particularly difficult. The formulation of
sound policies requires some form of forecasts of the future
values of the relevant variables. This, in turn, requires some
knowledge of the current and past values of those variables.
Where the available data are not reliable, this creates a problem.
As an illustration, consider the desire to maintain some degree
of price stability. Using a simplified quantity theory of
money model in which velocity is constant, this implies striking
a balance between the rates of growth of money and output. When
the latter cannot be measured reliably, the chosen rate of monetary
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expansion may be inappropriate so that the desired degree of price
stability cannot be realized. Moreover, in evaluating the
impact of a given policy, it is necessary to have an idea of the
values of the variables which it is expected to affect both before
and after the policy has come into effect. In the present
circumstances those values are not known for certain, even after
allowing for a reasonable length of time.
The untimeliness of data raises another kind of problem. At
the time the data on the relevant variables become available the
situation may have changed. Policies based on the current data
may produce de-stabilizing consequences. The simplest example
concerns the institution of expensionary measures when contraction¬
ary ones are desired. Finally, the untimeliness of the statistics
has the effect of increasing the lags in the effect of policy as
identified by, say, Johnson (1962).
Statistical deficiencies serve to increase the uncertainty surround¬
ing policy making as well as to raise the probability of discret¬
ionary policy turning out to be destabilizing. The use of
imperfect information to conduct policy is therefore a limitation
on the ability of the government.
3.2 STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS
The structure of a developing economy differs markedly from that
of a mature one in many respects. First, there is the predom¬
inance of primary production together with a correspondingly
small manufacturing sector in the former. This has some implic¬
ations for economic policy. It is now standard proposition
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that the price elasticity of the demand for primary products
in the world markets is considerably lower than that for manu¬
factured goods. Also, the response of supply to changes in
demand, especially in the case of agricultural products, tends
to be sluggish in a developing economy. This is definitely
true of tree crops with long gestation periods (e.g. cocoa,
rubber and oil palm). Consequently, it is difficult to improve
the balance of payments position in the shortrun through measures
that operate by raising export supply. As will be shown in the
next chapter, it is equally difficult to expand domestic pro¬
duction through shortrun fiscal policy.
Another important feature of an underdeveloped economy is the
absence of significant linkages among the sectors. In terms of
an input-output table, many cells are empty. The best example
is the relationship between the mining sector and the rest of the
economy. It will be emphasized in the next chapter that in Nig¬
eria this sector is virtually independent of the others. It is
not known for using the inputs of other domestic sectors and
neither do the other sectors use its output to any appreciable
degree. The same observation, mutatis mutandis, applies to the
agricultural sector. Since Nigeria is an agricultural country
one would have expected that the sector would provide the manu¬
facturing sector a large fraction of its raw materials. In
reality, the opposite is the case: the share of imported in total
raw materials cost is approximately 75% (CBN, Report, 1980, p. 18).
Domestic output of agriculture is consumed mainly as final pro¬
ducts. A consequence of the absence of strong linkages among
the sectors of the economy is that the government cannot confine
its activities to one sector and expect that sector to transmit
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the effect of its policy to the rest of the economy. For example,
the government cannot use credit availability to influence the
level of activity in the agricultural or distribution sector.
This example also shows that the imperfection of the financial
system (discussed in greater detail in Chs. 3 and 4) is a limit¬
ation on the effectiveness of policy.
Finally, it may be added that it is not only the manufacturing
sector which depends heavily on imports. All sectors which require
capital equipment (other than the rudimentary implements such as
hoes and cutlasses) have to import these goods. Thus, tractors
and other mechanized farm equipment and raw materials such as
animal feeds and fertilizers are imported. Transport and communi¬
cations equipment are a few of the products that are entirely impor¬
ted. Measures that only increase aggregate demand may produce
disappointing results.
3.3 POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
This problem may take one of two forms. On the one hand, there
is the problem created by federalism and, on the other, a conflict
may arise between two or more institutions involved in policy mak¬
ing.
Nigeria is a federation and the relationship between the central
and the lower levels of government is a potential source of con¬
flict. This possibility may be illustrated with the changes in
federal - state financial relations. The country was administered
as a strictly unitary state until 1951 when a quasi-federal con¬
stitution was introduced. In 1954 a truly federal constitution
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was adopted. This resulted in the progressive enlargement of
the powers of the constituent regions at the expense of those of
the Federal Government. The authority of the Federal Government
was confined to items on the exclusive and concurrent lists while
the regions were given residual powers as well as authority over
items on the concurrent list. In practical terms, the states
assumed the basic responsibility for economic development while
the central government contented itself with infrastructural dev¬
elopment, transport and communications. Thus, in 1955, the Fed¬
eral and each of the regional governments embarked upon separate
development plans. In order to enable the regions to carry out
their functions, their financial powers were correspondingly en¬
larged. The various fiscal review commissions (see Ch. 2) helped
to erode the financial powers of the Federal Government. The
implication of this development for the present purpose is that
stabilization policy powers became diffused, thus creating the
problem of ensuring that the various governments behaved in a way
that was conducive to the achievement of national goals. The
suspension of the constitution and the declaration of a state of
emergency in 1966 by the new military regime removed this potent¬
ial source of conflict temporarily. But the end of the war in
1970 saw its re-emergence : the states won back most of their
powers in the 1970's decade^ ^.
The second facet of the political problem is the relationship
between different departments of government, especially that
between the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance. This
issue is sufficiently important to justify a separate treatment
which is available in Ch. 4. Here it should be noted that the
Bank does not act independently of the Ministry of Finance. For
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instance, it cannot change interest rates which are fixed by
the Treasury. Neither does it have control over its assets,
especially the amount of government securities which it holds.
Having considered the objectives of the government and the limit¬
ations on its ability to achieve them, the next task is to con¬
sider the suitability of these objectives as criteria for assess¬
ing its performance.
4. THE OBJECTIVES AS CRITERIA
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, an obvious set of
criteria is the objectives set by the government. The suitabil¬
ity of each of the four main objectives for use as yardsticks for
measuring the performance of macroeconomic policy in the country
is examined below. Then some plausible alternative yardsticks
are presented.
4.1 OUTPUT
The target minimum rate of growth of the economy over the period
covered by the first National Development Plan (1962 - 68) is
an average of 4% compound. Under the Second Plan, 'In real terms,
the economy is projected to rise from the negative of 7.6% fall
in the gross domestic product in 1967 - 68, through the lowly .9%
of 1968 - 69, reaching, by 1970 - 71, the pre-war average level
of 4.7%. Henceforth, the real rate of growth is expected to
accelerate to 6.3% in 1971 - 72, 7.9% in 1972 - 73 and 9.5% in
the Plan's terminal year, 1973 - 74'(Nigeria, 1970, p. 46). Then,
in the Third Plan, 1975 - 80, it was stated that 'it is the Plan's
objective to raise the gross domestic product of Nigeria by about
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9 per cent per annum in real terms' (Nigeria, 1975, p. 29).
From this it is clear that quantitative targets have been set in
respect of the growth of the economy over time. The question
that arises is whether these targets were realistic in the light
of past trends and the prevailing economic conditions and there¬
fore could be used as criteria for judging the performance of
policy. In the table below, the target and actual rates of
growth of the economy for the period 1962 - 79 are set side by
side. But for the interruption by the civil war (1967 - 69)
and the political crises that preceded it (1966), the first Plan
target of 4% would have been realized as the target was exceeded
in each of the years before 1966. In the event, the compound
annual growth rate of the economy between 1962 and 1968 turned
out to be -3.6% compared with the target of 4%. However, it
is still true that the original target was a bit pessimistic.
The plan document itself points out that the average annual rate
of growth of the economy in the previous ten years was 3.9%
(p. 21). It is therefore surprising that a development plan
whose aim was to accelerate the rate of economic growth should
aim at only 4%.
Except for the minor exception of 1972, the Second Plan target
was exceeded in each year and on an average basis by a wide
margin. The compound annual growth rate was 12.4% compared with
the target of 5.9%. The wide divergence of actual from target
rates in this case was due to the effect of the cessation of host¬
ilities on the economy which could not have been predicted reason¬
ably accurately. The sector which was worst hit by the war and
which grew most rapidly thereafter was the mining sector. This
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TABLE 1.2 : PLANNED AND ACTUAL RATES OF GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY
(PERCENTAGE RATES OF GROWTH OF CONSTANT PRICE GDP
YEAR TARGET ACTUAL YEAR TARGET ACTUAL
1962 4 4 . 2 1971 6.3 M 00
1963 4 8.8 1972 7.9 7.3
1964 4 4.3 1973 9.5 9.5
1965 4 6.8 1974 NONE 12.0
1966 4 -3.2 1975 7.2 -2.4
1967 4 -15.5(?) 1976 8.5 10.5
1968 4 -1.1(?) 1977 9.8 6.7
1969 NONE 26.0(?) 1978 10 . 6 -5.6
1970 4.7 30.8(?) 1979 11 .5 5.9
SOURCES : FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS;
FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS 1 & 3
Notes: (l)The basis for the calculation of the FOS series of
national income was changed in 1973 which resulted
in the upward revision of the earlier estimate for that
year by N300m. Consequently, the growth rate shown for
1971 - 73 is taken from TNDP, p. 21 which uses a con¬
sistent series covering those years.
(2)National income estimates for 1967, 1968 and 1969
exclude data for the three Eastern states where the
civil war was fought. The area also produced the bulk
of the country's crude oil then. The resumption of
normal economic activities, the increased production
of oil and the inclusion of the data covering the
Eastern states, all contributed to the unusual growth
of the GDP between 1969 and 1972.
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contributed considerably to the growth of output from 1969.
As under the First Plan, the target rate of growth was not attained
under the Third Plan. Planned average annual rate of growth was
9% but the actual rate was only 2.4%. Again, the erratic behav¬
iour of the mining sector is largely to blame.
Thus, non-controllable factors contributed to the achievement of
the growth objective under the Second Plan and the failure to
realize it under the First and Third Plans. Political instability
was mainly responsible for the earlier failure of policy while, as
seen in App.l, the behaviour of the GDP from 1970 was influenced
heavily by the output of crude petroleum. It will be shown that
the level of activity in this sector was largely insensitive to
domestic policies. It is therefore not proper to attribute the
changes in the GDP wholly to government policy. Furthermore,
there is the issue of the unreliability of national income stat¬
istics explored in some detail in Ann.1• Owing to the limit¬
ations of output statistics, a difference in the values for any
two years cannot be taken directly as representing the actual
change between those years. One of the figures may be more
accurate than the other in which case the time difference is
under- or over-stated.
What is being suggested is that the growth of output is not a
reliable basis for assessing macroeconomic policy in Nigeria.
This arises from the statistical limitations and, to some extent,
the difficulty of separating the effects on output from those of
exogenous or uncontrollable factors. Moreover, growth is more
of a longterm objective than a short-term one whereas this study
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is concerned with short-term stabilization policy.
4.2 EMPLOYMENT
Under the Second Plan the employment target was set at 'full
employment' but it was revised downward to a 'reduction in the
level of unemployment' under the Third Plan. From the discuss¬
ion in Section 1, it is even easier to dismiss employment than
it is to discount output as a suitable yardstick for appraising
the performance of policy in Nigeria. The objective itself
has been expressed in a very vague manner and this is not sur¬
prising in view of the unavailability of any meaningful employ¬
ment statistics in the country. Even if one were to obtain all
the relevant statistics, conclusions regarding the effects of
policies designed to reduce the level of unemployment would still
be tentative since there is no satisfactorily unique definition
of employment.
Another consideration relates to the nature of the unemployment
phenomenon in Nigeria. As in other countries, there are great
variations from state to state, although in Nigeria there is
little information on the magnitude of the variation. Qualitative
evidence suggests that unemployment is more serious in the south¬
ern states (particularly Lagos and Imo) than in the extreme north¬
ern states (e.g. Sokoto and Borno). The problem is accentuated
by labour immobility. What makes the situation in Nigeria unique
is the fact that labour immobility is encouraged by official
policy (Eze, 1971, p. 89). State administrations prefer to offer
jobs to applicants from their states to recruiting people from
other states who may be better qualified. In terms of promotion,
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preference again is given to indigenous civil servants. Then,
until 1978 when the Federal Government made the practice illegal,
citizens of one state were not normally given pensionable appoint¬
ments in other states, i.e. they were treated as 'foreigners'.
This discrimination also extends to the private sector. State
administrations often apply pressure on private sector employers
to give preferential treatments to applicatants indigenous to
their states in hiring labour.
A second aspect of the unemployment problem is the existence of
a severe shortage of certain categories of labour side by side
with general unemployment (Nigeria, 1975, p. 29). After review¬
ing the situation, Eze has concluded that the problem is not
easily amenable to short-term macroeconomic policy. According
to him, 'Short-term fiscal policies can help but the main problem
is socio-political and at the same time one of long-term growth'
(Eze, 1971, p. 89).
For these reasons it is concluded that employment or unemployment
is an inadequate criterion for judging the performance of macro-
economic policy in Nigeria. This leaves prices and the balance
of payments which are considered together below.
4.3 THE FINANCIAL OBJECTIVES
As indicated earlier, the authorities did not regard inflation as
posing a serious problem until 1970. The acceleration of the
inflation rate from -0.4% in 1968 to 10.0% in 1969 and 13.8% in
1970 and further to 16% in 1971 prompted the institution of the
measures that will be discussed in greater detail in Ch. 5. In
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1975, a target rate was declared for the first time. It was
stated in the Third Plan that 'With regard to inflation, an
equally determined and sustained effort will be made to ensure that
the annual rate of increase in the general price level does not
exceed the 6% indicated in the macroeconomic projections (Nigeria
1975, p. 33). But in the light of subsequent developments within
the economy, this target was reduced to 'under 10% in the 1976/77
budget. The actual rates of inflation are compared with the
target below.
TABLE 1.3 : RATES OF INFLATION (ANNUAL) IN PERCENT
ACTUAL YEAR ACTUAL TARGET (MAX)
1970 13.8 1975 33.7 6
1971 16 .1 1976 24 . 3 10
1972 2.6 1977 19.3 10
1973 5.7 1978 18.7 10
1974 12.5 1979 11 .1 10
1980 11.4 10
1981 20.9
SOURCE: IMF, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS YEAR BOOK 1984;
FEDERAL MINISTRY FINANCE, 1976 - 77 BUDGET
The target, of course, was never achieved. Given the past trend,
the target was neither too ambitious nor too pessimistic. This
objective therefore constitutes a usable measuring rod for judg¬
ing the performance of policy.
With respect to the balance of payments, it has been an official
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policy since 1962 to 'aim at a minimum level of foreign exchange
reserves equal to the cost of the nation's import bill for four
months' (1962 Budget). However, the view taken is that this is
not a practical criterion. In the first place, the target is
too low since it is only in exceptional circumstances that it
will not be attained. Second, it provides no guide for policy
if it is attained as it was most of the time. Finally, the tar¬
get is rather arbitrary as it bears no logical connection to past
records or trend. Nevertheless, the state of the balance of
payments is a useful indicator of the effectiveness of policy.
The difference between the real objectives (output and employment)
and the financial ones (prices and the balance of payments) in
terms of the present exercise is that data on the latter are much
more reliable than those on the former although, in absolute terms,
neither set of data can be regarded as wholly reliable. None¬
theless, it makes sense to talk about the rate of inflation and
the magnitude of the deficit (or surplus) in the balance of payments
as it never does with respect to, say, unemployment. Changes in
these variables tend to have effects which are more observable than
changes in output, for example. Furthermore, as noted earlier,
the balance of payments is a sort of constraint on the government.
This leads to the conclusion that, of the four principal macro-
economic objectives, only two - those relating to the balance of
payments and prices - can be used meaningfully to appraise policy
in Nigeria.
But this does not mean that the other objectives are completely
irrelevant. Although one cannot measure the impact of policy on
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them, one cannot say they are unaffected by it. As should be
clear from the discussion in Section 1 and will be demonstrated
further in Ch. 2, the authorities were pre-occupied with accel¬
erating the rate of growth through policy measures. This fact
suggests that one should be careful about criticising them for
taking inappropriate measures against, say, inflation or the
balance of payments since the other objectives could have been
placed on a higher scale than the financial ones.
The use of objectives constitutes the first of two sets of criteria
for appraising policy. The other set is taken up presently.
5. ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA
The suggested standard for judging policy outlined above is to
confront performance with objectives. A statement can then be
made as to whether or not macroeconomic policy has been effective.
For instance, as seen above, the inflation objective may be said
to have been unattained and policy was therefore ineffective.
However, the main concern of this study is with why an objective
was or was not attained and the suggestion of possible improve¬
ments to policy. This involves a critical examination of the
policies pursued which is the subject matter of Chs. 2, 4, 5
and 6. It is in this connection that the second set of criteria
that is proposed here will be applied. Basically, these yard¬
sticks attempt to answer the following question: Could the gov¬
ernment have performed better in the situation in which it found
itself?
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The ideal criterion would be one which would measure the extent to
which the government, through its fiscal and monetary policy, made
the economy behave better than otherwise. For example, with regard
to the price stability example, this criterion would compare the
actual rate of inflation with the rate that would have been obtained
had the government not intervened in the economy. An obvious pro¬
blem with this approach is that no-one really knows what the path
of the economy would have been in the absence of government policy.
This suggests that it is not a usable criterion and others have to
be found.
An alternative approach is to examine the question of whether there
were better alternative policies which the government could have
pursued, i.e. given that the government had selected policy option
A, would performance have been better if it had followed option B?
However, this involves some degree of value judgement in two res¬
pects. First, there exists a potential conflict of objectives.
This makes it difficult to determine which policies are better
than the others. Consider, for example, the following situation.
There is domestic recession while the balance of payments is in
deficit. If the authorities were concerned only with the internal
objective, an appropriate policy option would be expansionary
fiscal and/or monetary policy. However, such an option would lead
to a further deterioration of the balance of payments in virtually
all models of the economy. But under some highly restrictive
assumptions it will still be possible simultaneously to achieve
the twin internal and external objectives by a suitable assign¬
ment of fiscal and monetary policy (Mundell, 1962, 1964; Cooper
1969; Levin 1972). An important characteristic of models which
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yield that conclusion is that there are no feedback effects, i.e.,
the analysis is static. Moreover, they assume perfect capital
mobility and fixed prices. These assumptions tend to reduce the
usefulness of the result for the present purpose. Furthermore,
it will be argued in Ch. 4 that in Nigeria there exists a close
connection between fiscal and monetary policy through the public
sector borrowing requirements. Therefore, it is not easy to
separate the two types of policy. Consequencly, the potential
for the conflict of objectives is real.
Even where there is no conflict of objectives, it is not exactly
clear which measures will achieve a given objective. This situ¬
ation is best illustrated with the Great Debate in macroeconomic
theory which is examined briefly in the next chapter. Basically
one group attributes changes in nominal income and the price level
primarily to changes in the stock of money and holds the view
that fiscal policy which does not affect the rate of monetary
expansion will have no lasting effect on the economy. By con¬
trast, the other group denies the primacy of monetary impulses
over fiscal policy.
Given these limitations, one may proceed to examine some specific
policy options. From the definition of the ideal criterion it
is at once clear that a possible policy option is laissez-faire.
If the government does not intervene in the economy then it cannot
make it behave better or worse than otherwise. A policy of laissez-
faire in its purest form can only be pursued if no government
exists. If a government exists it must finance itself in one way
or another which amounts to intervention in the economy. Since
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a no-government economy is no longer a viable alternative in this
(12 )twentieth century , laissez-faire is considered an unsuitable
criterion for appraising policy.
In the area of fiscal policy, the nearest alternative to laissez-
faire is a situation in which the government balances its budgets.
1131
This policy has been advocated in the U.S. as recently as 1953v .
But as Haavelmol1945) has shown many years ago, a balanced budget
does not necessarily exert a neutral effect on the economy; most
of the time it does not, i.e. the balanced budget multiplier is
not zero. While a balanced budget multiplier of unity (i.e.
income is increased exactly by the amount of the increase in
government expenditure) is a special case, the general case is
114)
that the multiplier is greater than zero . Moreover, there are
reasons why a growing economy need not balance its budget. There
is thus no guarantee that a balanced budget policy cannot worsen
the performance of the economy. This by itself suggests that
careful attention should be paid to the relationship between gov¬
ernment revenue and expenditure. The potential significance of
this relationship leads to the consideration of the next alternat¬
ive .
Various macroeconomic models suggest that the relation between
government revenue and expenditure, in conjunction with the mode
of financing the difference, has important implications for the
objectives of economic policy as set out earlier in this chapter.
For example a fiscal deficit financed through a new issue of
money raises the money supply and tends to exert an expansionary
effect on the economy. The resulting monetary expansion may
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have adverse effects on the balance of payments and/or prices.
Most models go further than this by arguing that, irrespective of
the mode of financing, a fiscal deficit is expansionary (e.g.
Blinder and Solow, 1973, 1974; Friedman, 1978). Realizing the
importance of the fiscal deficit, there have been suggestions
that the authorities should fix the proportion of their expendit-
(15)
ure financed by borrowing . But as will be shown in the next
chapter, there are many objections to targeting the public borrow¬
ing requirements. In particular, given that government revenue
in Nigeria is dominated by oil earnings whose behaviour is highly
erratic, following a PSBR target implies that other components of
expenditures will be fluctuating too. Obviously this is not a
welcome development. A PSBR target is therefore not an appro¬
priate yardstick. But the issue is taken up again below.
A similar and earlier suggestion has been made with respect to
the money supply. In modern times, a money supply rule is
closely identified with Milton Friedman who has been advocating
that policy since 1948 (Friedman, 1948). The case for a monetary
rule rather than discretion rests on the belief of Friedman and
his followers that changes in the stock of money affect the level
of economic activity with a long and variable time lag. Since
the consequences of varying the rate of growth of the money supply
cannot be predicted sufficiently accurately, discretionary monetary
policy, in their view, could prove to be destabilizing. It will
be noted that a consequence of the deficiency of existing statistics
in Nigeria is to increase the length of the lags in the effects of
policy. This implies that the case for a money supply rule is
stronger for Nigeria than for more developed economies.
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Another argument for a monetary rule concerns the natural rate of
unemployment which is discussed in greater detail in Ch. 2 . The
fear expressed by Friedman and associates is that the authorities
may set the target rate of unemployment below its natural rate.
When the actual rate is above this target, they may try to reduce
it even below the natural rate through discretionary monetary policy.
Although the unemployment temporarily can be reduced below its
natural rate, in the long-run it will move back to the natural rate
while the rate of inflation will have been raised permanently. More¬
over, the value of the natural rate cannot be ascertained precisely
so that it will form the target. For these reasons (and for others
mentioned in Ch. 4), proponents of a money supply rule argue,a discre¬
tionary policy may produce disappointing results, hence the advoc¬
acy of a constant rate of monetary expansion. However, from the
earlier discussions, this justification of a constant money supply
rule is largely irrelevant to Nigeria.
Although a monetary rule is a suitable criterion, it is by no means
certain that the attainment of a particular rate is feasible in
Nigeria. It will be argued in Ch. 4 that, given the existing
conditions and policies, the monetary authorities do not have an
effective control over the money supply, i.e. a monetary target
is unworkable. But that conclusion depends heavily on the present
use of some weapons of monetary management as well as fiscal policy,
in particular, interest rates and the fiscal deficit. Given that
the main pre-occupation of the government was with the real object¬
ives, especially that of growth (see Section 2.1 and 4.1; also Ch.
2), the government used interest rates and the fiscal deficit in a
way that it thought would achieve the highest rates of growth. As
seen in Section 2.1, capital expenditure was planned to grow at a
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compound annual rate of 24.4 between 1962 and 1980 and 43.9%
between 1970 and 1980. In Chapter 2 it will be shown that the
consequence of this policy of rapidly increasing capital expend¬
iture to raise the rate of economic growth was a widening budget
deficit. Moreover, this deficit was monetized by maintaining low
interest rates in the belief that a low interest rate structure
would stimulate investment and keep the cost of government borrow-
(16)
ing down
These are, of course, self-imposed constraints; another is the
exchange rate. The argument to be advanced in Ch. 6 is that the
government's exchange rate policy resulted in the domestic curr¬
ency being overvalued. Since the rate at which a country's
currency exchanges for other currencies may be used to effect a
correction of a disequilibrium in the balance of payments, the
use of the exchange rate weapon, like interest rates, may be
used as a criterion.
In effect, what is being suggested is that the use of particular
weapons of policy may be used as a criterion for judging the per¬
formance of policy. But a problem that needs to be solved relates
to the conflict of objectives. Given that the government's
desire to accelerate the rate of growth was paramount and the
policies which it pursued had adverse effect on other objectives,
especially the financial ones, it is necessary to optimize bet¬
ween the objectives. The question to be answered in the process
is: Were there measures which the government would have taken to
improve the balance of payments and the price stability object¬
ives without sacrificing growth or vice versa? In other words,
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are objectives separable? To be specific, could the government
have pursued an alternative interest rate policy which would have
enhanced the achievement of the financial objectives without
worsening growth?
The view taken is that the answer to these questions is generally
in the affirmative. The proposed set of alternative criteria is
therefore the comparison of the measures taken by the government
with alternative ones.
6. SUMMARY
The policy maker in Nigeria is confronted with a number of problems
the most important of which are statistical and structural. This
tends to reduce the usefulness of assessing the economic perform¬
ance of the government on the basis of how far it has succeeded
in realizing its macroeconomic goals. This is because such an
approach does not take into consideration the fact that no accur¬
ate measures of the objectives exist. Moreover, the approach does
not make adequate allowance for the constraints under which policy
making takes place. It does not distinguish between what is
feasible and what is not.
It has been an aim of this chapter to show that the objectives of
economic policy relating to growth and employment are not suitable
standards for appraising macroeconomic policy performance in Nigeria.
Other criteria suggested for the purpose (in addition to the price
and balance of payments objectives) consist of the comparison of
the actual measures pursued with the options open to the government,
given the prevailing conditions.
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In order to use these criteria, it is necessary to review the mac-
roeconomic measures instituted by the authorities over the review
period. In general, these may be divided into fiscal and monet¬
ary policy. Although the distinction between the two is not
water tight, this classification provides a point of departure for
this study. The next three chapters are therefore concerned
with the operation of fiscal and monetary policy in Nigeria.
Fiscal policy is examined first, in the next chapter.
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FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER ONE
1. More will be said on these peculiar objectives of macro-
economic policy under monetary policy (Ch. 4).
2. A study of export concentration specific to Nigeria is
Karp (1980 ) .
3. On this point consider the disagreement on the causes and
cures of inflation, especially the 'institutionalist' or
'sociological' and 'monetarist' views reviewed in Chapter
five.
4. The sectoral allocation of bank credit receives a detailed
treatment in Ch. 4.
5. The following account of the measures taken to correct the
balance of payments is not intended to express an opinion
on their appropriateness or otherwise. That judgement
is reserved for Ch. 6. Meanwhile, what is important is
that the authorities believed that the measures would be
effective.
6. For an account of these measures see CPN, Report 1964, pp.
14 - 16; 1965, pp. 10 - 12. See also Ch. 6 where these
measures are discussed.
7. A review of the government's fiscal operations is available
in Ch. 2.
8. See Ch. 4 for more details on the country's interest rate
policy.
9. The subject of inflation is tackled in Ch. 5.
10. For a generalization of this view see Enuenwosu (1972).
11. The relationship between the federal and state governments
is taken up again in the next chapter. But see Rupley
(1981) and Smith (1981).
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12. A modern nation state requires a government at least for
the maintenance of law and order. This function therefore
constitutes a primary responsibility of a government which
has to be financed through a transfer of resources from the
private sector income stream. Clearly, this is a case of
intervention.
13. Consider the following statements by President Eisenhower in
the 'State of the Union Message' of February 1953:
'The first order of business is the elimination of the
annual deficit ... A balanced budget is an essential first
measure in checking further depreciation in the buying
power of the dollar ... As the budget is balanced and infla¬
tion checked, the tax burden that today stifles initiative
can and must be eased ...' Quoted in Burkhead (1954), p. 191.
14. The effect of an increase in government expenditure depends
in part on the macroeconomic model being used. Se Ch. 2,
Section 1.
15. Eg.Godley (1974). But see Ch. 4 for more details.
16. Details of interest rate policy and its consequences are





It was noted in the last chapter that a useful way of looking at
macroeconomic policy in Nigeria is by examining the measures taken
by the Government to realize its policy objectives. It was also
stated in that chapter that, for analytical purposes, these meas¬
ures may be classified into fiscal and monetary policy although
it is recognised that the line of demarcation is not clearcut.
The present chapter is concerned primarily with fiscal policy.
It is organized as follows.
The second set of criteria for evaluating macroeconomic policy
enunciated in the last chapter involves relating the measures
taken to the options open to the authorities. These options are,
of course, derived from the predictions of economic theory. Acc¬
ordingly, the first section is devoted to a very brief review of
the theory of fiscal policy and an appraisal of the relevance of
the competing theories to the Nigerian situation. This is foll¬
owed by an overview of the fiscal system of the country which
affects considerably the stabilization policy powers of the
central government. Section 3 provides a summary of budgetary
developments while Section 4 deals with the determination of
government finances. Section 5 contains a critique of certain
aspects of demand management in Nigeria. Finally, Section 6
summarizes and concludes the discussion in the chapter.
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1• THE THEORY OF FISCAL POLICY
1.1 REVIEW
The state of macroeconomic theory at the beginning of the review
period of this study is aptly summarised by J.W. Nevile in his
Presidential Address at the Conference of Economists in Adelaide
in August 1982. According to him,
'Fifteen years ago there was widespread agreement about
the role of fiscal policy. Its function was to equate
aggregate demand with full employment demand so that, if
private demand fell short of the amount necessary to pro¬
duce full employment, given existing policies, fiscal
policy was to be used to increase aggregate demand by
increases in government expenditure or cuts in taxation
rates. The opposite fiscal measures were thought to be
called for in periods of excess demand and inflationary
pressures'
(Neville, 1983, p. 1).
This is equivalent to the proposition that, in general
'Government tax revenue should be higher relative to gov¬
ernment expenditure in periods of high employment than
in periods of substantial unemployment"
(American Economic Association, 1955 p. 419)
which became generally accepted in academic circles from the late
1940's and was a product of the 'Keynesian revolution'.
This consensus was broken by the 'counterrevolution in monetary
theory' of the late 1960's under the general leadership of Milton
Friedman. The 'counterrevolution' has since been christened
'monetarism'. Although the statement to the effect that monet¬
arism does not constitute a honogeneous monolith is now a cliche^
it is one that describes the state of affairs aptly. Nevertheless,
there are some elements that are common to all varieties of monet¬
arism .
- 55 -
Monetarism has been described as a 'set of propositions in direct
opposition to Keynesian fiscal policy' (Stein, 1976a). These
(2)
propositions are many but it would appear that the following
form the core and are subscribed to by monetarists of all per¬
suasion. First is the 'hypothesis which assigns to monetary
impulses a dominant role in the evolution of economic fluctua¬
tions' (Brunner, 1970, p. 2). According to this hypothesis,
changes in nominal income are produced primarily by changes in
the nominal quantity of money. Furthermore, output is unaff¬
ected by changes in the money stock, except in the shortrun (Mayer,
1978, p. 236). Second, it is a characteristic monetarist pro¬
position that in-flation is primarily a monetary phenomenon
(Ballen and Stone, 1983, p. 10; Friedman, 1970a). This propos¬
ition has profound consequences for policy: Any measure which
does not affect the rate of growth of the money stock will have
a negligible effect on the rate of inflation. As for fiscal
policy, since
'Past rates of growth of the money stock are the only
systematic factors determining the rate of inflation
... a restrictive fiscal policy without a reduction in
the rate of monetary expansion cannot reduce the rate
of inflation'
(Stein, 1982, p. 13).
Third, monetarists contend that 'there exists no usable trade-off
between inflation and unemployment' (Mayer, 1978, p. 236). How¬
ever, in the shortrun, such a trade-off exists as the rate of
unemployment can be reduced at the cost of a higher inflation
rate. But while the effect of a monetary acceleration on unem¬
ployment is temporary, that on inflation is permanent i.e. 'A
rise in the rate of monetary expansion temporarily reduces the
unemployment rate and permanently raises the inflation rate'
(Stein, 1982, p. 15). In the long-run then, there is no relation
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between inflation and unemployment that can be exploited by the
authorities, that is, the longrun Phillips curve is vertical.
In the steady state, unemployment will settle at its equilibrium
or 'natural' level and will be insensitive to steady inflation or
deflation. Fourth, monetarists assert that there exists a stable
demand for money function. This is in conflict with the Keynesian
notion of an unstable 'liquidity preference' function. Finally,
it is assumed that the private sector is inherently stable. Accord¬
ing to Brunner,
'The private sector absorbs stocks and transforms them
into a stabilizing motion ... The monetarist position
argues further that the major instabilities and uncer¬
tainties of the economic process result from the behav¬
iour of the government sector'
(Brunner 1970, p. 6)
The private sector is thus believed to be self-adjusting to
external disturbances. The combination of these propositions
yields another proposition, that is, government intervention in
the economy should be minimized (Mayer, 1978, pp. 240 -41). It
should also be pointed out that monetarist analyses tend to be
conducted in the long-run rather than the short-run period.
As regards policy, the central message of this school of thought
is that fiscal policy unaccompanied by monetary accommodation cannot
reduce the rate of inflation or unemployment permanently. The
idea that fiscal policy is powerless while monetary policy is
effective stems from the belief among most followers of Friedman
that any increase in public expenditure financed by bonds (as
well as any increase in private expenditure resulting from a tax
cut which is itself financed by bonds) crowds out an equal amount
of private expenditure which would have been undertaken. As
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Blinder and Solow (1973) have shown, some crowding out of private
by public expenditure is accepted by all. The simplest case of
crowding out occurs when the public sector undertakes productive
activities that would have been provided by the private sector.
A less than obvious but nevertheless universally accepted case
of crowding out occurs if a government budget deficit is financed
in a way other than new issue of money. This necessitates the
issue of a debt instrument which competes with private debt instru¬
ments and hence tends to lower their prices. The effect of the
upward pressure on interest rates is a reduction of private invest¬
ment, that is, the value of the government expenditure multiplier
is less than that implied by the formula which sets it equal to
the inverse of the marginal propensity to save. The first type
of crowding out may be referred to as real crowding out and the
latter financial.
It has been suggested that the proposition of complete corwding
out would be valid only if the demand for money was perfectly
(3)
interest inelastic . But Friedman insists that (within the
framework of the IS - LM analysis) the slope of the LM curve or
the interest elasticity of the demand for money was irrelevant
to the argument (Friedman, 1974, p. 141). The argument of complete
crowding out appears to be based on the wealth effect generated
by a bond-financed fiscal deficit. When there are significant
wealth effects, the initial increase in aggregate demand resulting
from government expenditure is reinforced because, with greater
wealth, individuals can spend more out of any given level of
income. This is represented by a further outward shift of the
IS curve. 1
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But the effect of the additional bonds is to reduce wealth by lowering
bond value which therefore tends to increase saving thus tending to
ujrv/e
counteract the rightward movement of the IS. Also, with greater
wealth, there will be an increase in the demand for money which tends
CUrV€
to shift the LM to the left. This shift, however, is moderated by
A
the effect of the reduction in bond value. Friedman and his followers
apparently believe the expansionary and contractionary shifts in the
IS and LM curves to be about equation magnitude but opposite in directior
i.e. complete crowding out. This challenges the Keynesian proposition
that a bond-financed deficit exerts a net expansionary effect on the
level of economic activity. Friedman attributes this difference to
the fact that opponents of crowding out emphasize the initial effect
of a bond-financed deficit while those who support the crowding out
hypothesis stress the continuing wealth effects (Friedman, 1972, p.922).
The question of crowding out has been examined rigorously by Blinder
and Solow (1973), Tobin and Buiter (1976) and (Benjamin) Friedman (1978)
all of whom conclude against crowding out. Indeed, the Blinder and
Solow analysis, subsequently elaborated in another paper (Blinder and
Solow, 1974a) shows that 'contrary to the usual supposition, the long-
run multiplier for bond-financed deficit spending exceeds that for
money financed deficit spending' (Blinder and Solow, 1973, p.327).
Although Infante and Stein (1976, pp 475-76) have criticised this
analysis as capable of yielding contradictory results, most recent
models now support the contention. For instance, the conclusion of
B. Friedman in a more recent paper is that 'Debt financed deficits
need not crowd out any priva.te investment, and may even crowd in
some' (Friedman, 1978, p.597).
The second prong of the attack on mainstream Keynesianism was
launched by M. Friedman and specifically directed at the Phillips
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curve - a relation which postulates a stable relation between
inflation and unemployment. The relation itself was the out¬
growth of A.W. Phillips' statistical discovery that, in the U.K.
for almost a century, the highest rates of unemployment were
recorded when wages fell and the lowest rates of unemployment
occurred when wages rose (Phillips, 1958). But this relation is
challenged by the monetarists on the grounds that 'Nothing in
Phillips' work or subsequent work showed that higher inflation
caused lower unemployment, and nothing in economic theory gave
anyone reason to believe that the relation Phillips uncovered
was either a dependable basis for policy or consistent with econ¬
omic theory' (Laidler, 1974). Friedman provided the theoretical
justification for this view when in his Presidential Address to
the American Economic Association in 1967 he unveiled a 'new'
Phillips curve which is vertical in the long run (Friedman, 1968).
This established the proposition already referred to, that is, in
the long run unemployment will settle at its 'natural' rate
regardless of the steady state rate of inflation. This 'natural
rate hypothesis' was developed independently at about the same
time by Phelps (1968).
A more recent criticism of conventional macroeconomic policy is by
an extreme version of monetarism - the new classical economics -
according to which neither fiscal nor monetary policy can affect
output except in the very shortrun in which the policy surprises
the public. The new classical economics is based on two funda¬
mental assumptions, viz, continuous equilibrium in all markets and
rational expectations. According to Lucas and Sargent, the new
classical economic theory 'predicts that there is no way that the
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monetary authority can follow a systematic activist policy and
achieve a rate of output that is on average higher over the bus¬
iness cycle than would occur if it simply adopted a no feedback,
x-percent rule of the kind Friedman and Simons recommended' (Lucas
and Sargent, 1978, pp. 60 - 61). Its policy conclusion follows
from this prediction. Since fiscal and monetary policies are
powerless all attempts at shortrun stabilization are futile and
should be stopped. What is recommended is a set of stable pol¬
icies in which the government specifies the rule of the economic
game so that people will become aware of the opportunities avail¬
able to them and understand the probable results of their decisions.
As the relevance of this development of the theory of macroecon-
omic policy to the immediate task of appraising macroeconomic
policy in Nigeria is highly dubious, it is not pursued further.
Instead, what is attempted in the next section is a brief examin¬
ation of the relevance of Keynesian and monetarist analyses to
the Nigerian situation.
1.2 THE RELEVANCE OF THE COMPETING THEORIES
Conventional fiscal policy, as summarized above, has some dis¬
advantages with respect to its application to Nigeria,quite apart frcm those
highlighted by the competing theories. Some of the disadvantages
arise from its view of the economy. The idea that the budget
deficit is negatively related to the rate of unemployment implicitly
assumes that output is demand-determined. In Nigeria, as in many
developing countries, there are reasons to suppose that output
may be supply-determined. This point has been emphasized by
Aghelvi et al (1979, pp 780 - 81):
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'Agricultural production, which constitutes a large
portion of total production in most developing coun¬
tries, is supply-determined and quite insensitive to
demand factors; manufacturing production in many devel¬
oping countries is also insensitive to demand factors
because of the lack of adequate capital, trained labour,
and technical knowledge. Moreover, the rigidities in
wages and prices that are present in the industrial
countries are not present in many developing countries
because of the surplus labour situation and the absence
of powerful labour organizations. Consequently, unem¬
ployment in the developing countries is largely in the
form of "disguised", as opposed to "fictional", unemploy¬
ment. In this setting, supply factors become the major
source of instability in output'.
One may expect the relative importance of each of these factors
to vary from country to country. In Nigeria "the most important
would appear to be the existence of various bottlenecks in the
economy - a capital goods industry is absent; the bulk of
industrial raw materials has to be imported; a shortage of
skilled labour exists side by side with mass unemployment of
unskilled labour- and the inelasticity of shortrun agricultural
response to changes in demand. In these circumstances, a fiscally-
induced increase in aggregate demand is likely to spill over onto
the external sector, that is, given a negligible shortrun response
of agriculture, the increase in demand has to be met by either
increased production in the modern sector of the economy which
requires the import of capital goods, raw materials and certain
categories of skilled labour or the importation of finished goods.
In either case, the result is a deterioration of the balance of
payments position. If the excess demand cannot be eliminated
through either means the price level may have to bear the burden
of adjustment.
A further limitation of Keynesian fiscal policy relates to the
concept of the marginal propensity to consume (MPC). In the
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discussion of conventional shortrun stabilization policy, the
impression is usually given that the MPC varies according to
income levels. In particular, it is assumed that the MPC of
individuals in a lower income group exceeds that of those in a
higher income group. It is therefore possible to vary aggregate
demand through compensatory finance. But in a developing coun¬
try like Nigeria, it is by no means certain that richer people
have a lower MPC than poorer ones. The reverse may indeed by
the case because of the desire to 'keep up with the Joneses' that
is typical of richer individuals. In Nigeria, then, socio-
ethnic factors are likely to be more important than economic
factors in the explanation of differences in MPCs. This is a
proposition that has been stressed by Agom Eze in the following
words:
'It is common knowledge in Nigeria that an average Ibo male
whose income is low has a lower MPC as compared with those
of some ethnic groups. Even within the same ethnic group
the MPC might diverge between different areas. For
instance a Yoruba male from Ijebu area is known to be
more "miserly" than most other Yorubas'
(Eze, 1971, pp. 94 - 95).
The possibility of the MPC varying according to ethnic groups
rather than income was pointed out a long time ago by Peacock and
Dosser (1962, pp. 243 - 44) thus:
In developed economies the marginal propensity to spend
of different income, regional or cultural groups will
not diverge so much from the overall propensity as is
likely to be the case in less developed economies. In
less developed countries the criterion will be tribe or
region rather than income and we cannot hope to do a
great deal to allow for the deviations from the average
in present conditions'.
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The implication of this phenomenon is that where it is desired to
maintain the tax yield constant and the fiscal system is to be
used as a cyclical stabilization policy tool, a regressive tax
structure is called for - a situation which may be politically
objectionable.
Even if one accepts that an increase in government expenditure
relative to revenue can raise output and employment, there is one
factor which may weaken the effectiveness of the policy in Nigeria.
There is a widespread belief that the marginal propensity to
import in Nigeria is' very high'(e.g. Aboyade, 1962; Falegan.,
1978). This hypothesis is examined in Ch. 6. At the risk of
prematurely letting the cat out of the bag, one may say that the
results obtained there provide no empirical support for the
contention of a high marginal propensity to import. But as noted
in that chapter, the results are subject to a number of criticisms.
However, a high marginal propensity to import poses a problem
because of balance of payments constraint and the reduction of
the value of government spend multipliers. This may vitiate
efforts at raising output through expansionary fiscal policy.
Monetarist stabilization policy has greater limitations in its
application to Nigeria than that of Keynesian analysis. Monet¬
arists make some implicit assumptions which are not fulfilled in
Nigeria and in many developing countries. These concern the
structure of the economy. A specific example is the absence of
the sort of rigidities enumerated above. Furthermore, monet¬
arist analyses do not take into account the close connection bet¬
ween the fiscal deficit and the money stock that is typical of
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of developing countries which is a main point to be made in this
study. An independent monetary policy that would yield a con¬
stant monetary growth rule is therefore difficult to implement.
Finally, there is the issue of crowding out which is the principal
monetary explanation of the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy.
The crowding out argument is weakened by two considerations.
First, though hard statistics are unavailable, the unemployment
situation in Nigeria seems to indicate that output and employment
are highly positively correlated with central government expend¬
iture (the simple correlation coefficient between thw GDP and
Federal Government expenditure over the 1961 - 81 period of
0.93). A possible explanation for this is the pervasive influ¬
ence of the government in the economy. Apart from being a large
employer of labour itself, a large section of the private sector
depends on it for patronage in the form of contracts for various
projects, including residential housing and general construction.
Consequently, when the government cuts back its expenditure many
firms are adversely affected and are forced to lay off workers.
This suggests that real crowding out is likely to be of minor
significance. Besides, either indivisibilities of investment
or commercial profitability considerations or both make the pro¬
jects usually undertaken by the government relatively unsuitable
for the private sector. Second, substantial portfolio crowding
out is not expected to be present. As will be shown in Ch. 4
interest rates are administered. Therefore, the effect of a
government budget deficit, whether accommodated or not, on interest
rates is almost zero. The prices of private securities are
thus unaffected. Also, government and private securities do not
appear to be in direct competition for while the government has
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had considerable difficulty in selling its bonds, the demand
for private securities far exceeds the supply. Therefore,
with respect to a developing economy such as Nigeria's, the
monetarist criticism of Keynesian stabilization policy based on
the crowding out argument is not particularly strong.
In sum, given that output is supply-determined, crude Keynesian
predictions are no longer appropriate but Keynesian policies are
still relevant if they are suitably adapted. It will be argued
in this chapter that the failure to recognize the need for adapt¬
ation constitutes a basic weakness of Nigeria's fiscal policy
over the review period.
Given this theoretical background, one is now in a position to
examine the conduct of fiscal policy in the country. Since
the fiscal arrangements determine the institutions responsible
for fiscal policy and the powers which such institutions can
exercise, a review of the fiscal system is provided in the next
section.
2. THE FISCAL SYSTEM
The following description of the fiscal system is a very brief
one and complements of the account contained in Appendix 1.
A thorough review of the fiscal system to 1966 is available in
Adedeji (1969) while Phillips (1975), Rupley (1981) and Smith
(1981) give a more recent analysis of the changes since 1951.
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2.1 THE FISCAL INSTITUTIONS
Nigeria is a federation whose political structure has changed a
number of times. In 1960 there were three regions (East, West
and North). The Mid-West was carved out of the West in 1963.
The regions were abolished and replaced with a twelve-state
political structure in 1967. Seven new states were created in
1976, thus bringing the total to nineteen. At the end of 1981,
the fiscal institutions consisted of the Federal Government,
nineteen state governments, a host of local government councils
and a number of Federal and state statutory corporations. The
powers of each level of government are defined in the constitution
while the powers to raise and spend funds are set out in a supple¬
ment to the constitution. These financial powers are subject
to a periodic review which is usually undertaken by an ad hoc
fiscal commission. The main task of a revenue allocation comm¬
ission is to devise a formula for the raising and the sharing
of revenue among the governments of the Federation, given the
constitutional provisions. Historically, the distribution of
the powers to raise revenue has not been as difficult as that of
sharing the revenue. The raising of revenue is taken up first.
2.2 GENERATION OF REVENUE
Taxation in federal finance involves three issues: the authority
to (i) levy a tax, (ii) collect the revenue from the tax, and
(iii) spend that revenue. The first two are treated here while
the last is considered below.
Given that the sharing of revenue is a different issue, the author-
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ity to levy a tax is more important than that of revenue coll¬
ection. The government which has the power to impose a given
tax decides both the tax base and rate and hence the total revenue
that may be collected. In the case of a direct tax, that gov¬
ernment also determines the distribution of the burden and
incidence of the tax. In any case, in Nigeria, apart from the
personal income tax under the Pay As You Earn System, there is
no major revenue source where there is a divergence between
legal authority and administration. The following account
therefore applies to (i) and (ii) above.
In federal finance, certain considerations indicate that a part¬
icular level of government should have jurisdiction over a given
tax. In general, such principles relate to efficiency and
equity. For example, customs and excise duties are more suitable
for the federal than the state governments while property rates
are best left to the state or local governments. Hicks (1951)
has applied these principles to Nigeria.
The operation of these principles in conjunction with constitutiona-
(4 )
provisions has ensured that the most important sources of
revenue - customs and excise duties, mineral taxation and corporate
income tax - have always been under the jurisdiction of the Federal
Government. Thus the states are restricted to insignificant
(5)
sources of revenue, which they share with the local governments
The following figures which relate to the fiscal year 1 April 1979
to 31 March 1980 illustrate the relative importance of the Feder¬
al and state governments (Nigeria, 1980, pp. 71 and 110):
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Million Naira
Total Revenue of the Federation 9,432.224
Collected by: Fed. Govt. 8,805.000
State Govts 627.244
Fed. Govt, as % of the total 93.35
In addition, the legal basis of the personal income tax (exclud¬
ing the poll-tax) which is administered by the states resides
with the Federal Government. It is therefore clear that the
states have jurisdiction over a tiny fraction of the revenue of
the Federation. Furthermore, the situation has not changed
much since 1946. For example, in 1950 - 51, the figure was 6%
(Adedeji, 1969, p. 74).
The ability of the state governments to raise revenue is curtailed
in another important respect. Except for the brief period
1977 - 79, they could not borrow money from the public and had
to rely on the Federal Government to borrow and on-lend to them.
The Federal parastatals, however, were empowered to borrow from
the financial system at home or abroad, if the Federal Government
guaranteed such loans. But the opportunity was not used osten¬
sibly because they were credit unworthy as they were making losses
most of the time. Similarly, the states declined to use the
opportunity offered to them by the Federal Government in 1977 - 79.
Only one state (Bendel) made use of the facility (Walls, 1979, pp.
5-9). The facility was completely withdrawn by the 1979 con¬
stitution which states that only the Federal Government can under¬
take 'Borrowing of moneys within or outside Nigeria for the
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purposes of the Federation or any state' (Second Schedule, item 6).
2.3 INTER-GOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS
The discussion above shows that the Federal Government collects
the bulk of the revenue of the Federation. It is therefore
necessary to describe the mechanism for transferring resources
from the Federal to state and local governments. Such transfers
are either statutory or non-statutory.
2.3.1 STATUTORY ALLOCATIONS
The system in operation in 1960 was based on the report of the
fiscal review commission chaired by Sir J. Raisman with R.C. Tress
as member. The commission recommended the following system
where the figures refer to the respective percentage shares of
the Federal and state governments: (1) import duties- (i) tobacco
(0,100) (ii) motor spirit and fuel (0,100, (iii) beer, wine and
spirits (100,0), (iv) general import duties other than those
already mentioned (70,30); (2) all export duties (0,100), (3)
excise duties - (i) all except those on tobacco and motor fuel
(100,0). (ii) tobacco and motor fuel (0,100), and (4) all mining
rents and royalties (20,80). All revenues not specifically
assigned to any government were paid into the Distributable Pool
Account (DPA) and shared among the states on an agreed formula
/ g \
which was changed in 1964 and 1970
In 1964 the share of the states in general import duties was in¬
creased by 5%. No major changes were made again until 1970
(by Decree No. 13 of that year) and again in 1971 (Decree No. 9)
The effect of these changes was to increase the share of the
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Federal Government in total revenue. Then, under the 1979
constitution 'The Federation shall maintain a special account
to be called "the Federation Account" into which shall be paid
all revenues collected by the Government of the Federation'
with minor exceptions (Ch. VI, Pt. IC, Section 149). The exact
arrangements were to be worked out by a fiscal review commission
whose recommendations would be incorporated in the constitution.
These are contained in the Revenue Enactment Bill which was
not signed into law until 1981. But the constitution provides
that until the Bill became law, the spending powers would be the
ones existing in the year 1 April 1978 to 31 March 1979 (Section
272). The scheme for that year was in effect the system in
operation since 1971 as follows (figures refer to shares of Fed¬
eral Government and DPA, %): import duty on beverages, petroleum
profits and company income tax and others not specified in this
list (100,0); import duty on tobacco, petroleum products, export
duty, offshore mining rents and royalties and personal income tax
of armed force personnel and External Affairs officers( 0,100) ;
unspecified imports (65,35) and all excise duties (50,50). On¬
shore mining rents were to be shared between the states on the
basis of derivation 20% and DPA 80%. The DPA itself was shared
among the states on the basis of 50% population and 50% equality.
2.3.2 NON-STATUTORY ALLOCATIONS
These grants are at the discretion of the Federal Government
and may be Plan (i.e. provided for in the Development Plans) or
non-plan. Grants were not important until 1970 (Nigeria, 1980,
p. 32) when provisions were made for subventions of projects
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under the Second National Development Plan 1970 - 74. Although
such grants were specific, there was no control on how the money
was spent so that the states treated them like general grants. The
total amount was N69.26 million under the Second Plan and Nl,300
million under the Third Plan (1975 - 80).
Non-plan grants were usually made to supplement the current
expenditures of the states unlike the other type which was for
capital expenditures. They became important under the Third Plan
when they totalled N1005 million.
2.4 EFFECT OF THE FISCAL SYSTEM ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF
REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE
The system of revenue allocation in use has given the Federal
Government command over more than half of the resources available
to the governments in the Federation as the following table illu¬
strates :
TABLE 2,1 : DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE %
REVENUE EXPENDITURE
RECURRENT CAPITAL
FEDERAL STATE FEDERAL STATE FEDERAL STATE
1976 53 47 52 48 66 34
1977 60 40 51 49 72 28
1978 65 35 49 51 72 28
1979 63 37 41 59 73 27
AVERAGE 62 38 49 51 71 29
SOURCE: NIGERIA (1980) p. 75
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2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE FISCAL SYSTEM
The emphasis of the foregoing description of the fiscal system
is on the fact that in Nigeria the central government determines
to a large extent how much the public sector should spend. It
also has an almost complete control of the use of the revenue
side of the budget as an instrument of fiscal policy. In this
respect the states are similar to the local authorities in a
unitary state subject to some qualifications.
Given the fiscal system, one is now in a position to examine the
conduct of fiscal policy. This is, however, preceded by a
delimitation of the coverage of the exercise.
3. SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS
The present exercise is concerned with the fiscal activities of
the FG alone. This narrow coverage is open to criticism in view
of the relative importance of the states' expenditures as shown
in Table 2.1. However, the decision on the coverage of the
exercise has been influenced by two factors. In the first
instance, the discussion has been restricted to the operations of
the FG out of necessity. As explained in Anpendix 1 > stat¬
istics on the finances of many states do not exist, especially
since 1976 while the situation is even worse for the local govern¬
ment councils.
Secondly, there are some theoretical considerations which tend to
suggest that the exclusion of the states and local authorities
from the discussion does not affect appreciably the substance of
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the argument. It has become widely accepted that the subnational
governments in a federation can have no major responsibility for
stabilization policy (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1968, 1972;
Burkhead and Miner, 1971). Also, at the practical level, as seen
above, the federal constitutions of Nigeria have given control
of all the sources of revenue which lend themselves readily to
use for stabilization purposes to the FG. Finally, on the
expenditure side, the constitution also ensures that the potential
roles of these governments are minimal. The expenditure functions
assigned to them - health, education, fire protection and other
essential public services - are such that cannot be varied easily
in response to the movement of the level of economic activity.
The analysis is restricted in another sense. In looking at the
macroeconomic measures taken ,it is useful to divide the period
into two with 1970 as the dividing year. There are two reasons for
this demarcation. The first is that the conditions in the two
sub-periods are basically different. The financial system has
changed considerably since 1970. It is now more sophisticated
than before: the number of financial institutions and the range
of services offered by them have increased substantially; comm¬
ercial banks now have more investment outlets so that the Central
Bank need not keep domestic interest rates in line with those
prevailing abroad as was the case before 1970. Also, before
1970, the government relied heavily on taxes on international
trade, especially import duties. But the external trade sector
grew very slowly and the associated revenue even more slowly.
Finally, the balance of payments was in deficit continuously
except 1968 and 1969 when small surpluses of N10.0 m and Nil.4 m
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respectively were recorded. The implications of all this is
that the ability of the government to manipulate the economy was
limited. But in the 1970's the situation changed dramatically.
Aided by the end of the civil war (which resulted in increased
oil production) and the oil price increases that started in the
early 1970's, the mining sector came to dominate all sectors of
the economy. It removed temporarily the financial and balance
of payments constraints. The economy in general underwent a
(7)drastic structural change . In turn, this changed the country's
macroeconomic problem from the management of poverty to the
economics of affluence. Fiscal policy in the 1960's was there¬
fore different from that in the period since 1970 and this provides
the second justification for the sub-division of the review period.
In order to make the discussion manageable, it is necessary to
concentrate on only one period. Consequently, the rest of the
Chapter is concerned mainly with the period since 1970.
4. FISCAL POLICY PROBLEMS IN THL 1970's
The country was beset by a series of political crises from 1964
which culminated in the civil war that lasted from 1967 to January
1970. During the war, a wide range of restrictive measures
were taken. These are catalogued in Nigeria (1970, Ch. 3, esp.
pp. 17 - 20) and reviewed by Ayida and Aboyade (1971) and Teriba
(1969). They include stringent quantitative controls on imports
and foreign exchange transactions in general as well as the wide¬
ning of the tax base and increases in the rates. The restrictions
on the private sector were complemented by an increase in the
ability of the government to enlarge its share of the national
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output. For instance, at the beginning of the war, the statutory
limit on 'treasury bills as a percentage of estimated FG revenue'
was 40% (Nigeria, 1970, p. 17). But my March 1970, the limit
had been altered to '150% of the estimated revenue retained by
the FG and the gross revenues of the states' (CBN, Report, 1970,
p. 54). Furthermore, a new debt instrument was introduced in
1968 (see Ch. 4). The consequence of this was the enlargement of
the FG deficit from N16.6 m in 1967 to N473.3m in 1970. The
banking system was the main source of funds to the government.
In spite of the measures aimed at correcting the balance of pay¬
ments disequilibrium, the pressure continued unabated to the end
of the war. By 1970 the country faced three sets of problems:
deterioration in the balance of payments, inflationary pressure
and growing labour disturbances. Two factors tended to contribute
to the inflationary pressure. On the one hand, the government
deficits which were financed by the banking system, led to a rise
in the money stock. On the other, the relaxation of controls
on consumer spending (such as the compulsory saving scheme intro¬
duced during the war) helped to increase aggregate demand. On
top of this was the slow response of supply because of the impaired
productive capacity of the economy.
It was against this background that fiscal policy was formulated
in the early 1970's. But before discussing specific measures,
it is useful to look at government finances over the review
decade.
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5. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES
From the discussion in the introduction, the budget balance may
be regarded as a first approximation of the impact of fiscal
policy on the economy, although it is recognised that there are
problems of definition and measurement (see, for example, Boskin,
1982). Meanwhile, these problems have been assumed away by
defining the overall budget balance as the difference between
measured actual revenue and expenditure.^^
The movement of the variable is depicted in Table 2.2. Although
the 1970 decade opened with a deficit, surpluses were recorded in
the next four years. The spectacular surplus of 1974 was, of
course, the result of the windfall gain arising from the oil
price increases that started late in 1973. But by the follow¬
ing year, expenditure had more than adjusted to the increase in
revenue so that the unprecedented surplus was transformed into
a deficit within a year. The deficit was to increase more than
twofold in 1976 and, though it declined in 1977, it reached its
highest ever in 1978 when it stood at N2290.7 million or 6.8%
of the GDP. This deficit was dramatically turned into a surplus
in 1979 but the surplus disappeared as dramatically as it came.
By 1981, the deficit stood at 12.4% of the GDP.
As the deficit is the difference between two quantities, it is
determined by the relative behaviour of these quantities which is
examined below.
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TABLE 2.2 : FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES, MILLION NA1RA
REVENUE REVENUE CURRENT CURRENT CAPITAL OVERALL
COLLECTED RETAINED EXPENDI¬ SURPLUS/ EXPENDI¬ SURPLUS
BY THE BY THE TURE DEFICIT TURE DEFICIT
FEDERAL FEDERAL (-) (-)
GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT
1959 154 . 6 92 . 6 70 . 1 22 . 5 44 . 5 -22.0
60 177 . 6 100.7 80. 6 20. 1 59. 0 -38 . 9
1 223. 5 156. 8 96 . 1 60.7 67 -6.3
2 238.9 167 . 0 101 . 5 65. 5 62. 8 2.7
3 249 . 1 173 . 4 119. 0 54 . 4 63 . 9 -9.5
4 277 . 2 168. 2 142. 6 26.6 75. 6 -49.0
5 321 .1 190 . 4 156 . 8 34.6 79 . 6 -45.0
6 306.4 185. 2 177.3 7.9 7.9 I o o
7 327 . 2 241 . 4 166. 7 74.7 91 . 3 -16. 6
8 290 . 8 207 . 6 218.8 -11 . 2 122.5 -133.7
9 378. 0 239. 8 287 . 0 -47 . 2 107 . 9 -155.1
70 633.2 365. 6 638.3 -272.7 200 . 6 -473.3
1 1169.0 838. 2 492.2 346 146 . 2 199 . 8
2 1404.8 1073.8 681 . 4 392. 4 295. 6 96.8
3 1695.3 1376.2 644. 4 731 . 8 435 . 1 296.7
4 4537.0 3878.6 873.6 3005 1223.5 1781.5
5 5514 . 7 4465.7 1685.9 2779.8 3207.7 427. 9
6 6765. 9 5120.9 2170.4 2950.5 4041.3 -1090.8
7 8042.4 6045.5 1822.2 4223.3 5004 . 6 -781.3
8 7469 . 3 5696.7 2895.1 2801.6 5092.3 -2290.7
9 10912.4 8040.9 2359.6 5681.3 4219.5 1461.8
80 15234.0 11556.8 6423.0 5133.8 8091 . 7 -2957.9
1 11978.9 7068.3 5077.5 1990.8 5699.3 -3708.5
2 11748. 8 7490.4 4859.5 2630.9 7519.0 -4888.1
3 10947.4 6791.4 5278.8 1512.6 6385.8 -4873.2
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW,
DEC 1970, JUNE 1975, JUNE 1982; ANNUAL REPORT 1983; AND
FOS, ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS 1972 FOR 1959 AND 1960
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6. DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE
The trend in and the changes in the composition of Federal Gov¬
ernment revenue and expenditure are analysed in Annendix 1
and set out in Table 2.2. This section is concerned with the
explanation of the observed behaviour of aggregate revenue and
expenditure.
6.1 REVENUE
As stated earlier and explained in Appendix 1 , the country
relied heavily on trade taxes until 1971, when petroleum-derived
revenue became the major item of revenue. But it is a standard
proposition that, ignoring administrative considerations and
terms of trade changes, trade taxes are an inefficient source
of revenue in an economy in general equilibrium. This is
because of the greater excess burden associated with trade
taxes as compared with, for example, taxes on individual income
and expenditure and domestic production:
'The discriminatory nature of trade taxes ensures that
their use imposes both a production distortion cost and
a consumption distortion cost. In contrast domestic
production/consumption taxes impose only a consumption
distortion cost since they do not discriminate between
home-produced and foreign supplies of the taxed commodity'.
(Greenaway, 1984, p. 71)
If this criterion is used, then it is clear that the revenue
system was inefficient. However, this may not be so because
the above argument assumes zero collection cost. As Due (1970)
and Prest (1971) and others have shown, direct taxes in develop¬
ing countries entail a high administrative cost which very often
exceeds the efficiency cost associated with indirect taxes, The
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administrative cost may be so high in some instances that the
direct tax is not feasible. In Nigeria, the existence of a
large subsistence sector mentioned in Ch. 1 increases the diff¬
iculty of income definition and valuation. Thus in a country
where income per capita is low, 'quest ions of equity and effic¬
iency are secondary to questions of administrative feasibility'
(Greenaway, 1984). Indirect taxes may become a necessity.
Nevertheless, reliance on these taxes has another drawback. The
study by Chelliah (1971) suggests that the income elasticity of
trade taxes tends to be low compared to other sources of revenue.
But as will be shown shortly, the proposition that the income
elasticity of government expenditure exceeds unity has been con¬
firmed by almost every researcher. This implies that a country
that depended solely or heavily on such taxes would eventually
find itself engaging in deficit-financing. There is thus an
incentive to develop other sources of revenue. The second
aspect of the disadvantage of trade taxes arises from the fact
that they are imposed to realize objectives other than raising
revenue (Greenaway, 1980, p. 176). One of these other object¬
ives is the protection of the so-called infant industries. It
is expected that as these industries 'mature', the degree of
protection accorded them would fall i.e. some taxes may be abol¬
ished or reduced. The revenue from such taxes is therefore
likely to fall. One may think of other objectives of imposing
trade taxes which may conflict with that of revenue. A common
one is import substitution which may be related to the infant
industry argument. Protective duties may be levied on the
capital goods and raw materials or the finished products. In
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either case, there is a clear conflict with the revenue object¬
ive. Appendix Table 6.1 shows that in fact there has been a
shift in the composition of imports in Nigeria in favour of
capital goods and raw materials - categories of imports that have
usually attracted low preferential duties. This also implies a
decline in the potential relative importance of revenue from
import duties.
The essence of the argument so far is that before 1970, the
ability of the authorities to manipulate the main source of
revenue was limited. In the period since 1970, the problem
was even worse. This is the era when petroleum activities
dominated all others. For reasons given in Appendix 1 the
government is unable to influence the revenue yield of oil.
In a nutshell, the level of production and the prices at which
this output is sold are determined exogenously by OPEC. In
theory the Government can vary the rates of taxation of petrol¬
eum activities but its independence in this respect is limited
by two considerations. First, the agreement with OPEC involves
the unification of oil taxation, including limits on the rates,
in all member countries. Furthermore, even without OPEC, the
Government's oil taxation policy cannot diverge very much from
what obtains in other countries at similar stages of development.
This is due to the fact that the firms involved in oil extraction
are multinational corporations with headquarters elsewhere. If
Nigeria's oil policy is perceived to be excessively unfair, i.e.
if the companies can obtain substantially better deals elsewhere,
commercial profitability considerations would encourage the oil
companies to reduce their level of activity in Nigeria in favour
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of other countries with better conditions. For these reasons,
it is concluded that the scope for manipulating oil revenue is
rather limited.
The alternative facing the government then is to pay more atten¬
tion to internal sources of revenue which respond to changing
economic conditions within the economy. Import duties which
constitute the second major revenue source are, of course, of
limited relevance in this respect for reasons already given.
Besides, under the present circumstances, the revenue yield of
import duties is related to oil exports in one sense. Oil
accounts for over 90% of total export earnings (see Appendix
Table 6.1). Export earnings, in turn, determine how much the
nation can import. Thus the base of the tax on import is influ¬
enced considerably by oil. However, the government is free to
fix the rates of duties subject to international agreements on
tariffs. The condition for the success of the use of tariffs
to raise revenue - a low price elasticity of the demand for
imports - appears to be fulfilled in Nigeria as will be seen in
Ch. 6. Yet, there are limits to the amount of revenue which
can be raised from a given level of import (for instance, an
excessively high tariff rate may encourage illegal activities
such as smuggling and the undervaluation of import for tax pur¬
poses ) .
In the field of direct taxes, the personal income tax is not very
important since it is administered by the states subject to the
qualifications noted in Section 2.2. But it can indirectly
influence Federal Government revenue because the more revenue
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the states derive from it, the less the necessity for the Fed¬
eral Government to make nonstatutory transfers. In the case
of the tax under the PAYE system, the present marginal tax
rates of up to 70% appear to be sufficiently high relative
to average income. The degree of progressivity which is
shown in Table 2.3 also seems to be adequate. Changes in the
rates of direct taxes produce a greater reaction from the econ¬
omic limits which pays the tax than do changes in indirect
taxes, since the former taxes cannot be shifted while the
latter usually can. Further increases in the present rates
may produce undesirable effects on incentives.
Although by international comparison the current company income
tax rate of 50% is low, it is high by historical record in Nig¬
eria since it was raised by 10%-age points in the 1970's. One
is then left with excise duties and taxes on consumption. These
revenue sources offer greater opportunities than those already
considered. In addition to excluding many commodities from
excise taxation, certain commodities are subsidized, A prime
example of such commodities is petroleum products. In the
1978/79 budget when the price of a litre of gasoline was raised
to 20k it was announced that the subsidy still amounted to 80%.
There is also some scope for an expenditure tax which was tried
in Eastern Nigeria in the 1950's (Hicks, 1956). There is thus
some possibility of raising more revenue from excise and expend¬
iture taxation by widening the base and raising the rates.
The conclusion of this discussion is that at present the government
has little control over its revenue but that there is some scope
for increasing the yield of taxes on domestic production and
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TABLE 2.3 : THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX IN NIGERIA :
MARGINAL TAX RATES
TAXABLE INCOME TAX RATE %
UNTIL 31.3.77 FROM 1.4.77
FIRST N2,000 10 10
NEXT II 15 15
It II 20 20
M 11 25 25
II II 30 30
11 N5,000 35 40
11 11 40 45
11 N10,000 45 55
OVER N30,000 50 70
DEDUCTIBLE ALLOWANCES (IN NAIRA) :
PERSONAL : 600 OR 10% OF EARNED INCOME, WHICHEVER
IS HIGHER
WIFE : 300
DEPENDENT RELATIVES : 200 EACH (MAXIMUM 400)
CHILDREN : 250 EACH (MAXIMUM 1000)
SOURCE: UDUEBO, M.A. 1976. The implications of the recent
changes in personal income taxation in Nigeria.
Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial
Review 14 (3) (December) : 14 and 17.
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consumption. However, there are some conditions to be fulfilled
for the success of raising more revenue from these domestic sour¬
ces. The most important of these is the administrative super¬
structure which at present appears to be wanting. Then were is
the need to sell the idea of the desirability of increasing taxes
in this way to the public e.g. the reduction in the subsidy on
petrol in 1978, led to a great deal of opposition which was,
however, contained by the military administration through ways
that might not be feasible for a civilian regime. All this
implies that it will take time before the government can influ¬
ence its revenue as effectively as in, say, the U.K.
6.2 EXPENDITURE
Given that control over revenue in the shortrun is difficult,
understanding the main causes and identifying the main areas of
expenditure growth become important in bringing the budget
deficit under control. This is what is attempted here.
The pattern of expenditure described in Appendix 1 is broadly
in accord with what others have found for other countries (e.g.
Lotz, 1970; Goffman and Mahar, 1971; Henning and Tussing, 1974;
Beck, 1979). The proposition that public expenditure as a
proportion of total output rises as income rises has come to be
known as Wagner's 'Law of Expanding State Activity'. Wagner saw
this phenomenon as arising from 'the pressure for social progress
and the resulting changes in the relative spheres of private and
public economy' (Wagner, 1958, p. 8).
In recent years, many writers have attempted to offer alterna-
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tive explanations of the phenomenon. But there is no consensus
of opinion. For example, Martin and Lewis (1956) in a paper
that appears to have triggered the spate of writings on Wagner's
Law argue that the level of income is not as important as the
prevailing conception of the state in explaining a nation's
expenditures, particularly its basic expenditures. They also
find that richer countries spend more relative to the GDP on
defence and transfer payments than poorer ones. This implies that
the stage of economic development may affect some items of public
expenditure (p. 206).
Richard Musgrave is in broad support of the argument of Martin
and Lewis but offers other possible explanations. According to
him,
'Low income countries today do not operate under the
same technological, political and value conditions as
prevailed in the past when now developed countries
were at similar low levels of income. Attitudes
towards growth, changed communications, the demonstra¬
tion effect and welfare measures taken abroad, the
conflict of political ideologies, all make for basic
differences in the historical setting'
(Musgrave, 1969, p. 72)
One may add here that the granting of independence to many
African countries in the early 1960's might have had the effect
of increasing the size of public expenditure relative to the
GDP. This line of reasoning has been adopted by Olaloku when
he argues that
'One relevant factor (in the high growth rate of public
expenditure) is the emergence in recent years of polit¬
ical pressures. Not only did the attainment of independ¬
ence come with a high level of consumption expectations
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which needed to be realized, but it also heralded a
general mood of political awareness which increased
the demand for public goods. A positive response
to these pressures has meant considerable increases
in public spending. Furthermore, the widespread
belief that spending constitutes development has
provided an added force to the escalation'
(Olaloku, 1975, p. 140)
Thus the adoption of a public sector-led accelerated develop¬
ment strategy by many developing countries is a possible explan¬
ation of the tendency for public expenditure to grow at a
faster rate than the GDP.
Other reasons for the rising expenditure - output ratio have
been advanced. Richard Thorn has suggested the growth and
changing role of the urban sector as a possible explanation
of Wagner's'Law' (Thorn, 1967) while Kuznets has put forward
the proposition of production lag in the public sector which
necessitates proportionately more expenditure in order to main¬
tain absolute services per head (Kuznets, 1962). Perhaps
the most influential of all the recent explanations of the
growth of public expenditure is the 'displacement effect' hypo¬
thesis of Peacock and Wiseman according to which expenditure
is related to revenue which, in turn, is a function of national
crises. According to this hypothesis, expenditure follows a
time path of discrete steps, with the steps occurring in times
of war or other social upheaval (Peacock and Wiseman, 1967,
especially p. XXXIV). Recently, Peacock and Wiseman (1979)
have offered further explanations of public sector expenditure
growth.
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It is clear then from this brief review that various factors
have been identified as contributing to expenditure growth.
The formal testing of most of these propositions is difficult
as researchers are unlikely to agree on the most appropriate
test. Consider the case of Wagner's 'Law' which was pro¬
pounded over a century ago. Even the definition of the 'Law'
is subject to dispute. Testing is therefore even more diff¬
icult. It has been argued that
Part of the problem can be attributed to Wagner's own
inexplicit formulation of his hypothesis plus the fact
that various English translations of his work and trans¬
lations of other writers' arguments concerning his law
are inconsistent'
(Michas, 1975, p. 77)
However, what Wagner originally had in mind is not directly
relevant for the present purpose and the test that is con¬
sidered most useful at this point will be pointed out below.
It is not expected that all the factors enumerated above will
operate in any one country at the same time. It is therefore
necessary to test a number of them separately and in combina¬
tion. For Nigeria it is possible to test only a few of them.
These are the effect of income on expenditure and a highly
modified version of the displacement effect.
6.2.1 SIMPLE TESTS OF SOME EXPENDITURE HYPOTHESES
In this section some simple tests of Wagner's 'Law" and the
displacement effect hypothesis along with those of the general
relationship between income and expenditure are carried out.
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6.2.1.1 WAGNER'S LAW
Although a precise definition of Wagner's Law has not yet been
established and so testing the hypothesis is a particularly
difficult task, in recent years a specific measure - income
elasticity of government spending - has found widespread accept¬
ance. Two empirical definitions of this elasticity are gener¬
ally in use. One is the ratio of the percentage increase in
government spending to the percentage increase in the GDP. It
is usually assumed that a value of this parameter in excess of
unity is consistent with Wagner's Law while a value below 1 is
not. Among those who have adopted this approach are Henning
and Tussing (1974), Beck (1979), Pluta (1981) and Gould (1983).
The other is the econometric approach whereby the elasticity is
derived from the coefficient of the GDP in a regression equation
with government spending as the dependent variable. An example
of a study which has taken this approach is Henning and Tussing
(1974). Both methods are employed here, starting with the
former.
In Table 2.4 the compound rates of growth of aggregate expenditure
and the GDP are presented together with the computed elasticity
for various periods. Each period is unique and has been chosen
for a particular purpose: the first is the entire review period;
1966 is the last normal year before the civil war which ended
in January 1970; the surge in oil revenue occurred between
1973 and 1974; and expenditure reached its height in 1980
after which it declined following the down-turn in government
revenue.
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TABLE 2.4 : INCOME ELASTICITY OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND
COMPOUND KATES OF GROWTH OF EXPENDITURE AND
GDP, ALL IN MARKET PRICES, 1959 - 83
SAMPLE PERIOD EXPENDITURE, % GDP, % ELASTICITY
1959 - 83 20.3 13.35 1 . 52
1959 - 80 24.6 15.16 1 . 62
1959 - 66 10.5 8.10 1 . 30
1959 - 70 18.0 9.30 1 .95
1959 - 73 16. 1 10.8 1 . 50
1970 - 83 20.7 15 . 9 1 . 30
1974 - 83 18.7 10. 1 1 . 85
Note: Percentage rate of growth between year zero and n:
Gx = <?/X
» (
/X ) -n' o 1; G' X
= G , G
y g
Elasticity n = G /Gg' y
What is clear from the table is that the estimated elasticity
is significantly above 1 in each period although there are
some variations. At 1.30, the elasticity of government spend¬
ing between 1959 - 66 and 1970 - 83 is lower than during any
other period. Similarly, elasticity was highest between 1959
and 1970 which of course includes the war years. Since the
only difference between this period and 1959 - 66 is the war
years (1967 - 69) one may say that the war exerted some positive
effect on the elasticity of government spending. This specul¬
ation is investigated more formally below.
In sum, the evidence presented above is consistent with Wagner's
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Law. But, as stated earlier, it is necessary to check these
results by applying an alternative test - the econometric
method. Following Henning and Tussing (1974) and others, per
capita government expenditure, G , is hypothesized to depend
on per capita income, Y . This gives the implicit function
Gc = f(Yc>
Two alternative explicit specifications of (1) are given below:
Gc = + <\1 Yc
log Gc " fto* £l log Yc (lb)
Equation la assumes a linear relationship between Gc and Yc
while lb assumes a non-linear relationship with the additional
assumption that the variables are log-linear. Both equations
were estimated but, based on the conventional goodness-of-fit
_2
and other statistics such as the R , the Durbin-Watson statistic
and the standard error of the regression, lb proved to be far
superior to la. Consequently, only the former results are
reported.
The basic sample period runs from 1959 to 1983 but in most cases
actual estimation covers the period 1960 - 83 for obvious reasons
_2
(lagging). In what follows, R is the coefficient of multiple
determination adjusted for degrees of freedom, D-W is the Durbin-
Watson statistic, h is Durbin' s h statistic (from Durbin (1970)),
S.E. is the standard error of the regression, and figures in
brackets are the t-ratios of the respective coefficients. The
estimates of lb are as follows:
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Log Gc - -4.675 + 1,536 log Yc (2)
(19.10) (31.39)
R2 = 0.977 D-W = 1.79 F(l,22) = 985 S.E. = 0.231
The results appear to be econometrically satisfactory: both
coefficients are highly statistically significant and their
signs do not run counter to expectations; the D-W statistic shows
that one can accept the null hypothesis of no serial correlation
_2
and the R is reasonably high. is, of course, the income
elasticity of government spending. From the results one may
say that the income elasticity of government expenditure is
about 1.5 which is roughly equal to the value obtained earlier
using the rates of growth of expenditure and income.
Given the reservations expressed in Ch. 1 on the reliability of
the population data one may question the validity of the present
results. In order to remove any error that the use of per
capita measures may have introduced, the equation was re-estimated
using the absolute values of expenditure and income:
log G = -6.273 + 1.463 log Y (2a)
(17.04) (36.58)
R2 = 0.983 D-W = 1.91 F(l,22) = 1338 S.E. = 0.220
The results are not fundamentally affected by the re-definition
of the variables. In particular, the income elasticity may
still be approximated by 1.5. However, the results show an
improvement in terms of the measures of the goodness-of-fit.
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So far it has been assumed that planned expenditures are always
realized within a single time period (in the present case, a
year). But this may not be so because of various constraints
(e.g. revenue). In that case, eqn. lb may be regarded as the
equation for desired rather than actual expenditure, i.e.
log C* = -fa + 3i log Yt (3)
where G* is the level of desired expenditure. G* is however,
not observable. Assume that actual expenditure adjusts to the
difference between the desired expenditure and actual expenditure
in the previous period,
log Gt - log Gt _1 = A log G* - log Gt_ 1 ) (3a)
where is the coefficient of adjustment. Substitute the value
of G* in 3a into 3 to obtain
log Gt = \XQ + A^i !°g Yt + (1 -^ ) log Gt_1 (3b)
Its estimates are given by
log Gt = -5.17 + 1.212 log Yt + 0.173 log Gt _1 (4)
(4.57) (4.90) (i:03)
R2 = 0.983 h =-0.792 F(2,2l) = 671 S.E. = 0.212
Durbin (1970) has shown that when the lagged dependent variable
is present in a regression equation the D-W statistic is an
inappropriate test of serial correlation as it is biased toward
two. He has suggested instead the use of the h - statistic
which is normally distributed. Since the critical value of the
z distribution at 5% is 1.65, a value of h between -1.65 and 1.65
may be taken to imply the absence of serial correlation at that
level of significance.
- 93 -
In the present case, there is no evidence of serial correlation.
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is statistically
not different from zero at traditional levels of significance.
This implies that adjustment is completed within a single period.
The computed long-run elasticity of 1.465 is not very different
from that obtained from eqn. 2a (1.463). The shortrun elast¬
icity of 1.212 is still above unity.
Beck (1979a, 1979b) and Pluta (1979, 1981) have suggested that
the use of nominal as opposed to real variables may affect the
size of the estimated elasticity of public spending. This sugg¬
estion cannot be fully taken into account because government
expenditure price indices are not available. Instead, what has
been done is the deflation of both income and expenditure by the
consumer price index (CPI). Estimates corresponding to (4)
above but using real variables are
log (G/P)t = -6.366 + 1.016 log (Y/P)t+ 0.519 log (G/P)t _
(3.62) (4.11) (4.72)
R2 = 0.944 h = -2.24 F(2,21) = 196 S.E. = .231
The h - statistic suggests the presence of negative serial cor¬
relation. The equation was therefore re-estimated by using the
Cochrane-Orcutt iterative technique which assumes a first-order
serial correlation of the error:
log (G/P)t = -4.99 + 0.798 log (Y/P)t + 0.623 log (G/P)t_
(4.03) (4.48) (7.77)
R2 = 0.979 h = 0.143 F(2,20) = 503 S.E. = 0.21
rho = -0.497 t - statistic of rho = 2.75
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All the parameters and their levels of significance are now
satisfactory and the equation is free from serial correlation.
The shortrun income elasticity is now below unity (0.798) but
its long-run value is 2.12. In the long-run, then, the results
do not contradict Wagner's Law. Given the value and level of
significance of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable,
the results also show that inflation tends to present full adjust¬
ment of expenditure within a single period (when account is
taken of the earlier results).
The results then show that generally the income elasticity of
government spending in Nigeria exceeds unity but that in the short-
run it is below unity if account is taken of inflation.
6.2.1.2. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINT
The desire for accelerating the rate of economic growth in develop¬
ing countries is well known and this is reflected in the ubi¬
quitous 'development plans' (which essentially are statements of
planned public sector investment programmes) that are found in
these countries. One factor that is often stressed is the
constraint imposed by the inelasticity of revenue to meet the
demand for public goods, both consumption and capital. A con¬
sequence of this constraint is that the budgetary decision runs
from revenue to expenditure (Peacock and Dosser , 1962). In
Nigeria there is abundant evidence of this. For instance, 1978
was declared as an 'austerity' year and the Federal Government
attempted to reduce its expenditure in view of the expected down¬
turn in revenue that year. By the following year, it was able
to effect a 17.6% reduction in the absolute level of expenditure
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- the second time since 1955,
The influence of revenue on expenditure is no longer confined
to developing countries alone. Recently, Gould (1985, p. 39)
has claimed that
'A study at first hand by the author of the budgetary
procedures of a number of Western countries - Sweden,
Japan, Germany and the U.K. - together with evidence
from other studies indicates that governments generally
have been guided to a very great extent in their short-
term expenditure plans by the projected increases in tax
revenues deriving from the estimated increases in
GDP' .
This provides a justification for investigating the statistical
relationship between revenue and expenditure. This was done
by replacing Y with R (government revenue) in eqns. 4 and 5.
The results are presented below
log G^ = 0.145 + 0.411 log R^_+ 0.594 log G^_ _ ^ (6a)
(0.9) (4.49) (6.43)
R2 = 0.990 h = 0.088 F(2,20) = 1114 S.E. = .223
rho = -0.385 t - statistic of rho = 2.00
log (G/P) = 0.319 + 0.363 log (R/P)t + 0.613 log (G/P)t _ 1(6b)
(1.26) (4.37) (7.26)
R2 = 0.978 h = 0.133 F(2,20) = 484 S.E. = 0.212
rho = -0.487 t - statistic of rho = 2.67
Before commenting on the results, it is necessary to state an
assumption underlying the above specifications. Expected revenue,
like expected expenditure, is not directly observable. It was
therefore assumed that the authorities had perfect foresight,
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i.e. revenue expectations were always realised. This is
one of the simplest assumptions. The other is static expect¬
ations according to which expected revenue is equal to the
realized revenue of the previous period. Both were tested
and the one reported above turned out to perform better.
Income does not appear to be a significantly better predictor
of expenditure than revenue. Indeed, it is outperformed by
revenue in the nominal specification (6a). Given this obser¬
vation at 0.411, the revenue elasticity of nominal expenditure
is very low in the shortrun. But in the long run, it is roughly
equal to unity (1.0123). When account is taken of inflation
(6b), there is not much difference in the response of expenditure
to revenue : the elasticity is 0.94 in the long-run although it
is only 0.363 in the short-run.
The implication of a high revenue elasticity of expenditure is
that public saving is curtailed. Indeed, the elasticity of
above unity obtained in 6a is consistent with the observation
made earlier that, on average, expenditure exceeded revenue
during the period under review (1959 - 83). The consequences
of a rapid adjustment of expenditure to revenue are explored
further below.
6.2.1.3 THE DISPLACEMENT EFFECT HYPOTHESIS
Two different sets of test of this hypothesis are examined here.
These are based on the influence of the civil war 1967 - 1970.
A common way of testing the influence of war on a relationship is
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by adding a dummy variable to the estimating equation. In
the present case, the dummy assumes the value of 1 in 1967,
1968 and 1969 and zero otherwise. This modification to the
equations produces the following results (see Table 2.5).
Except in the case of the nominal specification with revenue
as an explanatory variable, the coefficient of the war dummy
is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or
better. Furthermore, the performance of all the equations
is appreciably improved by the inclusion of the dummy variable.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the war exerted a
significant positive impact on public expenditure.
Although a positive influence of the civil war on expenditure
has been established, the results do not demonstrate convincingly
that the war took expenditure to a new higher level which was
maintained. This is the essence of the displacement hypothesis.
One of the first formal tests of the displacement hypothesis was
carried out by Gupta (1967), Gupta used an equation of the
form of lb and 'To test whether or not a shift in the level of
government spending associated with a major social upheaval was
significant the following formula is used:


























































































denote the observed value of log Gc and log Yc (as defined ear¬
lier on in this study) respectively during the period before a
social upheaval and Y| denotes the value of log Gc as calcul¬
ated from the regression equation for the sub-period before
the social upheaval' (XN+1 stands for the observed value of log
Y immediately after the shift). (Gupta, 1967, p. 431).
Recently, Nagarajan (1983) has shown that Gupta's formula can
be rewritten in a form which is identical to the 'forecast
error' formula as given in econometric textbooks (e.g. Kmenta
(1971, p. 160)). He then argues that
'Gupta employs the forecasting error formula to test
whether or not the level of government spending at
just one point in time, immediately following a social
upheaval, 'back-casted' from the second regression (i.e.
equation for the post upheaval period) lies within the
boundary lines of prediction of the first equation (i.e.
equations for the pre-upheaval period). When we com¬
pare two points (one from back-casting and the other from
forecasting), the divergence between those two points
may arise due to parametric instability of any coefficient
in the regression model. In other words, the so-
called shift test is basically a less formal test for
structural change just at one point'.
(Nagarajan, 1983, pp. 157 - 58).
In another instance, Diamond (1977) has criticised Gupta's test
as incomplete. According to him, Gupta has tested both inter¬
cept and slope parameters separately and that a joint test us¬
ing the Chow test is more appropriate for testing structural
breaks.
It must be pointed out that Gupta himself actually considered
the Chow test in a footnote but dismissed it on the ground that
it 'would not add anything of value to the reader' (Gupta, 1967,
footnote 9, p. 431). Nevertheless, Diamond's point is taken
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because, as Nagarajan has shown, the shift test employed by
Gupta is equivalent to a forecasting error formula while the
relevant test is one of structural breaks. The Chow test is
accordingly used here.
An examination of the estimates of the equations specified in
real terms using income as the independent variable and without
the dummy variable shows that Eqn. 5 is best. It is therefore
used for the Chow test. The Chow test, as given in Chow (1960),
requires the identification of the point in time at which a
structural break is suspected. In the present case, this is
given by the beginning of the civil war (1967). The test
statistic follows the F distribution with K and n - 2K degrees
of freedom in the numerator and denominator respectively, where
n is the number of observations in the full sample and K is the
number of regressors.
The computed F statistic is 12.366, the degrees of freedom are
2 and 19 and the corresponding critical values of F are 3.52
(5%) and 5.93 (1%). These enable one to reject the null hypo¬
thesis of no structural breaks, i.e., there is evidence for
the existence of the 'displacement effect' caused by the civil
war in Nigeria.
6.2.1.4 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS
The results obtained in this section are broadly consistent
with Wagner's Law and the displacement effect hypothesis as
defined earlier. Specifically, the income elasticity of gov-
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ernment spending exceeds unity and is close to 1.5. But when
an allowance is made for the effect of inflation the shortrun
elasticity is reduced to below unity but the long-run elasticity
is now considerably higher than that obtained in respect of
nominal quantities.
A second finding is the rapid speed of adjustment of expenditure
to revenue which, in the long-run,yields an elasticity that is
slightly above unity. In the shortrun, the elasticity is close
to unity. The result confirms the view that the public sector
in developing countries is generally subject to a financial
constraint. The constraint implies that public expenditure
rises with revenue but there is no evidence that spending and
revenue fall together. The conjecture here is that expenditure
is downward sticky, hence the tendency for it to outstrip revenue
in the long-run, thus giving rise to a deficit which persists
for many years. Further consequences of the relationship bet¬
ween expenditure and revenue are discussed below. Finally, the
civil war appears to have pushed expenditure to a higher than
normal level and that the displacement effect seems to have
operated in the country. This may be attributed to some of
the reasons given at the beginning of the section.
This bring to an end the discussion of the behaviour of govern¬
ment expenditure during the review period. The following section
contains a critical appraisal of fiscal policy in Nigeria.
- 102 -
7. CRITIQUE OF DEMAND MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA
The authorities did not consider monetary policy as capable
of making significant contributions to demand management and
fiscal policy was assigned a major role for this purpose (Nig¬
eria, 1970, p. 43). The reliance on fiscal policy in the
management of aggregate demand appears to be typical of develop¬
ing countries (Beveridge and Kelly, 1980). The ultimate obj¬
ective of demand management is to ensure that the rate of growth
of aggregate demand, given the rate of growth of supply, is
consistent with the objectives of economic policy. Crockett
(1981, pp. 66 - 70) has identified three general instruments
of demand management: fiscal, interest rate and exchange rate
policies but regards fiscal policy as the main instrument.
Interest rate policy is considered in Ch. 4 and exchange rate
policy in Ch. 6. This section deals mainly with the contri¬
bution of fiscal policy to demand management in Nigeria. But
as will become clear later these instruments are interconnected.
The discussion is divided into budgetary and general policies.
General policies include incomes and prices policies while bud¬
getary policies refer to the relationship between government
revenue and expenditure.
7.1 BUDGETARY POLICY
7.1.1 CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCING THE BUDGET DEFICIT
It is clear from the review in Section 1.1 that as an indicator
of the stance of fiscal policy, the budget deficit is not invar¬
iant with respect to the mode of financing it. Since foreign
borrowing is of relative insignificance it is omitted from the
following discussion.
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The mechanism by which borrowing from the banking system and
the non-bank public affects aggregate demand is now standard
textbook stuff and is not discussed in detail here. What is
done instead is to mention the factors that are peculiar to
Nigeria.
The banking system in Nigeria works with a high level of excess
reserves (see Ch. 4). Also, the government debt instruments
which they normally acquire are reserve assets. Consequently,
lending to the government need not affect credit to the private
sector so that commercial bank lending to the government is
expansionary.
Secondly, the direct effects on interest rates of the sale of
government bonds are almost zero since the rates are fixed by
the authorities. Government bonds are sold at face value and
carry fixed rates of interest and their capital value is guar¬
anteed by the Central Bank. Moreover the rates charged by
the financial institutions are not affected by the floating of
government bonds. The Central Bank is ready to take up any
excess supply of bonds. Consequently, financial crowding out
is likely to be small.
Finally, given the proposition advanced in section 1.2 that
output is probably supply-determined in Nigeria, the effect
of an expansionary budgetary measure may be an acceleration
of the rate of inflation or a deterioration in the balance of
payments rather than an increase in output.
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This provides the background to the examination of government
borrowing that is undertaken here. Table 2.6 shows the owner¬
ship of public debt and gives an indication of how the govern¬
ment has been financing its deficit.
There is little doubt that the banking system has been the main
source of funds for the government. The share of the nonbank
public in the total debt outstanding was always below 46% and in
many cases below 40%.
Another noticeable feature of the table is the declining importance
of both the commercial banks and the non-bank public with the
consequent rise of the Central Bank as a major holder of govern¬
ment debt in the second half of the decade. As one would expect,
the holding of the Central Bank was lowest in the year in which
the largest surplus was recorded (1974). It was a time when
the government did not really have to borrow. Conversely,
the Central Bank holding of government debt was at its maximum
when the largest deficit was sustained (1978). The share of
the Central Bank in total public debt outstanding is therefore
positively related to the size of the fiscal deficit.
Perhaps the net credit of the banking system to the government
provides a better picture of the reliance of the government on
the banking system than the share of banks with total debt out¬

































































































































































The table confirms the earlier observation of an increasing
indebtedness of the government to the banks from 1976.
It is necessary to mention at this point the fact that banks
in the country operate with substantial excess reserves and
that this has created a problem for the authorities. The
problem of how to reduce the excess reserves of commercial banks
belongs properly to monetary policy but it has some bearing on
the present discussion. The point of the argument above is
that given excess reserves in the banking system, government
borrowing from the commercial banks and the non-bank public,
as from the Central Bank, is expansionary. But the position
adopted in Section 1.1 is that output is probably supply - rather
than demand - determined. If so, a government budget deficity,
if sufficiently large, can create macroeconomic problems.
7.1.2 RELEVANCE OF A PSBR TARGET TO NIGERIA
It is in recognition of the potential effect of financing gov¬
ernment expenditure through borrowing that suggestions that the
amount of government borrowing should be limited have been
made. For instance, Godley (1974) has argued that
'The record of demand management during the last 20 years
has been extremely poor ... demand, output and the
balance of payments might have been more stable had
some simple rule been followed through thick and thin
such as that a tax yield should be sought such as to
cover, as nearly as possible, some fixed proportion
of public expenditure'.
The British Government eventually declared, in 1976, a target
for the public sector deficit while setting out its policy pro¬
posal for the following two years (Vaciago, 1978, p. 30).
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Targeting the fiscal deficit or the Public Sector Borrowing
Requirements (PSBR) is not without criticism. According to
the National Institute of Economic Research,
'The fundamental weakness of the PSBR is that its size
fails to distinguish the influence of the budget on the
economy from the influence of the economy on the budget
... Thus running budgetary policy according to a PSBR
Target may lead to a perverse stabilization policy :
a shortfall from the employment target will increase the
PSBR and may lead to deflationary action in an attempt
to achieve the original PSBR target'
(NIER, 1977, pp. 43 - 44).
In order to assess the validity of this criticism one needs to
look at it more closely.
The essence of the argument is that
within a Keynesian fiscal model, fixing the PSBR destroys the
automatic flexibility of the economy. For this reason, the
NIER suggests calculating the PSBR at the full (or 'high')
employment level of income. Although this argument is valid in
the context in which it was made (the British economy), its
relevance to Nigeria is reduced to some extent by one institut¬
ional difference. The built-in stability of the fiscal system
is substantially lower in Nigeria than in the U.K. Moreover,
the relationship between revenue and expenditure on the one hand
and income on the other is not as strong in Nigeria as in more
developed, industrial economies, especially in the period since
1970, because of the influence of crude petroleum. Neither the
personal nor corporate income tax is a major source of revenue
in the country. The bulk of the revenue comes from the mining
sector which is not an integrated part of the economy. Autom¬
atic stabilizers on the expenditure side are even weaker. Nigeria
has no social security of any sort. The only form of transfer
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payment apart from public debt charges is pension of civil
servants neither of which is directly related to the level of
economic activity. Unemployment benefits are unheard of.
Instead of the unemployed receiving payments from the State, he
is expected to pay some money to the Treasury. As the law
stands, all adult males who are not in full-time education
(except the very old) are expected to continue to pay their taxes
irrespective of whether or not they are gainfully employed.
Those employed in the public sector or by registered enterprises
pay their taxes under the PAYE system while all others are subject
to the poll or head tax.
In these circumstances then, observing a PSBR target is unlikely
to be as destabilizing as implied by the NIER. Objection to a
PSBR target in Nigeria arises from a different consideration. At
various points in the discussion up to this point, it has been
emphasized that the principal source of revenue in the country
is crude petroleum whose behaviour is highly erratic. Therefore,
following a PSBR target implies that other components of expend¬
iture will be fluctuating widely too. This will only serve to
increase the degree of uncertainty surrounding government policy.
This is obviously not in the interest of the economy. Thus a
PSBR target is not advisable in the present circumstances.
Other criteria for appraising the budgetary policy therefore have
to be sought.
7.1.3 ALTERNATIVE VIEWS ON BUDGETARY POLICY
In appraising a government's budgetary policy, it is helpful to
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be able to state whether the budget in a particular year is
expansionary or contractionary and if so, whether it is more
expansionary than that in another year. Such a measure would
also help in future planning i.e. to prescribe a policy of stim¬
ulus or restraint given expected values of other macroeconomic
aggregates (Mansfield, 1980).
The simplest measure of the impact of a budget, as seen earlier,
is the budget balance. But this measure, as applied to a part¬
icular year, is defective. As is well known, in a developed
economy, the revenue from the existing tax structure as well as
certain expenditure items are related to the level of economic
activity while tax changes and the general level of government
expenditure are largely at the discretion of the government. In
this setting, there is a tendency for the overall budget balance
to move to a surplus in periods of high levels of economic act¬
ivity and to a deficit at relatively low levels of income. Thus
the budget contains both discretionary and 'automatic' elements.
A budget surplus at the height of a boom therefore does not imply
that the budget is contractionary. Ideally, then, one would
like to separate the 'endogenous' from the 'exogenous' elements
of the budget (Mansfield, 1980, p. 402). The quest for devising
suitable measures that would indicate the stance of fiscal policy
led to the development of such concepts as the 'full employment
balance' (Chelliah, 1973) and the'weighted full employment bal¬
ance' (Borpujari and Ter-Minassian, 1973) as well as the 'cycli¬
cally neutral budget' (Dernberg, 1975). Statistical limitations
preclude such refinement of the budget balance here and even then
the relevance of these concepts to Nigeria are doubtful. Instead,
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a different line of investigation is tried here.
This approach is based on the assumption that the export sector
is the main source of fluctuations in the level of economic
activity Appendix 1. a principal task of fiscal policy then
is to dampen the effect of the export sector on the economy as
much as possible i.e. smoothen the fluctuations in income. This
implies that the year-to-year budget balance is not as signifi¬
cant as its trend over time. The relevance of this point would
be better appreciated by considering the situation in Nigeria
in the 1970's. The country depended heavily on trade taxes for
its revenue. Then came the oil price increases that started
from November 1973 which led to a sharp rise in foreign exchange
earnings and government revenue. Tanzi (1982, p. 1072) has put
the problem facing the government aptly:
'The government finds itself in the same situation as
the winner of a lottery prize. Should it continue to
spend in relation to its "permanent" incomejor should
it raise the level of its expenditure to the current
level of revenue?'
If the government decides to maintain the level of its 'normal'
expenditure then a budget surplus would result. But this is
obviously not contractionary as would have been concluded if the
year-to-year budget balance was used. It is therefore necessary
to develop some yardstick by which to judge the stance of policy.
The problem reduces to choosing the level of what might be re¬
garded as 'normal' expenditure and one way out is to carry over
the concept of 'permanent income' developed in consumption theory
(e.g. Friedman, 1957). An appropriate budgetary policy would
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be one which equated 'permanent' expenditure with 'permanent'
revenue (Tanzi, 1982, p. 1081). But there still remains the
definition of 'normal' or 'permanent' revenue and expenditure.
In the demand for money and consumption theory literature a
definition of permanent income that is frequently employed is the
sum of geometrically weighted past incomes. But there remains
the problem of the choice of appropriate lag structure. Mansfield
(1980) has adopted a somewhat different approach. According to
him, the relevant budget balance is the difference between 'trend
revenue'and 'allowable expenditure'. He starts from the premise
that in a developing economy, 'the trend of exports sets the
optimum capacity of output' and hypothesizes that 'government
revenues tend to fluctuate with the level of exports' (p. 404).
Consequently, he defines 'trend revenue' as a function of 'trend
export', the latter being derived by a log regression against
time, using an appropriate base year. 'Allowable expenditure',
on the other hand, is defined in relation to trend revenue:
'For any year, it is an amount that bears the same ratio
to trend revenue as actual expenditure bore to trend
revenue in a base year in which the budget is judged
to be neutral with respect to its impact on aggregate
demand'
(p. 406)
On the assumption that capital market facilities are rudimentary
in a typical developing economy, Mansfield defines a neutral
budget as one in which borrowing from the bank system is either
zero or very small. The difference between 'trend revenue' and
the 'allowable expenditure' is the 'implicit deficit'. The
expansionary or contractionary stance of fiscal policy relative
to the neutral norm is then measured by the difference between
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the actual and the implicit deficit. A budget is said to be
stabilizing if a contractionary impact corresponds to an above-
trend export year or an expansion an impact corresponds to a
below-trend export year. Finally, the norm can be used only
when there is a 'reasonably high' correlation between revenue
and exports.
This approach reduces considerably the problem associated with
the actual budget deficit as it takes into account the influence
of past and expected values of revenues. Furthermore, it
ensures that, if followed, wide fluctuations in output and
incomes are moderated, thus minimizing the disruptive effects
of a large unexpected fall in export earnings and hence government
revenue. Nevertheless, it has its own drawbacks as its appli¬
cation to Nigeria below shows.
The trend in Nigeria's exports shifted in 1955 and was not dist¬
urbed again until the petroleum export boom of 1974,
Since this covers a substantial part of the review period of this
study, 1955 has been chosen as the base year for calculating trend
export. Table 2.2 shows that there was no government borrowing
from the banking system in 1974. What is more, it was the only
year since 1960 in which the government did not borrow from the
banking system. Therefore, that year is chosen as the base for
calculating allowable expenditure. Since a necessary condition
for the use of the norm is that actual Revenue, , and export,
, should be 'reasonably' correlated, the simple correlation
coefficient for the two variables was first calculated. At
0.992 (apart from the calculation of trend export, 1955 - 83, the
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sample period of the following exercise runs from 1959 to 1983),
this statistic is high by any standard. The function
log Rt = + @>log Xt + Ut
was estimated and produced the following results:
log R = -1.501 + 1.171 log X
(9.29) (54.79)
R2 = 0.992 D-W = 1.56 F(l,23) = 3002
Given these results, it is concluded that actual revenue and
exports are closely correlated. An application of Mansfield's
test shows that the budget was destabilizing in seven of the
twenty-five years which is not a bad record. It is worth point¬
ing out that five of those seven years are concentrated in the
last ten years, specifically since 1974. The effect of the
export boom therefore was to increase the destabilizing impact
of the budget.
Table 2.2 shows that the budget deficit was lowest in 1962. If
this year is used as the base for calculating allowable expenditure,
the number of 'destabilizing' years rises to 13. Again if the
base year for calculating 'trend' export is changed, the number
of years in which the budget was destabilizing becomes 8. These
results indicate that the choice of the base years significantly
affects the outcome of the test (through the coefficients of the
trend export and revenue equations). Finally, it is difficult
to determine when the correlation between export and revenue is
'reasonably high'; the approach is inapplicable if this cor¬
relation is clearly low. Therefore, the simple budget balance
still provides the best indicator of the stance of fiscal policy
in Nigeria.
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Although a growing economy need not balance its budget, where
the expansion of the deficit aggravates macroeconomic problems
such as balance of payments disequilibrium and inflation as
has been the case in Nigeria, one may be justified in saying
that the fiscal deficit is inconsistent with the growth of the
economy. Over the entire period, 1959 - 83, the deficit averaged
N757.4 m or 2.346% of the GDP at current factor cost.On the basis
of these facts, one may say that the budgetary system was out
of equilibrium since, as will be seen in Chs. 5 and 6, a contra¬
ctionary policy was called for at certain times of the review
period.
The discussion in Ann.1 Section 5.1 of this chapter indicates that
the bulk of government revenue, especially since 1973, cannot be
treated simply as withdrawal from the income stream. Revenue
from oil activities differs from taxation as conventionally under¬
stood in the sense that changes in the rates of taxation of oil
have no significant direct impact on the rest of the economy.
Therefore, oil revenue may be treated as exogenous to the economy.
This implies that spending out of the oil revenue may be consid¬
ered as deficit-financed. If this line of reasoning is accepted
then the budget deficit is substantially larger than hitherto
portrayed and the size of the disequilibrium mentioned above is
considerably increased. The causes of this disequilibrium are
discussed below.
7.1.4. PROXIMATE CAUSES OF THE FISCAL DISEQUILIBRIUM
Before looking at the factors which contributed to the fiscal
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disequilibrium of the 1970's, it is instructive to look at the
answers given by Tanzi to the question of what the government
should do if it is confronted with an unexpected sharp rise in
revenue. According to him,
'The most important considerations are the following:
(a) its expectation about the permanence of the
current level of revenue; (b) the immediate invest¬
ment opportunities for the transitory portion of
current revenue; (c) the political pressure on the
government for additional spending; and (d) the
government's perception of the political and economic
benefits of additional spending.
There are three possible general uses for the 'windfall'
revenue: (a) current expenditure could be increased;
(b) the additional revenue could be spent on domestic
capital project; or (c) it could be invested abroad
in financial or real assets (including in this the
repayment of past foreign debt)'
(Tanzi, 1982, p. 1072)
The considerations, of course, determine the options finally
selected. But it is worth pointing out that the last two con¬
siderations (political pressure and government's perception of
the benefit of additional spending) are more or less normative
and not much can be said about them here. The first two involve
less value judgement and will be taken up presently.
Nigeria has had an 'export boom' twice - in the 1950's and 1970's
- and it is interesting to compare the options taken in those
two occasions. The first boom occurred soon after the end of
the Second World War. By then the country was still under
British rule. The marketing boards which handled all export
commodities paid the producers only a fraction of the value of
the commodities in the world markets in the good years and the
surplus was supposed to be used to stabilize producer prices in
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'bad' years. The result was that the country accumulated a
sizeable level of foreign exchange reserves which were invested
in U.K. financial assets. From 1955 when the terms of trade
turned against Nigeria the accumulated reserves were used to
cushion the effect of falling export values on imports and gov¬
ernment revenue. Therefore, it was option (c) above which was
selected.
The situation of the mid-1970's is strikingly similar, although
this time the effect is more dramatic. The government, however,
decided to choose option (b) above. As explained in Ch. 1,
it was committed to the. rapid development of the economy.
Before 1973 the main constraint on this objective was finance.
The sudden and sharp rise in oil revenue virtually eliminated
this constraint. But other problems emerged. This concerns
the feasible rate of development of the non-oil sectors, the
division of output between the public and private sectors, toler¬
able rates of inflation and acceptable standards of income distri¬
bution (Morgan, 1979, p. 64).
The objectives of economic policy discussed in Ch. 1 may be
divided into two: Financial (price stability, the balance of
payments) and real (growth and employment). It will be clear
that the government placed much emphasis on the real objectives.
It adopted a pragmatic approach to the new problems facing it
(mentioned above). It decided to spend revenue as it came on
both current and capital projects. As seen in Table 2.2,
current expenditure rose from N287 m in 1969 to N638.3 m in 1970
and again from N873.6 m in 1974 to N1685.9 m in 1975. In turn,
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capital expenditure rose from N435.1 m in 1973 to N1223.5 m in
1974 and to N3207.7 m in 1975 - a growth rate of over 637%.
These increases in expenditure are due principally to the govern¬
ment's attitude toward development and the absenqe of a con¬
sistent fiscal policy.
The sharp increases in planned expenditures under the development
plans has already been mentioned (p. 19 ). For instance, with
the unanticipated rise in oil revenue in the early 1970's, the
size of public expenditures under the Second Plan launched in
1970 was hastily revised from Nl,560 m to N3,271.9 m. The
Fourth Plan was launched in January 1981. It planned for a
total expenditure of N70,053.3 m ( CBN, Report, 1981).
The drive towards higher rates of economic growth thus led to an
ever-growing size of public sector investment commitments. One
may ask the question: What are the consequences of the government's
policy? With the benefit of hindsight one can now state that the
consequences are detrimental to the economy. But at the time,
little attention was paid to the possible impact on the economy.
As expenditures under the plans were on capital projects one would
think that in the longrun they would raise the productive capacity
of the economy so that a higher level of aggregate demand can be
sustained without increases in prices. But this does not nec¬
essarily follow. When total expenditure rises dramatically
following a rise in revenue, there is a tendency for inflationary
pressures to develop in the shortrun because it is not possible
to increase supply instantaneously. The inability to meet demand
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in the shortrun may stem from supply rigidities in the economy
and, in the case of Nigeria, it is due to the impossibility of
increasing the importation of tradeables in the shortrun. These
pressures may lead to the demand for higher wages which, if
satisfied, would intensify the inflationary tendency as indeed
happened (discussed below). This has the effect of reducing
the expected budget surpluses as labour costs are rising. Ano¬
ther consequence of sharply increasing capital expenditures is
that inefficient projects may be undertaken (Tanzi, 1982, p. 1072).
This may arise from a number of factors. There may be insuff¬
icient time for detailed feasibility studies of some programmes.
The inadequacy of the existing managerial and other technical
categories of skilled labour may place an effective constraint on
absorptive capacity. Furthermore, criteria other than economic
may be used to execute some projects which would never, in the
absence of the upsurge in revenue, have been embarked upon.
An example that comes to mind in this respect is the size of
the multi-billion naira new federal capital project. The dec¬
ision to build a new federal capital is essentially political.
The only significant economic argument is that the decentraliz¬
ation of business activity that would result from the relocation
of the capital would reduce the pressure on the present capital
for accommodation, communication and other infrastructural fac¬
ilities. But it is doubtful if the savings would be sufficient
to cover the cost. Even if costs could be covered, the expansion¬
ary effect on aggregate demand is undeniable.
A third effect of sharply rising capital expenditures is that
such expenditures almost invariably have recurrent components
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(Heller, 1974). New current expenditures are more difficult to
reduce than capital expenditures because they tend to be perman¬
ent. The building of a new school can be stopped with little
cost but to close down an existing school is relatively costly
in terms of the teachers and pupils. An example of a project
which raises the recurrent expenditure of the government but
has no clear positive direct effect on the economy is the creation
of seven new states in 1976. This was attended by expansion in
government expenditure on overhead costs (such as administrative
buildings and the increased demand for social services arising
from the rapid urbanization of the new state capitals as well as
labour costs). Other projects in this category embarked upon in
1976 include the introduction of a free universal primary educ¬
ation in September and the expansion of the number of universities
from six to nineteen.
There is also the possibility of the export boom coming to an end
before some of the projects are completed. The oil boom ended
in the late 1970's and some of the projects that were stranded
include the liquified natural gas plant and the iron and steel
complex as well as the new federal capital. Each has been
scaled down considerably while work on some phases has been stopped.
The universal free primary education scheme has already coll¬
apsed .
Finally, given the generally high import content of government
capital expenditures that is characteristic of developing countries,
the balance of payments implications of the above developments
become apparent. As Table A-6.2 shows, the composition of
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import has shifted in favour of capital goods and raw materials
so that a high import content of production is not confined to
the public sector alone. The building of the liquified natural
gas plant, for example, requires imported capital goods as well
as skilled labour. In the sphere of consumption demand, the
pressure is also often deflected to the external sector, thus
leading to a deterioration in the balance of payments.
In sum, the government's budgetary policy -was biased in favour
of the growth objective. But this had adverse implications
for the financial objectives. The policy of sharply raising
government expenditures with the aim of increasing the rate of
growth resulted in the expansion of aggregate demand beyond
the level that was justified by the increase in the productivity
of the economy. The resulting excess demand was eliminated
through price level changes (see Ch. 5) and deterioration in the
balance of payments (discussed in Ch. 6). However, even in terms
of the growth objective, the policy was misconceived. The auth¬
orities were too optimistic about the ability of fiscal policy
to raise the rate of growth. In particular, they failed to take
into account the supply constraint mentioned in Section 1. The
policy based on the mistaken belief that government spending
constitutes development resulted in inflation and balance of
payments disequilibria. The next subsection deals with what
was referred to as general policies at the beginning of this
section.
7 .2 OTHER POLICIES
The second set of policies consist of incomes and prices policies.
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Incomes policy is discussed first.
Between 1960 and 1981 there were four general wage increases.
The first wage rise was based on the recommendations of the
Morgan Review Commission of 1964. But this was a very small
exercise compared to those of the 1970's. After the war, there
was a general upward review of wages and salaries in 1971. The
increases were up to 30% in the case of the very low income
groups. But the review in 1975 raised the minimum wage in the
public sector from N15 to N60 per month. The increase was
subsequently extended to the private sector which has always
enjoyed a higher average wage than the public sector. The
public sector award was backdated by nine months. This resulted
in the payment of N859.3 m in arrears throughout the country.
The public sector paid N567.3 m as arrears (Falegan, 1978, p. 14).
This sudden increase in money income affected the money supply
appreciably. Commercial bank cash ratio rose from 19.6% at
the end of 1974 to 29.2% at the end of 1975 compared with a
statutory requirement of only 8%. Money supply (M^) also rose
by 73.5% during the year (1975). In 1974 the corresponding
figure was 42.5%. At the same time, the consume price level
rose by 33.7% - the highest ever. This tends to suggest that
the effect of the acceleration of monetary growth on output was
small. Interest rates were not affected as they were administered.
Therefore, within the Keynesian framework, there is no compelling
reason to suppose that real income rose. Under normal circum¬
stances, the monetarist implication of monetary acceleration would
be to exert an expansionary impact on both output and prices.
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But as pointed out previously, the absence of the requisite
factors of production domestically implies that output cannot
expand. The burden of adjustment would then have to be borne
by prices and the balance of payments.
The proposition that wages tend to be sticky downward is uni¬
versal. In 1980, as a result of union pressure, the minimum
wage was raised again to N100 per month. The pressure for
higher wages stemmed in part from the failure of wages to keep
pace with inflation. As a deflationary measure, a wage freeze
was imposed from 1978 with the concession of up to 7% rise in
for the lowest paid. Yet, the rate of inflation was 18.7,
11.1, 11.4 and 20.9% respectively in 1978 - 81. Real wages
therefore fell during this period. In addition, the precedent
set by the 1975 award played a part in determining the size of
the increase demanded which would have raised the minimum wage
from N60 to N300 per month.
Under some specified conditions it is easy to show that minimum
wage legislation affects the level of employment. Assume a
single competitive labour market. For the minimum wage to be
binding the market wage Wc of the honogeneous workers must be
less than N . The introduction of W leads to a reduction in
m m
the level of employment. Raising Wm further reduces the level
of employment.
Of course, as the assumptions are relaxed, the results of the
minimum wage become more complex. Thus, as Stigler (1946)
raising
showed a long time ago, there is a range over which the minimum
A
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wage actually increases the level of employment. Assume the
labour market is competitive on the demand side but there is
only one employer. The effect of the minimum wage may be illu¬
strated graphically as follows:
Wq and Eq are respectively
the monopsonistic wage and
the resulting level of employ¬




FIGURE 1 : MONOPSONISTIC EMPLOYER AND MINIMUM WAGE
An externally imposed minimum wage between the original monop¬
sony wage W and the competitive wage W raises the level ofo c
employment (Maurice, 1974). However, if Wm exceeds Wc employ¬
ment would fall as in the other case considered above.
Perhaps the two-sector model of minimum wage legislation is more
appropriate for Nigeria. This is because the minimum wage
usually relates to the public sector alone. Theoretically,
then, there are two sectors: the public sector which is covered
by the legislation and the private sector which is not. Such
a model has been developed by Welch (1974). In this model,
the affected sector behaves exactly as in the case where the
entire economy is covered. Workers who have been laid off
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in this sector go to the other sector in search of jobs, thus
shifting the labour supply curve (S in Fig. 1) outward and
depressing the wage there. But as the wage falls some of the
workers displaced in the sector covered by the minimum wage
and others originally employed in the uncovered sector decide
not to work in the uncovered sector as the wage there is now
less than the minimum they are prepared to accept. Many factors
therefore affect the outcome of the minimum wage legislation:
the elasticity of labour supply, the minimum tolerable wage of
those who cannot secure employment in the covered sector and the
elasticity of the demand for labour. Welch gives a formula
which, when plausible values are assigned to the variables,
shows that aggregate employment falls with the introduction of
the minimum wage.
In Nigeria the public sector minimum wage tends to set a floor
to wages in the private sector (IMF, 1975, p. 317) although wage
settlements here are by collective bargaining. This implies
that, for the purpose of analysing minimum wage legislation, no
distinction need be made between the private and public sector.
Given this assumption, the Federal Government minimum wages may
be said to have an adverse effect on employment. Indeed, some
state governments complained when the new N100 minimum monthly
salary was introduced that they would not be able to honour that
commitment. Although it is difficult to separate the effects of
that legislation from those of declining government revenue, it
is likely that the minimum wage made some contributions to the
retrenchment of workers in the private and public sectors and the
embargoing of the recruitment of workers in the public sector
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from 1981.
The conclusion then is that the policy of drastically increasing
wages and salaries across board adopted by the Government from
1971 was inconsistent with its objectives of price stability
and full employment. A more formal framework for reviewing
salaries and wages in the light of the prevailing rates of in¬
flation and productivity would have been desirable. Wages and
salaries may be set to keep pace with inflation or may be linked
to productivity increases so that they do not fuel the inflatin-
ary situation or lead to a reduction in the level of employment.
A stable policy is preferable to the present ad hoc system which
produces sharp and sudden increases in money income which, in
turn, produces shocks in other variables such as the money supply,
the price level and the level of employment.
The other aspect of demand management which will be briefly con¬
sidered is prices policy. As a result of threatening inflation¬
ary situation which resulted mainly from the release of pent-up
demand after the civil war, the government instituted a system
of price controls in March 1970. A board was set up to fix and
enforce prices of schedules items. These included all 'essential'
processed commodities (e.g. sugar, beverages and beer) as well as
other manufactured goods. Rents on residential buildings were
subsequently brought under control.
It is now standard proposition that price control alone cannot
solve the problem of inflation. Therefore, only one aspect which
is peculiar to the Nigerian situation will be mentioned.
- 126 -
As seen in Ch. 1, in calculating the CPI on which the calculation
of the rate of inflation is based, greatest weight is attached to
food. But the major items of food - locally produced foodstuffs
- were not subject to control. Apparently this was because of
the heterogenous quality of foodstuffs and the problems of meas¬
urement since such products were sold by a largely illiterate
population. Grading which is necessary for control was thus
difficult.
As elsewhere, the administrative control of prices tends to
encourage inefficiency such as corruption. This has the effect
of raising the cost of price administration. Furthermore, a
large scale government interference with prices may also lead
to distortion both in production and consumption.
Other measures taken with respect to the objectives of price
stability and the balance of payments are reviewed separately
in Chs. 5 and 6. Also, incomes policy is treated again in Ch.
5.
8. CONCLUSION
Judged by the objectives set for it, the performance of fiscal
policy during the review period has been less than satisfactory.
The balance of payments position which started to deteriorate in
1976 worsened sharply in the last few years of the review period
(Ch. 6). The rate of inflation also was at double digits by
the end of the period and has fallen below 10% only Qnce since
1974(Ch. 5). As the aim of anti-inflation policy was to reduce
the rate to 5% the objective was not achieved. Finally, another
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objective - that of reducing the dependence of the country on oil
for government revenue and foreign exchange - was clearly unatt-
ained. It will also be shown in Ch. 6 that the fiscal incentive
schemes - tax reliefs and favourable foreign exchange measures -
designed to diversify the economy did not appear to have had the
desired effect.
The chapter dealt with why fiscal policy was not as effective as
the authorities wanted. Basically two factors were responsible.
On the one hand, the government could not influence its principal
source of revenue : it could not control the quantity and prices
of the oil it sold. These were determined by external forces,
namely, world demand and OPEC. Given the existing institutional
arrangements for marketing oil, the ability of the government to
vary the rates of taxation of oil activities was curtailed by
international commitments. Furthermore, the government failed
to exploit new and traditional revenue sources as oil increasingly
became the dominant source. On the other hand, there was the
sharp growth of expenditure evident in Table 2.2. The inter¬
action of these forces produced a growing budget deficit. What
is more, during the review period, the deficit was financed mainly
through bank credit which is clearly inflationary. The resort to
direct price control to contain the inflationary pressure was
thus a futile exercise as it did not tackle the fundamental pro¬
blem which was the budget deficit. As regards the balance
of payments, the main fiscal measures taken included quantitative
controls on imports and administrative control on foreign exchange.
Inflation and balance of payments policies are discussed in greater
detail in chapters five and six.
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On an average basis, the budget was in deficit between 1959 - 83.
This apparent fiscal disequilibrium was traced to the effects of
(i) the civil war (displacement hypothesis);(ii) the desire of
the government for raising the rate of economic growth (through
the development plant); and its incomes policy. The consequ¬
ences of the fiscal behaviour for the monetary policy are consid¬
erable and are considered in greater depth in Chs. 3 and 4.
As stated at the end of the last chapter, fiscal policy is one of
two sets of macroeconomic policies to be considered. The other
is monetary policy which is the subject of the next two chapters.
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FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER TWO
1. For a review of the different facets of monetarism, see
Burton (1982).
2. While Brunner (1970) enumerates only four, Stein (1982)
has five, Purvis (1980) eight and Mayer (1978) twelve.
3. For a statement of this position, see Nevile (1983) p. 2.
4. For instance, under the 1979 constitution, customs and
excise duties, mines and minerals, including oil fields,
oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas, the taxation
of incomes, profits and capital gains are the exclusive
preserves of the Federal Government. (The Constitution
of the Fed. Rep. of Nigeria, 1979, Second Schedule, the
Exclusive Legislative List, items 14, 21, 36 and 56).
5. Specifically these are : sales or purchase tax, football
pools other than betting taxes, motor vehicle and drivers'
licence fees, entertainment tax, land registration and
survey taxes, property tax, land ground rents and fees and
the following two which they share with the local governments
: trading licences and fees, and motor park dues (Nigeria,
1980, p. 54).
6. Details are contained in Nigeria (1980).
7. These and other changes are described more fully in Phillips
(1975)
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MONETARY POLICY I : SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Until the publication of Keynes' General Theory there was little
doubt that money exerted considerable influence on some key
macroeconomic variables. The General Theory itself did not
dismiss money as inconsequential. The title indicates the
importance Keynes attached to money. Before then he had already
written two volumes on money (Keynes, 1930). But then the
interpretation of the General Theory is not necessarily the
same as the theory embodied in it (Leijonhufvud, 1968). This
interpretation, especially in the 1950's, had the effect of
de-emphasizing money to the extent that the proposition that
'money does not matter' could be ascribed to an extreme version
of the resulting theory. Although the General Theory attracted
criticism right from the time of its publication^"^ it was Fried¬
man's 're-statement' of the quantity theory of money in 1956
which, in the longrun, proved to be the greatest attack on it.
Even then, Keynesianism or the theory derived from or based on
the General Theory continued to be the mainstream macroeconomic
theory until the late 1960's. Since then there has been a
marked change in macroeconomic theorizing. This is evident in
the titles of such papers as 'Does fiscal policy matter?' (Blinder
and Soiow, 1973) and 'Is fiscal policy dead?' (Peacock and Shaw,
1978). The debate between those who assign to money a dominant
role in the economy (e.g. Friedman and Johnson) and those who
maintain that money is not as important (e.g. Tobin and Kaldor)
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is yet to be resolved. But in recent years, both groups have
modified their positions and are now agreed that money indeed
does influence the level of economic activity. A good express¬
ion of this view is by Modigliani who has written : 'Milton
Friedman was once quoted as saying, "We are all Keynesians, now",
and I am quite prepared to reciprocate that "we are all monetar¬
ists" - if by monetarism is meant assigning to the stock of money
a major role in determining output and prices' (Modigliani, 1977,
P- 1).
The following two chapters are therefore based on the premise
that money does matter and that it is desirable to control its
behaviour. The control of the money stock, along with the
factors which influence it, is subsumed under the term 'monetary
policy' here. The present chapter deals mainly with the theory
of monetary policy in Nigeria. The actual operation of policy
is discussed in the next chapter.
This chapter deals mainly with the market for money. As Goldfeld
(1973, p. 577) has observed,
'The market for money is a critical component of
virtually all theories that explain the evolution
of aggregate economic activity (and) an accurate
understanding and protrayal of this market is
essential both to the analysis of past monetary
policies and to the formulation of appropriate
contemporaneous policy'.
The relevant aspects of this market to be considered relate to
the effect of the quantity and changes in the stock of money
on the level of economic activity (i.e. the transmission mechan¬
ism of monetary policy). While, as seen above, it is generally
agreed that the behaviour of the money stock affects real var-
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iables such as output and employment, as well as the price
level, the magnitude of this effect is subject to dispute.
It was also stated above that, on the one hand, Friedman, Johnson
et al believe that money dominates all other factors in explain¬
ing changes in prices, on the other, another group
of people typified by Tobin, Kaldor and Davidson are convinced
that the influence of money on economic activity is (very small,
or, at any rate) nowhere as significant as implied by the first
group. In attempting to demonstrate the relative importance
of money, certain issues have been raised. Among others,
these include the appropriate definition of money, the existence
of a stable relationship between money and a few variables, the
endogeneity or otherwise of the money stock, and the significance
of income, wealth, interest rates, expectations and other economic
factors as the determinants of the demand for money. The interest
rate issue has two aspects : the interest elasticity of the demand
for money, and the most relevant alternative measures of the rate
of interest.
In general, the medium used for investigating these issues is the
demand and supply functions of money. Consequently, this part
of the chapter is concerned primarily with these functions, using
Nigerian data. But at the outset it must be admitted that the
quality of the available data does not permit the examination of
most of the issues that have been raised in the last few years.
For example, national income data are not available on a frequ¬
ency shorter than annual. It is felt that transforming the
annual observations on income into quarterly observations using,
for example, related series as suggested by Friedman (1962), Chow
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and Lin (1971) or Ginsburgh (1973) would only serve to increase
the unreliability of the already imperfect national income stat¬
istics. As a result, annual data have been used throughout the
empirical analyses. It is clear then that statistical limitations
place an effective constraint on the coverage of the exercise.
The discussion is organized as follows. Section two of the
chapter contains a review of one model of the demand for and supply
of money in Nigeria. In section three, a money demand and supply
model is specified and estimated. This is followed by an exam¬
ination of an alternative approach to money supply determination.
Specifically, the discussion is aimed at providing answers to
the following questions : What factors affect the money supply?
How much control has the Central Bank got over these? The
balance sheet approach to money supply determination has been
adopted in pursing these issues. The final section contains
the summary and conclusions of the preceding analysis. The
analysis now opens with an examination of the issues relating
to the targets and indicators of monetary policy.
1. TARGETS ANB INDICATORS
In formulating and implementing a country's monetary policy,
what specific variables should the monetary authorities aim to
control? Eurthermore, how would they appraise the impact of
their policy, i.e. what criteria should they use to evaluate
the effectiveness of policy? It is normal practice to consider
these issues respectively in terms of the targets and indicators
of monetary policy and this convention is followed here.
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It is usual to distinguish between four vafiabies involved in
the monetary policy decision process. The authorities are
assumed to have objectives which they wish to achieve. They
also have instruments - variables which are under their direct
control - which they manipulate to achieve their ultimate obj¬
ectives. In between the objectives and instruments are proxi¬
mate objectives and indicators. The former are variables which
give an early and unambiguous indication of theory in which the
ultimate objectives will actually move in response to policy or
other disturbances while the latter are variables which are
functionally related to the instruments such that they provide
preliminary information to the authorities about the stance of
policy . In view of the role of the proximate objectives,
the authorities are often interested in achieving pre-determined
values of these variables, hence the alternative term 'targets'
(Saving, 1937). As the latter is more suggestive, it is used
from this point onwards.
The issue of monetary targets has featured prominently in policy
discussions in recent years . The discussions were apparently
given an impetus by the adoption of monetary targets by many
Western countries in the last decade. The Federal Republic of
Germany started the trend in late 1974, followed by the US (1975),
Switzerland (1975), Canada (1975), the UK (1976) and France
( 4 )
(1976) . Before then, however, many countries outside the
Western World had operated some monetary targets. These were
mainly countries which had to borrow from the IMF. As will be
shown in Ch. 4 , Nigeria was one of the few countries which adopted
a domestic credit expansion (DCE) target voluntarily before 1970.
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The relevance of targets and indicators to the present purpose
arises from their potentiality as criteria for evaluating mone¬
tary policy. As such, only one of three issues usually discussed
in the monetary targeting literature (e.g. Griffiths and Wood,
1981a) is examined here. The two issues not dealt with are
(1) the question of whether or not policy sould be 'activist',
i.e. should there be 'fine tuning?' (2) the desirability or
otherwise of announcing the rules by which the authorities act.
These are largely irrelevant to the present purpose. On the
other hand, the adoption of targets always involves the problem
of the selection of targets. The choice of targets is there¬
fore considered here.
There are two broad sets of competing targets : prices and quan¬
tities. The relevant prices are interest rates while the quan¬
tities relate to monetary aggregates. Without going into a
detailed review of this and other aspects of monetary targeting
which is available in Griffiths and Wood (1981) and other sources
(e.g.Artis, 1974; Sparks, 1979; Fortin, 1979; White 1979),
one may identify certain criteria for the selection of a target.
First, the choice of a target involves some hypothesis about the
structure of the economy (Artis,1974 p.c^2j)- Poole (1970) has
formalized this view by showing that in a closed economy a mone¬
tary target is more suitable with a stable demand for money
functions' but that an interest rate target is indicated with
stable expenditure functions. In the case of an open economy
with fixed exchange rates, it is now known that a money supply
target is more effective in stabilizing income while a DCE target
is more suitable for the balance of payments (Polak and Argy,
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1971; also Vaciago, 1975).
The second consideration in selecting a particular variable to
be targeted is that the variable should be within the control of
the authorities. If the public believes the target is not
attainable and the authorities consistently miss it, this may
affect adversely the public's expections about the ability of the
government to conduct monetary policy effectively. This could
increase the degree of financial instability. Third, it is
desirable that data relevant to the chosen target be available
in a timely fashion and of reasonable reliability. This is to
say the authorities should be able to monitor the target variable.
Finally, if the choice of a target is controversial the outcome
could be disappointing. This point has been emphasized by the
Bank of England (1977, p. 151) according to which 'the principle
of adoption of a target may be more important than its precise
form, or the particular magnitude to which the target relates'.
Having outlined some of the factors that need to be taken into
consideration in selecting a monetary target, one may now examine
the relative suitability of interest rate and monetary aggregates
as targets of monetary policy.
( 5 )
This review is based on British monetary policy . The Report
of the Radcliffe Committee on the Working of the Monetary System
was published in the year the Central Bank of Nigeria was opened.
It is now well known that the Radcliffe Committee recommended
an interest rate policy as the centre piece of monetary policy
(Nobay, 1973, p. 53). Although the Bank of England temporarily
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abandoned the use of the Minimum Lending (or Bank) Rate, the
effect of the introduction of Competition and Credit Control
in 1971 was to restore it to'full vigour' (JNobay, 1973, p. 43).
Thus, as in most other countries, the rate of interest served
as the target of monetary policy in the UK until 1974. Accord¬
ing to the Governor of the Bank of England,
'What swung the argument in favour of choosing a quantity
rather than a price as the indicator of the thrust of
monetary policy was the acceleration of inflation ... We
can, if we like, think of the nominal interest rate as
having an "expected inflation" component and a "real"
interest rate element. But we can never observe
expectations which are in any case likely to differ
from person to person, and to be volatile. The real
rate of interest is an abstract construct. This has
made it very difficult to frame the objectives of
policy in terms of nominal interest rates'
(Bank of England, 1978)
In terms of the criteria listed above, this argument is suggesting
that reliable data on interest rates are no longer available,
hence it was abandoned in favour of, or at least subordinated
to, a quantity target (£M3) .
An alternative explanation of the change in policy is offered
by Artis and Lewis (1981, p. 42) who argue that
'the switch to monetary aggregates in the 1970's is a
reflection more of a change of emphasis within the
goals of monetary policy, especially a concern with
inflation. At the same time there was disillusion
with old remedies. Prices and incomes policies had
been tried but with mixed success ... incomes policies
became politically charged and a monetary rule for restr¬
aining wages became increasingly attractive, if only
because of its relative novelty, and because the under¬
lying environment had been altered by the transition
to more flexible exchange rates'.
Another argument in support of the explanation in terms of
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changes within the objectives of monetary policy and exchange
rate considerations has been offered by McClan (1978, esp. pp.
4 - 8) .
This brief review shows that during the review period of this
study both interest rate and monetary aggregates were used in
many countries at one time or the other. But the issue of
targeting cannot be assessed properly in the Nigerian context
without an examination of the theoretical and institutional
background to the formulation of monetary policy. The instit¬
utional setting is considered in Ch. 4 while the discussion
of the theoretical background proceeds in this chapter with an
examination of the market for money in Nigeria.
2. THE MARKET FOR MONEY
The analysis of the market for money in Nigeria is approached
via an investigation of the demand for and supply of money in
the country.
2.1 THE DEMAND FOR MONEY IN NIGEKIA
A logical starting point of this discussion is a review of the
work which already has been done in this area.
2.1.1 A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE DEMAND FOR
MONEY IN NIGERIA
The study of the demand for money in Nigeria is of a recent
origin (the first is (Tomori, 1972)). Although a number of
/ 0 \
studies now exist 'there are only very few of them that
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warrant any review1 as most of them are 'essentially relatively
simple regression without a clear discrimination between the
issues raised in the controversies that have raged elsewhere'
(Okigbo, 1981, pp. 52 - 53). The main conclusions of these
studies are that the most important factor affecting the demand
for money is income and that the rate of interest is an insig-
( 7)nificant argument of the demand for money function
The most comprehensive and recent of the existing published
studies and hence the one chosen for review is that of Akinnifesi
and Phillips (1978) .
Like many of its predecessors, this study contains very many mis¬
takes. In order to make this critique as short as possible
only the most obvious ones are pointed out. The authors est¬
imate the following inplicit function in its additive and
multiplicative forms:
where M stands for narrow (M^) or broad (M£) money, Y is the
GDP (both deflated by the CPI) and are interest rates includ¬
ing the minimum lending rate (MLR) and 'an average lending rate'
(ALR). In one set of equations (the additive form) all the
interest rates are used in each equation but in the second set
(log-linear) only one rate is used at a time. Since the results
of the former turn out to be disappointing (probably because of





Separate equations are estimated for and and their com¬
ponents (currency, demand, savings and time deposits). In
addition an equation is estimated for the supply of M and
high powered money. But the focus of attention here in on the
demand for and . The independent variables in these equ¬
ations are real GDP, ALR, lagged dependent variable and a dummy
variable (W) to capture the effect of the Civil War. All the
estimated coefficients (except the income variable in ) are
statistically significant and correctly signed. From these
results they conclude that 'Generally the demand for real money
balances can be described as a function of its own lagged value,
expected real income and expected rate of interest' (p. 35).
Furthermore, the insignificance of the coefficient of the dummy
variable 'probably provides some support for the monetarists'
view that the demand for money is relatively stable over time'
(p. 34).
The use of commercial bank lending rates in a demand for money
function is a bit odd. As a proxy for the opportunity cost of
holding money, interest rates are supposed to measure the degree
of substitutability between money and other assets. A lending
rate is not the return on any asset. To compound the problem
further, one is told that the lending rate used is not a part¬
icular one but an average of some undisclosed rates. Neither is
tie weighting formula specified.
Secondly, since the authors refer to their set of equations as
a 'model of the monetary sector of Nigeria' which is made up of
seven structural equations and seven identities, the use of
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ordinary least squares is inappropriate. A simultaneous equ¬
ation estimation method is required in such a situation.
On interpretation of the results, the authors seem to have missed
the concept of functional stability by connecting it with the
dummy variable.
Finally, many of their conclusions do not follow from their
analysis. For instance, they attribute growth in the money
supply to government spending and inflation to money supply.
But nowhere do government expenditure nor prices appear in their
model.
Their model thus suffers from many methodological shortcomings




2.1.2 A MONEY DEMAND FUNCTION FOR JNIGERIA
One of the very few settled issues in the empirical work on the
demand for money is that this demand is related to a 'scale'
variable (which serves as a measure of the value of transactions)
and the opportunity cost of holding assets in money balances.
As usual, the actual variables to be used for this purpose are
the subject of a dispute. The dispute has resulted in the
emergence of many theories of the demand for money which may be
classified broadly into two : the transactions and asset theories.
An essential difference between these theories concerns the views
of their authors on the functions of money. Transactions
theories of which the inventory theoretic models of Baumol (1952)
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and Tobin (1956) are archtypes stress the Importance of money
as a medium of exchange. According to these theories, money
is held principally for transactions purposes. The non-
synchronization of receipts and payments together with the costs
of converting assets into and out of money necessitates the hold¬
ing of the latter in spite of its lower yield compared to that on
the former.
Asset theories on the other hand take a broader view of the
role of money. Money is regarded as only one of many altern-
( 8 )
ative ways of holding wealth . Therefore, the demand for
money may be considered as part of the problem of balancing
one's portfolio of assets in a way that maximizes the returns on
them. Each asset is assumed to yield some services which may be
pecuniary or non-pecuniary. Pecuniary returns are easy to
identify and are not in doubt. Assets such as savings and time
deposits, bonds and equities are cases in point. Money is one
of the assets which provide non-pecuniary services. One may
think about the service provided by money in the form of simplify¬
ing transactions by reducing search time as under barter (Brunner
and Meltzer, 1971).
Judd and Scadding (198B, pp. 994 - 95) have argued that the diff¬
erences between these theories involve four empirical issues :
the definition of money, the appropriate 'scale' variable, the
opportunity cost of holding money, and the proxy for incomplete
adjustment of the demand for money in the shortrun.
Leaving aside the question of the appropriate definition of money
f
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for the meantime, it is felt that these issues provide a useful
frame of reference for an empirical study of the demand for money
in Nigeria.
2.1.2.1 FUNCTIONAL FORM OF THE DEMAND FOR MONEY
As noted above, there is a great deal of controversy surrounding
( 8 )
the appropriate scale and opportunity cost variables . For
(9 )
certain reasons
, the problems of the scale variable have been
assumed away here by using the GDP alone.
Over the years, certain conventions about the form of the money
demand function have been established. In the first instance,
nominal money balances and income are hardly used in empirical
work currently. This is because the use of nominal variables
constrains the elasticity of money demand w.r.t the scale var¬
iables to unity (Lieberman, 1980, p. 46). As the unit elasticity
condition often is not met in practice, real magnitudes are of¬
ten used. But when real magnitudes are expressed as the ratio
of the nominal quantities to the price level, as is done below,
the price elasticity is constrained to unity.
The second convention is that the demand function is almost
always estimated in log-linear form. However, the appropriate¬
ness of this formulation depends on individual cases. In most
studies using Nigerian data, the log-linear specification out¬
performs the additive version (e.g. Ajayi (1974), Ojo (1974a)
and Teriba (1973, 1974)) while others report only the results
for the multiplicative case e.g. Ghosh (1981)). The superiority
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of the conventional formulation is also confirmed by this study
and only those results will be reported.
There is an exception to the log-linear formulation. If
the rates of interest (or inflation) are entered in the multipli¬
cative form the impression is given that the effect on the demand
for money of doubling the interest rate from, say, 1 to 2% will
be the same as from 10 to 20%. Two options are available: (a)
enter the interest rate directly or (b) transform the rate to
(1 + r/100) before taking the log. White (1976) and Friedman
and Schwartz (1982) have opted for (a) which is adopted here
while Hacche (1974) prefers (b).
Finally, it is claimed that 'money demand equations tend to be
subject to serial correlation' (Lieberman, 1980, p. 44). Thus,
there is a tendency for money demand equations, especially since
1976, to be estimated by an autoregressive technique such as the
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure^^ . A related but simpler trans¬
formation is first differencing (Hacche, 1974). But as Hendry
and Mizon (1978) have shown, such a procedure may be inapprop¬
riate in some circumstances (e.g. if the original variables ave
covariance stationary).
Given these considerations and those in footnote 4, the money
demand function may be represented as
log mt = X O +Al log yt +£Orlt + " * ' <Xn+lrnt + Ut (1)
where m is real money balances, y is real income, r -r are interest
rates, and u is a stochastic disturbance term.
- 14b -
2.1.2.2 ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
The data are annual observations on each variable over 1960 - 80.
is currency outside banks plus private sector demand deposits
and is plus time and savings deposits. The three interest
rates used are the rate on savings deposits (SDR), time deposits
over twelve months (TDK) at commercial banks and the Treasury
Bill issue rate (TBR). The test statistics are as defined in
the previous chapter^1"'" ^. The estimates of eqn (1) are shown
below:
log m t = -2.89 + 0.972 log y - 0.112 TBK^+ 0.388 SDK 0.112TD]
(2.93) (6.11) (1.34) (b.4) (0.213)
R2 - 0.931 D-W = 1.57 F(4,15) = 65
log m.^ =-3.68+1.24 log y^ - 0.127 TBR^+ 0.284 SDR(_+ 0.053 TDR
(3.86)(8.06) (1.59) (4-17) (1.02)
R2 = 0.946 D-W = 1.61 F(4,l5) = 84
Among the interest rates, only the coefficient of the Treasury
rate has the right sign butxis not significant even at the 10%
level. The time deposit rate is neither correctly signed nor
statistically different from zero at any conventional level of
significance. Although wrongly signed, the coefficient of the
savings deposit rate is highly significant. Real income is also
significant as well as having the right sign. As the equations
do not pass the test of a money demand function in terms of the
opportunity cost variable, they were re-estimated using one or
two rates at a time (thus reducing the risk of multicollizearity).
The results (for ) are the odd-numbered equations in Table
3.1 .
- 146 -
Sometimes it is argued that m in eqn (1) represents not actual
but desired money balance (Feige, 1967). If so, it is nec¬
essary to eliminate the desired (unobservable) quantity. A
common way of accomplishing this is the partial adjustment
hypothesis. Thus, following Hetzel (1984) and others eqn (l)
becomes
log mt = ^X<\0+ Xcq log yt + A<2rlt +- ■ -+A<Xn+l rnt+ (j - w l-l-
(la)
where X is the coefficient of adjustment ana is constrained to
lie between 0 and l^1^. The estimates of this functional form
are shown as the even-numbered equations in Table 3.1.
An eximation of this table shows that none of the equations
meets the normal expectations of a money demand equation. As
before, real income is both correctly signed and statistically
significant at any reasonable level. Apart from eqn (2), the
coefficient of SDR is statistically significant but again wrongly
signed in all the equations in which it occurs. The coefficient
of TBR is nearly always correctly signed (except in 1) but is
not statistically different from zero in any of the equations.
The least satisfactory variable whose coefficient is neither of
the correct sign nor statistically significant (except in 5)is TDR.
The lagged dependent variable is well behaved.
Some of the D-W statistics are very low, especially in 1, 3 and
b, thus suggesting a problem of serial correlation. These and
other equations were re-estimated using the Cochrane-Orcutt



























































































































































































one case, both the value of rho and its t-statistic turned out
to be below 0.5 while the coefficients of the independent var¬
iables and the goodness-of-fit statistics were substantially
unaffected. But where rho is statistically significant, the
2 C13 )
R , the t- ratios and the F statistic are drastically reduced
This suggests that the models have been misspecified.
The underdeveloped nature of the financial structure of less
developed countries (as evidenced by the narrow range of fin¬
ancial assets) has led to the suggestion that the substitution
between money and real assets may be quantitatively more import¬
ant than that between money and financial assets.
It is then argued that the relevant opportunity cost variable is
(141
the expected rate of inflation (Aghelvi and Khan (1978))
This hypothesis is tested here.
Like all expected values, the expected rate of inflation is un-
observable and an adjustment mechanism is required. Two alt¬
ernatives - perfect foresight (p* = p ) and static expections
(p* = P^_^) where * denotes expectations and p is the actual
rate of inflation - were tried and the results are presented
below.
As in the case of interest rates, in none of the equations is
the coefficient of the rate of inflation statistically signi¬
ficant as well as correctly signed. The conclusion to be drawn
from these results is that, given the assumption on the form¬
ation of price expectations, the rate of inflation is not a
significant factor in the demand for money in Nigeria. This is
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in conflict with the findings by Ojo (1974) who obtained a
statistically significant and correctly signed coefficient of
the price variable. But his results are subject to some
qualifications. First, as he admits, his sample period which
runs from 1960 - 1970 is too short to permit valid generaliz¬
ations. Besides, the war years (1967 - 69) are included so
that only seven of the years are normal. Furthermore, even
with the presence of the lagged dependent variable, the D-W
statistic which is then biased toward 2 is only 0.95. Finally,
the coefficient of the lagged dependent obtained by him is -1.22
which implies that the coefficient of expectations which he had
earlier contrained to lie between 0 and 1 is now 2.22 - an impl¬
ausible result. The earlier conclusion about the insignificance
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of inflation in the demand for money is therefore retained.
Based on ail the usual goodness-of-fit statistics, eqn (8) in
Table 3.1 is preferred to any of the equations considered
so far. Given the limitations of this equation pointed out
above, one may make the following highly tentative statements.
The income elasticity of the demand for money is low at 0.456.
But in the longrun it exceeds unity (1.26). The second obser¬
vation is that Treasury bills appear to be a weak substitute for
money - a result that was obtained by Teriba (1974) for an
earlier and shorter period. The most puzzling of the present
results is that, according to conventional interpretations,
savings deposits are a complement for money. This is surpri¬
sing because, owing to the relatively difficult conditions
required by commercial banks for the opening of current accounts,
many people find it more convenient to operate savings accounts.
Moreover, these accounts are operated virtually like current
accounts (Ajayi, 1974). One would then have expected the demand
for money to be negatively related to the savings deposit rate
(SDR). A possible explanation of the curious result may lie
in the fact that a large fraction of commercial bank deposits
is owned by the corporate sector. A negative relation between
the demand for money by households and the savings deposit rate
may be offset by the demand by other agents. But no data exist
for that level of disaggregation.
(15)A final hypothesis that is tested is the influence of un¬
certainty on the demand for money. According to Friedman and
Schwartz (1982, p. 39), both variables are positively related.
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The civil war in Nigeria provides an ideal opportunity for test¬
ing this hypothesis. This has been done by including in the
preferred equation a dummy variable (W) which takes the value of
1 in 1967 - 69 and zero in other years:
log mlt = -1.1 + 0.40 log y + 0.174 SDK - 0.73 TBR
(2.8) (3.9) (3.1) (1.7)
+ 0.56 log - 0.06W
(4.5) (1.0)
R2 = 0.98 D-W = 2.3 F(5,13) = 175 S.F. = 0.088
On the basis of these results, one can conclude that the war
exerted a negative but insignificant impact on the demand for
(16)
money
2.1.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE DFMAND FOR MONEY
Various specifications of the demand for money have been tried.
The best fitting equation is that which contains the following
dependent variables : real income, the rate offered by commercial
banks on savings, the treasury bill issue rate and the lagged
dependent variable in addition to the constant which is negative
and statistically significant. The results suggest that Treasury
bills are a weak substitute for money while savings deposits
complement money. The coefficient of the savings deposit rate,
though statistically significant, does not have the expected
sign.
Many other formulations, including demand functions for the
components of money, were estimated but not reported here. A
striking feature of these regressions relates to the coefficients
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of the savings deposit rate and the Treasury rate. In nearly
all the regressions, the former is statistically significant but
incorrectly signed while the latter is correctly signed but
statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the best equation
is that which contains these two rates as independent variables.
Finally, the signs of these variables are reversed in the time
deposit equation (not reported), although neither is now sig¬
nificant. There is no apparent reason for this observed behav¬
iour. Treasury bills, savings and time deposits may be related.
In the absence of any obvious explanation, one may say that the
Treasury rate is acting as a proxy for the opportunity cost of
holding money. In this case, it is possible that Treasury bills
are positively related to an asset which is a close substitute
for money. In the personal sector, it is difficult to see how
Treasury bills can be direct substitutes for money since they
are issued in large denominations (N20,000) which are beyond the
reach of most people. Savings deposits, on the other hand, may
be related to a scale variable which is more appropriate than,
say, real income. The savings deposit rate, alternatively,
may be acting for some unobservable interest rates in the fin¬
ancial system.
2.2 THE ECONQMETKIC APPROACH TO MONEY SUPPLY DETERMINATION
Money supply is examined in greater depth below. Its treatment
here is therefore very brief. In particular, two functional
specifications only are tried.
Following Teigen (1964) and Gibson (1972), the supply of money is
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hypothesized to be a function of the base or high-powered money,
H, the Central Bank's minimum lending rate (MLR) and the comm¬
ercial bank prime lending rate (PLR). This gives
log M® = £o + fa log Ht ♦ MLRt - ^ PLKt + U(; (5)
where all variables are in nominal terms.
According to Gibson, MLR should be negatively related to the
supply of money while PLK and H are expected to be positively
related to the supply of money because 'ceteris paribus we
expect banks to expand their earning assets when their reserves
rise, market interest rates rise, and the discount rate falls'
(Gibson, 1972, pp. 365 - 6).
The estimates of equation (15) are:
log Ml® = -1.478 + 1.0007 log Ht + 0.0993 MLR + 0.200 PLKt
(2.87) (36.69) (1.743) (3.063)
R2 = 0.986 D-W 1.693 F(3, 16) = 452 8.E. = 0.143
With the exception of ^ (the coefficient of the Central Bank
discount rate), the coefficients of all variables have the ex¬
pected signs and one significant at the 1% level. The co¬
efficient of H is statistically not different from unity. But
the coefficient of MLR is wrongly signed and, at the 5% level,
it is statistically insignificant (although it is significant at
the 10% level).
When the hypothesis of incomplete adjustment was tested, the
following results were obtained.
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log Ml® = -0.402 + 0.478 log Ht -0.0130 MLR + 0.0574 PLR
(0.840) (3.379) (0.251) (0.932)
+ 0.573 log Ml® ^
(3.740)
R2 = 0.992 D-W = 1.6455 h = 1.088 F(4,lo) = 618 S.E. - 0.2064
All coefficients now carry the correct sign but those of the
interest rate variables are not statistically different from
zero at any conventional significance level. Moreover, the
absolute value of the same coefficients are relatively low.
_2
The R and F statistics are improved. Given that the critical
value of the normal distribution at 5% is 1.645 (one tail), one
cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero serial correlation so
that the OLS estimates may be regarded as reliable.
In view of the non-significance of M ^ and .. and their low
algebraic values, the equation was re-estimated without the
interest rate variables. Another reason for their exclusion
is their relative stability over the review period (PLR, for
example, was 7% between 1967 and 1973 inclusive). The outcome
of that procedure is shown below:
log Ml® = -0.0947 + 0.423 log Ht + 0.631 log Ml®_x
(0.621) (5.008) (6.780)
R2 = 0.993 D-W = 1.6525 h = 0.854 F(2,17) = 1308 S.E. = 0.1034
This time the intercept term is virtually zero. Other coeffic-
_2
ients are significant at the 1% level and the R is slightly
improved. The standard error of the regression is also slightly
lower and the lower h statistic implies one can accept the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation with more confidence. This
then is the equation of the money supply.
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High-powered money is itself endogenous in the model. It is
expected that it will respond to changes in some variables in
the system. For example, a higher level of income requires a
higher level of transactions balances (assuming, of course, that
velocity is fixed) which, in turn, require a greater amount of
high-powered money. Therefore, it is expected that the level
of income will be positively related to high-powered money. The
latter is then hypothesized to be a function of nominal income
and high-powered money in the previous period i.e.
log Ht = 7S0 + log Yt + log Ht_1 + ut (16)
The estimates of the equation are
log H = -6.168 + 0.768 log Yt + 0.437 log Ht_1
(4.68) (4.83) (6.4)
= 0.983 D-W = 1.8587 h = 0.686 F(2,17) = 533 S.E. = 0.164
The results are statistically satisfactory in all respects :
_2
absence of autocorrelation, high K , all coefficients are stat¬
istically significant at the 1% level and are correctly signed
and the null hypothesis that all the regression coefficients
are zero can be rejected at the 1% level. However, one may want
to compare them with those of an equation suggested by Akinnifesi
and Phillips (1978). The equation is given by
log Ht = aQ + a1 log g± + log Ht_1 (17)
where g = rate of growth of constant price GDP. Their argument
is that since growth is one of the objectives of monetary policy
in Nigeria, the monetary authorities would vary H in such a way
as to realize this objective. It is clear that this argument
assumes that changes in H have a predictable effect on the rate
of growth of the GDP. In that case, g should be on the left
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hand side and not on the right. The argument therefore does not
justify equation 17. Nevertheless, it was estimated and yielded:
log H = -0.0771 + 0.873 g + 1.019 log H ±
(0.371) (2.014) (22.44)
R2 = 0.966 D-W = 2.2204 h = -0.503 F(2,17) = 270 S.E. = 0.227
In terms of goodness-of-fit the performance of the earlier equ¬
ation is superior and it is therefore adopted as the equation
for the base money.
2.3 SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ESTIMATES OF THE DEMAND FOR AND
SUPPLY OF MONEY FUNCTIONS
The preferred functions of the demand for and supply of money and
of high powered money were estimated using the two-stage least
squares technique. But as the results show, there is little
difference between the ordinary and two-stage least squares as
far as the present model is concerned. They are presented
below.
(i) DEMAND FOR MONEY (NARROW)
log M = -1.05 + 0.427 log Y + 0.213 SDR -0.086 TBR+0.495 log Mt
(2.3) (3.53) (2.38) (1.82) (2/. 76)
R2 = 0.979 h = -2.26 F(4,15) = 222 S.E. = 0.0886
(Note : Y is real income)
(i) SUPPLY OF NARROW MONEY
log M^ = -0.095 + 0.423 log + 0.631 log
(0.62) (5.01) (6.78)
R2 = 0. 993 h = 0.854 F(2,17) - 1308 S.E. = 0.103
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(iii) SUPPLY OF HIGH-POWERED MONEY
log H = -2.46 + 0.67 log Y + 0.45 log Ht_1
(4.98) (5.27) (3.93)
R* = 0.984 h = 0.843 F(2,l7) = 604 S.E. - 0.153
In some ways, the OLS estimates are better than those of the
2SLS estimates. No serial correlation was evident in the former
but the latter yeild an h- value of less than -2 in the case of
money demand. With a critical value of h at -1.645 at the 5%
level, one cannot accept the null hypothesis of no serial cor¬
relation. For this reason, the OLS results are retained in
each of the three cases.
This ends the econometric analysis of the demand for and supply
of money. But this is only one way of analysing the money
supply. Another alternative is the balance sheet approach to
money supply determination which was indicated at the beginning
of this chapter. This approach is adopted in the next section.
3. BALANCE SHEET APPROACH TO MONEY SUPPLY DETERMINATION
One of the conclusions of sections 2.2 and 2.3 above, given the
weaknesses of the models estimated there, is that high-powered
money (H) is the most important determinant of the money supply.
The money supply (M) itself may be expressed as the product of
high-powered money and the money multiplier (m) since m = M/H.
The remaining part of this chapter is devoted to the investig¬
ation of H and m.
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3.1 HIGH-POWERED MONEY
A useful way of analyzing high-powered money is by examining the
balance sheet of the Central Bank. Following Zecher (1974, 1976),
its assets (A) are classified into two : foreign reserves (F) and
assets other than foreign reserves (OA). Similarly, the lia¬
bilities of the bank (L) are grouped into high-powered money and
other liabilities (OL). The accounting identify, A = L, enables
one to write
F + OA = H + OL or H = F + (OA - OL)
which may be written as
H = F + D (2)
where
D = OA - OL (3)
and D is a measure of Central Bank credit to the domestic economy.
From (2) it is clear that factors which increase F or D also
increase H. Eqn (3) also shows that, provided there are no
offsetting changes in the other variables, an increase in OA
(which comprises of such items as private and public secutiries,
investments, loans and advances) or a decrease in OL (which is
made up of state and Federal Government, foreign and other dom¬
estic deposits and other liabilities) leads to an increase in D
and hence H. Therefore, it may be instructive to examine some of
the items in greater detail. As a starting point, the balance
sheet of the Central Bank of Nigeria is shown in Table 3.3.
Taking assets first, the table shows that in 1981 the largest
item was government securities which formed 62% of the total.
At 25% of total assets, foreign reserves constituted the second largest
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TABLE 3.3 ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE CENTRAL BANK
OF NIGERIA AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1980 AND 1981
ASSETS (N M)
1980 1981
Foreign Reserves 5469.1 3441.0
Government Securities 2859.3 6046.5
Treasury Bills - 3404.0
Treasury Certificates 1590.9 1112.5
Others 1268.4 1529.1
Rediscounts 80.7 85.4
Treasury Bills and Certificates 1.5 6.2
Commercial Bills 79.2 79 . 2
Advances 450. 3 565.7
Investments 226 . 8 265.5
Other Assets 271.2 305.3
LIABILITIES
High-Powered Money 4798.3 5026.1
Notes and Coins 3589.5 4547.7
Commercial Bank Deposits 1208.8 678.4
Other Liabilities 4559.1 4683.3
State Government Deposits (224.8) (143.1)
Federal Government Deposits (1874.6) (1442.3)
Foreign Deposits (36.8) (37.0)
Other Domestic Deposits (1394.1) (1038.4)
Capital plus Reserves (67.0) (91.0)
Others (961.8) (1931.5)
TOTAL ASSETS/LIABILITIES 9357.4 9709.4
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item. However, this is an unusual development. The year saw
an unprecedented increase in the Bank's holdings of Treasury
Bills. It is therefore necessary to use the figures for 1980
which are more representative of past trend than those of 1981.
When this is done, the relative importance of government secur¬
ities and external reserves is reversed. More than half of
the Bank's assets (58%) were held in foreign reserves while
government securities amounted to less than a third (31%) of
the assets. Together, these assets amounted to 89% of the
total which compares with the figure of 87% for 1981. Bills
discounted are particularly insignificant.
A further examination of the Bank's balance sheet shows that
high-powered money was the largest liability both in 1980 (51.3%)
and 1981 (51.8%). High-powered money, of course, consists mainly
of currency in circulation (75 and 87% in 1980 and 1981 respect¬
ively). As a proportion of total liabilities, notes and coins
amounted to 38% in 1980 and 45% in 1981. Other single items on
the liability side of major importance include FG deposits (20%
in 1980 and 15% in 1981) and other deposits (15 and 11% res¬
pectively ) .
i
The composition of the assets and liabilities of the Bank has
undergone considerable changes since 1960. For instance, in
that year the ratio of government securities to total assets
was 1.9% while notes and coins amounted to 94%. The changes
in the main items are shown in Appendix Tables 3.1 - 3.3.
The first two of these tables show that there was a tremendous
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jump in many of the items in 1974. This was caused by the
massive inflow of foreign exchange assets following the oil
price increases that started late in 1973 (see Chart 6.1).
Given this review of the trend in main items of the balance sheet
of the Central Bank, the next two subsections deal with the
components of H identified in eqn (2).
3.1.1 DOMESTIC CREDIT CREATION IN NIGERIA
From eqn (3), a ceteris paribus increase in OA or decrease in OL
will increase D. As a fraction of total assets/liabilities, OA
has varied between 5.9% in 1960 to 79% in 1978 while OL rose
from 4.7% in 1960 to 79.7% in 1974. They therefore need some
closer examination.
Holding its liabilities constant, the Central Bank can increase
domestic credit by purchasing private or public securities, re-
discounting bills or making advances. Until 1974 the principal
method by which the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) increased D
from the asset side of its balance sheet was through the purchase
of government securities. As Table A-3.3 shows, the ratio of
government securities to total assets rose from 1.6% in 1962 to
59% in 1967. This was due mainly to the shortfall of expected
foreign contribution to the First Plan mentioned in Ch. 1. and
the financial requirements of the Civil War.
The favourable developments in the oil sector between 1974 and
1977 (Appendix 1; Table A -2.1) reduced or even eliminated
the pressure on the CBN to invest in government securities,
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hence their share in total assets plummeted from 20% in 1976 to
0.3% in 1974. But following the reduced earnings from the oil
sector in the late 1970's owing to world oil glut of the period,
the ratio of government securities to total assets climbed to
39% in 1978 and to 62% in 1981. Thus, domestic credit was con¬
ditioned to a large extent by the government's fiscal needs.
The second main way of increasing D while holding liabilities
constant is through advances to the government and the private
sector. In Nigeria, this is insignificant compared to govern¬
ment securities. Moreover, advances were made mainly to the
government. Nevertheless advances constitute a source of credit
to the economy.
Finally D increases when the CBN grants loans to commercial banks
through the rediscounting of bills or advances on the security
of some specified liquid assets (see Ch. 4, Section 1.1) . But
this facility has not been used much (Ch. 4).
Table A - 3.2 shows that government and other deposits are the
largest items of OL. Government deposits were stagnant until
1969 as the budget was in deficit during this time (Ch. 2).
But like the other items, it jumped from N48.7 m in 1973 to
N2125 m in 1974 because of the increased oil earnings.
Until 1980, other domestic deposits constituted a minor source
of changes in domestic credit.
From this examination of other assets and liabilities of the CBN
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domestic credit (as used here) is determined by the Central Bank,
the Treasury, the commercial banks, and the private commercial
sector. The accounts also shows that the Treasury exercises
a predominant influence on D. Moreover, the CBN cannot take
the initiative which must come from the other sectors. As
such it does not have an absolute control over D. From the
identity D = OA - OL, it is plain that the purchase of government
securities (or any other asset) does not necessarily affect dom¬
estic credit and hence high-powered money. If, for example,
the Central Bank purchases N1000 m worth of government securities,
that item and government deposits in its balance sheet will
increase by the same amount i.e. the increase in OA is exactly
matched by an increase in OL. However, should the Treasury
decide to reduce its deposits at the Bank, OL will fall while OA
remains at the new higher level. D therefore increases by the
fall in OL. The result will be an increase in currency or
commercial bank reserves. But a loan to commercial banks in¬
creases D and high-powered money directly. This follows from
the fact that the increase in an item of OA (loans and advances)
is matched by an increase in commercial bank reserves which are
part of high powered money. Since there is no change in OL,
both D and H increase by the same amount. The commercial banks
can then create new demand deposits of an amount equal to the
product of the money multiplier and the amount of the loan and
advances. The effect of a Central Bank loan to the private
sector is the same if the loan is deposited with the commercial
banks; otherwise, only high-powered money (currency) will
increase.
Thus the initiative for changing domestic credit lies outside
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the Central Bank in this setting : the commercial banks, the
private sector or the Treasury must seek and use the Central Bank
loans. Nevertheless, there are two ways in which the Central
Bank can influence domestic credit through the commercial banks.
First, it can alter its portfolio of domestically created assets
through the sale and purchase of securities on the open market.
Second, it can compel commercial banks to borrow from it by
raising the statutory liquidity ratio sufficiently. These are
two of the four main traditional instruments of monetary control
and are discussed in greater detail in Ch. 4. Meanwhile, the
second component of high powered money, foreign reserves, is
discussed next.
3.1.2 THE FOREIGN COMPONENT OF HIGH-POWERED MONEY
High-powered money is Central Bank domestic credit plus foreign
reserves, F. The level of reserves in year t, F^_, is equal to
the level in the previous period, F ^, plus the change in res¬
erves in the current period, F^ i.e.
F^_^ may be taken as given in any period so that F is completely
determined by A f . But Af is identically equal to the balance
of payments. Under a perfectly flexible exchange rate regime,
A F is zero so that the level of foreign reserves remains
fixed, say at F. In this scenario, H is determined by domestic
factors alone. In this regard, such an economy may be treated
as a closed one. But as Nigeria was never under a flexible
exchange rate regime during the review period, this line of argu-
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ment is not pursued further.
Over a very wide range, there is no limit on the value of ^F
with a fixed exchange rate. The new high-powered equation is
Ht = rt-i + + Dt
A fall in ^F^ leads to a fall in H, all other items remaining
constant. There are many ways in which AF^ can fall. Under
the Central Bank of Nigeria Act as subsequently amended, all
foreign exchange assets of the Federation are centralized in the
Bank. An individual who wants to buy foreign currencies (to
pay for imports for example) applies to the Bank through his
bank. Both the individual's deposits at his bank and those of
his bank at the Central Bank are reduced by the resulting sale
of foreign exchange. In addition, H fails.
Another way in which ^F^ can change is through the government
fiscal account. Under the existing institutional arrangements
all foreign exchange earned from oil (over 90% of the total)
accrues directly to the government. Therefore the inflow of
foreign exchange increases the level of foreign reserves and
government deposits by the amount of the inflow. There is thus
no change in high-powered money as the increase in F is exactly
offset by an increase in D : foreign exchange inflow is completely
sterliized. It is monetized when the government reduces its
deposits at the Central Bank (by increasing its expenditure)
which lowers OL without affecting OA.
This shows that the effect of the balance of payments on high-
powered money is determined by the government and the private
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sector while the influence of the Central Bank on II is negligible
(given the insignificance of interest rates in financial assets
found above). The only other way the Central Bank can influ¬
ence the money supply is through the money multiplier. The
extent of its control over this quantity is examined below.
3.2 THE MONEY MULTIPLIER
As stated earlier, the money multiplier, m, is the ratio of the
stock of money, M, to high-powered money, H:
m = M/H ^ M = mH
The aim of this section is to review the traditional multiplier
approach to money supply determination.
The multiplier is made up of different components so that different
definitions can be obtained by including more or less of these
components. As the detailed derivation of m is available in
many textbooks (e.g. Simpson (1976)) and other sources (e.g.
Ajayi (1972), Ojo (1976), Oyejide (1974)), only the results are
reported here.
Let M1 be as defined previously and the sum of currency outside
banks and commercial bank reserves. Then the associated multi¬
plier is iri^ where
m
1 = 1 + c (4)
r + c
where c is the currency-deposit ratio and r is the reserve
deposit ratio. m is therefore a function c and r i.e.
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m1 = f(c,r) (5a)
and
dm1 = r-1 dc - 1+c dr (5b)
9 9
(r+c) (r+c)
Since 0 ©L c, r 1, f^ 0 and dm^ 0. In practical terms, a
rise in c or r reduces the value of the multiplier.
c is the outcome of the decisions of individuals to hold their
money in currency or demand deposits. As such, it is determined
by the portfolio behaviour of the non-bank public. Commercial
banks choose the actual level of r while the Central Bank sets
the required level of r.
Now let the money supply be defined more broadly to include
savings plus time deposit (=quasi-money, QM). Then, given ,
m^ = 1+c+q (6)
r+rq+c
where q is the quasi-money-deposit ratio.
Another concept of high-powered money may be obtained by noting
that in Nigeria Treasury Bills are reserve eligible assets (Ajayi,
1973a, p. 31). Then, given this expanded base (H^)
m = 1+c (Narrow Money)
r+c+t (7)
m. = 1+c+q (Broad Money)
1+rq+c+t (8)
where t is the ratio of Treasury Bills outside the CBN to demand
deposits.
The components of the money multiplier are therefore c, r, q and
t. The first two are definitely the most importand and are
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considered briefly below.
8.2.1 THE CURRENCY-DEPOSIT RATIO
The currency deposit ratio is especially important in under¬
developed economies where, in general, currency forms a higher
proportion of money supply than in more developed economies.
Changes in the currency ratio are therefore more important in
the former than in the latter. The ratio therefore needs a
closer scrutiny.
As seen above, it is determined by the portfolio behaviour of
the non-bank public which ultimately decides how its total money
balances are to be split between currency and demand deposits.
But its decision may be influenced by the Central and commercial
banks through the opportunity cost of holding both forms of money
balances discussed below. In this sense, one may say that the
currency-deposit ratio is the outcome of the joint decisions of
the Central and commercial banks, and the non-bank public.
Many factors affect the way individuals hold their money balances.
In the shortrun, a rise in real income is expected to affect the
ratio except in the unlikely event where the income elasticities
of the demand for currency and demand deposits are equal. There
is reason to believe that the income elasticity of the demand for
(17)
currency is, in fact, lower than that of demand deposits
First, since demand deposits earn a negative rate of return (e.g.
bank charges), there is a critical minimum level of money balances
which makes the holding of demand deposits worthwhile, assuming
that bank charges have a fixed element. Second, those who already
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may find
operate chequing accounts/that the level of currency that would
that would result from splitting the increase in money (necessary
to finance the increase in income) equally between currency and
demand deposits is higher than the desired level. In other
words, 'rising income ... may convert practices of holding wealth
and making payments from currency to deposits' (Cagan, 196b, p.
126). Anotber hypothesis relating the ratio to income is that the
former may react positively to changes in the share of income going
to labour (Diz, 1970, p. 110).
As both currency and demand deposits react in a similar manner to
changes in the price level, the effect of inflation on the ratio
may be approximated by zero.The opportunity cost of holding
currency then is zero. But holding demand deposits instead of
currency entails a sacrifice such as bank charges. In Nigeria
there are other indriect costs e.g. the risk of bank failure (as
happened in the 1950's (Brown, 1966, p. 25)) and the conversion
of demand deposits which is a costly process in terms of time and
effort. This opportunity cost, however defined, is thus expected
to be positively related to c.
Other factors which have been suggested are familiarity with bank
facilities (which is a function of bank facilities themselves),
literacy (Ajayi, 1978, p. 61) and urbanization (Kaufman, 1966, p. 9).
These (except perhaps urbanization which is double-edged) are
expected to lead to a fall in the currency deposit ratio. Chart
3.1 indicates clearly that the ratio has been falling over time in
Nigeria.
Charh 3.1:Currency-deposih Rahio and
Rahio of Demand Deposihs ho Money
YEAR
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3.2.2 THE RESERVE-DEPOSIT RATIO
This is the second main determinant of the money multiplier.
The observed reserve ratio r has two elements : the legal component
rj and excess liquidity ratio r . This gives
r = ri + re (9)
The relation shows that the Contral Bank (which sets r^) and
the commercial banks (which select r ) determine r jointly. In
principle, the Central Bank can force commercial banks to shift
their portfolio of assets in favour of government securities
(which are reserve-eligible) by raising r^ and/or varying the
composition of reserve-eligible assets.
In selecting r, commercial banks take r^ as well as the avail¬
ability of profitable investment outlets into consideration.
Even where investment outlets are unlimited, there is still the
need to maintain excess reserves because of the high cost of an
unexpected cash shortfall as described in detail in Simpson (1976,
esp. p. 149). According to this analysis, the level of excess
reserves may be related to the Central Bank discount rate and to
the cost of borrowing from other banks.
For these reasons, banks always keep excess reserves. In Nigeria,
an additional reason is the strong seasonal variation in the demand
for money, and loans and advances (Okigbo, 1981, p. ). Finally,
interest rates in Nigeria have been very low (see Ch. 4). In
such a situation, banks might prefer to work with excess liquidity
to expanding earnings assets. Actual end of quarter liquidity
ratios are presented graphically in Chart 3.2. The statutory
Charh 3.2:End oP Quarher
Commencia I Bank Liquidih y Ra hi o
1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
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liquidity ratio remained at 25% throughout the entire period.
Excess liquidity therefore varied between 2.3% in 1962 III to 70.4%
in 1969 III as the actual ratio was 27.3% and 95.4% respectively.
3.2.3 FINAL REMARKS ON THE MONEY MULTIPLIEK
When the money supply is expressed as M = mH it gives the impression
that m is constant so that all variations in M are attributable to
H. Multiplier analysis also gives one the impression that banks
work to a constant reserve ratio. This implicitly assumes that
they face an insatiable demand for loans and advances. But as
shown above, the constant reserve ratio assumption is contradicted
by the historical evidence. Some of the reasons for the variab¬
ility of the ratio have already been given. In addition, banks
may work with excess reserves (1) if the increase in reserves
is deemed to be temporary (2) in anticipation of a surge in the
demand for loans or cash or (3) if there is deficient demand for
loans and advances. In Nigeria, (3) is usually due to the absence
of suitable collateral security. Finally, another implicit assum¬
ption of multiplier analysis is a constant currency-deposit ratio.
This has been shown above to be negatively trended in Nigeria.
Taken together these factors suggest that m should not be treated
as a constant. End of year values of m^ - m^ between 1960 and
1981 are shown in Table A - 3.1 while Chart 3.3 presents the end
of quarter values. All the multipliers display an element of
positively trend. Summary measures of variability in the various
multipliers are set out below:
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TABLE 3.4 : SUMMARY MEASURES OF THE TREND IN THE
MONEY MULTIPLIERS, 1960 - 80
Mean
Standard deviation, (f
& as % of Mean
mi m2 mB m4
1.54 2.36 1.24 1.89
0.19 0.39 0.52 0.78
12.4 16.7 41.6 41.2
Column 1 shows that m^ has been strikingly stable around its mean
of approximately 1.5 since 1960. The table above confirms this by
showing a standard deviation of only 0.19 which is one-eighth of
the mean. m^ displays no consistent trend. Similar comments
apply to m although in this case a slight upward trend is discern-
ible as it exhibits a slightly greater variability (see above
table).
mg shows a clear trend. In the first six and last seven years,
its value exceeded unity while in the intermediate years (except
1974), its value was below unity. Furthermore, it displays
greater variability than either m^ or m^. On the whole, m^
tended to rise over time. Apart from the absence of a dramatic
pattern, m^ and m^ behaved in a similar fashion.
The behaviour of the various multipliers has some implications
for monetary control. Although the Central Bank cannot control
high-powered money effectively, it may still be interested in pre¬
dicting the money supply or the multiplier. It would therefore
have to select the multiplier to use for the purpose. In this
regard, the summary table suggests that m^ and should be the
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appropriate multipliers because they are the most stable.
m^ is superior to all others while m^ follows closely. The
least stable is m .
o
Ojo, in an article covering a shorter period (1962 - 73) (Ojo,
1976), has also examined the issue of which multipliers are the
most useful for predictive purposes. His method is regression
analysis. The general form of the estimating equation is
4
mit = Hkt + mit-l + Sj 1 i = 1, , 4
j~2 k = 1, 2
where S. is a seasonal variable with value 1 if the observation
J
relates to quarter j and zero otherwise, and other variables
are as previously defined and all observations are quarterly.
His conclusion is that m^ and m^ (which are defined as in the
present analysis except that time deposits are excluded from broad
money) predict best. This conclusion is at variance with that
of the present exercise with respect to m^ and . However,
the difference can be explained in terms of the definition of
high powered money. While H has been defined here as the sum
of currency in circulation and commercial and foreign deposits at
the Central Bank of Nigeria he uses H which consists of the first
two items plus 'other deposits' as shown in the balance sheet of
the Central Bank. If this definition is accepted, the summary
table above is altered as follows:
m1 m^ m3 m4
Mean 1.45 2.21 0.995 1.49
6" 0,25 0.43 0.23 0.26
^ as % of Mean 17.5 19.3 23.5 17.7
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which shows that and are superior.
The usefulness of being able to predict a variable which cannot
be controlled is that it may be related to some variables of
interest and which can be controlled. Such variables can then
be used to predict values of the policy variables. But the
fact still remains that in Nigeria, the money multiplier is
outside the control of the authorities.
4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The principal objective of this chapter has been to provide some
theoretical information that would facilitate the appraisal of
monetary policy in Nigeria.
The major concern of the chapter was, therefore, with the analysis
of the demand for and supply of money. The main conclusions of
the demand analysis are summarized in Section 2.1.3. The
analysis yielded results which contradict well-established
hypotheses. For instance, according to David Laidler,
'there is an overwhelming body of evidence in favour of
the proposition that the demand for money is netatively
related to the rate of interest. Of all the issues in
monetary economics, this is the one that appears to have
been settled most decisively'
(Laidler, 1977, p. 130)
The results obtained in this chapter show that this assertion
needs to be qualified. The interest rate variable did not have
the expected sign and where it did, it was not significantly
different from zero. A possible explanation offered is the
regulated nature of all interest rates (to be discussed in the
next chapter). The interest rate behaved in a similar fashion
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in the econometric analysis of the supply of money. An import-r¬
ant consequence of this phenomenon is that interest-rate-related
policies might not work in Nigeria. A high degree of instability
was also noticed in the demand for money. This also has the
effect of weakening the effectiveness of monetary policy.
In addition to the econometric method, the money supply process
was also analysed by the balance sheet approach. It was shown
that the Central Bank of Nigeria has limited influence over high
powered money, the money multiplier and, consequently, the stock
of money, i.e. these variables are endogenous with respect to
the Bank. High powered money is determined by reserve flows and
the Treasury while the multiplier is determined by the portfolio
behaviour of the Central and commercial banks and the non-bank
public. Reserve flows are, of course, exogenous to the Central
Bank while the extent of its monetization is determined by the
Treasury given that the government debt is monetized (discussed
further in Ch. 4).
Given this theoretical background, the next task that is under¬
taken is the appraisal of monetary policy.
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FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER THREE
1. Consider, for example, the sympsium on the book in the
November 1936 issue of the QJE, especially papers by
Robertson (1936) and Viner (1936), and Keynes' reply
(Keynes, 1937) as well as Friedman (1948).
2. Editors' Introduction to Griffiths and Wood (1981), pp.
2-3.
3. Examples are Griffiths and Wood (1981), and the sumposium
on the subject in the Canadian Journal of Economics,
1979 involving Sparks (1979), White (1979) and Fortin
(1979).
4. This list is taken from Foot (1981), p. lb.
5. Most financial institutions in Nigeria started initially
as foreign subsidiaries of British firms (Brown, 1966;
Okigbo, 1981). The first financial legislation (passed
in 1952) was based on the recommendations of a report
by G D Paton of the Bank of England. The Central Bank
Act of Nigeria Act, 1958 was essentially the draft ordin¬
ance drawn up by J.B. Loynes, also of the Bank of England.
Before, J.L. Fisher, also of the Bank of England, had
reported on the establishment of a central bank in
Nigeria (Fisher 1952). It is common knowledge that
both Fisher and Loynes based their recommendations on
their experience at the Bank of England (Nwankwo, 1980,
pp. 5 - 6). Finally, the Governor of the CBN for
the first three years was Roy Fenton who was on second¬
ment from the Bank of England. Clearly British mone¬
tary policy affected Nigeria's monetary policy in the
early years.
6. These include (Ajayi (1974), Akinnifesi and Phillips
(1978), Ghosh (1981), Iyoha (1976), Ojo (1976) and
Teriba (1973, 1974).
7. There are two exceptions : Akinnifesi and Phillips (1978)
which is reviewed below and Ghosh (1981). However, Ghosh
is concerned primarily with the supply of money. He
estimates a demand function for three monetary aggre¬
gates : M-. and as defined previously, and a third
which he defines as less time deposits. The independ¬
ent variables in each case are an income measure and an
undefined 'interest rate on deposit' as well as the lagged
dependent variable. These functions were estimated by
OLS 2SLS and 3SLS. It turns out that only the three-
stage least squares estimates of and M^, yield a stat¬
istically significant interest rate coefficient. How¬
ever, the use of the index of industrial production as a
proxy for income in order to be able to use quarterly
data tends to reduce the reliability of his results.
8. In transactions theories of the demand for money, one
of the most widely used measures of the value of trans-
- 177 -
actions, and hence the scale variable, is some measure of
the level of current output, usually the GDP or GJMP. But
as it well known neither is a perfect measure of the value
of transactions (Goldfeld, 1973). The inadequacy of
national income as a proxy for the value of transactions
has led to the suggestion of alternative ones. For example,
Lieberman (1977) has proposed bank debits; Goldfeld
(1976) the ratio of GNP to previous peak GNP in addition
to current GNP.
While transactions theories emphasize the medium of exchange
role of money, asset theories take the view that money is
primarily a store of wealth. The latter therefore argue
that the relevant scale variable is not measured or observed
income but permanent income in Laumas, and Spencer (1980) in
addition to human and non-human wealth (e.g. Friedman (19b6,
1959)).
The transactions - asset argument has important implications
for policy because the controversy over the crowding out
of private investment by public expenditure seems (see Ch.
2) to revolve around whether there are significant wealth
effects in the holding of money. It has been suggested
that if wealth is substantial in the demand for money
function then there may be significant crowding out in
which case fiscal policy will be relatively ineffective
while monetary policy will be, by comparison, more effect¬
ive (Blinder and Solow, 1973; Friedman, 1978). The
asset theory is not tested here because data on some
relevant variables (e.g. the capitalized value of the
public debt as used by Marothia and Phillips (1982) for
Canada) are not available and the number of observations
is too small to permit the usual calculation of permanent
income.
The return on various financial assets has been used as a
measure of the opportunity cost of holding wealth in monet¬
ary assets but there is still substantial disagreement on
which rate of interest is most appropriate. The portfolio
approach suggests that different interest rates be used in
conjunction. For Nigeria, this approach has been followed
by Teriba (1974) and Akinnifesi and Phillips (1978). How¬
ever, this increases the risk of multicollinearity and in
practice only one or two are used together. For the US in
particular, the shortterm commercial paper rate is favoured.
(Goldfeld's 1973 paper appears to have made this the 'stand¬
ard' rate. See also Goldfeld (1976), Garcia and Pak (1979)
and Laumas and Spencer (1980)). Other variables besides
interest rates have been proposed as proxies for the opport¬
unity cost of holding money (e.g. dividend-price ratio and
long-term bond rate by Hamburger (1977) and the rate of
growth of nominal income by Friedman and Schwartz (1982,
pp. 274 - 80). For developing countries, the rate of
inflation is now widely used, see below.
9. See Footnote 8 above.
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10. For instance all the equations reviewed by Judd and
Scadding were estimated this way. See Judd and Scadding
(1982, pp. 996 - 97).
11. R2 is the corrected coefficient of multiple determination,
D-W is the Durbin-Watson statistic, h is Durbin's h
statistic (for equations containing the lagged dependent
variable), and figures in brackets are the t- ratios of
the respective coefficients.
12. In eqn (la) mt_1 may be defined as (M/P) where M is
nominal money balances and P is the price level. The
adjustment mechanism on which this is based has been
questioned and two alternatives have been proposed.
Hacche (1974) and Goldfeld (1976) and others believe
that inflation is a real phenomenon so that m^ =
But Laidler (1982) who subscribes to the monetary theory
of inflation prefers to define it as m^ = M^/P. See
Hetzel (1984), p. 186.
18. The two cases are illustrated with the following examples:
log mlt = 3.72 + 0.048 log y - 0.0075 TBR
(2.4) (0.197) (0.123)
R2 = -0.129, D-W = 1.205, F(2,15) = 0.026, rho = 0957
rho t- statistic = 14.0
log mlt = -1.4 + 0.42 log yt + 0.115 SDR + 0.645 log m._1
(3.6) (3.7) (2.2) (5.1)
_2
R = 0.975, F = 190, rho = -0.011, rho t- statistic = 0.049
14. Other studies in which this procedure has been followed
include Aghelvi et al (1979), Morgan (1979), Crockett (1980),
Eggertsson (1982) and, for Nigeria, Ojo (1974).
15. Stability of the demand for money function over time is
regarded as important because if the relationship between
the demand for money and its determinants breaks down,
policy makers become unsure of future demand. In that
case it becomes difficult also to project the link between
money and important macroeconomic variables such as out¬
put, prices and interest rates. (Hafer and Hein, 1979;
Judd and Scadding, 1982 p. 993). Accordingly, using the
Chow test mentioned in Ch. 2, some stability tests were
carried out here. From the results, all the functions
considered above display strong evidence of structural
instability. This is not surprising in view of the
disappointing results reported above.
16. In an attempt at isolating the effect of the civil war as
far as possible, the same equation was re-estimated
with the war years and the dummy variable excluded. The
coefficient estimates and the levels of significance were
hardly altered.
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17. The estimates of the demand for the components of money
show that the shortrun income elasticity for the demand
for currency is 0.77 while that of demand deposits is
1.16.
Appendix Table 3.1
SELECTED ASSETS OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA
















| 1960 | 155.2 3.2 9.7 I 1.9| 164.9 |
| 1961 | 151.5 9.0 25.9 | 15.5| 177.4 |
| 1962 | 153.3 3.1 35.7 | 24.2 | 189.0 |
| 1963 | 129.0 34.5 69.4 | 56.5 | 198.4 |
| 1964 | 155.0 37.1 78.9 | 62.0 | 233.9 |
| 1965 | 165.2 56.8 73.9 | 55.3 | 239.1 |
| 1966 | 142.7 92.8 120.9 | 97.2 | 263.6 |
| 1967 | 72.3 151.0 183.4 | 154.5 | 255.7 |
| 1968 | 75.9 86.6 209.4 | 129.8 | 285.3 |
| 1969 | 93.2 93.7 264.0 | 184.7 | 357.2 |
| 1970 | 143.6 169.2 308.7 | 245.3 | 452.3 |
| 1971 | 279.9 231 .4 348.1 | 113.0| 628.0 |
| 1972 | 243.6 132.3 302.7 | 185.3 | 546.3 |
| 1973 | 378.0 134.0 300.0 | 123.7 | 678.0 |
| 1974 | 3446.5 9.7 220.3 |-2702.4 | 3666.8 |
| 1975 | 3448.5 313.0 655.9 1-1589.1 | 4104.4 |
| 1976 | 3059.3 502.4 982.4 | -614.1 | 4041.7 |
| 1977 | 2521.0 370.0 2277.6 | 271.6 | 4798.6 |
| 1978 | 1078.5 1999. 1 4050.6 | 1820.1 | 5129.1 |
| 1979 | 3063.7 2483.8 3500.7 I 19.7| 6564.4 |
| 1980 | 5469.1 2859.3 3888.3 | -670.8 | 9357.4 |
| 1981 | 2441.0 6046.5 7268.4 | 2585.1 | 9709.4 |
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SELECTED LIABILITIES OF THE CENTRAL BANK












| 1960 | 154.2 157.1 I 2.1| 7.8 |
| 1961 | 160.2 167.0 1 2.3| 10.4 |
| 1962 | 174.6 177.5 1 1.2| 11.5 |
| 1963 | 183.3 185.5 1 1 -6 | 12.9 |
| 1964 | 214.7 217.0 I 1.4| 16.9 |
| 1965 | 217.9 220.5 1 1 -3 | 18.6 |
| 1966 | 236.5 239.9 I 1.3| 23.7 |
| 1967 | 221.0 226.8 1 1.5| 28.9 |
| 1968 | 202.2 205.7 1 2.3| 79.6 |
| 1969 | 273.2 277.9 1 4.2 | 79.3 |
| 1970 | 370.4 388.9 1 3.4 | 63.4 |
| 1971 | 386.4 392.9 1 4.6| 235.1 |
| 1972 | 414.0 428.9 | 10.0 | 117.4 |
| 1973 | 486.3 501 .7 I 9-3 | 176.3 |
| 1974 | 638.7 744.1 | 2087.9 | 2922.7 |
I 1975 | 1155.5 1859.4 | 1595.1 | 2245.0 |
| 1976 | 1540.0 2445.2 | 861.3 | 1596.5 |
| 1977 | 2162.6 2992.6 | 404.5 | 2006.0 |
| 1978 | 2381.7 2898.6 | 582.1 | 2230.5 |
| 1979 | 2703.4 3083.4 | 1438.9 | 3481.0 |
| 1980 | 3589.5 4798.3 | 1874.6 | 4559.1 |
| 1981 | 4347.7 5026. 1 | 1442.3 | 4683.3 |





















































































































































































































TA^l£ A-S-S HONEY MULTIPLIERS: NARROW H 0 N E Y ■ C 0 N V E N T I 0 N A L BASE HONEY
| YEAR
I Q U A R T E R|
1









I 1 97 I 1 67 | 1 .53
| 1961 1 1 70 I 1 60 I 1 58 | 1.46
| 1962 I 1 56 I 1 51 I 1 50 | 1.42
| 1963 | 1 54 I 1 47 I 1 43 | 1 .42
| 1964 I 1 53 | 1 54 I 1 55 | 1.41
| 1965 | 1 50 I 1 50 I 1 51 | 1 .44
| 1966 I 1 48 I 1 54 I 1 41 | 1 .44
| 1967 I 1 47 I 1 33 I 1 33 | 1 .38
| 1968 | 1 69 | 1 65 I 1 67 | 1 .60
| 1969 I 1 61 I 1 63 I 1 54 | 1.54
| 1970 I 1 59 I 1 55 I 1 53 | 1.56
| 1971 I 1 70 I 1 63 I 1 53 | 1.60
| 1972 I 1 62 I 1 62 I 1 61 | 1 .63
| 1973 I 1 77 I 1 81 I 1 76 | 1 .65
| 1974 | 1 78 I 1 79 I 1 64 | 1.58
| 1975 I 1 12 I 1 36 I 1 40 | 1.10
| 1976 I 1 06 I o 96 I o 95 | 1 .35
| 1977 I 1 57 I 1 49 I 1 60 | 1 .72
| 1978 I 1 76 I 1 74 I 1 84 | 1 .65
| 1979 | 1 93 I 2 22 I 2 09 | 1 .99
| 1980 I 1 97 I 2 02 I 2 11 | 1 .92
| 1981 I 1 89 I 1 97 I 1 97 | 1 .94
8
-pOr&t-E 4-3 fe HONEY MULTIPLIERS: BROAD HONEY. CONVENTIONAL BASE HONEY
| Y E A R
I Q U
i
A R T E R|
1
1 1 I 2 I 3 |
-I I -
4
| 1960 | 2.02 | 1 .97 I 1-67 I 1 .53
| 1961 I 2.12 | 2.00 I 2.08 | 1 .88
| 1962 | 2.10 | 2.05 | 2.10 | 1 .89
| 1963 | 2.09 | 2.08 | 2.02 | 1 .93
| 1964 I 2.14 | 2.25 I 2.22 | 1 .93
| 1965 | 2.16 | 2.23 | 2.29 | 2.08
| 1966 | 2.22 | 2.33 | 2.23 | 2.12
| 1967 | 2.25 | 1 .89 I 1-92 | 1 .96
| 1968 | 2.63 | 2.68 | 2.72 | 2.49
| 1969 | 2.65 | 2.62 | 2.45 | 2.31
| 1970 | 2.35 | 2.43 I 2.41 | 2.43
| 1971 | 2.67 | 2.60 | 2.52 | 2.55
| 1972 | 2.62 | 2.71 I 2.71 | 2.70
| 1973 | 2.92 | 3.06 | 3.07 | 2.81
| 1974 | 3.05 | 3.17 I 3.03 | 2.89
| 1975 | 1.85 | 2.26 | 2.39 | 1 .94
| 1976 I 1-75 | 1 .66 | 1.60 | 2.16
| 1977 | 2.40 | 2.25 | 2.36 | 2.52
| 1978 | 2.54 | 2.62 | 2.79 | 2.55
| 1979 | 2.89 | 3.23 | 3.21 | 3.19
| 1980 | 3.08 | 3.36 | 3.40 | 3.00
| 1981 | 14.16 | 3.22 | 3.25 | 3.09
9




A R T E R |
I
I 1 I 2 I 3 |
-I I -
4
| 1960 2.02 | 1 .70 I 1-47 | 1 .40
| 1961 1 .55 | 1 .40 I 1-27 | 1 .30
| 1962 1 .29 | 1.21 I 1.15 | 1. 17
| 1963 1 .24 | 1 .14 I 1-14 | 1 .23
| 1964 1.12 | 1.18 I 1-15 | 1.12
| 1965 1.12 | 1 .15 | 1.06 | 1 .15
| 1966 1 .10 | 1.11 | 1.01 | 1 .08
| 1967 1 .07 | 0.95 | 0.86 | 0.90
| 1963 0.81 | 0.74 | 0.72 | 0.75
| 1969 0.73 | 0.73 | 0.67 | 0.72
| 1970 0.75 | 0.70 | 0.70 | 0.72
| 1971 0.67 | 0.72 | 0.75 | 0.73
| 1972 0.63 | 0.61 | 0.65 | 0.69
| 1973 0.75 | 0.76 | 0.79 | 0.80
| 1974 0.83 | 0.84 | 0.85 | 0.88
| 1975 0.79 | 0.93 | 0.96 | 0.83
| 1976 0.84 | 0.78 | 0.78 | 1 .08
| 1977 1 .08 | 1.21 | 1.32 | 1 .44
| 1978 1 .24 | 1 .36 | 1.38 | 1 .30
| 1979 1 .39 | 1 .75 I 1-34 | 1.18
| 1980 1 .24 | 1 .23 | 1.32 | 1 .33
| 1981 1 .27 | 1 .33 I 1-34 | 2.61
Note: Expanded base money = currency outside banks
plus commercial bank reserves plus treasury
bills (less central bank holding(ux).
10




u A R T E R |
I





.02 | 1 .70 | 1 .47 I 1 40 |
| 1961 1 .92 | 1 .75 | 1 .66 I 1 67 |
| 1962 1 .73 | 1 .64 | 1.61 I 1 55 |
| 1963 1 68 I 1 .62 | 1 .60 I 1 67 |
| 1964 1 57 | 1 .72 | 1 .64 I 1 54 |
| 1965 1 60 | 1 .70 | 1.61 I 1 66 |
| 1966 1 65 | 1 .69 | 1 .59 I 1 59 |
| 1967 1 63 | 1 .35 | 1 .25 I 1 28 |
| 1968 1 25 | 1 .20 | 1 . 17 I 1 17 |
| 1969 1 20 | 1.17 | 1 .07 I 1 08 |
| 1970 1 10 | 1 .09 | 1.11 I 1 12 |
| 1971 1 05 | 1.14 | 1 .23 I 1 17 |
| 1972 1 01 | 1 .03 | 1 . 10 I 1 15 |
| 1973 1 23 | 1 .29 | 1 .37 I 1 37 |
| 1974 1 42 | 1 .49 | 1 .57 I 1 60 |
| 1975 1 31 I 1 .55 | 1 .64 | 1 46 |
| 1976 1 39 | 1 .35 | 1 .32 I 1 72 |
| 1977 1 65 | 1 .84 | 1 .94 I 2 12 |
| 1978 1 79 | 2.04 | 2.10 I 2 00 |
| 1979 2 09 | 2.53 | 2.06 I 1 89 |
| 1980 1 94 | 2.04 | 2.13 I 2 08 |
| 1981 9 52 | 2.17 | 2.22 I 4 16 |
11
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1 1 40 |
| 1961 I 1 .46 1 88 I 1 30 I 1 67 |
| 1962 I 1 42 1 89 I 1 17 I 1 55 |
| 1963 I 1 42 1 93 I 1 23 I 1 67 |
| 1964 I 1 41 1 93 I 1 12 I 1 54 |
| 1965 I 1 44 2 08 I 1 15 I 1 66 |
| 1966 | 1 44 2 12 I 1 08 I 1 59 |
| 1967 I 1 38 1 96 I o 90 I 1 28 |
| 1968 I 1 60 2 49 I o 75 I 1 17 |
| 1969 | 1 54 2 31 I o 72 I 1 08 |
| 1970 I 1 56 2 43 I 0 72 I 1 12 |
| 1971 I 1 60 2 55 I o 73 I 1 17 |
| 1972 I 1 63 2 70 I 0 69 I 1 15 |
| 1973 I 1 65 2 81 I 0 80 I 1 37 |
| 1974 I 1 58 2 89 I 0 88 I 1 60 |
| 1975 | 1 10 1 94 I 0 83 I 1 46 |
| 1976 I 1 35 2 16 I 1 08 I 1 72 |
| 1977 | 1 72 2 52 I 1 44 I 2 12 |
| 1978 I 1 65 2 55 I 1 30 I 2 00 |
| 1979 I 1 99 3 19 I 1 18 I 1 89 |
I 1980 | 1 92 3 00 I 1 33 I 2 08 |
| 1981 I 1 94 3 09 I 2 61 I 4 16 |
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CHAPTER FOUR
MONETARY POLICY II : APPRAISAL
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter was designed to provide the theoretical
background to the appraisal of monetary policy in Nigeria which
is the subject matter of this chapter. But before considering
the actual operation of monetary policy it is necessary to
describe the milieu in which monetary policy is conducted in
Nigeria. This is because policy-making and execution do not
take place in a vacuum. In the specific case of monetary policy,
the financial environment influences the range of issues selected
for attention (i.e. what the authorities expect of monetary policy),
the feasibility of particular weapons, and the effectiveness of
policy in general. Consider, for example, that group of countries
often lumped together under the umbrella term 'developing countries'
of which Nigeria is one. The financial structure of these coun¬
tries is so different from that of developed countries (in terms
of the type and range of financial institutions and services avail¬
able and their comparative importance) that it is unlikely for
the same set of instruments to work equally well in the two.
Even among countries in the same group, or even in the same
country over time, there are significant differences. As an
illustration of the latter case, one may cite the following:
Nigeria had no 'monetary authorities' before 1959; there was no
money market (conventionally defined) before the first issue of
Treasury Bills in 1960; and a capital market came into being
only with the establishment of the Lagos Stock Exchange in 1962.
Therefore, discretionary monetary policy was impossible before
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1959 while the tool of open market operations was clearly in¬
applicable before 1960. Similarly, the following may serve
to illustrate the differences among countries in the same group.
The weapon of open market operations was a main tool of monetary
management in the UK and US but it was of little importance in
W. Germany, at least before 1970 (Courakis, 1977, p. 23).
Constitutional provisions also condition the choice of monetary
policy instruments. As will be seen later, the main instrument
of monetary control in Nigeria is selective regulation of comm¬
ercial bank activities. The regulation takes many forms : a
ceiling on permissible increases in total credit to the economy;
the distribution of aggregate credit among the various sectors
of the economy; and the number and location of bank offices.
These powers are conferred on the Central Bank by law. But,
again, in West Germany, the Bundesbank has no such powers (Courakis,
1977, p. 17) and so the tool is not feasible there.
For these reasons, the institutional framework for monetary policy
in Nigeria is discussed in some detail. The relative importance
of the main financial institutions with emphasis on the Central
and commercial banks is considered in the first section. Con¬
stitutional provisions which affect the ability of the Central
Bank to use certain tools are also discussed.
Then the actual operation of monetary policy is examined. First,
the problems at which monetary policy was directed are set out.
Then the conduct of policy is considered. The discussion is
organized around the techniques of monetary control. By dis-
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cussing policy in terms of the weapons of control, it will
become clear why some tools were used and others were not att¬
empted. This, in turn, will shed some light on what conditions
are required to improve the performance of policy. Another
topic that is discussed is interest rate policy. The annual
rate of growth of narrow money accelerated from 17.8% in
1973 to 45.5% in 1974 and to 84.3% in 1975. Corresponding
figures for M2 were 20.1, 47.1 and 75.3% while, for inflation,
they were 5.7, 12.5 and 33.7%. Yet, the predominant interest
rates were revised downward in April 1975. A critique of
interest rate policy in general is provided in this section.
1. THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
In discussing the financial system, it is useful to distinguish
between the 'organized' and 'unorganized' markets (Wai, 1956,
1957). The distinction being made here is similar to the con¬
cept of a 'dual economy' in the development literature according
to which a modern, capitalist sector exists side by side with a
traditional, subsistence sector with little contact between the two.
The ' unorganized ' sector comprises -©T all the institutions listed
in Table 3.1. The unorganized sector, on the other hand, is
made up of money lenders, contribution clubs and other lenders
not yet referred to.
1.1 THE FORMAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
There are now many textbooks on the modern sector of the Nig¬
erian financial system (e.g. Brown (1966), Ojo (1976), Nwankwo
(1980), Okigbo (1981), and Ojo and Adewunmi (1982)) while val¬
uable information is available from other sources (e.g. Olakanpo
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(1963, 1965), Teriba (1969) and Udo-Aka (1971)). But the
traditional sector of the financial system is hardly ever dis¬
cussed. Given the abundance of information on the former, the
well-worn path is avoided in this study by concentrating on the
unorganized or informal sector. However, relevant facts on the
formal market will be highlighted.
The modern financial system of Nigeria comprises ©~f the monetary
financial institutions (i.e. the Central and commercial banks)
and a number of non-monetary institutions. All these perform
a common function which takes many forms : financial intermed¬
iation. In the first place, the monetary institutions create
the money which is used in transactions and therefore provider a
payments mechanism. This feature places them at the centre of
(K
the financial system. Secondly, the financial instutions as a
whole provide the economy with financial assets which readily
can be converted into money as required with minimum loss of
value, thus enabling the economy to operate on a lower stock of
cash than would have been possible. Furthermore, most financial
institutions perform the function of mobilizing savings. This
aspect is of special importance to a developing country like
Nigeria but is also important in any other economy because,
in addition, they also help to transfer funds from surplus to
deficit sectors of the economy. A great deal of time would be
wasted if all those who required funds had to negotiate directly
with those who had funds surplus to their requirements. Another
valuable function performed by some financial institutions is
the insurance of certain risks of the society.
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The list below gives an idea of the relative importance of the
various financial institutions in Nigeria.
TABLE 4.1 : ASSETS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AS AT 31 DEC. 1980
(PER CENTAGE SHARES IN THE TOTAL)
1. Central Bank of Nigeria 33.2
2. Commercial banks 57.9
Total, monetary 91.1
3. Merchant Banks 3.6
4. Federal Savings Bank 0.0
Total, Banks 94.7
5. Mortgage Institutions 1.2
Federal Mortgage Bank 1.2
6. Insurance Companies 0.6
7. National Providend Fund 1.2
8. Development Banks: 2.3
Nigerian Industrial Develop¬
ment Bank 1.0
Nigerian Agric. and Co-op
Bank 0.9
Nigerian Bank for Commerce
and Industry 0.5
Total, Non-banks 5.4
GRAND TOTAL (MILLION NAIRA) 28,222.4
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ANNUAL REPORT, 1980
The amount of savings collected determines to a large extent
the amount which financial institutions can lend to the final
- 185 -
users of funds. Table 4.2 further demonstrates the superiority
of the commercial banks.
TABLE 4.2 : SAVINGS DEPOSITS OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, END
OF 1980
MILLION NAIRA %
Commercial Banks 5 163.2 89. 6
National Provident Fund 340.4 5.9
Merchank Banks 219 . 7 3.8
Federal Mortgage Bank 32.5 0.6
Federal Savings Bank 7.3 0.1
TOTAL 5 763.2 100
SOURCE : CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ANNUAL REPORT , 1980
Consequently, the Central and commercial banks are emphasized.
The Central Bank is taken up first.
1.1.1 THE MONETARY AUTHORITIES
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) which, together with the
Federal Ministry of Finance, constitutes the monetary author¬
ities was established in July 1959. Before then there was no
monetary policy making body. The West African Currency Board
(which issued a common currency for the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria
and Sierra Leone until each of these countries established its
own central bank) had no control over the money supply which
the
completely determined by / balance of payments (Mars, 1948, p.
186. )
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The Act establishing the CBN gave the Bank all the traditional
powers of a central bank, including the regulation of commercial
bank activities through the setting and varying of the liquidity
ratio, and supervision. The Act was amended in 1962, 1968 and
1970. Relevant provisions of the law will be pointed out in
the course of the discussion. One of these provisions which
is especially relevant for the present purpose is the position
of the Bank in relation to the government. It is therefore
discussed in some detail.
1.1.1.1 CENTRAL BANK - GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP
The Bank is statutorily independent of the government. Accord¬
ing to the Central Bank Act, policy and general administration
are the responsibility of the Board of Directors of the Bank.
Civil servants and members of the Federal and state legislature
are ineligible for membership of this board.
Although the statute excludes government representation from the
Bank, there are some channels of contact. For instance, the
1958 Act has provision for an Advisory Committee composed of
the Federal minister of Finance, the Minister of Finance in the
regions, the Governor and the Deputy Governor of the Bank.
The Central Bank of Nigeria (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1970
however, abolished this Committee. Another channel of commun¬
ication between the Bank and the Government is that Section 3(i)
of the Central Bank of Nigeria (Amendment) Decree No. 3 of 1968
requires the Bank to 'keep the Commissioner (i.e. Federal Mini¬
ster of Finance) informed of the monetary and banking policy
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pursued or intended to be pursued'. Contact is also maintained
through the requirement that the Bank should submit an annual report
to the Conmissioner within two months of the end of each financial
year. In addition, the Bank is required by law to prepare and
submit to the Commissioner returns on the 15th and last days of
each month. Finally, the Commissioner of Finance has access
to all the books of the Bank and may direct the Director of
Federal Audit to examine and report on them.
In spite of these provisions, the Central Bank statute makes it
clear that the Bank is independent of the Ministry of Finance in
the performance of its duty which includes the formulation and
execution of monetary and credit policy. The Bank need only
inform the Commissioner of its activities and if the latter dis¬
agrees he is required to inform the former of his disagreement.
If the disagreement is not resolved the Commissioner is then
asked to submit his representation and that of the Governor of
the Bank to the Federal Executive Council whose decision is
final. Ultimate responsibility for monetary policy therefore
rests with this body which is made up of all the members of the
Federal Cabinet.
Theoretically, then, the Bank is independent of the Government in
general and the Ministry of Finance in particular. In practice,
the situation is not as clear-cut. Sometimes the impression
is given that the Bank is just another department of the Mini¬
stry. For instance, in all his budget speeches (1959 - 65),
the late Minister of Finance was in the habit of using the first
person singular when setting out the monetary measures to be taken
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by the Bank. The interpretation of C.V. Brown (1966, p. 144)
is that the 'I' pribably refers to 'the monetary authorities'.
This is unlikely to be true because the same pronoun was used
everywhere in those speeches, even where speaking about new
legislation to be introduced. Besides, the Minister was
not a member of the Board and could therefore not stipulate
the monetary policy measures to be taken. As Nwankwo (1980,
p. 13) has observed, such a situation 'is potentially explosive'.
One of the potential sources of conflict between the Bank and the
Ministry of Finance arises from differences in planning horizons
(Okigbo, 1981, p. 251). The Ministry of Finance usually has a
shorter time horizon than the Central Bank. The Ministry is
often concerned with shortterm problems and its policies are
influenced to a great extent by the prevailing political pressures
on the Government. The Central Bank which is relatively free
from such influences is able to take a longer view of the economy
and formulate policies accordingly.
Another potential source of conflict is overlapping jurisdiction.
The functions of the Ministry are derived from many sources such
as the constitution, the Central Bank statute, the banking statute
and the warrant setting out the functions of the Commissioner or
Minister of Finance. Yet other functions of the Ministry are
based on the interpretation of the Ministry of its statutory
functions. These are usually summarized in the budget. For
the 1978/79 Budget, the following are listed as some of the
functions of the Ministry (Okigbo, 1981, p. 253):
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'formulation of policies in fiscal and monetary matters;
maintenance of adequate foreign exchange reserves aimed
at ensuring a healthy balance of payments position; main¬
tenance of the internal and external value and stability
of the Nigerian currency'
These functions clearly bear a resemblance to those of the
Central Bank.
In reality, there was no open confrontation between the Bank
and the Government. But there was some evidence of discord,
especially during the period before the civil war. The friction
arose from the fiscal operations of the government. The First
National Development Plan which was launched in 1962 expected 50%
of the cost of the public sector projects to come from outside
the country. In the event, this expectation proved to be too
optimistic and less than half of the expected foreign aid was
forthcoming. Domestic revenue also fell short of expectation.
The political crises and the civil war that followed also con¬
tributed to the financial pressure. In the face of all this,
the government resorted to deficit financing. After putting up
with this situation for three years, the Bank publicly expressed
its experience which
'has clearly demonstrated the difficulty of administering
a policy of credit restraint in the face of expanding gov¬
ernment budget deficits. For while the Bank was endeav¬
ouring to restrain credit in the private sector, credit
to the public sector, in its potentially inflationary
form, was on the increase. In fact credit operations
in the government sector provided one of the major expan¬
sionary impulses on money supply in most of 1965'
(CBN Report, 1966, p. 13)
It then went on to argue that in order to achieve the desired
stability, credit to the private sector had to be curtailed but
'there must be a limit beyond which credit to the private sector
cannot be reduced if balanced economic development is to be
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realised' (pp. 13 - 4).
The resolution of this conflict was not made public. But it
is clear that the Bank's warning was not heeded : the scope for
deficit financing was enlarged during and after the civil war
as will become clear later on. Furthermore, the Governor of
the Bank complained about government interference in the affairs
of the Bank in a public lecture delivered in 1979 (CBN, Report,
June 1979).
In recent years, a subject of criticism in the Bank-Government
relation is the provision in Sec. 8 (3) subsections (1) - (3)
of the 1968 amendment decree already referred to. In summary
form, the provisions are (i) the Bank should inform the Commiss¬
ioner of Finance what actions it is taking or proposes to take
(ii) if the Commissioner disagrees with the Board he may submit
his representation and the Bank's to the Federal Executive Coun¬
cil (iii) whose decision is final. The controversy seems to
centre around (ii) - the method of representation (Report of
the Financial System Review Committee (1976)) . The Commissioner
is a member of the FEC while the Bank has no representation
there. Secondly, the law does not specify how the Minister will
put the case of the Bank before his colleagues in the Cabinet
and there is no guarantee that the Commissioner will put its
views (with which he disagrees in the first instance) fairly.
For these reasons, the Committee recommended that Section 3 (ii)
should be changed so as to read 'shall submit his representation
and the representation of the Central Bank without any abridge¬
ment' to the FEC instead of 'may submit his representation and
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that of the Central Bank' to the FEC. The government, however,
rejected this and other recommendations relating to the relation¬
ship between the Bank and the government.
Another instance in which the Bank's advice was ignored was in
respect of the payment of the salary awards discussed in Ch. 2.
In the year following payment of the awards, the rate of infla¬
tion reached an all time high of 33.7% (1975) (a year earlier
it was 12.5%) The Bank felt vindicated.
The conclusion is therefore that although the Bank is independent
of the government in theory, in practice it is not.
1.1.2 THE COMMERCIAL BANKS
The main features of the commercial banking system are as follows.
It is oligopolistic^^, highly concentrated in a few urban areas
( 2 )
and states and all banks are publicly owned, at least notion-
(3)
ally . Finally, the volume of banking business has grown
(4 )
rapidly in recent years . The assets and liabilities of comm¬
ercial banks are shown in Table 4.3. On the whole, Nigeria is
underbanked^.
1.1.3 OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
From Table 4.1 the only other financial institutions of some
significance are merchant banks. Merchant banking business
/ 0 \
before 1975 was negligible . But they are still relatively
insignificant financial institutions (Table 4.1). Insurance
companies are even less significant although they are the largest
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( 7 )financial institutions in terms of number .
1.1.4 THE FINANCIAL MARKETS
Financial markets may be classified according to the length
of maturity of the debt instruments used in transactions. For
analytical purposes, the money market is defined here as the
market for shortterm funds where the debt instrument mature
within two years. The capital market is then the market for
longer-term funds.
1.1.4.1. THE MONEY MARKET
Given the above definition, the money market instruments in
Nigeria are Treasury Bills and certificates, commercial paper,
eligible development stocks, certificates of deposits and
(8)
Bankers' Unit Fund . The relative importance of these instru¬
ments is depicted in Table 4.4. Clearly, Treasury bills and
certificates, accounting for 95.{%of the total at the end of 1981
(95.5% in 1980) are the most important money market assets.
Treasury bills are government IOUs with a maturity length of 90
days. Treasury certificates are similar to Treasury bills
except that the former have longer maturity lengths. There
are two varieties : one-year and two-year. Eligible Development
Loan Stocks are long-term government securities of not more than
three years to maturity. All government securities in Nigeria
are sold at face value at the time of issue and carry a con¬
tractual rate of interest. This implies that the capital sum
is guaranteed and that a purchaser can lose no more than the
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TABLE 4.4 : PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MONEY MARKET
INSTRUMENTS OUTSTANDING AS AT 31.12.81
Treasury Bills 70.5
Treasury Certificates 25.1
Bankers' Unit Fund 0.2
Eligible Development Stocks 1.2
Certificates of Deposits 2.1
Commercial Papers 0.9
Total (MILLION NAIRA) 8,199.2
SOURCE : CBN, ANNUAL REPORT, 1981, p. 39
interest foregone should he decide to sell them before they
mature. The amount of Treasury debts outstanding is directly
(9)
related to the government's financial position . At 31% at
the end of 1980, the ratio of money market assets to total
commercial bank assets is rather low.
1.1.4.2 THE CAPITAL MARKET
The principal feature of the Nigerian capital market is its
highly imperfect state. It is dominated by government
stocks : the ratio to the total has fallen below 90% only once
(84.8% in 1964) and has always been close to 99% (Central Bank
of Nigeria, 1979). The capital market is very narrow in terms
of the number of quoted firms and securities (Ojo and Adewunmi
(1982, p. 234)). The level of activity on the stock exchange
is very low. For instance, in 1977, the value of transactions
for the whole year was only N180 million. Of this, N178.8
million was in government securities. In 1981, the correspond-
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TABLE 4.3 COMMERCIAL BANK ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1981, N MILLION
ASSETS
Cash and balances with banks
in and outside Nigeria 2605.2
Total Loans and Advances 8604.8
To: (i) Banks and subsidiaries of
banks in Nigeria 1.0
(ii) Other customers 8242.2
(iii) Money at call outside CBN 297.8
(iv) Total Bills discounted 62.8
Total Investments 2350.2
(i) Treasury Bills 917.5
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SOURCE : CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW
Vol 20, No. 1 (June 1982)
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ing figures were N304.8 m and N298.7 m (CBN Report, 1981, p. 58).
The Central Bank has held an increasing amount of the government
stocks over the years, ostensibly because of the low yields on
them ^. Finally, the prices of all private sector securities
are fixed by a government authority^^^^.
1.2 THE ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL MARKET
A discussion of financial markets in Nigeria would not be complete
without mention of the informal sector already defined above.
Unfortunately, knowledge about the nature and size of this sector
is very limited. The following treatment is rather superficial.
A useful way of organizing the discussion is in terms of sources
and uses of funds in the market.
1.2.1 THE SUPPLY OF FUNDS
Suppliers of funds include friends, relatives and neighbours of
the borrower who normally lend money without interest but if the
borrower is particularly desperate and cannot obtain interest-
free credit from any other source he may have to pawn some
articles. Traders also give trade credit and may beregarded as
a source of funds like individuals with cash to spare. But
the most important sources of funds are the professional money
lenders and the informal credit associations. This group is
motivated by the desire to maximize the rate of growth of its
funds. The interest rates charged by them may therefore be
regarded as the 'market rates' in this sector of the financial
markets.
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Professional money lenders, like any other dealer in the informal
market, usually are in full time employment and money lending is
undertaken as an incidental occupation. The rates of interest
they charge are often as high as any other rates in the vicinity.
Since their activities are surrounded by a great deal of secrecy
borrowers are not normally aware of the rates charged by others,
even within the same locality. The general shortage of funds
in this market enables them to behave like monopolists.
The contribution club is the principal form of the informal
credit associations. Perhaps the best known of these is the
'Esusu'. The 'esusu' is an indigenous credit association fund
in south-western Nigeria. This type of credit arrangement is
found all over the country and even as far afield as Trinidad and
Tobago (where it is called 'susu'), Bascom, 1952, p. 63, Java,
(known as 'arisan'), Japan and other parts of Asia, not to men¬
tion nearby Ghana and the Cameroons (Geertz, 1961, pp. 243 - 55).
Variously called contribution clubs, friendly societies, slates,
mutual lending societies, pooling clubs, thrift groups and rot¬
ating credit associations, the savings institution works essen¬
tially the same way. It is therefore not necessary to give a
detailed description of the various types found in Nigeria.
What needs to be appreciated is the fact that it is found in
all parts of the country, rural and urban.
Three studies have been undertaken in respect of the institution
and one available in published form. It must be stated at the
outset that these studies were sociological and anthropological
investigations. Moreover, they are fairly out of date (the
latest was in 1963 while the other two were in 1952). However,
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this is not a serious consideration as only the size of each
contribution and the total amounts involved have changed.
All three, as well as other unrecorded cases, are variations
on the same general theme. The variations are due in no small
measure to economic and social factors. The three cases are :
the 'esusu', the ' dashi' (a group of people found in the north)
and the 'etoto' of the Ibo in south-eastern Nigeria. Since the
(12)
'esusu' has been documented in some detail there is no
point dwelling on it for a long time. Rather, only an outline
of its working will be provided while the sociological factors
will be omitted. The 'dashi' will not be mentioned at all
since it is an institution of only a small fraction of the pop¬
ulation (about 1% or less) and since it is very similar to the
other cases. What is left is the Ibo version which will be
considered in greater detail than the 'esusu'.
The similarity of the mechanism of the contribution club in
places where it is found has struck many investigators. Writing
on the subject, Geertz notes that
'The basic principle upon which the rotating credit
association is founded is everywhere the same : a lump
sum composed of fixed contributions from each member
of the association is distributed, at fixed intervals
and as a whole, to each member of the association in
turn ... Whether the fund is in kind or in cash; whether
the order the members receive the fund is fixed by lot,
by agreement, or by bidding; whether the time period
over which the society runs is many years or a few weeks;
whether the sums involved are minute or rather large;
whether the members are few or many; and whether the
association is composed of urban traders or rural peas¬
ants, of men or women, the general structure of the
institution is constant'
(Geertz, 1961, p. 243).
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The above quotation has been selected because it lists the
various differences between one association and another. The
'esusu' is one such association. It has been described as
being
'in practice a kind of temporary joint-stock bank,
in which the shares are also the deposits, are
collected in a fixed number of regular instalments
and are returned to the shareholders in ways which
offer to some of them at least a considerable measure
of credit'
(Galletti et al, 1956, p. 527).
A vivid illustration of its functioning has been provided by
Bascom in the following words:
'The number of contributors, the size of the
contributions and the length of the intervals
at which they are made vary from one group to
another. For the purpose of illustration, however,
we may imagine a simple case where 20 members con¬
tribute one shilling each, monthly. At the end of 20
months, which completes the cycle in this case, each
member will have contributed 20 shillings or £1, and
will, on one occasion, have received the amount of £1 in
return. In theory at least, each member is paid back
in one lump sum exactly what he paid in contributions
during the course of one cycle. There is neither gain
nor loss, but the advantage to the members is that
they have available a large sum of money with which
to make expensive purchases or to meet debts of con¬
siderable size. Furthermore, an attempt is made to
pay the fund to members at times when they have special
need for it for particular purposes'
(Bascom, 1952, pp. 63 - 4)
The structure of a contribution club is therefore described by
the following variables : the number of memberships and the
amount of contributions per membership determine the size of
the fund, and the length of the interval between two contribu¬
tions which, together with the number of memberships, determines
the length of a cycle. The number of memberships need not be
equal to the number of contributors. Two or more contributors
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may join to form only one membership while a contributor may
hold more than one membership. But each receives a share in
proportion to his contribution. Thus, in the case of the former,
a contributor receives half (or less) the contributions coll¬
ected on a day.
Membership of contribution clubs may be open to the general public.
But this is not very common because of the possibility of default.
The common types are those formed by people related by birth,
profession or a common bond. Thus clubs have been formed by
extended families, teachers, traders, civil servants and members
of an age-grade association. It is clear from these examples
that the informal market covers both the rural and urgan areas.
1.2.1.1 RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOURCES
The various sources of funds in the informal market have been
briefly considered above. The next task is a comparison of
the importance of the main sources. In the absence of more
recent data, the following analysis is based on the results of
a survey of 370 and 357 cocoa-farming families conducted in
1951 and 1952 respectively (R. Galletti et al, 1956). Admitt¬
edly the study is now out-dated but it is better than nothing.
Besides, it will be supplemented with the results of a pilot
survey conducted in the same area in 1973 (Ojo, 1976).
Available evidence suggests that the professional money lender
is not as important a source of finance in Nigeria as in, say,
















































































1.2.2 THE DEMAND FOR FUNDS
All the surveys available do not consider the uses of funds
in this market. In the absence of explicit data on the demand
for funds, the reasons for saving may be used as a proxy. The
data are in Table 4.7.
TABLE 4.7 : MAJOR REASONS FOR SAVING IN NON-URBAN AREAS
NO. OF RESPONDENTS RELATIVE IMPORTANCE, %
Business Purposes 44 22 . 3
Educational " 54 CO
Ceremonial " 10 5.1
Housing " 31 15.7
Personal Consumption 18 9.1
Future security 39 19.8
Repayment of Past Loans 1 0.5
TOTAL 197 100.0
SOURCE : A.T. OJO, THE NIGERIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM p. 61, Table 5.3
A striking feature of the information contained in this table
is that in spite of being conducted in a rural, peasant society,
none of the respondents mentioned the improvement of agricul¬
ture as a reason for saving (in Nigerian parlance the term 'bus¬
iness' is never applied to agriculture). Another important
feature is the relative importance of education which accounts
for over a quarter of the reasons for saving. This is not sur¬
prising because 'development associations' whose sole purpose
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is the communal finance of education of indigenous students
are found in all parts of the country. Housing also ranks
high on the scale because there are no viable sources of fin¬
ance. There are no building societies in the country apart
from the Federal Mortgage Bank and a number of state housing
authorities which cater for selected senior civil servants.
1.2.3 STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES
It is by now common knowledge that interest rates in the un¬
organized money markets of underdeveloped countries are notor¬
iously high (Wai, 1957, 1977; Bottomley, 1963, 1964, 1968).
What may be new is the magnitude of the rates. In a study
undertaken in Eastern Nigeria many years ago, Ardener (1953,
p. 135) found that 'The interest rate on loans in this area is
normally 100% p.a.' and repeats this assertion many times. But
even this appears to be an understatement as the following
quotation from the same page shows:
'The smaller the period and amount of the loan the
higher tends to be the rate of interest. 10/- can
be borrowed for Id per day. £1 can be borrowed for
2d per day. It is becoming more frequent for the
interest on loans to be paid monthly. Thus £1 can
be borrowed at a monthly interest of 4/-'.
Taking the lower interest of 4/- per £ per month, yields a rate
of 233% p.a. on a simple interest basis. That was why a fund
of just over £3 14/- could grow to £17 19. 4Jd in just over
a year (Ardener, 1953, p. 135).
The situation is not very much different in other parts of the
country. In the extensive survey by Galletti et al (1956)














































































between 60% and 166% are not uncommon in all the major (cocoa)
producing areas' (p.510).
However, when Tables 4.5 and 4.6 [sources are studied carefully,
it will become apparent that the average rates are not as high
as indicated above. This is because the suppliers charging
high rates of interest are of relatively little significance
while the bulk of the loans carry low interest rates. This
point is brought out more carefully in the next table. Most
s
of the loand (63.1%) were on an interest-free basis while only
an eighth of them attracted interest rates of 50% p.a. or more.
The average lending rates are therefore closer to the range of
24 - 36% estimated by Wai (1977, p. 304). Yet these are quite
high by any standards. The conclusion is therefore that interest
rates in the informal money market are higher than outside it.
1.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
The Nigerian financial system is dominated by the Central and
commercial banks which own over 90% of the assets/liabilities
of the financial institutions between them with the commercial
banks taking up over 50% of the total. Although the Central
Bank is statutorily equipped with all the instruments of mon¬
etary control it needs, its independence in the use of these
weapons is compromised by the Federal Ministry of Finance. If
the Central Bank is excluded, commercial banks are the only
financial institutions of major importance.
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2. THE OBJECTIVES OF MONETARY POLICY
The objectives of monetary policy are derived from those of
economic policy discussed in Ch. 1. From that chapter, the
following objectives may be inferred : (a) maintenance of con¬
fidence in the Nigerian currency; (b) price stability; and (c)
the acceleration of the rate of economic growth through the
organization and provision of development finance. The relative
position of these objectives on the authorities' scale of pre¬
ferences varied from period to period and is assessed in Section
6.
Given these objectives, the task undertaken in this section is
an evaluation of the use of the weapons of monetary policy to
achieve them, with emphasis on inflation and the balance of
payments.
3. TECHNIQUES OF MONETARY MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA
The conventional weapons of monetary policy are normally thought
to be open market operations, the reserve requirements, the
minimum lending rate, and moral suasion and related controls.
They are discussed in that order.
3.1 OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS
It is often asserted that 'open market operations constitute
the primary weapon of monetary policy' (Aschheim, 1961, p. 31;
also: Smith, 1963, p. 47; Guttentag, 1966 p. 16; and Simpson,
1976, p. 225). Open market operations (OMO) work by altering
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the level of commercial bank reserves and hence the prices of
the securities affected or other interest rates without affect¬
ing bank reserves. The effective use of 0M0 in this manner
requires certain preconditions which are well explained in text¬
books (e.g. Simpson, 1976). These are : the Central Bank should
have an appropriate portfolio of assets in reasonable quantities;
the securities used should be sufficiently attractive to be held
as wealth; the demand for OMO assets should be relatively interest
inelastic; and fairly stable commercial bank liquidity ratios
enhance the efficacy of OMO. For various reasons OMO have never
been used in Nigeria. As seen in Section 1 above, financial
intermediation is still at a very low level and the money market
is correspondingly imperfect. The main money market instruments
- Treasury bills and certificates - were not available in appre¬
ciable quantities before 1979 and the certificates were relatively
unattractive. The CBN has therefore had to take up a large
fraction of it. Unlike in the UK, there is no agreement between
the CBN and the discount houses to take all unsubscribed bills
(Artis and Lewis 1981). The CBN's holding money market assets is
thus a measure of their excess supply. As in the case of all
commodities, the inability of the CBN to sell the securities is
largely explained by the prices of the assets (discussed below).
Secondly, since the quantity of the relevant assets was small, trans¬
actions in them might be insufficient to bring about the desired
• v. i (14)change in bank reserves
The shallowness of the money market is related to the small size
of the public sector. This has constrained the main tool of OMO
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(Treasury bills) whose volume (along with that of Treasury
certificates) depends on government borrowing requirements.
Thirdly, the definition of reserve assets has militated against
the effectiveness of OMO in Nigeria. To be effective in alter¬
ing the level of bank liquidity, it is desirable to extend OMO
to assets not admissible as reserve-eligible. But in Nigeria,
reserve assets include Treasury bills and certificates as well as
development stocks with three years or less to maturity. Open
market operations on any of them would only alter the composition
of liquid assets while leaving the level of bank reserves un¬
affected .
Finally, as shown in Ch. 3 and Chart 3.2, commercial bank liquid¬
ity ratio has fluctuated very widely between 27.3% and 95.4%
while the statutory minimum limit remained unchanged at 25%.
In these circumstances, it would be difficult to influence the
level of bank liquidity through OMO without producing some un¬
desirable consequences (e.g. drastic changes in interest rates
and bank failure).
For these reasons, the authorities have never used OMO as a del¬
iberate weapon of monetary policy. Ultimately, the inapplic¬
ability of the weapon reduces to the unwillingness of the auth¬
orities to allow interest rates to rise above certain levels,




This weapon is particularly attractive to countries which do
not have developed money markets as it does not require any
market as such to be effective. However, in order to maximize
its effectiveness, certain conditions need to be met. The
Central Bank should be able to control the volume of reserve
assets in the banking system and the ratio should be above that
which commercial banks would have maintained in the absence of
statutory regulations. Furthermore, commercial bank liquidity
ratios should be reasonably stable. If the ratios vary widely ,
the effect of changes in the legal ratio may be to alter the
level of excess reserves without affecting the capacity of banks
to expand credit. Also, if the ratio is used frequently, banks
may come to anticipate the changes and take precautions, thus
neutralizing the Central Bank action. The weapon should there¬
fore be used sparingly. In any case, it cannot be relied upon
for contractionary monetary policy.
In Nigeria, there are two liquidity ratios : total liquidity ratio
and cash reserve ratio.
3.2.1 TOTAL LIQUIDITY RATIO
This has remained at 25% since it was first set by the CBN.
However, it has been changed implicitly through the redefinition
of reserve assets. But in each case, the aim was not to influ¬
ence credit expansion by banks^"1"^.
Although the Bank was empowered to set separate ratios for diff-
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erent classes of banks and for demand and time deposits, it has
always prescribed one ratio for all banks and deposits. The
main reason for the non-use of the weapon appears to be the
high and widely fluctuating levels of commercial bank excess
reserves. But the authorities made matters worse by admitt¬
ing a wide variety of assets in the definition of eligible
reserve assets.
3.2.2 VARIABLE CASH RESERVE RATIO
The Central Bank acquired this power under the 1968 amendment to
its act. Unlike the uniform application of the total liquidity
assets ratio, it has used this tool selectively. But the
weapon was not used until 1976. In clarifying the operation,
the Bank states that the cash deposit of each bank should be
'expressed as a ratio of its total demand deposits plus time
deposits on which it pays interest of less than 2$% per annum'
(CBN, Report, 1976). For this purpose, banks were classified
into four as in Table 4.9.
TABLE 4.9 : STIPULATED CASH RESERVE RATIO OF BANKS BY CLASS
CLASS OF
BANK
DEFINITION IN TERMS OF
DEPOSIT LIABILITIES
STIPULATED
CASH RESERVE RATIO (%)
A N300 m or more 12.5
B N100 m or more but less than
N300 m 10 . 0
C N30 m or more but less than
Ml00 m 7.0
D Less than N30 m 5.0
SOURCE : CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, REPORT, 1976, p. 6
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These ratios remained unchanged until 1979 when they were
revised as shown in Table 4.10.
TABLE 4.10 : MINIMUM AND ACTUAL AVERAGE CASH RATIOS, %
STIPULATED MINIMA ACTUAL (MONTHLY
A B C D
« V-LiXVtiVJ-U )
1975 12. 5 10 7 5 26.3
1976 12.5 10 7 5 31 .8
1977 12.5 10 7 5 16.1
1978 12.5 10 7 5 8.0
1979 6.25 5 3.5 2.5 12.4
1980 5 4 3 2 10.6
1981 5 4 3 2
SOURCE : CBN, ANNUAL REPORTS, 1976 - 81
The cash ratio also is subject to considerable fluctuations.
The Bank appears to have been following the movement of the
ratio rather than influencing it. The dramatic fall of the
monthly average in 1978 seems to have occasioned the halving of
the legal minimum a year later. Evidently the Bank did not
intend to use the weapon for restricting credit expansion.
This view is reinforced by the fact that it was more or less
compelled to use the tool following the recommendations of the
Anti-Inflation Task Force (Oct. 1975) to that effect. The
conclusion is that the cash ratio was not actively used by the
Central Bank possibly because of its skepticism regarding the
efficacy of the tool.
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3.3 THE MINIMUM LENDING RATE
Between April 1960 and December 1961 the minimum lending rate
(MLR) was revised ten times (Akinnifesi and Phillips, 1978,
p. 27). The rate was changed again three times between 1962
and 1968 as follows : in January 1963 it was reduced from 4£%
to 4% but increased to 5% in December 1964 before being reduced
again to 4^% in May 1968. It remained at this level until
1975 when it was reduced by 1% to 3£%.
Under the 1968 Decree amending the Central Bank Act, all interest
rates are linked to the MLR. Furthermore, the Bank is expected
to prescribe the interest rate structure for the financial system.
According to the Bank, it
'formally directed the commercial banks to link their
interest rates with the minimum rediscount rate and
approved the following interest rate structure for
the banks. The minimum and maximum rates of interest
chargeable by the banks were set at 2£ and 7\%,
respectively, above the minimum rediscount rate'
(CBN, Report, 1970, p. 63)
This marked the first official intervention in interest rates in
Nigeria which have remained regulated since then. Thus, when
the rediscount rate was reduced in 1975, all other rates were
also reduced e.g. the commercial bank minimum and maximum lending
rates from 7 and 12% to 6 and 9% respectively, the Treasury bill
rate from 4 to 2\% (from then always 1% below the MLR). The
downward revision of interest rates was announced in the 1975 -
76 Budget and took effect from 1 April 1975, the beginning of
the fiscal year. The minimum lending rate, along with other
predominant interest rates, was raised in the Budgets of 1977 -
78, 78 - 79, 79 - 80, 80 - 81 and 81 - 82. Details are avail-
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able in Chart 4.1.
From this review, it is clear that the minimum lending rate weapon
has been used. However, it is also true that the changes in
the 1960's cannot be interpreted as active monetary policy.
The Bank did not hide the fact that the changes in its rediscount
rate were a passive response to external circumstances since
'these revisions were aimed at encouraging the commercial banks
to repatriate short term funds from London and hold them in
Nigeria' (Akinnifesi and Phillips, 1978, p. 27). Indeed,
'in view of the very dependent nature of the Nigerian
colonial economy up to the 1960 's, the interest rate
structure in Nigeria was adjusted to the rediscount
rate of the Bank of England and reflected not the
credit and monetary circumstances within Nigeria but
those in the London market'
(Okigbo, 1981, p. 69)
Active monetary policy in the Bank Rate therefore started in
1975.
The logic behind the use of this weapon in Nigeria is sometimes
difficult to comprehend. For example, in reporting the change
to interest rates in 1975, the Central Bank attributed the down¬
ward revision to 'the overall high liquidity of the economy'
(CBN, Report, 1975, p. 20). In that year the annual rate of
inflation averaged over 33%. Even when the minimum lending
rate was raised in subsequent years, the rise was only 1% or
less. Changes were thus infrequent and small in magnitude.
The suggestion here is that the use of the rediscount rate
weapon in Nigeria has been less than satisfactory. Interest
rates play an important role in an economy and therefore deserves
a closer examination than has hitherto been accorded to it.
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General interest rate policy is thus reviewed in the following
section.
3.4 INTEREST RATE POLICY
Interest rate policy has a number of roles to play in an economy.
First, interest rates may be used to influence the cost and avail¬
ability of credit. This is the purely monetary role and is the
basis of such monetary policy tools as the Central Bank discount
rate and open market operations discussed above. Secondly,
interest rates may be used as an instrument for a more effective
mobilization of savings. This point is especially relevant for
developing countries where it has long been argued that the in¬
sufficiency of domestic savings is an effective constraint on
/ ^ 0 \
economic growth . If this is so, then there is the need to
encourage and mobilize savings by offering attractive rewards in
the form of sufficiently high real rates of interest on savings
and time deposits, government securities and liabilities of
financial institutions. However, there is still considerable
doubt as to whether savings are interest-sensitive. According
to Shackle (1965, p. 151) 'the influence of the rate of interest
on saving is doubtful even as to its algebraic sign'. Instead,
such diverse factors as income change and the sources of income
(e.g. from employment) have been stressed as important in the
savings function (Houthakker, 1965, p. 222). Yet, other writers
have suggested that savings may be subject to life cycles :
'saving may be for a specific purpose (the Harrodian "hump saving"),
for old age, for inheritance, or for unknown future contigencies'
(Chandavarkar, 1971, p. 51). In these circumstances, it is
- 214 -
difficult to see how changes in the rates of interest offered on
financial assets will affect the saving decision. Nevertheless,
it must be borne in mind that the evidence is not conclusive.
Some studies have indicated that consumption may be sensitive to
interest rates and that the relationship is probably negative
(Hamburger, 1967, p. 1131; de Leeuw and Gramlich, 1969, pp.
480 - 81). Moreover, in Nigeria there are other grounds for
pursuing a purposeful interest rate policy (see below).
Another possible use of interest rates is in the determination of
the optimum allocation of income between present and future
consumption. The social rate of discount whose function is to
rank present consumption relative to future consumption is in¬
fluenced to a great extent by the prevailing rates of interest.
Finally, interest rates may be used as a device for rationing
funds among competing investment projects. For this purpose,
the higher the rate of interest used, the lower will be the
present value of a future income stream and the fewer will be
the projects which are judged commercially viable.
This discussion shows that interest rates have got an important
role to play in an economy. It is therefore necessary for a
country to have an appropriate interest rate policy. The aim of
this section is to offer a tentative appraisal of monetary policy
use of interest rates in Nigeria with special reference to the
period 1970 - 81.
3.4.1 INTEREST RATE POLICY, 1970 - 81
During this period, the authorities adopted the policy of admini-
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stering interest rates by stipulating minimum and maximum rates
which financial institutions could pay on their liabilities and
charge on their loans. Before discussing the objectives of
the policy, it may be useful to ask why intervention was nec¬
essary at all.
One reason often given for government intervention in the fin¬
ancial markets of underdeveloped countries is the presence of
substantial externalities and other imperfections in those markets
(Leite, 1982). Market imperfections arise from the very nature
of the financial market. Briefly, the financial system consists
of, aside from the Central Bank, a few commercial banks and a
handful of specialized financial institutions, mainly develop¬
ment banks (which are invariably owned by the government) and
insurance companies. Under almost any criteria, commercial
banks dominate all financial institutions (excluding, of course,
the Central Bank). In Nigeria, three banks control the bulk
(17)
of commercial banking business , while a similar concentration
of business exists among the other types of financial institutions.
As a result, the financial system is oligopolistic. Moreover,
there is no strong competition between the different financial
institutions. For instance, there is only one building society
which is owned and strictly controlled by the Federal Government.
Thus a potential source of competition to the commercial banks
as exists in some countries (such as the UK) is absent. Also,
financial assets are not widely held. In general, commercial
banks tend to monopolize short-term assets while longer-term
debt instruments are almost the exclusive preserve of savings-
type institutions. Then there is the fragmentation of the
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money and (the undeveloped) capital markets into submarkets
that are not as closely integrated as found in Western econ¬
omies. In particular, there is the broad division of the
financial system into the formal and informal sectors. Given
these circumstances, it is argued, there is no guarantee that
a system of market-determined interest rates would be socially
optimal. This argument is akin to that used to justify gov¬
ernment intervention in the economy as presented, say, by
Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972).
Certain considerations appear to have influenced Nigeria's interest
rate policy. The first was the desire to increase the level of
investment generally. Secondly, it was the aim of general
economic policy to encourage the flow of investment to some
sectors while discouraging the flow to other sectors. One of
the methods used to implement this objective was the manipulation
of interest rates. Finally, for whatever reason, the government
sought to minimize the cost of funds to it. These objectives
of interest rates are examined in more detail below.
As stated at various points in this study, one of the main ob¬
jectives of the country's economic policy was to accelerate the
rate of growth of output. It was believed that low rates of
interest would stimulate investment and hence growth. This
belief seems to be based on the notion that, while savings are
probably unresponsive to interest rate changes, investment
expenditures are negatively related to interest rates. In
that case, in principle, it would be possible to stimulate
investment without necessarily adversely affecting saving by
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maintaining very low rates of interest.
As in the case of the saving-interest relation, the role of
interest rates in the investment function has not been firmly
established. For example, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973)
have challenged the idea that low rates of interest stimulate
investment. This counter argument - that interest rate changes
may not be very important in the investment decision - appears
to be valid in Nigeria, especially in 'the period 1970 - 74
when the returns being declared by the industrial and commercial
houses ... were over 100% return on capital invested (and)first
class prime advance rates remained unchanged at 7%' (Okigbo, 1981,
p. 70.) Given this high rate of return, what would be more
important to firms is whether or not credit will be available
at all and not its cost.
Another objection to the argument is that interest rates may in
fact affect savings in some respects. If nominal interest rates
are sufficiently low so that real rates are below their equili¬
brium values (as they appeared to be in Nigeria during the review
period), the resulting savings available for investment may be
insufficient. This can happen because even if the level of
savings is invariant with respect to real interest rates, the
form in which these savings are held may be affected by the
various rates. As an example, if the interest rate in comm¬
ercial bank savings deposits is low relative to the rates on, say,
building society deposits, savers may opt for the latter.
Where the rates on all institutional deposits are considered too
low as not to justify parting with perfect liquidity, individuals
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with excess balances may decide to store the cash in their
homes or buy physical assets such as consumer durable goods.
When savings are held in such forms, they are not available
for investment. In this sense, very low rates of interest
may actually inhibit the growth of investment.
In the plan documents and in the budgets, the authorities expr¬
essed the desire of keeping down the cost of development finance
by maintaining a low level of interest rates. This policy is
found in other places. It has been observed that
'in many (Latin American) countries that imposed
interest rate ceilings to prevent the increase in
interest rates, this policy was concomitant with
or even propelled by a keen desire of the fiscal
authorities to have access to subsidized credit for
use by the governments, the public enterprises, and
other public entities'
(Galbis, 1979, p. 335)
The idea behind this argument seems to be the belief that the
liberalization of interest rates would result in inflation
(Leite, 1982, p. 56). However, the inflationary impact of
allowing interest rates to rise appears to have been exagger¬
ated. Interest rate payments probably account for a small
percentage of total production costs. Moreover, as Leite (1982,
p. 56) has argued, it is unlikely that the increase in production
costs arising from increases in interest rates will be passed
completely to consumers. On the contrary, a general increase in
interest rates may lead to a reduction in the rate of inflation
if one or both consumption and investment are negatively related
to interest rates.
Another use to which interest rates were put over the 1970's
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was in redirecting credit flows towards specific sectors at
the expense of others. Thus one finds in official publications
statements such as the following:
'interest rates chargeable by commercial and merchant
banks were revised in April in order to stimulate
investment in the more productive sectors of the
economy and to discourage the flow of credit to non¬
productive imports'
(CBN, Report, 1976, p. 6)
Since this particular policy will be dealt with in great detail
below, it is not pursued further.
It has been suggested that one of the reasons for low interest
rates found in less developed countries is 'the desire of the
monetary authorities to have an interest rate structure similar
to that prevailing in the advanced countries' (Park (1973, p.
386)). A superficial examination of the evidence would seem to
suggest that the argument is applicable to Nigeria, especially
in the 1960's when the interest rate structure was very similar
to that of the U.K. In particular, the Treasury Bill rate and
the Central Bank's rediscount rate were often changed in response
to changes in the U.K. corresponding rates. But this close
association was broken in the 1970's, starting with the Central
Bank of Nigeria (Amendment) Decree, 1968, and the Banking Decree,
1969. The latter decree, for example, required that all banks
be incorporated in Nigeria and laid conditions for the transfer
of funds out of and in to Nigeria, thus removing the need for
domestic interest rates to reflect interest rate movements abroad.
Thus where the interest rate structure in the country was sim¬
ilar to that in other countries, it was not so much the desire
of the authorities as the necessity which arose from the close
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links between the local banks and their parent companies abroad.
3.4.2 INTEREST RATE STRUCTURE
The structure of interest rates that resulted from the various
considerations above is summarised on Chart 4.1. These rates
refer to the organized sector of the money market only.
It would be noted that quoted interest rates in Nigeria have
a number of defects. In the first place, some rates are quoted in
terms of minima and maxima while only the range is prescribed
for others. Thus deposit rates usually represent minimum values;
lending rates for the preferred sectors relate to the maximum
permissible; and the lending rates for the less preferred sectors
are subject to both an upper and a lower limit. It is therefore
difficult to ascertain the rates at which business has actually
been done for various types of transactions.
Secondly, there is need for another adjustment. This arises
from the presence of various forms of bank charges the magnitude
of which varies from bank to bank and may even depend on the val¬
uation of customers by banks (which may be based on, for example,
the size of customer's transaction or the type of collateral
tendered). In an environment of generally low interest rates,
banks may manipulate these charges to the extent that the effect¬
ive interest rates exceed the legal maximum by a wide margin.
In such cases, quoted interest rates are not very useful for
judging the appropriateness of interest rate policy.
In comparison, deposit rates are much more reliable. Since the
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11960 5.0 4.0 3.0 6.0 3.0 3.5 2.5 |
| 1961 5.5 5.0 3.0 6.0 3.0 3.5 2.5 |
| 1962 4.5 4.0 3.0 6.5 3.0 3.5 2.5 |
| 1963 4.0 3.5 3.0 8.0 3.0 3.5 2.5 |
| 1964 5.0 4.5 3.0 7.0 3.0 3.5 2.5 |
| 1965 5.0 4.5 3.5 7.0 3.5 4.0 2.5 |
| 1966 5.0 4.5 3.5 7.5 3.5 4.0 2.5 |
| 1967 5.0 4.5 3.5 7.0 3.5 4.0 2.5 |
| 1968 4.5 4.0 3.0 7.0 3.0 3.5 2.5 |
| 1969 4.5 4.0 3.0 7.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 |
| 1970 4.5 4.0 3.0 7.0 3.0 3.7 2.5 |
| 1971 4.5 4.0 3.0 7.0 3.0 4.0 2.5 |
| 1972 4.5 4.0 3.0 7.0 3.0 4.0 2.5 |
| 1973 4.5 4.0 3.0 7.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 |
| 1974 4.5 4.0 3.0 6.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 |
| 1975 3.5 2.5 3.0 6.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 |
| 1976 3.5 2.5 4.0 6.0 2.5 3.5 5.0 |
| 1977 4.0 3.0 4.0 7.0 3.0 2.0 5.0 |
| 1978 5.0 4.0 4.0 7.0 4.7 5.5 5.0 |
| 1979 5.0 4.0 5.0 7.0 5.5 6.5 5.0 |
| 1980 6.0 5.0 6.0 7.5 5.7 6.5 6.0 |
TABLET A ~ L+ ■ Z REAL INTEREST RATES. 19SCI-80
I Minimum Treasury Savings Prime Time Time Federal









I 1960 -1.1 -2.1 -3.1 -0. 1 -3 .1 -2.6 -3 . 6
11961 -0.8 -1.3 -3.3 -0.3 -3.3 -2.8 -3.8
| 1962 -0.8 -1.3 -2.3 1.2 -2.3 -1 .8 -2.8
| 1963 6.8 6.3 5.8 10.8 5.8 6.3 5.3
| 1964 3.9 3.4 1.9 5.9 1.9 2.4 1.4
| 1965 1 .1 0.6 -0.4 3.1 -0.4 0. 1 -1 .4
| 1966 -4.7 -5.2 -6.2 -2.2 -6.2 -5.7 -7.2
| 1967 8.7 8.2 7.2 10.7 7.2 7.7 6.2
| 1968 4.9 4.4 3.4 7.4 3.4 3.9 2.9
| 1969 -5.5 -6.0 -7.0 -3.0 -7.0 -7.0 -7.5
| 1970 -9.3 -9.8 -10.8 -6.8 -10.8 -10. 1 -11.3
| 1971 -11.5 -12.0 -13.0 -9.0 -13.0 -12.0 -13.5
| 1972 1.7 1.2 0.2 4.2 0.2 1.2 -0.3
| 1973 -0.9 -1.4 -2.4 1.6 -2.4 -1 .4 -1.4
| 1974 -8.9 -9.4 -10.4 -7.4 -10.4 -9.4 -9.4
| 1975 -30.0 -31.0 -30.5 -27.5 -30.5 -29.5 -23.5
| 1976 -18.7 -19.7 -18.2 -16.2 -19.7 -18.7 -17.2
| 1977 -17.5 -18.5 -17.5 -14.5 -18.5 -19.5 -16.5
| 1978 -11.6 -12.6 -12.6 -9.6 -11.8 -11.1 -11.6
| 1979 -6.8 -7.8 -6.8 -4.8 -6.3 -5.3 -6.8
| 1980
I
-3.9 -4.9 -3.9 -2.4 -4.2 -3.4 -3.9
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quoted rates are the minimum, it is safe to assume that these
are the rates actually offered by financial institutions in view
of the relatively low lending rates. For example, the lending
rates for the favoured sector were fixed within the range of 4
to 6% p.a. in 1979. At the same time, the minimum savings
deposit rate was pegged at 5%. Profit-maximizing banks would
not be expected to offer a deposit rate in excess of the stipul¬
ated minimum of 5%.
In spite of these weaknesses, published nominal interest rates
will continue to be used here as other alternatives do not exist.
3.4.3. CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING INTEREST RATE POLICIES IN NIGERIA
Various criteria for determining the appropriateness of interest
(18 )
rates in underdeveloped countries have been put forward
Four of these are reviewed briefly here.
3.4.3.1 REAL VERSUS NOMINAL RATES
One popular method of appraising interest rates is to compare
the level of interest rates with the annual rate of inflation.
The expectation is that the real rate of interest, defined as
the nominal interest rate less the annual rate of inflation,
should be positive for otherwise savers will incur a capital loss.
'The real rate of interest is the reward for sacrifice
involved in holding rather than consuming wealth. If
individuals optimize a stream of real consumption over
time, and assuming the existence of only two periods,
"future" and "present", the real rate can be defined as
the relative price between future and present consumption'
(Leite, 1982, p. 61)
k
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A reconstruction of the interest rates along these lines results
in the interest rates shown as Table 4.15. The Table shows that
apart from 1980 when the real maximum lending rate was a mere
0.3%, all rates were negative in real terms throughout the
period 1970 - 80. The phenomenon of negative real rates of
interest is sometimes taken to be indicative of financial re¬
pression (Galbis, 1979, pp. 353 - 60). On this basis, the
Table shows that there was financial repression through the 1970's.
Although it is conceivable for the equilibrium real interest
rates to be negative, it is doubtful whether such an equilibrium
can persist for a period of over ten years as happened in Nig¬
eria. Therefore, the conclusion to be drawn from the applic¬
ation of this criterion is that the authorities maintained inter¬
est rates at sub-equilibrium values. This conclusion is not
invalidated by the observations of Chandavarkar (1971, p. 67) that
'the real rates on saving deposits was negative in the developed
countries (specifically in U.K. and Japan) in all the years'
1965 - 69 because, as shown above, not only the deposit rates
but all rates, including the lending rates, were negative for a
prolonged period.
3.4.3.2 INTEREST RATES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Another standard for assessing interest rates in developing
countries which has been suggested is to compare them with the
levels prevailing in developed countries. It is then argued
that interest rates should be higher in developing than in dev¬
eloped countries (Myrdal, 1967; Bruton, 1973), The assumption
behind this argument is that since the developed countries are
more abundantly endowed with capital than their less developed
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counterparts, the prices of capital should be higher in the
latter than in the former. This capital scarcity argument has
been questioned by Khatkhate (1980). According to him, the
argument implies that (i) real interest rates which reflect the
scarcity of capital have historically fallen with the growth
of the capital stock (ii) savings which are the sources of growth
in the capital stock are interest-elastic (iii) capital scarcity
reflects the rate of return on capital or the rate of interest
and (iv) in developing countries labour is substituted for cap¬
ital when interest rates are higher than otherwise. He con¬
cludes by arguing that the experience of the now developed
countries and theoretical and empirical work have shown the
first two propositions to be false while the evidence available
does not support the other two. A comparison of interest rates
in the two sets of countries is therefore inappropriate.
The position taken here is the same. Interest rates should be
judged according to conditions prevailing in an economy. More¬
over, capital movements in countries like Nigeria often take the
form of direct investment and official capital flows such as
foreign aid and loan repayments. These are unlikely to be sen¬
sitive to domestic interest rates. Finally, the very idea of
capital shortage in Nigeria is the subject of a dispute, even
(19 )
before oil emerged as a dominant force in the economy
3.4.3.3 RATES OF RETURN ON INVESTMENT
Rates of return on investment have also been suggested as a
possible yardstick for measuring the appropriateness of interest
rates. This line of argument has been followed by Khatkhate
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(1980). After observing that
'If money is considered an asset comparable to other
assets, there is no reason to stop at only the financial
assets of one sort or another - cash at one end and long-
term bonds at the other. Investment and consumption
goods, among others, are also assets available to be
held by the public with given income and wealth. The
interest rate can then be viewed in its role as the
rate of return or yield consequent on holding different
types of assets ... Assets will tend to be held in
combinations such that the marginal rates of return ...
on all assets are equal'
(pp. 215, 216).
He then asks which of the various rates of return should be taken
as a "lead" rate for others to follow. This he answers as
follows:
'Clearly, the crucial rate from this point of view is
the rate of return on investment (i.e. capital), as
all other financial assets are claims or ultimately
motivated by the desire to finance such capital'
(p. 217)
This proposition has its own problems. As factors of production
are not perfectly mobile in most countries and in many instances
there are barriers to entry in the high-return investment sector,
there are many rates of return on investment in any economy.
Furthermore, the calculated rates of return are influenced by
many factors. Apart from the accounting method used, the cal¬
culated rate of return on any project may deviate from the true
rate because the calculations are based on actual rates which,
in the face of financial repression, are suboptimal (Leite, 1982,
p. 69) i.e. since interest rates are kept artificially low,
they are no longer suitable for investment decisions. The use¬
fulness of the suggestion is further reduced if a country is
experiencing rapid rates of inflation because of the inevitably
high nominal profitability of investment. As mentioned earlier,
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the rate of return on capital in Nigeria for enterprises in the
first half of the 1970's was over 100%. It would be ridiculous
usa-
to suggest interest rates approaching that magnitude became such
high rates of return were earned only by firms which enjoyed mono¬
poly profits.
Nevertheless, the rate of return on investment may be used as
a supplementary yardstick if some of the problems mentioned above
are taken into consideration.
3.4.3.4 RATES OUTSIDE THE ORGANIZED MONEY MARKET
A distinguishing characteristic of the financial system of under¬
developed countries is the coexistence of a traditional with a
modern sector, each of which is more or less self-contained.
In general the interest rates in the informal sector are relat¬
ively very high. Also, this sector is the main source of credit
to the bulk of the (mainly rural agricultural) population. The
share of this sector in agricultural credit has been estimated
at 72% for Nigeria (Wai, 1977, p. 294), although it is probably
higher. U Tun Wai estimates the level of interest rates in
this sector for 1961 as follows
Lower exceptional Less than 10%
Usual 10 - 50%
Occasional 70%
Higher exceptional 100 - 500%
(Table 4, p. 304)
He puts the average lending rates at between 24 and 36%. But
evidence from elsewhere tends to indicate that the rates have
been underestimated. Nevertheless, if one accepts Wai's average
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rates, they are still high relative to those prevailing in the
modern sector.
Having made this point, it may now be asserted that a comparison
of the two interest rate structures is not appropriate. This
is because the rates in the informal sector are not free market
rates. In a number of papers, Anthony Bottomley (1963, 1964,
1975) has stressed four factors that contribute to the high rates
of interest charged on loans in the informal sector : (i) the
opportunity cost of parting with liquidity (ii) risk premium
(iii) premium for administration and (iv) monopoly profit. The
risk attached to the loans arises from the fact that such loans
are normally unsecured. As income is generally low and as
loans may be used for unproductive purposes, the risk of default
is very real. Often when the loan is due for repayment the
lender has to visit the debtor several times. Even when it is
repaid, it is done at uneconomically small instalments which has
the effect of raising administrative costs. Finally, as stated
earlier, rural income is by and large lower than elsewhere. There
is therefore little surplus available for lending. Lenders
therefore enjoy some monopoly in areas where there is a desire
to spend more than current income. In addition to these factors,
Long (1968, 1973) has added the seasonal character of the demand
for these loans.
For these various reasons, conparison with the informal sector is
not considered desirable. But such rates may serve as upper
limits on the rates in the modern sector. Furthermore, a
desirable objective of monetary policy in general would be to
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diminish the importance of the unorganized money market, thereby
integrating the national money market.
3.4.4 CONSEQUENCES OF NIGERIA'S INTEREST RATE POLICY
It is clear from Chart 4.1 that the rates have remained relatively
low and stable over the years.
Aside from the reduction of the maximum lending rate by 3 percent¬
age points in 1975, there were no changes of more than 1 percent¬
age point in interest rates at any one time. The changes that
were made were very infrequent from 1962 and became even more
so from 1968. The few changes that were made since 1968 had as
their objectives the redirecting of credit and the reduction of
commercial bank liquidity. Judged on the basis of these ob¬
jectives there appears to be little evidence that interest rate
policy has been successful. Interest rate differentials were
not sufficient to make any appreciable impact on the direction of
credit. The fact that a shift in the composition of credit was
effected over the period may be attributable to the operation of
another policy (discussed below). Then the authorities even
admitted (and the records show) that commercial bank liquidity
was not affected as desired.
Three of the criteria examined above - rate of inflation, rates
of return on investment and rates in the informal sector -
indicate that interest rates were low. The result of this
policy is to make the already imperfect financial system even
less perfect by introducing a distortion - accentuating structure
of interest rates. This has the effect of preventing interest
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rates from acting as an efficient rationing device. In addition,
individuals may have been discouraged or at least not given the
incentive to save with financial institutions.
Another consequence of the interest rate structure is that the
public debt is made unattractive to hold as wealth. The Central
Bank has therefore had to take an ever growing proportion of
government debt. The situation is worse for longer-dated gov¬
ernment securities. For instance, the Central Bank took up
98.8% of the 18th Development Stock floated in 1979. In 1981
(20th Development Stocks), the corresponding figure was 94.8
(CBN, Report, 1979 and 1981). The monetization of the public
debt is clearly inflationary.
Finally, and following from the above discussion, the Central
Bank cannot make use of some instruments of monetary policy.
Indeed, the reluctance to allow interest rates to rise is the primary
cause of the inability of the Bank to use open market operations.
In terms of the demand for and supply of credit, it will be noted
that if interest rates are below their equilibrium values or market
-clearing levels, there will be excess demand for credit. With
effective control on the rate of growth of credit, financial
institutions will resort to the rationing of available credit.
Rationing may be based on such non-economic factors as political
influence which may be less than efficient, i.e. rationing may
\
distort resource allocation. It may also be mentioned by way of
passing that under-equilibrium interest rates have the effect of
undervaluing future consumption. By making present consumption
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cheaper than it is relative to future consumption, such a policy
is biased in favour of current consumption thereby leading to
a temporal misallocation of resources.
3.4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON INTEREST RATES
The interest rate policy pursued in Nigeria, especially from 1970
to 1981, was that of low, stable, and discriminatory rates.
There was a marked unwillingness on the part of the authorities
to try out new policies. Although there is no single satisfac¬
tory yardstick for judging the appropriate levels of interest
rates, the notion that in the long run interest rates should be
positive in real terms as measured conventionally remains a
minimal requirement for an effective interest rate policy.
Nigeria is yet to satisfy that condition.
4. THE MAIN WEAPON OF MONETARY MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA :
MORAL SUASION AND DIRECT CONTROLS
Right from its inception, the Central Bank realized that orthodox
monetary weapons were largely inapplicable. In its annual
report for the year ending 31 December 1960 it observed that
'In present circumstances there is only very limited
scope for the employment of monetary measures in deal¬
ing with expansionary tendencies or balance of payments
difficulties, should this be necessary. It will clearly
take time before capital and money markets, which are
still in very early stages, have sufficient breadth and
activity to make effective the employment of the instru¬
ments normally used by Central Banks to influence credit
conditions'
(P. 19)
The alternative was moral suasion and direct controls. The need
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for restrictive monetary measures first arose in 1964 following
the balance of payments crisis of that year. As stated earlier,
the First National Development Plan 1962 - 68 was launched in
1962. But government revenue significantly lagged behind expend¬
iture. Furthermore, there were considerable shortfalls in
expected foreign capital inflows. The authorities therefore
resorted to deficit financing. The balance of payments deterior¬
ated and the level of foreign reserves fell below the official
minimum (of two months import bill). A policy of monetary
restraint was thus required. But as the Central Bank observed,
this
'was not an easy task, partly because of the problem of
restraining private spending without discouraging cap¬
ital formation, and partly because of the deficit fin¬
ancing by the governments. In this situation, the Bank
had to fall back primarily on a selective control measure
based on moral suasion and certain general regulatory
measures'
(1964, p. 15)
It then went on to introduce a package of measures the most
important aspect for the present purposes being the Guidelines
to commercial banks. These were contained in a letter sent to
commercial banks in October 1964. A ceiling was placed on the
rate of expansion in the aggregate of each bank's loans and
advances. Furthermore
'the banks were requested to limit the rate of increase
of aggregate advances, and specifically to exercise re¬
straint in the granting of loans and advances for
financing consumption expenditures, namely loans for
less essential imports, advances to hire-purchase com¬
panies and individuals'
(1964 p. 15)
The guidelines were retained until November 1966 when they were
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as -it appeared in the economy
withdrawn as it /vas heading for a recession. The era of monetary
ease which lasted until the end of the civil war then began.
However bank credit to the Government rose by 81% in 1967 and
85% in 1968, while loans and advances to the private sector
declined by 7.8 and 17.9% respectively. The diversion of
resources to the war effort also caused supply shortages (Central
Bank of Nigeria, 1975. p. 22).
As the Bank saw it, it had to attempt
'to counter positively, at least partially, the inflation¬
ary effect of the fiscal measures by inducing increased
production in the private sector. In order to achieve
this, it was desirable to change the direction of the
movement of credit to the private sector, and to channel
any allocated increase in credit to productive sectors
through selective credit control. Because of the size¬
able deficit, however, it was still necessary to hold
down the amount of additional credit that should to go
the private sector'
(CBN Report, 1969, pp. 12 - 13).
Consequently, from 1969, it started to issue its annual monetary
circulars detailing the desired changes in bank credit. The
Banking Decree of 1969 gave legal backing to these credit guide¬
lines by empowering the Bank to prescribe fines for banks which
did not meet its directives.
4.1 CREDIT GUIDELINES
A hallmark of the working of Monetary Circulars (MC for short)
is the categorization of the economy into four : production
(consisting of agriculture, mining, manufacturing and real estate
and construction) services (made up of public utilities, trans¬
port and communications, and, since 1978, export and development
and financial institutions), general commerce (defined inclusive
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of bills discounted, imports, domestic trade, and, before 1978,
export), and 'others' (composed of credit and financial instit¬
utions, governments, personal and professional, and miscellan¬
eous). Together, production and services constitute the
'Preferred Sectors' while general commerce and 'others' were
regarded as the 'less-preferred sectors'. Sectoral allocations
and rates of expansion specified for the preferred sectors were
to be interpreted as desired minima while those for the less-
preferred sectors were to be regarded as desired maxima.
In the first three monetary circulars, specifications related
to the percentage change over the level of credit at the end of
the previous year (which coincides with the fiscal year). In
1972, absolute ceilings on the rate of expansion of bank credit
were removed and replaced with percentage distribution among
the main sectors and subsectors of the economy. But owing to
the growing magnitude of the problems which the monetary circulars
were supposed to tackle, the Anti-Inflation Task Force recommended
in 1975 that the Central Bank should revert to the systems of
imposing ceilings on total and sectoral increases in commercial
bank credit to the economy (Inflation Task Force, 1975, p. 3).
The Government accepted this recommendation and, in the Budget
of April 1976, it was announced that a 40% ceiling on permissible
increase in commercial banks' loans and advances was desired
for the year ending 31 March 1977. No limit was placed on
credit to agriculture and real estate sectors within the 40%
ceiling. Only marginal changes were made in the following
years.
Following a recommendation of the Anti-Inflation Task Force, the
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credit guidelines were extended to merchant banks for the
first time in the fiscal year 1976 - 77. But owing to their
relative insignificance their operations are not investigated
here.
4.1.1 AN APPRAISAL OF THE CREDIT GUIDELINES
There are many ways in which to evaluate the success of the
Central Bank's credit guidelines.The most obvious is to examine
how far commercial banks have complied with the directives by
comparing the actual performance with the prescribed figures.
A second possible way is to examine to what extent the stru¬
cture of commercial bank loans and advances has changed in the
desired direction over the years. Finally, one may consider
the influence of the guidelines on the ultimate objectives
of monetary policy in Nigeria - price stability and the bal¬
ance of payments. Of these three alternatives, the last is the
most difficult because the objectives are influenced by other
policies and factors beyond the control of the monetary author¬
ities. Thus the comments in this connection should be regarded
as tentative. The exercise starts with an examination of the
effectiveness of the monetary circulars.
4 .1.1.1 CREDIT GUIDELINES AND COMMERCIAL BANK PERFORMANCE
Table 4.11 sets out the prescribed and actual distribution of
commercial bank loans and advances. Since the civil war was
still on in 1969, the year has been excluded.
- 234 -
TABLE 4,11 : LOANS AND ADVANCES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS, %
PRODUCTION SERVICES GENERAL OTHERS
COMMERCE
PRESCR ACTUAL PRESC ACTUAL PRESC ACTUAL PRESC ACTUAI
1970 45 45 50 52 10 2 0 19
1 30 92. 6 11 . 2 77.5 5 . 1 47 .3 -33 . 6 55
2 45 38.1 11 7.7 32 35.7 12 18.5
3 45 38. 3 11 8.1 32 34 . 4 12 19.2
4 45 43.6 11 7 . 5 32 30.0 12 18.9
5 48 44.2 10 7.5 32 30. 4 10 17 . 9
6 48 52. 1 10 9.2 30 25. 1 12 13.6
7 48 53 . 4 10 9.2 30 23.5 12 13.9
8 50 55.6 10 8.2 28 21 .6 12 14 . 6
9 53 59. 3 11 8 . 2 28 19.2 12 13.3
80 56 60 . 8 12 8.5 17 18.8 12 11 .9
1 56 59 . 4 12 9.2 17 18 . 3 12 13.1
SOURCE : CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ANNUAL REPORT (1970 - 81)
Note: Figures for 1970 and 1971 relate to rate of change over
December of previous year's level. Others are per¬
centage distribution (average for period April -
December).
Using this yardstick, one may say that the tool has achieved some
degree of success. The proportion of bank loans and advances
granted to the production sector has risen over the years while
the shares of 'others' and general commerce declined. These
changes, as explained earlier, are in the desired direction.
Table 4.12 presents an alternative view of the distribution of
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bank credit.
TABLE 4.12 DEVIATION OF COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS AND ADVANCES
FROM TARGET
PRODUCTION SERVICES GENERAL OTHERS
COMMERCE
1972 -15.3 -30. 0 11 .6 54 . 2
3 -14 . 9 -26. 4 7.5 60.0
4 -3. 1 -31 . 8 -6.3 57.5
5 -7.9 -25. 0 -5.0 79.0
6 8.5 -8.0 -16.2 13.3
7 11 .3 -8.0 -21 . 7 15.8
8 11 . 2 -18.0 -22. 9 21 . 7
9 11 . 9 -25. 5 -31 . 4 10 . 8
80 8.6 -29. 5 10 . 6 -0.8
1 6.1 -23 . 3 7.6 9.2
SOURCE: TABLE 5.16
ACTUAL 1 1
Deviation is defined as follows: PRESCRIBED
This brings out clearly the fact that the target for the services
sector has never been attained while that of the'others' sector
has consistently (with the very minor exception of 1980) been
exceeded by wide margins, as much as 79% in 1975. In general,
the performance in respect of the production and general commerce
sectors has been better than that of the services and ''Others'
sectors. Given the fact that these two sectors (production
and general commerce) accounted for 73.8% in 1972 and 77.7% in
1981 of total loans and advances, one may say that the credit
guidelines have been relatively effective. The table shows that
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performance has been particularly impressive since 1976 (columns
1, 2 and 4). However, the aggregate figures tend to hide the
important differences among the subsectors in each sector.
Accordingly, a more disaggregated table is provided in Table
4.13.
This table makes clear that the improvement in the share of
production was due wholly to the construction subsector and
that the target for the other subsectors has never been ach¬
ieved. The manufacturing subsector has fared particularly
badly while the agricultural subsector was slightly better off
only from 1978. This slight improvement could be explained in
part by the introduction of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee
Scheme in 1977 under which the Central Bank guaranteed about 80%
of all loans made to agriculture. The favourable treatment
accorded the real estate subsector has been explained in terms of
the fact that
'The demand for residential accommodation has been on
the increase, and landlords made brisk business by
taking advantage of the favourable interest rate charged
on preferred sector loans to put up buildings which
carry rather exhibitional rents'
Okogu, 1982, p. 21.
The reduction in the share of the general commerce sector appears
to have been achieved at the expense of credit for domestic trade
and bills discounted while the import subsector did not suffer
appreciably.
Fines were imposed on defaulting banks for the first time in 1977
According to Monetary Policy Circular No. 14 (1982) which repeats
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the operation of the penalty,
'Where a bank's monthly aggregate of loans and advances,
excluding loans for purchase of shares under the Indig-
enization Scheme, facilities to workers for purchase of
cars and loans to Agriculture and Residential Building
Construction over and above the minimum prescribed under
the guidelines on sectoral allocation of bank credit,
rises by more than 30% or 40% as the case may be or its
credit to import subsector and the less-preferred sectors
in general, exceeds the prescribed percentage, the bank
shall receive a warning on the first default. For any
subsequent default or continuation of a default, the
bank shall pay to the Central Bank a stipulated penalty









Payment of 1/8% of
Excess Credit




4th default Payment of 3/16% of
Excess Credit





Payment of \% of
Excess Credit





These figures appear to be very low compared with the monetary
cost of granting loans to some subsectors of the preferred
sectors especially agriculture. The main element of this
cost is the risk of the loan not being repaid i.e. the expected
value of bad debt in the preferred sectors exceeds that in the
less preferred sectors. Another element of the cost is that
loans to the preferred sectors attract lower interest rates
than those to the less-preferred sectors. For example, in 1982,
interest on loans for agricultural production and residential
housing construction was fixed at 6% while the less preferred
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TABLE 4.13 : AVERAGE DEVIATION OF COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS
AND ADVANCES FROM TARGET (MONTHLY AVERAGES,
APRIL TO DECEMBER
















































5.6 6 . 3 4 . 8 3.4
-1 . 1 -0 . 5 -1 . 2 -0.8
-1.1 -1.0 -1 . 1 -1.1
-4 . 4 -7.0 -5.2 -5.1
-1 . 2 1.3 0.2 0.4
-1 . 2 1.3 0.2 0.4
- - 12 . 6 10 . 0
-1.8 -1.8 -3.5 -2.8
-0 . 5 -0.9 -1.6 -1.4
1 . 3 -1 . 9 -2.0 -1.4
-4.0 -4.4 -3.5 -3.6
0000 oi -4.2 -5.0
-2.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.1
0 . 9 1.5 0.4 0.7
-2 . 2 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8
-1.1 -1.4 -1.5 -
2.6 1.3 3.9 5.1
0.5 -0.4 1.5 2.3
1.5 1.5 0.2 1.2
0.7 0.2 1.0 0.5
-0.1 — 1 . 1 1 . 1
00CO1 0.7 4.2 5.0
Deviation = Actual - Prescribed
sectors attracted an interest rate of 12% and the rate on comm¬
ercial banks' savings deposit was 6i%. In addition, loans to
the preferred sectors are in general for longer term than those
of the less preferred sectors. On agricultural loans, a leading
merchant banker in the country has this to say:
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'Agriculture has never been an attractive area for the
ordinary run of commercial or merchant banks, which do
not specialize in financing it. Although financial
penalties are now imposed for non-achievement of the
minimum lending prescribed for specific sectors ... I
believe there are banks that would rather pay the
monetary fine than lend to agriculture'
(Onosode, 1981, pp. 16 - 17)
Given these considerations and the fact that compliance with
the sectoral allocation directive started to improve dramatic¬
ally in 1976 while fines were imposed for the first time in 1977,
it is difficult to link the improvement with the introduction of
penalties. An alternative explanation is that banks took ad¬
vantage of a loophole in the guidelines. They shifted their
loans in favour of real estate in order to avoid the fines while
agriculture continued to be underfunded in spite of the penalties
and the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme^ . The political
climate as expressed in the Indigenization Scheme which started
in 1972 was also an important factor. Under the scheme, the
ownership of certain enterprises was to pass into the hands of
Nigerians while for other categories of enterprises, specified
minimum proportions of their equity shares were to be held by
Nigerians. It was under the scheme that the Federal Government
acquired 60% of the equity shares of all private, foreign- con¬
trolled banks in 1976. But of more direct relevance is the
Government's official policy. This was made forcibly clear to
(21)
banks in the experience of Barclays Bank (Nig) Ltd . This
has taught banks to attach more importance to goodwill than other
enterprises.
The observation that the credit guidelines have been relatively
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successful in moving credit to the preferred sectors is confirmed
by a comparison of the end of year figures for the year in which
the Central Bank was established (1959) with those of the last
years of the review period. This is done in Table 4.14.
TABLE 4.14 : PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS
AND ADVANCES, END OF DECEMBER
1959 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
PRODUCTION 37 55.. 3 56 . . 5 61 . . 6 60..2 59 , . 3
Agriculture 22 . . 9 4.. 5 5..5 7 . . 1 7..3 6 . 9
Mining 1 . , 0 1 . . 2 1 . . 0 1 , . 0 0..8 1 . 0
Manufacturing 4 . . 1 27 . 2 27 . 7 29.. 4 30..8 31 . . 0
Construction 7 . . 5 21 . 5 21 . . 5 22 . . 7 20..9 20.. 4
Bills Discounted 1 . . 5 0 . . 8 1 . . 0 1 . . 4 0 . 4 -
SERVICES 8., 3 12 . . 2 12.. 1 10.. 2 12 . . 3 13.. 4
GENERAL COMMERCE 33 . . 2 22., 4 20., 2 17 . 3 18.. 6 17 . . 1
OTHERS 21 . . 5 10., 2 11 . . 2 10.. 9 8.. 9 10 . 1
SOURCE : CBN : ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW 19(2)
(Dec.) 1981, ANNUAL REPORT for Dec. 1961. p. 14
Again, the gain by the construction subsector at the expense of .
agriculture is striking. The proportion of total loans and
advances to agriculture fell from 22.9% in 1959 to 6.9% in 1981
while that of construction rose from 7.5% to 20.4% over the same
period. The manufacturing subsector also recorded an impressive
gain - from 4.1% to The decline in the relative import¬
ance of agriculture may not be unconnected with the demise of
the agricultural export sector in the 1970's (Appendix Table
6.1)
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From this review, one may conclude that the Central Bank's credit
guidelines have been relatively successful in moving credit in
favour of the production sector. But commercial banks have not
complied with the credit guidelines in some other respects.
This is especially so in the cases of the services and 'others'
sectors, and the intersectoral allocation within the production
sector. Compliance has also been less impressive in the last
three years in terms of the broad divisions of 'preferred' and
'less-preferred' sectors.
The use of ceilings on and prescriptions of the sectoral alloc¬
ation of bank credit may be criticised from another point of view.
This relates to the desirability of having such controls in the
first place. This issue will be considered very briefly in the
next section in terms of targets and indicators of monetary
policy already introduced in Ch. 3.
4.1.1.2 CREDIT GUIDELINES AND TARGETS AS INDICATORS OF
MONETARY POLICY
It was shown in the previous chapter that generally there are
two alternative targets and indicators of monetary policy.
These are interest rate and monetary aggregates. It was also
explained that up to the early 1970's the rate of interest was
favoured in most industrial countries whereas from the mid-1970's
various countries changed over to the use of monetary aggregates
as targets of monetary policy. But from the discussion of
interest rate policy above it is evident that the Nigerian auth¬
orities have pre-empted the use of interest rates by administer¬
ing them and keeping them apparently below the market clearing
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levels.
Having closed the door to interest rates, the authorities still
have three monetary aggregates to consider. These are the
base money and broad and narrow money as previously defined.
But as shown earlier, the combination of the fiscal operations
of the Federal Government and the monetization of the public
debt through the government's interest rate policy implies that
these candidates for targeting do not pass the controllability
criterion enunciated in Ch. 3. This may have prompted the
authorities to look for an alternative. The chosen variable is
commercial bank credit to the economy which has been the subject
of discussion up to this point.
In appraising the use of a specific variable as a monetary target,
a question that comes to mind is "Was the target attained?'
In the present case, the answer, as seen above, is mixed, i.e.
the controllability criterion is not completely satisfied. Ano¬
ther that needs to be answered is 'How relevant is the particular
target variable to the ultimate objective of policy?' Finally,
one may enquire into the consequences of targeting a particular
variable.
It will be explained in the last section of this chapter that
until 1977 the Main Macroeconomic problem facing the economy
was inflation and that since then both inflation and the bal¬
ance of payments have dominated policy. In Ch. 5 it will be
argued that changes in the money stock constitute one of the
most important factors affecting the rate of change of the price
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level. Now commercial bank credit to the economy is only one
source of monetary expansion and is therefore not a complete
measure of the latter. The inflow of external reserves, for
example, does not necessarily affect the domestic credit expan¬
sion due to commercial banks. But as shown in Ch. 3, it will
affect the money supply which, of course, is more important in
terms of inflation. The argument that the stock of money is
more important than the DCE in the inflation process has been
advanced by Sargent according to whom
'domestic credit expansion should not be seen as a
measure of monetary expansion as such; that is, as
something which, set against the flow of goods and
services at current prices, monitors the extent of
inflationary potential'
(Sargent, 1981, p. 105).
Furthermore, commercial bank credit to the economy is one of
two components of DCE; the other is Central Bank credit.
Another aspect of the use of bank credit in Nigeria is that
the Central Bank paid more attention to its distribution than
to its level. The re-introduction of credit ceiling in 1976,
as seen earlier, was due to the recommendation of the Anti-
Inflation Task Force to that effect in 1975. Although a re¬
direction of credit to the 'more productive' sectors of the
economy may have a salut.ory effect on the inflation objective,
the extent to which it can do so is not clear; such an effect
is likely to be small and may be realized only in the long run
through the growth of the economy. Ceilings on credit expansion
which were de-emphasized thus appear to be more appropriate than
the sectoral distribution of aggregate credit for the inflation
objective. The same holds for the balance of payments.
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Finally, controls on bank lending often give rise to credit
rationing other than by price, especially in the presence of
absolute ceilings on credit. Banks may also engage in an un¬
healthy competition which in the end may drive out the least
successful which in Nigeria are the indigenous banks. That
some of these banks have not yet failed owes in part to the fact
that they are all fully owned by either the Federal or state
governments. Their failure would defeat one purpose of econ¬
omic policy (the 'indigenization' of financial institutions
(Nwankwo, 1980)).
In sum, commercial bank credit is not an appropriate target of
monetary policy; in particular, the emphasis on its sectoral
distribution appears to be misplaced.
4.2 OTHER DIRECT CONTROLS : SPECIAL DEPOSITS
Two types of special deposits were introduced in 1976 along
with the cash reserve requirement discussed earlier. These
are stabilization securities and letters of deposits. The
power to issue and place stabilization securities was conferred
on the Central Bank by the 1968 Amendment Decree. But the
(22)
potential dangers of the exercise of this power are considerable
The Bank wisely avoided the use of the power until 1976. Then,
in its report submitted to the government in October 1975, the
Anti-Inflation Task Force (p. 3) argued for the activation of
this weapon. In its White Paper on the Report published in
Dec. 1975, the government accepted this recommendation and dir¬
ected that the 'Bank should now exercise its power of issuing
stabilization securities' (p. 26). The Bank obliged in 1976 as
stated above.
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The securities were based on increases in each bank's savings
deposits over the level outstanding on 31 March 1976 and were
in respect of deposits in individual savings accounts not ex¬
ceeding N20,000 each. The securities earned an interest rate
of 4%. In 1978, the securities were made compulsory for banks
with savings deposits of N50 m or more and the amount to be sub¬
scribed to by the affected banks was fixed at 50% of the increase
in savings deposits as above. The securities were to be non-
negotiable, non-transferable and non-eligible for calculating
the statutory liquidity ratio.
The exclusion of these assets from the calculation of the liqui¬
dity ratio had some perceptible impact. The mean of the average
monthly ratio was as follows:
1975 68.5% 1978 38.4%
1976 58.1% 1979 45.1%
1977 52.7% 1980 47.6%
This development lends support to the suggestion made earlier
that the composition of eligible reserve assets should be de¬
fined less broadly than it is at present.
To round up the discussion of the conduct of monetary policy,
the impact of policy on the economy will be briefly examined
by considering the movement in the money supply, consumer prices
and the balance of payments.
5 THE IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY ON THE MONEY SUPPLY AND
THE PRICE LEVEL
The relationship between money and prices in Nigeria is explored
V
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in Chapter 5. The present exercise is confined to the changes
in the two series. The annual percentage changes in money and
prices are set out in Chart 5.3 and App. Table 5.1.
Both narrow and broad money show a pattern of acceleration in
the rates of growth at the beginning and end of the decades and
corresponding deceleration in the middle. This is unconnected
with the policies pursued during the period. The deceleration
in the period 1965 to 1968 may be attributed to the political
instability of the time. As the end of the war became increas¬
ingly obvious in 1969, some of the restrictions were removed
(Aboyade and Ayida, 1971; SNDP, pp. 17 - 20). This released
part of the pent up demand, leading to an acceleration of the
rate of growth of both and Mg as well as the rate of infla¬
tion. The effect of the progressive liberalization of economic
policy (such as the easing of foreign exchange controls and the
abolition of the compulsory saving scheme) seems to have filtered
out by 1972, hence the fall in the rate of monetary expansion
and the rate of inflation. But in 1973, the first round of oil
price increases took place. As made clear in Ch. 3, the ensuing
inflow of foreign reserve which the government decided to monetize
had a great impact on high powered money and consequently on the
money supply. The biggest increase in reserve flow and the
highest level of foreign reserves were recorded in 1974. Gov¬
ernment expenditure reacted with a lag of about a year and the
full impact of the development was felt in the monetary sector
in 1975. Also, in that year, the biggest wage increases were
made. Together, these factors accounted for the unprecedented
growth in the money supply and increase in the price level bet-
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ween 1974 and 1977.
Owing to the depression in the world oil market and the con¬
sequent decline in oil production and export in Nigeria, there
was a decline in the level of economic activity in 1977 and 1978.
In particular, government revenue and expenditure in nominal
terms fell in 1978 and the GDP in real terms declined absolutely.
There was considerable improvement in the oil sector in 1979
with respect to government revenue and foreign exchange earn¬
ings. This enabled the government to increase its expenditure the
effect of which was felt in 1980 in the monetary sector.
The most important factors affecting the money supply and the
price level therefore appear to be government fiscal operations
and reserve flows during the 1970's. In the earlier years,
the money supply was dominated by government financial require¬
ments .
6 EVOLUTION OF MONETARY PROBLEMS AND POLICY
So far the use of specific weapons of monetary policy and their
impact have been considered in a piece meal fashion. This
approach does not provide an integrated picture of the evolution
and development of monetary policy. The aim of this historical
survey is to present a summary account of the problems confronting
the economy to which monetary policy was applied. Inflation
and balance of payments policies are reviewed in Chs. 5 and 6
respectively.
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The review period has been divided into three phases. There
is nothing special about the particular dates chosen apart from
analytical convenience.
6-1 THE FIRST PHASE : 1959 - 62
One of the principal objectives of the Central Bank of Nigeria
is to issue legal tender currency in Nigeria. This was the
first task it undertook on its establishment. But the various
advisers consulted on the establishment of the Bank had expressed
great concern over the potential dangers of the Bank in gener¬
ating an 'inflationary pressure.' According to Fisher (1952, p.
7), 'lending by a central bank can have greater expansionary
effects' than a commercial bank or a currency board. The World
Bank Mission also voiced the same concern (IBRD, 1955). This
view was accepted by government as seen in Ch. 1.
The main preoccupation of the Bank during this period therefore
was with issuing and strengthening an indigenous currency. In
addition to linking the Nigerian pound to the pound sterling, the
Bank followed the recommendation of the World Bank Mission that
'the new (currency) issue like the old should be backed
by sterling. Foreign exchange reserves should not fall
below 100% of the currency issue in the foreseeable
future'
(IBRD, 1955, p. 97)
Its current liabilities were backed by almost 100% in the first
two years.
Ostensibly to strengthen further the power of the Bank to defend
the external value of the Nigerian pound, the government decided
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to centralize in its control the external reserves of the country.
Hitherto, these had been held in London as long-term securities
by various official, semi-official and private bodies. However,
the real reason for this decision appears to be the desire for
administrative controls over foreign exchange transactions.
Controls would have been difficult without the centralization
of reserves in an official institution.
Recognizing the fact that the effectiveness of monetary policy
is constrained by the absence of the requisite financial inst¬
itutions, it set out to lay and nurture the foundation for the
operation of a modern financial market. First, it took steps
to improve the efficiency of the commercial banks which are
central to the effectiveness of any financial or monetary policy.
These included bank examination which helped to enforce stand¬
ards thus building public confidence in the banks; the estab¬
lishment of clearing houses at some of its branches; and the
meeting of the Bankers' Committee which facilitated exchange of
views between it and the commercial banks.
Above all, it launched the money market in 1960 with the first
issue of Treasury bills. This was followed by the establish¬
ment of the Call Money Fund and the Commercial Bill Finance
Scheme in 1962. The Bank has been supporting the money market
by providing rediscount facilities where applicable. The
Lagos Stock Exchange opened for business in 1961 for dealings
in private and public securities.
Finally, in 1962, the Bank reduced the minimum ratio of liquid
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assets to total demand and time deposits to 25% - the level at
which it has remained ever since.
6.2 PHASE TWO : 1962 - 70
Government's financial needs made it impossible to maintain the
100% backing of the currency indefinitely. Besides, full back¬
ing of the currency implies a complete dependence of the money
supply on the balance of payments as under the currency system
and this was an unacceptable situation (Nwankwo, 1980, pp. 3 - 4).
Fiduciary element was introduced in 1961. By the end of the year
the ratio of reserves to total demand liabilities had fallen to
80.3%. At the end of 1962 and 1963 the ratio stood at 84.6%
and 55.6% respectively. The progressive expansion of the fid¬
uciary element continued until the outbreak of the civil war in
1967 .
As seen in Ch. 2, less than half of the expected capital inflow
under the First National Development Plan launched in 1962 had
materialized by the end of the plan period. The country there¬
fore had to look inwards for internal sources. But revenue
failed to expand sufficiently fast to keep pace with expenditure.
Private financing for the government from the non-bank public
also proved disappointing. During this period, the balance of
payments deteriorated sharply (see Ch. 6). In 1964 the level
of external reserves fell below the official target minimum.
This trend was accentuated by the civil disturbances that began
in 1965. As all other sources of finance failed, the government
resorted to deficit financing. This was reflected in the
growth of the public debt which rose from N90 m at the end of
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1962 to N800 m at the end of 1964, with over 75% being derived
from inflationary sources (CBN Annual Report 1964, p. 12). The
size of the budget deficit also rose. Aggregate credit to the
economy, especially the part going to the public sector, as well
as the money supply grew (comparatively) rapidly. According
to one view, this tended to generate inflationary pressures which
appeared 'to have been deflected to the external sector' (Falegan,
1978), hence the deterioration in the balance of payments.
Despite this development, the government insisted that the cost
of its borrowing should be kept low. The Central Bank thus
found itself in a dilemma : measures taken to improve the balance
of payments position (primarily through tight credit policy)
would be incompatible with its role in providing development
finance for the government. This was the beginning of the
low interest policy criticized at length in the text.
The Central Bank Act was amended in 1962 in order to increase
the ability of the Bank to lend to the government (as well as
to regulate commercial bank activities). The Bank was permitted
to hold its assets in other currencies besides the Nigerian pound
and pound sterling. This was not possible under the original
Act. Previously it held dollars but could not include its
holding in the calculation of its reserves. Furthermore, the
amendment raised substantially the ceiling on the fiduciary
element which could not rise to 60% before 1965 under the 1958
Act.
The Bank started to pursue a 'cheap money' policy in 1962. In
order to finance the growing budget deficit arising principally
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from, first, the implementation of the public sector programmes
under the Plan and, then, the prosecution of the civil war.
Development Loan stocks totalling N246.8 m were issued between
May 1958 and March 1969 out of which the Bank underwrote over
N192 million. Its holding of Treasury bills also increased.
The discount rate had to be kept deliberately low in order to
minimize the cost of government borrowing.
Matters came to a head in 1964 with the depletion of foreign
reserves to the level already mentioned. This roused the Bank
to action and as it observed,
'It may be said that 1964 marked a new stage in monetary
management in Nigeria : a year when passive monetary
policy, in vogue since the West African Currency Board,
was replaced by a conscious effort on the part of the
Central Bank and the Government to influence the rate
of credit creation and patterns of expenditure'
(Annual Report 1964, p. 10)
The relevant policy at the time was credit restraint. But the
Bank was handicapped by three considerations in successfully
executing a tight credit policy. First, its primary objective
in that period was facilitating economic development through its
policy of monetary ease. An anti-inflation or a deflationary
policy was likely to affect adversely capital formation (through
credit squeeze and the inevitable rise in interest rates).
Secondly, any success achieved with its deflationary policy
was likely to be neutralized by the growing deficit in the gov¬
ernment budget. Finally, the absence of the requisite instit¬
utional framework curtailed considerably the choice of instru¬
ments of policy. Under those circumstances 'the bank had to
fall back primarily on a selective control measure based on
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moral suasion, and certain general regulatory measures'
(Annual Report 1964).
It then imposed the ceilings discussed above.
The civil war that ended in 1970 began in 1967. No guidelines
were issued again between November 1966 and June 1969 as the
objective of monetary policy was to channel credit to the public
sector for the prosecution of the war. The Bank switched back
to its policy of monetary ease. The balance of payments deter¬
iorated but the problem was left to fiscal policy since 'Monet¬
ary policy does not yet have a cure for adverse movements in
the economy caused by political uncertainty' (Ekukinam, 1968,
p. 220).
As the war progressed beyond expectations some of the measures
already reviewed were taken. These included the amendments
to the Treasury Bill Acts and the Central Bank Acts as well as
changes in the minimum lending rate, and the introduction of
Treasury certificates (in 1968), all with the aim of widening
the scope for public sector borrowing while at the same time
keeping down the cost of such borrowing. Credit to the economy
increased sharply.
In order to protect the balance of payments position, the govern¬
ment adopted stringent fiscal (see Ch. 2) and direct exchange
control measures (discussed in Ch. 6) which proved to be effect¬
ive. The domestic sector therefore bore the brunt of the press¬
ure exerted by the expanded aggregate demand. This was effect-
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ively restrained until when, following the drawing to an end of
the war, some of the restrictions were removed. The officially
recorded price level which declined by 3.7% and 0.4% in 1967 and
1968 respectively rose by 10% in 1969. This spurred the Bank
into action but the only weapon it used was its selective credit
control which it started to issue in that year in the form of
'Monetary Circulars' as detailed in the text.
In sum, monetary policy started to be used actively in 1964
but its use was short-lived because of the crises of the mid-
1960 's. Apart from the brief period of 1964 - 66, the major
objective of monetary policy was the financing of government
expenditure, first.,, under the First National Plan, and.secondly,
during the war.
6.3 THIRD PHASE : 1971 - 81
Inflation continued to dominate policy considerations throughout
this period. By March 1970 a Price Control Board to fix and
enforce the prices of most essential commodities had been set
up. But the problem worsened to such an extent that the gov¬
ernment appointed an "Anti-Inflation Task Force' in 1975. In
1977 the balance of payments position became a major source of
concern. These two problems persisted to the end of the review
period and even beyond.
In the early part of this phase the Central Bank continued to
rely on moral suasion and other related measures. But as seen
earlier, monetary policy was largely ineffective. 'Monetary
Circular No. 3' of 1971 had placed ceilings on the growth of
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commercial bank credit to the economy. But at the end of the
year it was found that
'In general, the commercial banks did not comply with
(these) directives ... Their total loans and advances
outstanding rose by 42.6% compared with the policy
prescription of 8.4%. The permissible limits of
credit to each sector were exceeded by very substantial
margins'
(Annual Report 1971, p. 46).
This non-compliance, it will be remembered from earlier discuss¬
ions, was to be a recurring feature of the credit guidelines.
In 1971, for the first time in many years, the central government
realized an overall surplus in its budget (Table 2.1). Part
of this was used to liquidate its indebtedness to the banking
system. By 1974, following the inflow of petroleum receipts
on an unexpected scale, it had become a net lender to the system.
But this development was not altogether beneficial to monetary
policy. The increased liquidity of the banking system occas¬
ioned by the retirement of part of the government debt posed a
problem. As bank liquidity rose, the rate of monetary expan¬
sion also accelerated. rose by 42.5 and 73.5 in 1974 and
1975 respectively compared with a figure of only 11.3 and 18.1%
two years previously. The following measures were some of those
taken to reduce the rate of monetary growth. Ceiling re-imposed
in 1977; minuscule upward adjustments in interest rates were
made; stabilization securities started to be issued in 1976;
in the same year a cash ratio requirement was introduced and a
call for special deposits made while some assets - e.g. deposits
against letters of credit and cash deposits at the Central Bank
in fulfilment of the cash ratio requirements - were excluded from
be
the calculation of liquid assets for the statutory liquidy require-
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ments; and merchant banks were brought under the umbrella of
the credit guidelines in 1978.
But, as stressed in the text, these measures did not produce
the intended effect of reducing commercial bank liquidity con¬
siderably. The problems which monetary policy was expected
to solve - inflation and the balance of payments disequilibrium
- became worse over time.
7. GENERAL EVALUATION OF MONETARY POLICY AND SUMMARY
7.1 GENERAL ASSESSMENT
Except for the brief period 1964 - 66 discretionary monetary
policy was virtually non-existent in Nigeria in the 1960's.
The only weapon used during this time was the minimum lending
rate which, as seen above, was not designed to influence commer¬
cial bank credit. As such it was not used as a weapon of mon¬
etary control. Nevertheless the changes to the rate made dur¬
ing this time reflected the thinking within the British monetary
tradition (in which monetary policy in Nigeria was expected to
be conducted) that the best target and indicator of monetary
policy was the rate of interest. The political crises and the
civil war which followed introduced a great deal of uncertainty
into the financial system and the incomplete coverage of data on
the relevant variables all contribute to make the criteria
developed in Ch. 3 inapplicable to this period.
The interesting period is thus the one since 1970. This also
corresponds to the period of interest rate administration. The
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administrative control of interest rates precludes them from
serving as either targets or indicators of monetary policy.
Thus both the money and bond markets were of little relevance
to monetary policy since the yields of securities were also
administered.
Pegging interest rates at predetermined levels implies that the
money supply was allowed to find its level. Still, if it could
be shown that the money supply was influenced by the prevailing
rates of interest, it would still be possible to realize a desired
level of the money stock by setting interest rates appropriately.
However, it was clear that the authorities were neither interested
in a specific definition of the money supply such as or
nor in total bank credit; instead emphasis was on the distrib¬
ution of commercial bank credit as detailed above. The use
of selective credit control to effect a change in the distribu¬
tion of bank credit then constituted the Central Bank's monetary
policy. Strictly speaking, it is difficult to link the distribu¬
tion of bank credit to any of the objectives of monetary policy.
But this is an issue that is taken up below.
The performance of the credit guidelines in relation to the
targets was reviewed above. Using the first set of criteria
for assessing policy proposed in Ch. 1, monetary policy in Nigeria
must be judged to have had mixed success - the conclusion arrived
at in relation to the effectiveness of the credit guidelines of
moving credit in the desired direction. Theoretically, credit
guidelines can be made effective if sufficient penalties are
imposed. But the authorities decided not to take that option.
But using the second set of criteria, the conclusion is strongly
negative : Nigeria does not appear to have pursued any particular
monetary policy. The rates of monetary expansion were excessive
given the growth of output,and interest rates were not used for
judging the stance or effect of policy. Criteria for determining
the timing and the magnitude of the interest rates were not made
public and the justification usually given by the Central Bank
(such as 'in view of the growing liquidity of the economy') is
inadequate in the light of the changes themselves. A prime
example of this point is the explanation of the downward revision
of interest rates in 1975 to reduce inflationary pressure already
mentioned. Since the exchange rate also was administered from
1973, the changes in interest rates were unconnected with exchange
rate considerations. It is therefore necessary to re-evaluate
the philosophy behind the Bank's use of interest rates.
The most important conclusion of the investigation into the demand
for money in Nigeria undertaken in Ch. 3 is that as of now it is
difficult to relate the demand for money in the country to a few
variables i.e. the existence of a stable demand function in
Nigeria is yet to be established. The stability tests carried
out (but not reported) merely served to confirm this proposition.
It was also pointed out in that chapter that this had profound
implications for monetary policy. When the absence of a stable
demand for money function is combined with the inability of the
Central Bank to influence appreciably the determinants of the
money stock (monetary base and multiplier) shown in the same
chapter, it is not surprising that monetary policy in Nigeria
has been ineffective. As Boorman (1972, pp. 250 - 51) has
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remarked,
The stability of the money demand function, together
with a capacity on the part of the monetary authority
to influence closely the stock of assets corresponding
to the theoretical concept of money employed in that
function would seem to be necessary conditions for the
successful implementation of monetary policy'.
One of the reasons suggested for the behaviour of the money
demand function observed in Ch. 3 is the administered nature of
the interest rates. The argument advanced there was that the
pegging of interest rates removed the sensitivity of the demand
for money to changes in interest rates. However, if one pursues
this argument further, one would find himself in a vicious cycle
: the authorities discounted the use of interest rates because
the rates were not important determinants of the demand for money;
since the rates were pegged they could not influence the demand
for money; and so on. Since the administration of interest
rates started in 1970, one may wish to test whether official
policy had a role to play in the abnormal behaviour of money
demand in the country. For this purpose, a money demand function
covering the period to 1969 was estimated. The results were
even worse than those for longer or later periods. Also, it
has been explained that changes in interest rates before 1970
were dictated by changes in the Bank of England minimum lending
rate and the London money market rates in general. This suggests
that the demand for money in Nigeria may be related to the inter¬
est rates in the U.K. during this period, Iyoha (1976) has
tested this hypothesis by estimating a money demand function
covering the period 1950 - 65 with income and the 'U.K. bond rate'
as the explanatory variables. But 'the results were not very
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encouraging as interest rate coefficient was usually insignificant
and sometimes had the wrong sign' (p. 392). Of course, it is
possible to argue that the interest rate used was inappropriate and
so the results are inconclusive with respect to the influence
of U.K. interest rates on the demand for money in Nigeria. How¬
ever, so far available evidence tends to suggest that the demand
for money in Nigeria is insensitive to interest rates, domestic
and foreign. This does not imply that the demand for money
would still have been interest-inelastic even in the absence
of controls on interest rates. A possible explanation for the
failure of money demand in Nigeria to respond to interest rates
found by Iyoha is that during the period covered by his study
the financial system was very rudimentary. But many changes
have occurred in the system since then and if there had been no
interest rate controls the money demand function might have beh¬
aved better.
In spite of this apparent ineffectiveness of interest rates, the
Central Bank made use of them frequently from 1975 as is evident
from the earlier discussion. The reasons usually given were to
reduce bank liquidity, to stimulate investment in the more pro¬
ductive sectors and discourage the flow of credit to the less
productive sectors, and to stimulate savings, agricultural and
local industrial production (e.g. Annual Report, 1976, pp. 5 - 6;
1977, pp 5, 45; 1978, pp. 5, 46 - 47). In order to achieve
this, interest rates were usually revised by 1% or so while the
'productive sectors' attract lower rates than the 'less productive
sectors'. As the interest rates were raised (or reduced) by
only a percentage point while the annual rate of inflation aver¬
aged over 10%, and, given the quantitative controls on the
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sectoral allocation of bank credit instead of total credit, one
may say that the authorities did not expect interest rates to
affect the overall availability of credit to the economy - a result
that was reached earlier on. It is also doubtful if the Bank
expected interest rates to achieve the other objectives of re¬
distributing credit in favour of some sectors at the expense of
others, given that demand for credit has been found to be un¬
responsive to interest rates.
In order to get at the reasons behind the use of interest rates
by the Bank one has to look beyond its published statements of
objectives. An obvious source of information in this regard
is academic thinking within the Bank. Results of research at
the Bank tend to suggest that the government's fiscal operations
are to blame for the economic malaise of the country and that
monetary policy is ineffective until government spending is
brought under control (Nwade, 1977; Akinnifesi and Phillips,
1978; Falegan, 1978). In other words, monetary policy is
powerless in respect of inflation, balance of payments^ disequili¬
brium and unemployment.
One may then say that the Bank did not really believe in the
efficacy of interest rates or monetary policy in general for that
matter. Still, it does not explain its use of interest rates.
The reason behind its interest rate policy suggested here is
that the changes were forced on it. This conclusion is based
on the following considerations. Since the commencement of the
active use of interest rates, the changes have always been
announced by the Federal Commissioner/Minister of Finance in the
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budget. Although it is difficult for the outsider to determine
how much consultation goes on behind the scenes, one may say
that the level of such consultation is probably low for a reason
to be given presently. Secondly, as seen above, studies in
the Bank agree that interest rates as they now exist are in¬
effective. Thirdly, the conclusion of the earlier discussion
of Central Bank - government relationship is that the former
is in practice not independent of the latter, specifically the
Ministry of Finance. This point is supported by the fact that
the Bank was forced to issue stabilization securities and call
for special deposits from 1976. In a public lecture delivered
recently, the Governor of the Bank touched the issue of the
absence of the independence of the Bank in the following manner:
'Under the military regime (1966 - 1979), the powers and
independence earlier conferred on the Central Bank by
Acts of Parliament were persistently eroded'
(Vincent, 1979, p. 12).
According to him, the necessity for a central bank to 'co-operate
with the whims and caprices of the government of the day is one
of the fundamental problems of monetary management' (p. 9).
7.2 SUMMARY
This chapter has shown that monetary policy in Nigeria over the
last two and a half decades has met with limited success in ach¬
ieving the usual objectives relating to prices, the balance of
payments and income. This is not surprising as it was demon¬
strated in the previous chapter that the Central Bank does not
have an effective control over the stock of money. The inability
of the Bank to influence the money stock was attributed to,
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among other things, the influence of reserve flows and the fiscal
activities of the Federal Government. In the present chapter
it has been argued that the pegging of interest rates at very low
levels together with the existence of a high and volatile level
of commercial banks' excess reserves rendered most conventional
weapons of monetary policy, particularly open market operations,
liquidity ratio and the discount rate, ineffective or inoperative.
Consequently, the Bank relied mainly on selective credit control.
The particular form of this weapon chosen by the Bank was the
issuing of credit guidelines to commercial and (later) merchant
banks on the growth of aggregate credit and the distribution
among the main classes of borrowers. As a target of monetary
policy, ceilings on the growth of and the distribution of comm¬
ercial bank aggregate credit is inappropriate because it is
outside the control of the monetary authorities. The achieve¬
ment of the target requires the co-operation of the banks which
cannot be taken for granted as shown by the experience with the
system. The stipulation of the sectoral allocation of credit
(in which the sectors to which the banks are reluctant to lend
(e.g. agriculture) are given a large share in addition to att¬
racting substantially lower than average interest rates) espec¬
ially is in conflict with the profit-maximizing behaviour of
banks. At a more fundamental level, there is the question of
the relevance of sectoral distribution of bank credit to the
ultimate objectives of macroeconomic policy in the country ident¬
ified in Ch. 1. Yet, the Bank paid more attention to the alloc¬
ation of credit than to its growth rate.
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Over the review period, then, the two main determinants of the
money stock were the balance of payments and the fiscal operations
of the government. On the other hand, the greatest limitations
on the effectiveness of monetary policy in the country are the
fiscal deficit and government intervention in the formulation
and execution of monetary policy by the Central Bank. In the
context of policy, it is government expenditure and interference
which are the relevant variables. Consultation and co-operation
between the Bank and the Government are preconditions for an
effective monetary policy.
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FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER FOUR
1. For instance, in 1963 there were seventeen banks with 218
offices. 192 of these were owned by the largest five
which controlled 75% of the banking business (Olakanpo,
1965, p. 17).
2. According to Soyode and Oyejide (1975, p. 12.7-), most commer¬
cial bank branch offices are concentrated in Lagos, Ibadan,
Kaduna, Enugu and Port Harcourt. In 1977, Lagos State,
with an estimated 2.6% of the total population of Nigeria,
had 100 bank offices or 21% of the total (Nwankwo, 1980,
p. 65).
3. Most indigenous banks in Nigeria are completely owned
by state governments. The FG set 60% as the minimum indig¬
enous equity participation in all banks w.e.f. 1976. Gov¬
ernments have controlling interests in all but three minor
banks. Ojo and Adewunmi (1982, p. 47).
4. Total assets/liabilities rose more than 7 -fold between
1970 and 1978 (Okigbo, 1981, p. 97).
5. There are more than 137,000 persons to a branch office in
Nigeria (Okigbo, 1981, p. 100).
6. Okigbo (1981, p. 121). According to Nwankwo (1980, p.
90), 'the Indigenization Decree, the oil boom and the
Third Plan ... explain the upsurge of merchant banking
in the country in the mid-1970's'.
7. At the end of 1981 there were 84 registered insurance
companies compared to 20 commercial banks. But of the
former, only 20 reported on their operations. A year
earlier 27 of the 72 registered insurance companies reported
to the CBN as required by law (CBN, Report, 1980, p. 69;
1981, pp. 34, 64).
8. These last three assets were introduced by the CBN in 1975
to combat the growing scarcity of shortterm investment
outlets owing to reduced government borrowing in mid-1970's
occasioned by the increased earnings from oil. e.g. The
amount of the Treasury debt instruments outstanding stagnated
at their 1971 level until 1977 when Government revenue
slumped. See Ojo and Adewunmi (1982, pp. 228 - 19).
CDs and BUF are interbank debt instruments.
9. See footnote 8 above.
10. This obvious reason was suggested by the Bank itself. See
its Report for 1980, p. 54.
11. The then Minister of Finance defended government regulation
as follows: 'while accepting the universal principle that
market forces should be given free play in the determin¬
ation of prices, we must, by the same token, give due weight
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to the fact that as of now there are relatively few stocks
on issue. Furthermore, once stocks are purchased, they
hardly ever change hands'. (Speech by the Federal Commiss¬
ioner of Finance at the inauguration of the Capital Issues
Commission (Lagos : Federal Ministry of Finance, May,
1973).
12. In addition to those mentioned above, another well known
study is Isong (1957, pp. 112 - 14).
13. Although the first issue in 1968 was oversubscribed, mainly
by the commercial banks (Udo-Aka, 1971, p. 23), in recent
years the CBN has had to take up sizeable amounts of the
asset. On average, it held 50.7% in 1980 compared to
28% held by commercial banks.
14. Courakis (1977, p. 23) cites this as the main reason for the
non-use of the weapon in W. Germany until recently.
15. For instance, under the 1962 amendment of the Central Bank
Act, commercial banks could include up to 7i% of their
externally-held assets in the calculation of the liquidity
ratio. This was reduced to 3% in 1964 and abolished in
1964. The changes were designed to encourage banks to
repatriate their foreign assets from abroad.
16. This argument is often couched in terms of the so-called
'vicious cycle of poverty'.
17. These are the First Bank of Nigeria, United Bank for Africa
and Union Bank of Nigeria. See Ojo and Adewunmi (1982,
p. 51) for details.
18. For a selection of these criteria see Chandavarkar (1971),
Khatkhate (1980) and Leite (1982).
19. A classic reference on this point is Myrdal (1967). See
also Bruton (1973).
20. This line or agrument is suggested by Okogu (1982, p. 24).
21. The occasion was a politically objectionable statement made
by the Chairman of Barclays Bank International concerning
the association of the bank with S. Africa. The Nigerian
Federal Government responded by directing all governments
and government-controlled institutions in the country to
withdraw their accounts from Barclays Bank (Nig) Ltd in
1978. Although the directive applied only to official
institutions, most private customers of the bank transferred
their businesses to other banks probably for fear of the
bank going insolvent as heppened in the early 1950's.
This created a lot of problem for the bank. As part
of its survival measures, it changed its name to Union
Bank of Nigeria Ltd which is its present name. It
survived the trauma but incurred heavy public relations
expenses.
The influence of political pressure is greater than one
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would expect. Name changing is a reflection of this
climate. Other instances in which banks changed their
names were politically motivated too. First the Barclays
Bank shortened the tag 'Dominion, Colonial and Overseas'
to DCO in the 1950's; at independence, it dropped it
altogether. Then, the Bank of British West Africa removed
the 'British' with the independence of Ghana in 1957. In
1964, it merged with the Standard Bank of South Africa
and in 1969 it changed its name to Standard Bank (Nig) Ltd.
when it took out a Nigerian Incorporation in compliance
with the Banking Decree of that year. But with the increas¬
ingly anti-apartheid stance of the Federal Government, the
association with S. Africa became a liability. In order
to improve its public image, the bank changed its name
to First Bank of Nigeria Ltd in 1979. Finally, the United
Bank for Africa (which, together with the other two banks
mentioned above, constitutes the three largest banks) was
originally known as British and Franch Bank.
The willingness of banks to change names and to assume the
associated promotion expenses shows how much importance
they attach to goodwill or public image.
22. The relevant part of the amendment empowers the Central Bank
to 'issue, place, sell, repurchase, amortize or redeem
securities to be known as "stabilization securities" (which
shall constitute its obligations) and the securities shall
be issued at such rate of interest and under such conditions
of maturity, amortization, negotiability and redemption
as the Bank may deem appropriate'. In case of default,
the Bank can 'prohibit'the institution concerned from extend¬
ing new loans and advances and from undertaking new invest¬
ments until full compliance has been obtained' (Nwankmo, 1980,
p. 31). Under the 1969 Banking Amendment Decree, the Bank
could take over the business of a commercial bank that





For reasons already given in Ch. 1, price stability and the balance
of payments are the most amenable to appraisal of all the govern¬
ment's objectives of economic policy. The former objective is
taken up in this chapter while the latter is reserved for the
following chapter.
The aim of the present chapter is two-fold: to explian the behav¬
iour of the price level and to appraise the policies pursued by
the authorities in the attempt at achieving the desired degree of
price stability. Like many countries in the world, Nigeria did
not experience a serious problem with respect to inflation before
1970 .
The chapter is divided into three main sections. Section I
presents the facts to be explained while Section II is concerned
with one specific explanation of inflation - the monetary theory
of inflation. Section III deals with another group of explan¬
ations which may be called the institutional theory of inflation.
The conclusion is contained in the final section.
1. THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE PRICE LEVEL
Between 1952 (the earliest year for which price statistics are
available on a continuous basis) and 1969, the annual rate of
inflation as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) was below
10%. Also, during the same period, the price level declined
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absolutely in three years (1963, 1967 and 1968). But in 1969
the annual rate of inflation exceeded 10% and accelerated in the
following two years, reaching 16.1% in 1971 after which it started
to decelerate. But in 1975, it attained its highest value to
date of 33.7%.
Chart 5.1 shows that the annual rate of inflation fluctuated
widely around a rising trend until 1975 when a big deceleration
that lasted for five years set in. The country appears to have
experienced a more rapid rate of inflation than most other coun¬
tries (excluding of course Latin America) over the period since
1952. Chart 5.1 also presents a visual comparison of inflation
rates in Nigeria and the average for OPEC as a whole and industrial
countries between 1959 and 1981. From the Chart one may say that
from 1959 to 1981 the price level in Nigeria rose more rapidly on
an average basis than that in industrial and OPEC countries. This
is particularly so between 1975 and 1979. The Chart also shows
that until 1972 there was no definite relationship between the
average rate of inflation in OPEC countries of which Nigeria is
one and that in industrial countries. But since then the former
has consistently exceeded the latter.
Given this background, the task of the next two sections is to
analyse the movement of the price level with a view to identify¬
ing the factors which affect the rate of inflation in Nigeria.
These have been grouped into monetary and non-monetary, and the
discussion is organized along those lines. The first examines
the influence of money on prices with Nigerian data while the
second deals with the institutional explanation. Although
Charf" 5.1 : InPlahion 1959-81
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statistical evidence is consistent with the monetary theory of
inflation, it is concluded that non-monetary factors also have a
role to play.
2. THE MONETARY THEORY OF INFLATION
For a long time now, money has been singled out as one of the
most important factors which determine the price level. The
relationship between money and prices was first expressed form¬
ally as the Equation of Exchange which was subsequently trans¬
formed into the Quantity Theory of Money. This theory attri¬
buted changes in the price level primarily to changes in the
stock of money, according to Meiselman (1975, p. 70),
'In the four centuries since the coronation of Queen
Elizabeth I, there is no important episode of infl¬
ation or deflation that has been studied which contra¬
dicts the general proposition that changes in the
price level stem primarily from changes in the nominal
stock of money per unit of output'.
This is only one of such statements of which the best known is
probably Milton Friedman's assertion that
'inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon
... and can be produced only by a more rapid increase in
the quantity of money than in output'
(Friedman, 1970, p. 24).
In support of this contention, Friedman and Schwartz (1982)
have recently produced a voluminous amount of statistical evid¬
ence for the US and UK which has been summarized, rather unkindly,
as 'money causes prices, money does not cause output and nothing
else causes prices or output'.
It therefore seems worthwhile to look at the evidence for Nigeria.
This is especially so as no such exercise is known to have been
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undertaken for t.he country as at the time of writing. But as
emphasized at various points in this study, data limitations
preclude any detailed analysis of the proposition. The follow¬
ing exercise is therefore on a very small scale. Furthermore,
the results to be obtained are subject to the overall quality
of the data used as mentioned in Ch. 1.
I
2.1 VELOCITY, MONEY AND THE PRICE LEVEL
A basic variant of the quantity equation is given by
M V = P Q (1)
l
where M is the stock of money, V is the velocity of circulation
or the ratio of nominal income to money, P is the price level
and Q is the value of output. Differentiate equation (1)
w.r.t. time and re-arrange to obtain
v = p + q —• m (2)
where lower case letters represent the rates of change of the
respective variables w.r.t. time.
Sometimes it is assumed that V is determined by institutional
factors and that these factors do not change rapidly over time
(Doblin 1951, esp. p. 202). Therefore, for analytical pur¬
poses, v may be set equal to zero in eqn. (2).
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Again, assuming for convenience that output grows at a constant
rate over time, the rate of change of the price level may be
expressed as a linear function of the rate of change of the money
stock:
p =
o + <Xlm (3)
This extremely simple equation is at the heart of many models
of inflation, the best known of which is probably Cagan (1956).
The assumption of a constant velocity obviously is not very
realistic. For example, velocity may be an increasing function
of the rate of inflation, (Mundell, 1965). But there are people
who argue that velocity is so stable that it may be approximated
by a constant over some defined time period (Meiselman, 1975, p.
76; Friedman and Schwartz, 1982, p. 2/0 ). However, such con¬
clusions are usually obtained after transforming the data in
various ways. Also, the assertion may not be valid for all time
periods as Friedman (1959, p. 327) himself acknowledges. Fin¬
ally, in a cross-section study using data for the post war period
in 37 countries to examine the secular behaviour of income velocity,
Ezekiel and Adekunle (1969) have found 'a significant inverse
relationship between levels of velocity and levels of income'.
Given that v = 0 in eqn (2), eqn (1) may be rearranged to yield
p = 'Xo + (Xi M/(y/p)
where Y = P Q. This is the form estimated by Meiselman for the
US from which he concludes that
'the constant term is virtually zero and the regression
coefficient essentially unity. This means that prices
have varied proportionally with output'
(p. 76)
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Since the stability of the relationship between money and prices
requires the stability of velocity, it is worth having a second
look at the latter variable. The income velocity of four mon¬
etary aggregates - Currency (M^), currency plus demand deposits
(M^), plus time deposits (Mg) and plus savings deposits
(Mg) - are shown in Chart 5.2 and labelled Vq - respectively.
It is clear that velocity over this period (1960 - 80) has not
(2)
been constant and has tended to fall . Thus as noted several
years ago by Doblin (1951), Selden (1956) and Friedman (1959),
velocity has a negative time trend.
Nevertheless, eqn (4) was estimated for Nigeria over the period
1959 - 81:
P = 1.35 + 4.3 (M1/(Y/P)) R2 = 0.96, D-W =1.0
(8.0) (23.7)
P = 14.0 + 2.8 (M9/(Y/P)) R2 = 0.97, D-W =0.87
(9.0)(25.3)
Clearly, there is a strong positive statistical relationship
—2
between prices and money per unit of output as depicted by the R .
But the low D-W (which suggest model misspecification) indicates
that the relationship may not be as significant for Nigeria as
claimed for the US.
Chart 5.3 shows the close relationship between money and prices.
Apart from a few cases, the rates of growth of both variables
rise or fall together. Moreover, if they do not achieve local
maxima simultaneously, the rate of change of money tends to peak
before that of prices.
Year
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2.2 A SIMPLE PRICE EQUATION
From eqn. (3)
pt » a0 + ax mt
where a dot denotes a rate of change defined as
x+ 1x, = t -1
In this form the intercept term is supposed to capture the influ¬
ence of velocity and output which has been assumed away. A
straightforward OLS estimation of this eqn. over the 1962 - 81
period yields
p^ = 3.16 + 0.33
R2 = 0.61 D-W = 1.75 F(1,18) = 31
By adding the lagged value of the rate of growth of the money
stock, its explanatory power is increased slightly as shown here:
p^ = 1.56 + 0.234 m^ + 0.179 ^
(0.9) (3.87) (3.0)
R2 = 0.73 D-W = 1.87 F(2,27) = 27
An even better fit is obtained if these equations are estimated
in levels (P^, ) instead of in rates of change. The positive
constant in these equations which is in any case statistically
insignificant suggests that velocity has not been constant.
Charh 5.3 : InflaMon and
Monetary Expansion
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These results confirm the earlier proposition that money supply
and its rate of change are closely related to the price level
and the rate of inflation. Although the results tend to cor¬
roborate the monetarist contention of inflation being a monetary
phenomenon, in recent years doubts have been raised as to whether
in fact causation is unidirectional. With respect to the German
hyperinflation, for example, Frenkel (1977) is of the view that
while increases in the money supply cause inflation, such increases
are themselves affected by the rate of inflation. Similarly,
after re-examining the hyperinflation cases studied by Cagan
(1956), Sargent and Wallace (1973) conclude that causation pro¬
bably runs both ways. This hypothesis is briefly examined below.
2.3 A TEST OF CAUSALITY
Investigations into the demand for money have suggested that price
expectations may constitute an important argument of the function.
This is especially so in developing countries where in many inst¬
ances empirical research has produced results which tend to
indicate that income and price expectations are the only relev¬
ant variables in the money demand function (e.g. Aghelvi et al,
1979). In conjunction with the results of the previous section,
this implies that both money and prices may be interdependent.
The general test of the direction of causality used here is the
method of correlation and regression.
The simplest test of a linear relationship between two variables
is the simple correlation coefficient. Thus the value of
this parameter for money and prices indicates the degree of the
relationship between the two. For the period 1959 - 81, this
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test statistic is 0.992 for Nigeria when the narrow definition
is used. For broad money it is 0.994. On the basis of this
one may say that the stock of money and the level of prices
are highly correlated. However, as is well known, this
observed level of statistical association could have been due
to a third, common factor in which case one has a situation
of spurious correlation (Granger and Newbold, 1974). The
influence of the common factor, where present, may be minimized
by working with first differences rather than levels i
the third variable follows a first-order autoregressive process.
Define the first difference of a variable as
Then the simple correlation coefficient between A and
gives a more reliable guide to the statistical relationship bet¬
ween money and the price level. Assuming that money and prices
exhibit a first-order autoregressive process and that the coeff¬
icient of autoregression is unity, first differencing renders the
residuals white noise. These assumptions were made in the case
of Nigerian data and the simple correlation coefficient between
A and AP^. turns out to be 0.794 which is still relatively
high (narrow money is used here). The earlier observation is
therefore further confirmed by this result : there is a strong
positive statistical relationship between money and prices.
But this does not say anything about the direction of causality
since correlation is a linear symmetric relation. Besides, in
some situations, the present value of a variable may be more
highly correlated with the lagged than the current values of
another variable. Therefore correlating the contemporaneous
values of a variable with the lagged (past or future) values of
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another variable achieves two things : it breaks the symmetry
and it gives an indication of the probable direction of causality.
On the assumption that first differencing of the price level and
the money stock renders the two series covariance stationary,
the following exercise was undertaken. Lagged values of the
first differences of the two variables were correlated. It is
assumed that if the past values of the money supply and the
current values of prices are strongly correlated, then causality
running from money to prices cannot be rejected. But if in
addition a higji correlation coefficient is obtained when these var¬
iables are interchanged, the conclusion is in favour of inter¬
dependence. With this in mind, the relevant results are presented
here.
TABLE 5.1a : CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN THE FIRST
DIFFERENCES OF MONEY AND PRICES
A Pt APt-l APt-2 APt-3






TABLE 5.1b : CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN RATES OF CHANGE
OF MONEY AND PRICES
■ • »






Both tables tell the same story in broad terms. It is clear
that the highest correlation coefficient in each case is that
between the contemporaneous value of the price level and the
one-lag value of the money supply. The table also shows that
the current money stock is more closely related to the current
price level than is the money stock in the previous two or more
periods. Furthermore, lagged values of prices are more weakly
related to the current money stock than are lagged values of the
money supply to the current price level. From the tables, it is
also possible to look at the relationship between the current
values of one variable and the future values of the other. For
instance, the influence of future values of money on the current
values of prices is given by the correlation coefficient between
& ?t_3 anc* *~*^t-l or ^^t-2' Evidently, the statistical
relationship between the current price level and future money
stock is relatively weak.
Thus, according to the suggested criterion, money may be said to
cause prices. Nevertheless, the correlation between and
APt_i (i > 0) is too high for one to rule out the possibility
of interdependence.
So far, there is no conclusive test of causality that can be
used for all purposes. But one that is often mentioned is that
suggested by Granger (1969) and extended by Sims (1972) and
(4 )others . This test makes use of the predictive power of an
equation which uses only the historical values of the variable
to be explained relative to one which, in addition, makes use of
the contemporaneous and past values of another variable. It
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may be illustrated with the help of a bi-variate process rep¬
resented by (P^ ) which is assumed to be covariance stationary
i.e. the respective means and variances of the time series are
constant over time. The following definitions are utilized:
(a) P* and M* are the set of ail the past values of P and M
(b) P** and M** are the set of all the past and present values
of P and M
(c) 2 (Pt | X) is the minimum predictive error variance of
P^ given X where X may be any one of the sets mentioned
in (a) and (b).
Then:
(1) M causes P if <52 (P | M*, P*) < 6" 2 (P | P*)
(2) M causes P instantaneously if
€ 2 (Pt| P£, M** )/. "5 2 (Pt | P*, M*)
(1) asserts that if the additions of the past values of M reduces
the predictive error variable of P conditioned upon its past
values, then M causes P. (2) states that if the addition of the
current values of M to the past values of P and M reduces the
predictive error variance of P then M instantaneously causes P.
Further casual relations may be obtained by noting that the
roles of P and M above may be reversed. Then feed back exists
if M causes P and P causes M, i.e. (1) above holds as it stands
and when the roles of P and M are reversed. Furthermore, it is
possible that neither P nor M causes the other. Then P and M
are said to be independent : in eqns (1) and (2), each term is
equal to the other (the inequality signs are replaced with the
equality signs).
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Suppose condition (1) or (2) above has been established (i.e.
unidirectional causality). Obviously there comes a time when
the addition of more distant values of M increases the error
variance. Let the point at which the error variance is at a
minimum be reached with M, . Then K is the causality lag betweenV K
P and M.
What is applied here is a variation of the Granger test which has
been suggested by Sims (1972). According to him, the test for
unidirectional causality between two variables X and Y is
'...to regress Y on past and future values of X...
then if causality runs from X to Y only, future
values of X in the regression should have coefficients
insignificantly different from zero as a group'
(Sims, 1972, p. 545)
Sims proposes that the data should be prefiltered and suggests
2
a particular filter (1-0^513) which, he claims, 'approximately
flattens the spectral density of most economic time series".
The regression is then given by
(Y • Y. . + U.GC.1 t-i t
where U is a disturbance term.
A problem with the application of this proposal, apart from the
filter to use, is the determination of the values of n and n0.
1 z
However, one particular set of values of n1 and n2 has found wide
application. This is given by n^ = 4 and n2 =8 as originally
suggested by Sims and used by Barth and Bennett (1974), Williams,
Goodhart, and Gowland (1976), and Feige and Pearce (1979) among
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others. This set is also used here. The sample period runs
from 1970 I to 1982 II which gives a total of 50 observations
but the actual number of observations differs from one equation
to another because of different lag specifications. All equa¬
tions include a constant term. The critical values of the F
distribution for the different degrees of freedom shown in the
results on the next page are
DEGREES OF CRITICAL VALUES OF F
FREEDOM
0.05 0.01
12, 24 2. 18 3.03
8, 32 2. 25 3. 12
4, 40 2. 61 3.83
A comparison of these figures with the results indicates that
at the 1% level of significance, the null hypothesis that the
coefficients of all the independent variables are not statist¬
ically different from zero cannot be accepted in respect of la
and 2a, 5a, 6a, 9a - 12a. But even at the 5% level, the same
hypothesis cannot be rejected in the case of 3a, 4a, and 7a,
although it may be with respect to 8a. The rejection of the
hypothesis as regards la and 2a implies that past and future
values of the money supply are significant in explaining the
current price level. Conversely, the acceptance of HQ in 3a
and 4a implies that past and future values of the price level
are insignificant in explaining contemporaneous money supply.
At this stage, the evidence is unambiguously in favour of money
causing prices.
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TABLE 5. 1 ; RESULTS OF ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION :











la P M1 4, 8 0.548 4.6 12, 24
2a P M2
ft 0 . 535 4 . 4 11
3a mi P
»f -0.026 0.9 II
4a M2 P
IT 0.167 1.6 If
5a P M1 0, 8 0.524 6.5 8, 32
6a P M2
If 0.520 6 . 4 If
7a M1 P
If 0. 056 1.3 II
8a m2 P
II 0 . 073 2.6 8, 32
9a P M1 4, 0 0. 210 3 . 9 4, 40
10a P m2
11 0.251 4.7 II
11a M1 P
11 0 . 213 4.0 II
12a M2 P
II 0.421 9.0 11
i = 0 is excluded in each case.
It is also necessary to examine the role of past values alone of
each variable in explaining the current value of the other i.e.
eqns. 5a - 8a. The earlier conclusion is still unaffected by
these equations as far as the narrow definition of money is con¬
cerned. But a slight qualification is needed in terms of broad
money : at the 5% level there is some evidence of causality runn¬
ing from prices to money while at the 1% level no such evidence
2
exists. However, given the low R in both 7a and 8a relative
to 5a and 6a one may conclude that the influence of past values
of the price level on the current money supply is negligible.
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The rejection of the null hypothesis in respect of 9a and 10a
combined with its acceptance in the case of 11a and 12a would
almost establish a definite Granger unidirectional causality
running from money to prices, given the above results. But
while the latter condition is fulfilled the former is not.
When account is taken of the earlier inconclusive result with
respect to prices 'causing' broad money, the possibility of
a feedback causal relation cannot be ruled out completely. The
conclusion is therefore that money 'causes' prices with a feed¬
back .
Feige and Pearce (1979) have argued that Sims' test is sensitive
to both the lag specification and the filter employed. On the
latter, they conclude that 'the particular pre-filter chosen can
affect the substantive results of the analysis even when the
alternative filters utilized whiten the regression residuals'
(p. 530). In order to ascertain the influence of the filter
in this particular case, equations la - 12a have been re-estim¬
ated using the same data set but with a different filter. The
chosen filter is the simple one given by (1-B) i.e. logarithmic
first differences. The results are presented as equations lb -
12b in order to aid comparison.
The critical values of the F distribution for the degrees of
freedom shown are broadly the same as before except F.05(12, 25)
= 2.16 and F.01 (12, 25) = 2.90. The results shown overleaf
differ from the earlier ones in some respects. The most signif¬
icant difference is that the present results emphatically reject
the hypothesis of causality running from prices to money: the
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TABLE 5,2 : 0L5 REGRESSION RESULTS : FILTER = (1 - B)
DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT LAG R2 f DEGREE OF
VARIABLE VARIABLE nl ' n2 STATISTIC FREEDOM FOR F
lb P M1 4, 8 0.345 2. 64 12, 25
2b P m2
11 0,263 2.10 f»
3b M1 P
tl 0.110 1 .38 n
4b m2 P
t! 0.124 1 . 43 n
5b P mi 0, 8 0.269 2.89 8, 33
6b P M2
t» 0.238 2. 60 tf
7b M1 P
1» -0.0715 0 . 66 It
8b M2 P
t» -0.097 0. 55 T!
9b p M1 4, 0 0.0097 1 .11 4, 41
10b p m2
11 -0.0072 0.9 t ?
lib Mi P
If 0.156 3. 08 »»
12b M2 P
?» 0.176 3.41 11
All regressions exclude the cases i = 0
null hypothesis cannot be rejected in 3b, 4b, 7b, 8b, 9b, and 10b
at any reasonable level of significance. The implication of
this is that past values of the price level are not important in
explaining current money supply; neither aiefuture values of the
money supply important in explaining current price level. Even
a hypothesis of causality running from money to prices can now
be accepted only at the 5%. At the 1% level, a null hypothesis
of money and prices being statistically independent can no longer
be rejected. This leads to the conclusion that at the 5% level,
there is evidence of causality running from money to prices without
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feedback.
This conclusion is of course different from that reached with
2
respect to the (1 - 3/4B) filter. The results are therefore
consistent with those obtained by Feige and Pearce. As Sims
himself has noted, at the 5% level, the residuals from his regre¬
ssion of GNP on even after filtering are significantly diff¬
erent from white noise. This casts some doubts on the relia¬
bility of the F test and emphasis may be placed on the results
obtained earlier here which establishes interdependence between
money and prices.
3. INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES OF INFLATION
These theories are based on the premise that a persistently
high rate of inflation which may sometimes be accelerating
reflects the underlying socio-economic conflicts and tensions
(Panic, 1976, p. 1). More specifically, inflation is sometimes
seen as one of the results of the competitive struggle of various
classes in the society to maintain and, if possible, enlarge
their respective shares of the national product. Two classes
which have been singled out in this respect for the analysis of
inflation are owners of labour and capital. The struggle between
these two income groups is often thought to lead to a wage-price
spiral : workers press for higher wages which are granted by
employers but these in turn pass the higher labour costs back to
consumers in the form of higher prices of final consumption goods.
Again this leads to the demand for yet higher wages and the
process continues ad infinitum. Of recent, a different kind
of struggle has been identified : that between different labour
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groups themselves. In this case, the outcome is probably a
wage-wage spiral (Bispham, 1982, p. 9). Labour is therefore
seen to play an important role in the institutional theories of
inflation. It therefore seems appropriate to make it the point
of departure for the discussion of these theories.
3.1 TRADE UNIONS
The medium through which labour fights for its income shares is
the trade unions. This class of theories has therefore assigned
a prominent role to trade unions. The intellectual ancestry
of the modern versions of these theories may be traced to the
work of Phillips (1958), Klein and Ball (1959), Lipsey (1960)
and Dicks-Mireaux (1961). The mainstream explanation of infl¬
ation based on these works is that inflation varies directly
with the excess demand for labour and the rate of increase in
import prices and inversely with the rate of productivity growth
(Parkin, 1978, p. 11). It was Hines (1964) who first incorpor¬
ated explicitly the influence of trade unions, a model of inflation
in which trade union 'pushfulness' as measured by the rate of
change of the labour force unionized is a significant independent
cause of inflation. However, Hines' hypothesis has not gained
as much ground as the explanations of inflation in terms of the
level and changes in the rates of unemployment probably because
his index of trade union militancy referred to above reached a
peak a long time ago. Furthermore, after a detailed review of
Hines' work, Purdy and Zis (1974, p. 34) reached the conclusion
that Hines' work is 'extremely unsatisfactory' and 'theoretically
weak'. The dominant wage-inflation theory therefore remains
one which uses the same measure of the excess demand for labour
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rather than union militancy.
But there is no agreement that the labour market is a relevant
factor in the explanation of the inflation phenomenon. Accord¬
ing to one view,
'... in the post-war era in Britain . .. organized labour
has had (the) capacity, by increasing general pay
levels faster than productivity increases, to induce
the authorities to expand the money supply ... to
reduce any concomitant unemployment'
(Jay, 1974, p. 35)
At the other extreme is the view that
'Fundamentally, ... the right relation between infla¬
tion and trade unions ... (is) that inflation strengthens
trade unions, not that strong trade unions produce in¬
flation '
(Friedman, 1974,^41-4^.
This counter-argument which is closely associated with the monet¬
arist viewpoints (Bispham, 1982, p. 10) is supported by Laidler
(1974) who argues:
'I do not believe that the trade union movement has any
power whatsoever to raise the level of money wages in
the absence of expansionary monetary policy'
Similarly, Haberler (1966, p. 9) attributes changes in prices
to changes in the stock of money. His position is that
'there has never been a serious inflation without
an increase in the quantity of money. No wage
push in the world can produce inflation, if the
monetary authorities stand firm and refuse to
create money; but the wage push can produce un¬
employment ' .
This quotation is, of course, reminiscent of that of Meiselman
already encountered.
Individuals who support wage inflation argue that the government
would not allow unemployment to prevail because of the commitment
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to full employment. Money supply would therefore have to be
increased to prevent unemployment, and inflation results. Al¬
though some writers who hold what Bispham (1982, p. 8) has
termed 'eclectic' or 'newspaper reader's review' have argued
that it becomes a matter of semantics whether the resulting
inflation is due to the increased money supply or to the fact
that the trade unions have compelled the authorities to increase
the stock of money (Jay, 1974, p. ) to a certain extent the
debate corresponds to the traditional views of demand - pull and
cost - push theories of inflation. More formally, the wage
theory implies the existence of a stable long-run (even if
augmented) Phillips curve while the opposing view denies its
existence or that it is vertical (c.f. Friedman, 1968 and Phelps,
1968). There is thus in the longrun no trade-off between infl¬
ation and unemployment as suggested by the Phillips curve analysis.
This is because there exists a rate of unemployment at which the
rate of inflation is constant : if unemployment is below this rate,
the rate of inflation accelerates; if above it decelerates.
However, left on its own, the economy tends to come back to this
rate. This is the rate that Friedman called the natural rate of
unemployment but which is now more popularly called the non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment.
In sum, both proponents and opponents of wage inflation are
agreed on the existence of an expectations augmented Phillips
curve in the shortrun (except the 'new classical economists') but
disagree on the existence of a longrun trade-off between infl¬
ation and unemployment. Monetarists or people whose views on
the working of the economy are closely related to those of Friedman
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are against activist policy such as incomes and prices policies
and this is the level at which this controversy is relevant
for the present purpose. His reason is that the timing of
intervention is likely to be wrong and would therefore be de¬
stabilizing. As seen in Ch. 2, one tenet of monetarism is
that the private sector is inherently stable i.e. except pre¬
vented by some misjudged government intervention, it tends to
move back to a position of equilibrium if disturbed. Friedman
believes that interventions in such forms as prices and incomes
policy only serves to make the economy more imperfect than it
was before the introduction of the policy. What is needed, in
his view, is the removal of existing imperfections in the labour
market. These views are of course in direct contrast to those
who subscribe to the existence of a longrun trade off between
inflation and unemployment which makes incomes and prices policy
a sensible course of action (Minfird, 1976). There is thus the
need to make a choice between these competing theories since they
have different policy prescriptions (monetary and wage policy).
Formal testing of the theories here is completely ruled out as
the necessary information (e.g. the wage and unemployment measures)
is not available. Furthermore, to test them would require a
model and the specification of the model itself is influenced
by one's views of the economy which are invariably closely related
to one or the other of the theories. Model selection is there¬
fore often biased in favour of one or the other (c.f. Ando and
Modigliani (1965)) with Andersen and Jordan (1968) and see
Desai (1981, Ch. 3)). Also, it should be clear from chs. 2 and
3 that the relevance of such concepts as full employment and the
natural rate of unemployment to Nigeria is doubtful. Nigeria,
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however, is not alone in this situation because
'In all less developed countries employment in the
"modern" sector represents a small, but privileged,
proportion of the total labour force, strengthened
as it usually is by strong trade unions and govern¬
ment legislation (minimum wage legislation, etc.)
The great mass of labour is engaged in small-scale,
self-employed, low-productivity activities in the
"traditional" sectors of the economy (both rural
and urban) and may be idle or underutilized for
lengthy periods of time. (This phenomenon which
has been termed) disguised unemployment or under¬
employment in less developed countries refers to the
mass of the labour force that is permanently engaged
in low productivity activities'
(Kirkpatrick and Nixson, 1976, p. 129)
Mainstream inflation theory as developed in the economic and
institutional setting of Western, industrialized economies is
thus not directly applicable wholesale to the fragmented and
disintegrated economies of less developed countries. This is,
however, not a new finding; in the early 1960's Seers (1963)
had drawn attention to the 'limitations of the special case'
while more recently Streeten (1972 p. 127) has argued against
'the simple transfer of fairly sophisticated concepts from
one setting to another without close scutiny of the inst¬
itutional differences'.
As a result, it is necessary to search for a theory of inflation
which takes the unique features of less developed countries into
consideration. One such theory is the Latin American model of
inflation. But again, as Seers would have said, the 'special case'
is subject to some limitations. Developing countries are not
homogenous and this is easily illustrated with reference to the
development literature. The Lewis^-Fei-Ranis model of economic
development for developing countries was developed specifically
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for countries in South-East Asia and therefore assumed an unlim¬
ited supply of labour (Lewis, 1954; Fei and Ranis, 1961) which
is characteristic of these countries. But as Helleiner (1965)
has argued, a more appropriate assumption in respect of African
countries is an unlimited supply of land. The Latin American
model of inflation thus requires a similar modification before
it can be applied to any particular country outside the Western
Hemisphere. But first it is necessary to give an outline of
the models.
3.2 'STRUCTURAL' VERSUS 'MONETARY' INFLATION
The debate arose from an attempt at explaining the persistently
high rates of inflation experienced by many Latin American coun¬
tries. There are two lines of argument which have been termed
'structuralist' and 'monetarist' respectively (Campos, 1967, p.
108) .
In the structuralist view, the structure of the economy is such
that it generates certain disequilibria such as inflation, unem¬
ployment, balance of payments difficulty, deficit in the public
sector budgets, and stagnation in certain sectors. Sunkel, a
leading exponent of the structuralist view, identifies the in¬
elastic supply of foodstuffs, the foreign exchange bottleneck
and financial constraint as the main structural constraints giving
rise to inflation (Sunkel, 1960). With respect to the first con¬
straint, it is argued that the rapid rise in the demand for food
arising from urbanization and rising incomes cannot be met because
of the sluggish response of the agricultural sector which operates
close to the subsistence level. Foreign exchange constitutes a
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bottleneck because rising income together with accelerated develop¬
ment efforts as found in most less developed countries leads to
a rapid rise in the demand for imports. By contrast, total for¬
eign exchange earnings grow, if at all, at a very slow rate so
that a structurally-induced balance of payments disequilibrium
develops. As for the financial constraint argument which is
not supported by all structuralist writers, it is believed that
a rapid rate of urbanization and growth of other aspects of social
development enlarges the sphere of government activity. But
revenue does not expand at the required rate because of, inter
alia, an inelastic tax system. Moreover, private capital form¬
ation takes place at an equally slow pace. Yet, basic infra¬
structure is necessary for the desired rapid development. The
government therefore resorts to deficit financing. Basically,
the existence of the public budget deficit financed by the banking
system is seen to represent the inability of the government to
resolve the problem of the distribution of real resources between
the public and private sectors. The interaction of the three
constraints produces strong inflationary pressures. The result¬
ing increase in the money supply is the factor which makes
inflation manifest itself.
The 'monetarists' (their own brand of monetarism is not the same
as that propounded by, say, Milton Friedman) deny that the factors
outlined above are the causes of the chronic inflation in L.
American countries. For instance, the alleged structural in¬
elasticity of the food supply is explained away as the result
of the policy of administrative control of food prices (which in
fact is used by the government to subsidize the urban consumer
- 293 -
so as to avoid a wage-price spiral). Producers, therefore, are
not given the incentive to produce more. The foreign exchange
constraint is explained in terms of inappropriate policies such
as the overvaluation of currency and an 'inward-looking' develop¬
ment strategy which fails to stimulate the traditional sector.
Inflation, they argue, is a pure case of excess demand. "This
is the basic framework for the inflation process', write Bernstein
and Patel, 'when aggregate demand for all purpose - consumption,
investment and government - exceeds the supply of goods at con¬
stant prices (Bernstein and Patel, 1952, p. 368). Continuing in
a later article, Bernstein writes:
'Although the basic causes of inflation vary widely in
different countries, and at different times, the process
of inflation always shows strikingly similar characteri¬
stics. Eventually, it is caused by the excessive
expectations of government, business, or labour in
the use of the national product and is associated with
the excessive creation of credit'
(Bernstein, 1958, p. 323)
Harberger (1963) in an empirical study of inflation in Chile
found a high correlation between the rates of inflation and of
monetary expansion. Most of the empirical tests he performed
tended to support the monetarist proposition. Nine years later,
his conclusion was confirmed in another empirical study (of Brazil)
by Kahil (1973, p. 327).
However, another study (for Chile, Argentina, Peru and Uruguay)
concluded in favour of the structuralist propositions (Edel, 1969).
On the basis of these studies one cannot reject one or the other
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of these hypotheses. It seems that the result of any test
would depend on the country concerned. In the following para¬
graphs, the relevance of this model is considered by examining
some aspects of the controversy.
4. INFLATION IN NIGERIA : STRUCTURAL OR MONETARY?
A disadvantage of the monetary analysis of inflation is the
preoccupation with the demand for output to the neglect of its
supply. This is the aspect that has been stressed by the stru¬
ctural theory reviewed above. One of the arguments of the
Latin American monetarists against the proposition of the in¬
elasticity of food supply advanced by the structuralists is that
food prices are administered in Chile, thus preventing the market
from functioning efficiently as producers are not given the
necessary motivation. The implication must be that if all
controls were removed there would be no shortage of supply. For
Nigeria this argument is not sustainable. Although the prices
of certain agricultural commodities (i.e. cocoa, beniseed, coffee,
tea, palm produce, cotton, beans, rice, maize, millet, rubber,
soya beans, sheanut, ginger and groundnuts, wheat, guinea corn
and kenaf) are fixed officially and are always considerably
below those prevailing in the free market, such prices are not
binding. Producers have the option of selling their output to
official agencies at the fixed prices or to the public at the
market prices. This probably accounts for the fact that the only
commodities now purchased by the marketing boards in significant
quantities are cocoa and palm kernel which do not have a firm
domestic market (and therefore cannot contribute to the inflation¬
ary situation.
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In spite of this, foodstuffs are in short supply and the rising
ratio of food import to the total import bill is indicative of
this. This aspect of the structuralist viewpoint therefore
appears to be consistent with the facts in Nigeria. There are
many reasons for the inelasticity of the supply of foodstuffs
(e.g. low agricultural productivity, rural-urban drift which
reduces the size of the agricultural labour force) and the absence
of economic incentive is not one of them.
From the discussion in Chs. 2 and 4, there is some evidence of
the existence of the financial and balance of payments constraint
although both were temporarily removed in the early to middle
1970's. It was seen that financing the expanding budget deficit
through the banking system is now a characteristic feature of
Nigerian central government finance. Although some countries
which cannot be said to be facing a financial constraint also
finance their deficits in this manner the proportion of the
deficit financed by the financial system and the length of period
over which such financing takes place in Nigeria suggests the
presence of a financial constraint in the country. The balance
of payments constraint will be obvious from the next chapter.
It is clear then that structural rigidities exist in Niberia.
But it is doubtful if they, by themselves, can explain the infl¬
ationary process. Section 1 of this chapter has already in¬
dicated the possible role of the money stock in the inflation
phenomenon in Nigeria. A suitable model should therefore take
into consideration the importance of both real and financial
variables. This is done in a simple model that is discussed
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below. But first it is necessary to present the government's
views of inflation in the country and the steps taken to bring
it under control.
5. INFLATION POLICY IN NIGERIA
5.1 OFFICIAL VIEWS ON INFLATION
There is evidence of a divergence in the official perception of
inflation in Nigeria. On the one hand, there is the danger of
the potentially inflationary consequences of government fiscal
operations which the Central Bank has emphasized since 1964 as
seen in the last chapter. To the Bank, inflation is a monetary
phenomenon which is fuelled by excessive expansion of government
expenditure, particularly if deficit financing is sizeable. The
cure then lies in pruning down government expenditure which will
ultimately reduce the rate of monetary expansion. It may be
pointed out at this point that research in the Bank (to be dis¬
cussed further below) indicates that the rate of inflation is
closely related to the rate of domestic monetary expension and
that causation runs from money to prices. Specifically, Nwade
(1977, p. 10) has concluded that 'every N100 m increase in
added 6.3 percentage points to the price index' during the period
1973 - 77. The direction of causality, of course, is not incon¬
sistent with the findings of the more formal analysis in the
first part of this chapter.
On the other hand, the government appears to have held the view
that the problem of inflation can be solved without reference to
the money supply. This seems to be the basis of its anti-
inflation policy reviewed below. But, as pointed out in Ch. 1 ,
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the government has pursued not one but many objectives which are
not necessarily compatible. Measures that take it nearer to
the realization of one may take it further away from another.
The decision on how much of one objective to sacrifice in order
to achieve a given level of another is a normative one but it
will be possible to state that appropriate policies to realize a
particular objective have not been taken. All it then means is
that the objective in question is not valued as much as another
which requires the policies that have been taken or that, the
government does not know or is not willing to take the appropriate
policies. It is on this premise that the review of the policies
is undertaken.
5.2 THE POLICIES
In the discussion of fiscal and monetary policy, reference was
made to measures which were supposed to influence the rate of
inflation. One such measure was the attempt by the Central Bank
to reduce the rate of growth of the money supply. But it was
shown in the last chapter that the Banks effort was vitiated by
of the government,
the financial behaviour/ Therefore, the monetary measures are
not considered further here. Similarly, the operations of the
price control board (discussed in Ch. 1) are ignored here.
The remaining measures may be divided into direct fiscal and
incomes policy. The former are treated first.
5.2.1 DIRECT FISCAL MEASURES
One of the arguments used by Fisher (1952) to conclude against
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the establishment of a Central Bank in Nigeria is the inflationary
potential of such a bank in a highly underdeveloped market econ¬
omy. Although Fisher's report was given a cold reception in
the country, various governments have kept the warning in mind.
Thus, in the various budget speeches there are references to
the need to maintain price stability. The 1960's was, as else¬
where, in most parts of the world, a period of relative stability.
It is therefore not possible to identify clearly anti-inflationary
measures before the end of the war in Jan. 1970. The end of the
war brought the problem of inflation into sharp focus. During
the war itself, efforts were made to rationalize non-essential
expenditures with the savings going into the war effort. Actual
war took place in the traditionally food-deficit region. As a
result, surpluses accumulated in the area outside that region while
there were attempts at self-sufficiency in the war-affected region.
Given the heavy weight attached to food in the calculation of
the CPI already noted, a decline in the price level was recorded
in 1967 and 1968. The end of the conflict saw the removal of
restrictions on the movement of people and goods. The CPI thus
rose by 10% and 13.8% in 1969 and 1970 respectively (the war
ended gradually, not suddenly). This necessitated the instit¬
ution of measures to curb inflation. On reviewing these measures,
the Anti-Inflation Task Force set up by the government in August
1975 and which submitted its first report in October of the same
year found that the
'Government relied in the main on : reductions in
import and excise duties; the introduction of price
control and bulk purchase arrangements; income tax
concessions to businesses, and direct investments
and capital grants to states for investment in directly
productive activities, particularly those in the
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agricultural sector'
(Inflation Task Force, 1975, p. 28).
What emerges from this list is that the government regards
inflation as a real phenomenon. Furthermore, some of these
measures are likely to conflict with other objectives (e.g.
reductions in import duties and the balance of payments - see
next chapter). Price control has already been examined in Ch.
4 where it was concluded that it was unlikely to make signifi¬
cant contributions to the solution of the problem of inflation.
Business income tax concessions are discussed in the next,
although in a somewhat different context. At the risk of pre¬
maturely letting the cat out of the bag, it may be stated here
that the effectiveness of the scheme, according to many studies
based on both the Nigerian situation and the experience of other
countries, is highly doubtful. Direct investments and capital
grants to states to invest in agriculture are clearly long-
term policies. However the success of the measures has not yet
been demonstrated : the public sector in Nigeria is not noted
for its agricultural output.
One is then left with changes in import and excise duties as
the only direct fiscal measure worthy of further consideration
here.
One of the measures designed in 1970 to reduce the upward pressure
in the domestic price level was
'a general reduction of tariffs on imports connected with
agriculture, reconstruction and road development, drugs,
iron and steel, wrought iron billets, cement, machinery
and plants'
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(CBN Report 1970, p. 11)
The policy of tariff reduction was to be an important anti-
inflation measure in subsequent years. In 1972, for example,
'import duties on a large number of items were reduced sub¬
stantially' as 'anti-inflationary measures' (CBN, Report, 1972,
pp. 11 - 12). Then, in his 'Press Statement on the 1975 - 76
Budget' the Federal Commissioner (i.e. Minister) Of Finance
announced 'the review of the level of the Customs and Excise
Duties' (p. XXV) with the aim of bringing inflation under control.
But from 1978, as a result of the deterioration in the balance
of payments, the policy of downward revisions of import and
excise duties was reversed : in that year several items were
placed under licence (e.g. radio, stereo, and television sets
and built-up commercial vehicles) while several others (precious
stones, beer and stout, fresh milk among others) were banned
outright (CBN, Report, 1978, p. 6).
Whatever the reasoning behind tariff reduction as a measure aimed
at reducing the rate of inflation, it is bound to be confronted
with problems. Such measures were supposed to act by lowering
the supply prices of the affected commodities. Those responsible
for designing the measures, however, failed to realize that in
the final analysis the price of a commodity is not determined
by its cost of production. The important factors in price
determination are the relative forces of demand and supply.
Elementary price theory suggests that irrespective of how low
the cost of producing a given commodity is, it can still command
a high price depending on its supply relative to the demand
for it. What is being suggested is that there was no guarantee
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that the "lower prices resulting from tariff reductions would be
passed back to consumers. This seems to be the essence of
the argument of the Central Bank when it states:
'Perhaps the major factor that prevented some of
the Government's anti-inflationary measures from
being more successful was the oligopolistic market
structure prevailing over a wide segment of the
economy. Where largely non-competitive market
conditions exist, it would be difficult to expect
that consumers in general would benefit much from
reductions in customs and excise duties. The
reductions in 1974 were substantial and coupled
with the appreciation of the external value of
the naira, the dampening effect on inflation would
have been much larger if the prevailing market
conditions were more competitive'
(CBN, Report, 1974, p. 15).
Despite its relative impotence, tariff reduction was used to
curb inflation until 1978 as seen above and restored in 1980
(CBN Report, p. 5). But other policies were pursued as well
as detailed below.
5.2.2 INCOMES POLICY
The issue of incomes policy was touched on in Ch. 2 . It is
discussed in greater detail here with the period since 1970
serving as the review period.
A wage freeze was imposed in 1969 (CBN, Report 1970, p. 12). But
inflationary pressures intensified as from that year (see first
part of this chapter). The cost of living rose by 14% in the
first half of 1970 (Inflation Task Force, 1975, p. 16) and this
increased the demand for higher wages. A Wages and Salaries
Review Commission was set up by the government in July 1970 to
review the existing wages and salaries at all levels in the
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public sector. In its first report, the Commission recommended
an interim aware of 4.8% of salary to workers in the public
(5 )
sector on an annual income of N100 or less . In August 1971,
the second and final award ranging from 12 to 30% of salary to
/ 0 \
ail categories of public sector employees was made .
A similar Commission was set up in September 1972 to carry out
a comprehensive review of the salary structure in the public
sector. But soon after it started its work, the government
froze all wages pending the submission of the Commission's
report. According to the Inflation Task Force
'This measure was widely interpreted as an indication
that the Commission would be recommending a general
increase in wages and salaries quite apart from con¬
sidering the question of grading. This expectation
accelerated the pressure on prices and this in turn
further reinforced the expectation that the Commission
would be making a general award'
(p. 17)
The commission submitted its report to the government in September
1974 but the recommendations were not implemented until January
1975 thus leading to a great deal of speculation. By abolishing
the daily - pay scheme and recommending a minimum salary of N60
per month, the Commission raised the minimum salary by about
3 1/3 times from #18.0833 (CBN, Report 1971, p. 36 gave this as
the lowest daily pay recommended by the 1971 Commission). In
most cases, however, the salary increases ranged from 8% to
more than 100% (Inflation Task Force, 1975, p. 17). The awards
were backdated to April 1974 and resulted in the payment of
N657.3 m of which N567.3 m represented the payment of arrears.
Initial estimate of the expenditure of the private sector on
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salary increases was put at N349 m (CBN, Keport 197b, p. 21).
A Productivity, Prices and Incomes Board was set up early in
1976 with the task of providing 'guidelines on incomes including
wages, salaries, profits, dividends and rents and on the basis
of its findings, to harmonize the policies on all increases
especially wages and dividends and the level of prices generally'
(CBN, Report 1976, p. 7). The recommendations of the Board
led to the imposition of a wage restraint effective to the end
of March 1977. Distribution of dividends in excess of 30%
was disallowed. The wage restraint was relaxed in 1977 when
wages and salaries of workers with an annual income of N3,000
or less were allowed to rise by up to 7%. The ceiling on the
payment of dividends was raised to 40% in fiscal year 1978/79
and to 50% in 1979/80 and then to 60% in 1980. Collective
bargaining was restored in 1980 when the minimum wage was raised
from N720 to Ml,Z00 per annum (CBN, Report 1930 p. 8). For
the three years 1980 - 82 wages and salaries were not to increase
by more than 15% for the low-pay (N3,000 or less p.a.) and 10%
for the high-income groups. The minimum salary was raised to
Ml,500 p.a. in 1981 (CBN, Report 1981, p. 33).
According to the authorities, the incomes policy introduced since
1976 was directed at price stability and income redistribution
(CBN, Report 1980 p. 7). The first of these objectives is evid¬
ently the most relevant for the present purpose. But having
set out the incomes policy of the 1970's one may now enquire
into its probable effects on the price level.
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A casual observation of the facts in the Nigerian case would
seem to suggest that incomes policy has no place in analyzing
the inflationary situation.
'According to the 1966/67 Labour Force Sample Survey,
only 5% of the gainfully employed persons were
employees; the other 9b% were itinerant or unpaid
family workers, with three fourths of them engaged
in agriculture'
(IMF, 1975, p. 319)
This shows that the number of people in wage employment con¬
stitutes an insignificant proportion of the total labourforce.
Wage income then, even if it increased by more than 100%,
would not have an appreciable impact on total income and would
therefore have only a negligible effect on the price level.
However, there are reasons to suppose that this is not so.
This small fraction of the labour force exerts an impact on
the price level out of proportion to its relative size. As
in other countries at similar stages of economic development,
the workers in wage employment represent a privileged segment
of the labour market (Kirkpatrick and Nixson, 1976, p. 139).
Since their income is usually higher than the national average
they exercise a greater than average purchasing power. Moreover,
they are also more vocal than their counterparts in traditional
employment and can therefore influence the government to a
greater extent than their size indicates. Finally, the method
of wage settlements in use in Nigeria as outlined above tends
to aggravate the pressure on prices.
It will be recalled that the civil war ended in 1970 and that
the first salary awards were made in December 1970 and August
1971. The dislocation to the productive capacity of the economy
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could not be said to have been repaired completely by then.
The wage increases thus accentuated the strain on the economy.
A special price survey conducted by the Central Bank covering
the period December 1970 to March 1971 showed that the weighted
average prices of the commodities covered rose by 14.1% in the
first quarter of 1971 compared with the average level in 1970.
The CPI rose by 16% in 1971 compared with 13.8 and 10% respect¬
ively in 1970 and 1969. However, it is not possible to attri¬
bute the acceleration of the rate of inflation to the salary
awards alone since other factors were at work. For instance,
the abolition of the compulsory saving scheme introduced during
the war eased the restraint on consumer spending to some extent.
In 1975 when the second major set of wage awards was settled,
the CPI rose by 33.7%. But again the cost of living was influ¬
enced by other factors. As seen in Ch. 2 the greatest ever
increase in government revenue occurred in 1974. Retained
revenue of the Federal Government rose by 181.8% over the level
in 1973 but total expenditure rose by only 94%. In l97b retained
revenue increased by only 15.1% but total expenditure rose by
133.4%. By 1975 the expenditure had adjusted fully to the rise
in revenue in 1974. The increased expenditure is thus partly
responsible for the increases in the CPI. Nevertheless, the
salary increases have also a part to play in the acceleration
of the inflation rate.
The question that arises is whether or not these wage increases
can cause continuing inflation. The official view is that
they cannot. Commenting on the 1975 (Udoji) awards, the Comm-
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issioner of Finance in his 'Press Statement on the 1975 - 76
Budget' referred to earlier stated:
'The immediate reaction of the local markets to the
recent increases in wages and salaries and the
absolute scarcity of goods in the shops should give
way to more stable prices in the longrun. Over the
next three to six months, a more realistic adjustment
of price levels is expected when the empty shops are
replenished but it would be unrealistic not to expect
some upward movement in the general level of prices'
(p. xxvi)
It is therefore conceded that the increases can have a shock
effect on the price level. The facts are set out below. Tak¬
ing the years in which the awards were made (1971 and 1975)
first, there is evidence of some relationship between salary
increases and changes in the CPI. In each of the years, the
highest ever increase in the CPI was recorded. In the follow¬
ing years on each occasion the rate of inflation decelerated.
Since the 1971 increases were not as significant as those of
1975 one may single out the latter for further examination.
Here, the highest increases in the money supply were recorded
too. But monetary acceleration started from 1974 (in the case
of narrow money the rate of expansion accelerated from 17.B%
in 1973 to 45.5% in 1974; corresponding figures for broad
money are 20.1% and 47.1%). A second set of forces were there¬
fore in operation. These forces were identified in Ch.4 as
the monetization of the oil receipts. It is difficult then, as
explained above, to ascribe a major part of the price rise in
1975 to the wage increases. The argument that wage increases
cause inflation must rest on the following evidence in the part¬
icular case being considered. Each time an award is made, the
highest rate of inflation is recorded - 16.1% in 1971, 33.6%
in 1975. Within a period of four months of the -payment—of: the-
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TABLE 5.3 : ANNUAL HATES OF CHANGE OF MONEY AND THE CPI
MONEY MONEY & QUASI-MONEY CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
970 47.5 43 . 7 13.7
1 17.3 21 .9 16.1
2 8.3 10 . 5 2.7
3 17.8 20 . 1 5.7
4 45.5 47 .1 12 . 5
5 84. 3 75 . 3 33. 6
6 50.6 48.9 24.3
7 46.7 35.5 19.3
8 14.9 15.1 18.7
9 12.0 18.6 11 .1
80 23.0 30.8 11 .4
1 20. 1 19.8 20.9
2 3.9 8.8 7 . 5
3 12.8 13 . 3 20.0
payment of the greatest awards (first four months of 1975), the
money supply increased by 46.7% compared with a rise of only
9.2% in the same period a year earlier (CBN, Report 1975, p. 50).
In the six months of the same award, the composite consumer price
index (the measure of inflation in Nigeria) rose by an average
of 4.7 per month compared with the figure of 1.4% in the corres¬
ponding period of the previous year (CBN, Report 1975, p. 45).
The rate of monetary expansion also attained its highest values
in the year of the biggest award (1975). Finally, the wage
awards also contributed to the growth of government expenditure
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which was identified in the last chapter as the main source of
the growth of the money stock. In 1975, current expenditure
rose by 93% to N1685.9 m. The respective rates of growth a
year earlier and later were 35.6% and 38.7%. If the amount
spent on the payment of the increase and arrears is excluded,
the increase in the current expenditure of the Federal Govern¬
ment would have been substantially less than it was.
The conclusion then is that wage increases on the scale that is
typical in Nigeria can have a positive impact on the price level
by (i) inducing monetary expansion through increases in government
expenditure and (ii) raising the expected rate of inflation.
Wage awards affect the formation of inflation expectations
through the 'announcement effect'. Ofter there is a long lag
between the announcement of the recommendations of a wage review
commission which are invariably implemented and the actual pay¬
ment of the awards which is generally backdated. This tends to
generate expectations that prices are going to rise. Given the
generally inelastic supply of output, this expectation tends to
be self-fulfilling. However, it is doubtful if salary and wage awards
can lead to a self-propelling inflation.
Nevertheless, it makes sense for the authorities to modify their
methods of wage settlements. Drastic wage increases, as explained
above, tend to exert a shock pressure on the price level which
eventually rises. But as in most countries of the world the
price level rarely declines and only the rate of acceleration is
expected to fall. The increase in prices may lead to distortions
in projected expenditures and the overall performance of a develop¬
ment plan, thus adversely affecting other objectives of the
- 309 -
government. (The doubling of the minimum wage in 1975 and 1980
alone is sufficient to lead to some degree of plan distortion).
Since 'the lowest wage paid by the Federal Government tends to
set the floor on wage rates' (IMF, 1975, p. 319) labour costs
are also raised in the private sector. This can cause some
problems to private sector employers. For instance, it was
reported that
'The high incidence of trade disputes in 1975 arose
mainly from the reluctance of employers in the private
sector to match the salary and wage increases in the
public sector following the recommendations of the
Public Service Review Commission'
(CBJN, Report 1975 p. 4b)
This, of course, can adversely affect capacity utilization in
the economy, especially when the minimum wage is increased not
in small doses but multiplied by a factor of two or more. Em¬
ployment is also likely to suffer (see Ch. 2 for more details).
6. CONCLUSION : IS INFLATION CONTROLLABLE?
From the discussion of the inflationary phenomenon in Nigeria,
the question that arises naturally is this : Can the government
control inflation in Nigeria? The discussion so far may be
summarised as follows. Inflation in Nigeria is due to many
factors but monetary expansion appears to dominate all others.
The examination of the inflationary process shows that it is
broadly consistent with the monetary slogan coined by M. Friedman
quoted in part one of this chapter which may be summarised as
p = m - q
where p, m and q are the respective rates of change in the price
level, the money stock and output. A successful inflation
policy should therefore aim at either reducing m or raising q
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or both. Most of the anti-Inflation fiscal measures of the
government, as reviewed here, were clearly aimed at raising
q (e.g. the fiscal incentive measures to be discussed in the
next chapter and tariff reductions). Such policies are gen¬
erally ineffective as far as inflation is concerned. Moreover,
where they are effective, they cannot raise q appreciably.
Finally, changes in the money supply (i.e. m) may dominate any
rise in q. Given the difficulty of raising q in the shortrun,
the burden of adjustment must be borne by m. Thus the question
posed at the beginning of this section reduces to whether or not
m can be controlled which was discussed in the last chapter.
In turn, this question depends on how successful the government
is in controlling its expenditures (a subject matter of Ch. 2 )•
For these reasons, the original question may be answered in the
negative unless the government is willing to control its expen¬
diture .
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FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER FIVE
1. Quoted by R.C.O. Matthews (1983)
2. The results of an econometric exercise not reported here
strongly support the contention made by Adekunle (1970,
p. 9) for an earlier period (1950 - 66) that 'the broader
the concept of money supply the stronger is the negative
trend movement in the velocity'.
3. This proposition is proved in Dorhbusch (1980) for example.
4. There are many modifications of or even alternatives to
the Granger test. Some of the better known are the Haugh-
Pierce Method which is based on Haugh (1977) and Pierce and
Haugh (1977). (This has been used by Aghelvi and Khan
(1978)), and HernAndez-Igiesias and HernAndez-Iglesias (1981).
b. Federal Republic of Nigeria 1970. First Report of the Wages
and Salaries Review Commission. Lagos : Federal Ministry of
Information.
6.—1971. Second and Final Report of the Wages and Salaries
Review Commission. Lagos : Federal Ministry of Information.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The balance of payments has been one of the most important objective
variables of the government since 1960. From the balance of
payments crisis of 1964, which led to the imposition of a wide
range of controls on trade and to the adoption for the first time
of an active monetary policy, to the blanket controls on imports
and other foreign exchange transactions in 1982, the Federal
Government demonstrated the extent of its commitment to achieving
a 'healthy' balance of payments position. The main aim of this
chapter is to assess how far the government succeeded in achieving
this objective.
The discussion is divided into four parts. The first describes
the movement of the main measures of balance of payments perform¬
ance while the second summarizes the measures taken to correct
the disequilibrium observed in the first part. Part four con¬
tains an appraisal of these measures in the light of the theor¬
etical discussion which is the subject matter of Part three.
1. NIGERIA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Before giving an account of the main developments in the balance
of payments of the country, it is necessary to say a word about
the concept of the balance of payments being employed here.
This is the official settlements balance which may be contrasted
with another concept that was widely used - the basic balance.
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The difference between the two is that while, in addition to
the current account items, the latter treats long-term capital
as autonomous, the former regards the net change in official
monetary reserves and the net change in liabilities to foreign
official institutions as compensatory items and all others as
autonomous or independently-motivated. As far as Nigeria's
balance of payments presentation is concerned, the official
settlements definition places both the 'errors and omissions'
item and commercial bank transactions 'above the line' while
the basic balance places them 'below the line'.
Arguing a case for the treatment of the 'errors and omissions'
items as autonomous in the case of Nigeria, Osagie (1973) states
that
'Errors and omissions are the result of unrecorded
merchandise and autonomous short-term capital
flows. The progressively increasing import tariff
rates in the 1950's and 1960's, and the operation of
the Exchange Control Act made illegal transactions
such as smuggling and secret dealings in foreign debt-
instruments rather profitable. In addition, the
high incidence of export commodity taxation (export
tax, marketing board surpluses) may have induced a
number of operators to completely avoid the normal
marketing channels by smuggling the produce to
neighbouring countries'
If this view is accepted then the basic balance is an inadequate
measure of the imbalance in the balance of payments of Nigeria.
Moreover, this concept takes a long-run view of the balance
of payments as it abstracts from volatile short-term capital
movements, thus focusing on the real sector of the economy.
It says nothing about the level of foreign reserves (under
fixed exchange rates) or the exchange rate (under perfectly
flexible exchange rate) as short term capital movement may
be sufficient to offset any disequilibrium. But the level
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of foreign reserves and the exchange rate are relevant for the
present purpose, hence the choice of the official settlements
definition.
1.1 TRENDS IN THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
In Table 6.1 the balance of payments position of the country,
along with major individual accounts, is set out for the years
1960 through 1981. It is clear from the table that the balance
of payments was in deficit in all the years between 1960 and 1969
except 1965, 1968 and 1969. Although the deficit persisted for
nine years (from 1956 to 1964), and was relatively substantial
in some years, the country's balance of payments position was not
considered as posing a serious problem until 1964. In that year,
the continuous deficits sustained in the previous years resulted
in the decumulation of foreign reserves below the minimum level
of four months' worth of import set by official policy. It
was at this time that measures to stem the drain of foreign res¬
erves were announced (CBN, Report, 1964). That the deficit was
turned into a surplus in the following year owed more to the
rapid increase in petroleum exports than to the success of the
policies. In any event, deficits were recorded in the following
two years after which the balance of payments was in surplus
until 1975 (except 1972). The table shows that the balance
of trade had the greatest impact on the balance of payments in
1974 and 1975. In particular, petroleum exports have exerted
a tremendous impact on the balance of payments since 1972 as
shown below.
The movement of the official settlements definition of the balance
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of payments since 1974 is particularly interesting. In that
year, the modest surplus of N174.4 m recorded a year earlier
jumped to N3102 m - a figure that has never been equalled in
the country. But the surplus declined to only N157.5 m in 1975
and was transformed into a deficit a year later. The deficit
increased progressively until 1979 when it was turned into a
surplus of nearly N2000 m. As before, the balance of payments
swung dramatically to a record deficit of N2989.6 m in 1981.
A remarkable feature of Nigeria's balance of payments is that
a positive net services figure has never been recorded. More¬
over, the deficit on the services account has been growing
over time. Another notable characteristic of the balance of
payments is that, with the exception of comparatively small net
outflows of N.9 m and N50.6 m sustained in 1974 and 1976 res¬
pectively, the country has always recorded positive net capital
inflows.
As the balance of trade and the services account were in deficit
between 1955 and 1964, and as unilateral transfers were small in
magnitude, the current account was also in deficit during this
period. Even when the trade account recorded surpluses in
the mid-1960's, the deficit on the services account exceeded the
trade account surplus. As a result, the current account was
in deficit until 1972. In 1976, the deficit on the services
account more than offset the surplus on the trade account and given
negative net unrequited transfers, the current acocunt was in
deficit in that year as it was to be in 1978 and 1981.
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The discussion so far has been in terms of aggregate balances
of specific accounts. A clearer picture emerges if the data
are disaggregated into two broad types of transactions, namely,
oil and non-oil. The non-oil accounts for 1970 - 81^. are
presented in Table 6.2. The table demonstrates clearly that
the balance of trade, the services and the current accounts
have always been in deficit since 1970. Furthermore, the
deficit on each account has risen monotonically over the years
with the single exception of 1979 in respect of the trade and
current accounts. As a proportion of the GDP at current factor
cost, the non-oil current account deficit rose from only 7.7%
in 1970 to slightly more than a quarter in 1977, reaching a
peak of 30% in 1981. The figures for net capital flows do
not tell the whole story. These figures are dominated by official
long-term borrowing which aCGOunted for M881.2 m out of the net
inflow of N1019.8 m.
When the two tables are compared, it is clear that the source of
Nigeria's balance of payments problem is in the non-oil external
transactions. When the net capital movement figures and the
year 1975 are excluded, the data presented in Table 6.2 do not
behave as erratically as those in Table 6.1. This suggests
that trade in oil has had a destabilizing effect on Nigeria's
balance of payments since 1970 - a proposition that has been
investigated formally and confirmed by Karp (1980) with respect
to export concentration. An aspect of the instability intro¬
duced by oil may be illustrated with reference to the merchan¬
dise trade account disaggregated into oil and non-oil (not shown).























TABLE 6.1 SUMMARY MEASURES OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1960 - 81
MILLIONS OF NAIRA
MERCHANDISE NET NET CURRENT NET OFFICIAL
TRADE SERVICES UNREQUITED ACCOUNT CAPITAL SETTLEMENTS
BALANCE TRANSFERS BALANCE INFLOWS BALANCE
-88.6 -46.6 -3.4 -138.6 54.2 -76 . 2
i 00 -28.4 -7.6 -123.4 64 -66
-64.2 -39.8 -1.4 -105.4 29.8 -50.2
-32.0 -73 . 6 -5.4 -111 69.2 -57
-72. 0 -100 -0 . 4 -182.4 147.6 -17.2
-5.0 -179.2 5.4 -178.8 132 10.2
60.2 -248.6 4.2 -184.2 96.8 -20.0
40 . 8 -222.2 15.4 -166 122 . 8 -62 . 2
34 . 6 -237.2 34. 4 -168.2 160 10
166 . 8 -296 . 2 20 . 8 -108.6 80 . 6 11 .4
173 -268 45 -50 49 . 2 46.6
285 -516.2 1 . 8 -229.4 293.4 117 .4
477 . 5 -785.9 -14.3 -322.7 259.2 -49 . 8
1166.9 -1078.8 -35.4 52.7 59.2 174 . 4
4439.3 -1314.7 -62 .1 3062.5 -5.9 3102.2
1487.1 -1367.7 -76.8 42.6 141 . 1 157 .5
1293.5 -1455 -97 . 8 -259.3 -50.6 -339.9
1553.9 -2082.7 -155.7 528 . 8 150.4 -527.2
-741.9 -1474.6 -170.6 -2386.9 1111.9 -1293.6
1967.4 -1724.4 -233.5 1009.5 813.2 1868.9
4084.5 -2176.3 -315.2 1593 774 . 6 2402.6
-342.6 -2719.3 -357.5 -3419.4 475 -2989.6













TABLE 6.2 : BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (NON-OIL ACCOUNT)
MILLIONS OF NAIRA
MERCHANDISE NET NET CURRENT NET CURRENT A/C
TRADE SERVICES UNILATERAL ACCOUNT CAPITAL BALANCE
BALANCE TRANSFERS BALANCE INFLOWS AS % OF GDP
-291.8 -186.6 45 -433.6 179.6 7.7
-644.8 -187.0 1.8 -830 289.4 11 .7
-663.7 -257.0 -14 . 3 -935 73 . 4 12.1
-798.1 -452.6 -35 . 4 -1286.1 80 .3 14.3
-1179.0 -753.5 -62 .1 -1994.6 -141.7 11 .8
-3161.2 -788.4 -76 . 8 -4026.4 19.7 19.7
-4533.4 -907.6 -97 .8 -5538.8 -8.6 21 . 8
-5797.5 -1199.3 -118.7 -7115.5 2.9 25.4
-6636.6 -1229.5 -170.6 -8036.7 1019.8 28.0
-6239.4 -1508.4 -230.6 -7978.4 817.6 20. 0
-7920.9 -1853.8 -310.0 -10094.7 804.6 23.3
-10559.0 -2208.5 -349.7 -13117.2 568.7 30.2
SOURCE: CBN, ANNUAL REPORT FOR VARIOUS YEARS
while its role on the import side is negligible. Increases
in export earnings tend to lead increases in import by a year.
However, the relationship between the growth of exports and
imports appears to be asymmetrical : while increases in exports
tend to lead to increases in imports, imports tend to be sticky
downward. This 'ratchet effect' may be responsible for the
erratic movement of the current account balance observed in
Table 6.1, especially since 1973. The probable effect of export
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on import is further investigated in Section 3.
2. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POLICY
Having described the main trends in the balance of payments to
1981, the next task that is undertaken is a review of the bal¬
ance of payments policy pursued by the Government. The measures
taken may be divided into two broad groups : macro- and micro-
economic. The former have been discussed in Chapters 2 and
4 under fiscal and monetary policy respectively. The monetary
policy measures consisted essentially of reducing the growth
of domestic credit and the method through which this was sought
- credit guidelines and interest rates - was discussed in detail
in Ch. 4. In addition to monetary and fiscal policy, the auth¬
orities made use of the exchange rate tool explicitly and by de¬
fault. A discussion of this issue is deferred to a later
section. Also, direct controls were imposed on foreign ex¬
change transactions. These are discussed along with the micro-
economic policy measures which are taken up presently.
2.1 FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY
Owing to the relative ineffectiveness of monetary policy noted
in Ch. 4, the Government relied heavily on fiscal policy. But
even then it was reluctant or unable to use the expenditure side
of its budget to achieve its balance of payments objective (see
Ch. 2). Consequently, the burden of adjustment was borne
largely by the revenue side. This also helps to explain the
pre-eminance of microeconomic measures among the balance of
payments measures.
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As total external reserves fell below what was regarded as pru¬
dent in 1964, measures were taken to halt its drain. The
Central Bank issued its first credit guidelines although, as
already stated, the emphasis was on direct controls. Earlier,
in August 1963, restrictions had been placed on imports from
specific countries, notably Japan with which the country had
sustained the largest deficit. While extending these controls
to Japanese goods shipped from Hong Kong, the import duties on
certain items were increased in March 1964 and, in August, the
indirect taxes on a wide range of imported goods were increased
(CBN, Report, 1964, p. 14). Further restrictive measures were
taken in 1965. On 24 August the government announced a number
of measures which included '(i) the imposition of higher customs
tariffs ranging from 33 1/3% to 150% ad valorem ... (ii) ban on
all categories of imports from Japan, except textile, and (iii)
restoration of restriction of imports from Hong Kong' (CBN, Report,
1965, p. 11). The Central Bank also maintained its restriction
on commercial bank credit. But as the balance of payments
improved that year and as it was thought that the economy was
heading towards a recession, these controls were relaxed in
1966.
However, following the outbreak of war in 1967 and the sterling
devaluation of that year, measures to restrain the growth of
imports were taken. Specific import licensing was introduced
against the Dollar Area, Japan, Hong Kong, the Netherlands,
Eastern Europe and China as well as against a long list of
commodities, notably cement, meat and petroleum products. Fur¬
thermore, tariff rates were substantially increased on an even
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longer list of items while the range of banned imported items
was extended. Later, in 1968, a range of 45 items were removed
from the Open General Import Licence and put under the special
licence system. In 1969, further duty increases were introduced
under the Customs Tariff (Duties and Exemptions) Order No. 2 of
1969. However, duties on some goods, especially those of an
intermediate nature were reduced (Nigeria, 1970, pp. 17 - 20).
Thus by the end of the civil war in January 1970, the economy
was operating with a set of stringent controls on transactions
involving the use of foreign exchange. Yet, the external pay¬
ments position pointed to the need to conserve foreign exchange
at the official exchange rates. The Government therefore imposed
additional taxes on what it thought to be luxury items in great
demand, granted exemptions to exporters of manufactured goods in
respect of value or volume at a defined level, and relaxed the
controls on the repatriation of dividends, profits and management
fees with a view to attracting foreign capital (CBN, Report, 1970,
p. 13).
Further controls were instituted in 1971. This involved the
reduction of foreign exchange outflow in the form of travel
allowance, remittance of salaries, dividends and profits due to
non-residents. Finally, the authorities decided to introduce
the use of a foreign exchange budget in that year (CBN, Report,
1971, p. 12).
In 1972 some of the measures in existence were retained while
other controls were relaxed : the limit on remittance of monthly
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salaries was restored to its pre-1971 level subject to a new
higher maximum, the travel allowance was also restored to the
level at the end of 1970 while remittance of arrears of profits
and dividends was permitted.
From 1973, there was no new policy aimed at conserving foreign
exchange reserves and, indeed, opposite policies were pursued :
duties on many items were reduced while the controls on foreign
exchange outflow were relaxed. For instance, the travel allow¬
ance which stood at N150 per adult in 1971 was progressively
revised upward to N1000 in 1977. But in the latter year, the
problem of external imbalance assumed a greater dimension. Con¬
sequently, duties on a wide range of items were raised. The
duties on some were as much as 100% (e.g. outer garments) while
import licensing which was abolished earlier was reintroduced
for some items while others were banned.
In 1978, further controls on foreign exchange were instituted,
including the Comprehensive Import Supervision scheme which
involved the pre-shipment inspection of imports to control the
rate, quality, quantity and quoted prices of imported goods.
By 1980 the authorities were able to report that
' In designing fiscal measures for 1980, the Federal
Government took cognizance of the fact that the
import restrictions of the preceding fiscal years had
largely fulfilled their aim of improving the balance
of payments by the end of 1979'
CBN, 1980, p. 5
In accordance with this conviction, tariffs were revised down¬
wards and even eliminated in certain cases (such as paper bags,
spare parts for the cement industry and some raw materials).
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Other foreign exchange controls were relaxed, mainly in the
areas of consultancy fees, royalties, repatriation of salaries
and of the proceeds from the sale of shares under the indigeniz-
ation programme.
Again, as explained earlier, the balance of payments deteriorated
sharply in 1981 and existing controls were retained for that
year.
2.2 EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
When the country joined the IMF in March 1961 its currency was
pegged at par to the pound sterling and the declared par value
of the Nigerian pound (£N) was US$2.80. On 17 April 1963 an
initial par value of 2.48828 grammes of fine gold per £N was
established. The Central Bank quoted rates at which it was
prepared to deal in sterling and US dollars with authorized
dealers and the public. But such dealings were for approved
transactions subject to a minimum of £10,000 (sterling) and
were on a spot basis only. It determined the dealing rates for
sterling periodically while the rates for the U.S. dollar were
based on the £N/£ sterling cross rates.
There was no major change to the exchange rate system until
November 1967 when sterling was devalued. The £N appreciated
in terms of the pound sterling since Nigeria took no action.
Prior to the suspension of dollar-gold convertibility on 15
August 1971, the buying and selling rates were 1.1681 and 1.1620
pounds sterling per £N. From 23 August a complicated exchange
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rate system was established. (CBN Report, 1971, p. 13). But
following the currency realignment and the devaluation of the
US$ by 8.57% against gold in December that year, Nigeria reverted
to the pre-15th August gold parity of its currency. This
meant that the £N appreciated against the US$ from £N1 = $2.80
to £N1 = $3.04. The £N was then tied to the US$.
The present currency, the naira (N), was introduced in January
1973 with a value of £N1 = N2. The external value of the curr¬
ency was not affected apart from the change of units. The
naira was devalued by 10% on 14 February 1973 which was the
full extent of the US$ devaluation two days earlier. A cen¬
tral rate of 1.11973 g of fine gold per naira corresponding
at the time to MO.793648 = SDR1 or MO.657893 = US$ was then
established. The dollar became the intervention currency and
the Central Bank's rates for the $ were set at 0.50% either side
of parity, with those of sterling being determined on the basis
of sterling-dollar rates quoted in London.
From 1 April 1974 the Bank stopped observing any specified
ceilings on rates for SDR, gold and US$:
'From April, the monetary authorities adopted the
policy of progressively appreciating the external
value of the naira. There was no reason for con¬
tinuing to hold the fluctuation of the naira exchange
rate within the specified margin of 2\% on either
side of the central rate. Adherence to the central
rate had led to undesirable results in the past. For
example, movements of the naira exchange rate had
depended solely on the behaviour of the US$ on the
foreign exchange markets, despite the divergent
strengths of the naira and the US$ as evidenced by
the respective balance of payments performances of
Nigeria and the United States'
(CBN, Report, 1974, pp. 13 - 14)
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Since then Nigeria has followed an independent exchange rate
policy. The middle rate of the intervention currency (US$)
is now
'determined through an import-weighted basket of
currencies taking into consideration the country's
balance of payments and reserve positions as well
as chance factors which caused erratic movements
in some of the major currencies'
(Ozumba, 1978, p. 5)
This policy gives the Central Bank much discretion in determin¬
ing the external value of the currency. The only truly objective
factor is the weight of the currencies which is based on the
average shares of the issuing countries in Nigeria's import trade.
The resulting exchange rates against the dollar and SDR are
presented in appendix table 6.3 both on an end-of-year and
annual-average basis.
It must be pointed out that virtually all imports were subject
to 'national reconstruction surcharge' until 1974. The rate
was raised from 5 to 1\% in 1968 and reduced to 5% in 1970.
It was finally abolished on 1 April 1974. However, all non¬
government foreign exchange transactions attach a commission
of To the people affected, this has the effect of reduc¬
ing the external value of the currency.
From this review, it is clear that most of the measures were
directed at restraining the growth of imports. Now the success
of such measures (and the tariff policy discussed below) depends
to a large extent on the behaviour of the import demand function.
Moreover, this function has some implications for the effective-
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ness of policies directed at other objectives. For instance,
a high marginal propensity to import has the effect of reducing
the expenditure multiplier and hence the impact of a given
increase in government expenditure. Consequently, the next
section is devoted to an empirical analysis of the import demand
function.
3. THE DEMAND FOR IMPORTS IN NIGERIA : A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
In the 196o's, imports grew very slowly, rising from N432 m in
1960 to only N497 m in 1969. The 1970's, however, witnessed a
number of changes. Imports rose more than two-fold between
1969 and 1971 and again between 1974 and 1975, reaching a peak
of N12,013 m in 1981.
Output grew faster than imports between 1962 and 1974. As a
proportion of the GDP, imports (both in nominal terms) declined
from 0.18 in 1960 to 0.10 in 1974. But the ratio rose as from
1975 and stood at 0.297 by 1981, averaging 0.172 over the entire
review period.
There is evidence of a close statistical relationship between
imports and exports. Moreover, there is a tendency for exports
to lead imports by a year. The simple correlation coefficient
between the logarithms of the contemporaneous values of the two
variables is 0.967 and for lagged exports it is 0.987. This
correlation is illustrated graphically in Chart 6.1.
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3.1 SPECIFICATION OF THE IMPORT DEMAND FUNCTION
The conventional import demand function relates the quantity
of import demanded, Z, to the level of the demand for goods and
services, Y, and relative prices, Pr. The total demand variable
is often proxied by the national income while relative prices
is often expressed as the ratio of import prices to the domestic
price level (e.g. Kubursi, 1974; Aghelvi, 1977). However,
national income is an imperfect proxy for total demand because
of the definition of the former which includes exports but
excludes imports. Total demand is given by private and public
expenditure on imported and home produced goods and services and
should therefore include imports but exclude exports. The
imperfection is further increased by the problems of valuing out¬
put (Ch. 1; Appendix 1). To minimize this problem, the sum of
private and public expenditures has been used to proxy total
demand in the following exercise except as indicated. The
validity of the results to be obtained is therefore subject
to the overall limitations of this measure of aggregate demand
in terms of suitability and errors of measurement.
The import demand function is therefore given by:
Zt " f<Yt> Prf <!>
where all variables are measured in the domestic currency and
it is expected that f^> 0, f2 < 0.
Another factor that might affect the demand for imports in a
country like Nigeria is the level of foreign reserves. The
notion that foreign exchange receipts are a possible argument
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in the import demand function is implicit in some models of
world trade and economic development (e.g. Chenery and Strout,
1966; Maizels, 1968). Furthermore,
'In order to account for the role of quantitative
restrictions, most studies have included measures
such as the level of international reserves, of
export receipts, and overseas assets in the import
equation. The assumption behind the use of
these alternative measures is that the authorities
vary restrictions inversely with the country's
capacity to import, and this capacity can be meas¬
ured by one of these proxies'
(Khan, 1974, pp. 682 - 83).
In Nigeria, as part of its measures designed to conserve foreign
exchange the government decided in 1971 to make 'explicit use of
a foreign exchange budget to guide officials handling various
applications' (CBN, Report, 1971, p. 12). This statement implies
that even before then, the decision on how much to import had
been influenced by the availability of foreign exchange. It
also implies that the relevant reserve measure is the level at
the beginning of the current period, i.e. the level at the end
of the previous period. The reserve variable may replace or
supplement Y in eqn (1).
Finally, there is the possibility that the demand for imports
adjusts to a 'desired' or equilibrium level and that adjustment
may not be complete in a single period. The familiar stock
adjustment technique introduced in Ch,2 may then be used to
eliminate the unobservable 'desired' quantity.
These considerations give six estimating equations^ :
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+ al2 log Prt + U1t (2)
+ a22 logFt-l + U2t (3)
+ a32 log Prt + a33 log Ft_1 + U3t (4)
+ b12 log Prt + c log Zt_1 + Vlt (5)
+ b22 log Ft_1 + c log Zt_1 + V2t (6)
+ b32 log Prt + b33 log Ft_1 + c
(7)
0, . .. , 3 c = l - A ;
of reserves in the previous period;
of adjustment s.t. 0 /\*-l.
3.2 ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
Equation 2-7 were estimated in nominal and in real terms.
In the latter case, real import is defined as nominal imports
deflated by the import price index while real income is the
value of total domestic expenditure deflated by the consumer
price index. The sample period runs from 1959 to 1981 but
lagging may lead to some loss of degrees of freedom. All data
are annual.
It is clear from the results presented in Table 6.3 that the
coefficients of the income and foreign reserve variables have the
expected signs and are statistically significant at the 5% level.
The coefficient of the price variable is also correctly signed
in each equation but it is not statistically different from
zero in equations 1, 4, 10 and 12 even at the 10% level. The
_2
adjusted R which ranged from 0.924 (equation 7) to 0.994 (equ¬
ation 3) is reasonably high. The null hypothesis that all the
log Zt = a10 + an log Yt
iog Zt = a1Q + a21 log Yt
log Zt = a30 + a31 l0g Yt
iog Zt = b1Q + bn log Yt
iog Zt = b2Q + b21 log Yt
log Zt = b30 + b31 log Yt
log Ztl + v3t
where bjj = *±^ , i, j =
V± = Au : Ft_1 = level
and A is the coefficient
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regression coefficients are zero cannot be accepted for any
equation as the critical values of the F distribution at 1%
significance are F(2, 19 ) = 5.93 and F(4,16) - 4.77 and all
the valculated F- statistics are above 115.
However, there is great variation in respect of the Durbin-Watson
statistic. The equations to which the D-W statistic is directly
applicable are 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 and 9. Of these 1 and 7 display
clear evidence of positive serial correlation while, at the 5%
level, the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation is barely
acceptable for 2. But the null hypothesis cannot be rejected
in the case of 3, 8 and 9.
The remaining equations (4, 6, 10, 12) contain the lagged values
of the dependent variable, hence the D-W is inapplicable. In
such situations, it is Durbin's h test (introduced in Ch. 2)
which is more appropriate for detecting the presence of serial
correlation. The value of this statistic is presented for
eqns. 18 and 24 only since the coefficient of the lagged endog¬
enous variable in the other equations is not statistically diff¬
erent from zero:
Eqn 18 : h = 0.847
24 : h = 1.685
The critical value of the normal distribution at the 5% level
is 1.645. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no serial correl¬















TABLE 6.3 : AGGREGATE DEMAND FOR IMPORTS : LEVELS
NOMINAL













































































































An examination of the static equations in which the D-W statistic
suggests the presence of first-order serial correlation (1 and 7)
shows that they have one thing in common : the relative price
variable is the only explanatory variable in addition to income.
Similarly, the other equations with no evidence of a first-
order correlation (2, 3, 8 and 9) each contains the level of
reserves as an explanatory variable, whether the variable is used
in place of or in conjunction with relative prices.
In terms of model selection, only those equations which are free
from autocorrelation (2, 3, 4, 8 and 23) need be considered.
This decision is based on the results by Granger and Newbold that
'From our own studies we would conclude that if a
regression equation relating economic variables is
found to have strongly autocorrelated residuals,
equivalent to a low Durbin-Watson value, the only con¬
clusion that can be reached is that t^e equation is
misspecified, whatever the value of R observed'
Granger and Newbold, 1974, p. 117
Of these equations,(2) may be dropped on the ground that its
D-W value is very close to the critical point of indeterminacy
(between d, and d ). If the test statistics shown are used1 u'
to discriminate among the remaining equations, (3) would be the
_2
winner : it has the highest R and F- statistics and its D-W
value is closest to the ideal figure of 2.0. The preferred
import demand function is therefore given by equation 4.
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is not statist¬
ically different from zero in most of the equations. This sugg¬
ests the absence of a significant adjustment lag. This is not
entirely unexpected since the data used are annual. All adjust-
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ments therefore appear to be accomplished within a year or so.
Ajayi (1975) p. 173 who obtained a similar result has suggested
the 'absence of habit persistence' as a possible explanation.
The existence of such a phenomenon is not incompatible with
the results above or those he obtained because lag in adjustment
may persist over quarters, rather than years. A shorter-run
model is needed to validate the suggestion.
In order to take account of the effect of the civil war, a dummy
variable with value 1 in the war years (1967 - 69) and zero
otherwise was included in equation 4. The coefficient of the
variable was -0.09 with a t value of 0.65. The results show
that the war had a negative but insignificant impact on the
demand for imports. Equation 4 therefore stands as the preferred
import demand equation.
From the estimates of this equation presented in 3, in Table 6.3,
one can say that the income elasticity of the demand for imports
is below unity. This observation is contradicted only by
results contained in eqns 1 and 7 in the table which in any
case have been shown to be misspecified and may be neglected.
The absolute value of the price elasticity of the demand for
imports is also substantially below unity.
3.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS
It is necessary to draw attention again to the poor quality of
the data. In addition to the limitations of the income series
already highlighted, the import price index is imperfect as it
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has been from three series each with a different
base year published in World Bank, World Tables. The'quality
of measured import itself is suspect. This is largely due to
the existence of a wide range of import controls surveyed in
Section 2.
Given these reservations, one may make the following inferences.
A widely-held view is that the income elasticity of the demand
for import in developing countries is (relatively) high. Accord¬
ing to a UNCTAD study, the historical income elasticity of the
demand for import in Nigeria over the period 1958 - 65 is 2.6
(Goreux, 1969, p. 67). Aboyade (1962, p. 55) also makes
reference to a 'high' income elasticity in the country. Admitt¬
edly, these studies refer to earlier periods, in particular, the
pre-1970 period. Nevertheless, the results of the present
exercise do not support the contention of a high import elasti¬
city. Furthermore,they are broadly in conformity with those
of more recent studies even though the latter make use of diff¬
erent explanatory variables as the following two examples show.
The equation estimated by Ajayi (1975) is similar to Eqn (4)
except that (a) his income series is the constant price GDP and
(b) the reserve variable is the current level of foreign exchange.
These are, of course, different from those used in the correspond¬
ing equation (i.e. 12 in the table) here. His results (which
cover the period 1960 - 70) yield a shortrun income elasticity
of 0.257 and a long-run elasticity of 0.351 (Ajayi, 1975, pp.
172 - 73), both of which are lower than any of the elasticities
reported above. Another formulation employed by Ajayi involves
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the deflation of Zt, Zt_x and Ft by the population, But the
resulting elasticities are still lower than 0.5,
Ajayi's estimates show that the coefficients of Z ^ and F^
are not statistically different from zero at any conventional
level of significance. The same results were also obtained in
this study when equations involving these variables were estimated.
However, when was substituted for F^ (the coefficients of
the two variables become statistically significant as eqns 2-4
in the Table show), F^_ is therefore not the appropriate reserve
variable. Another difficulty with Ajayi's model is the use of
per capita measures in his second formulation. In view of the
doubts cast on the population statistics in Ch. 1 and Appendix
1, the use of per capita in the import function is considered
inappropriate. Moreover, the relevance of the concept of
foreign reserves per capita is not clear and no explanation is
offered apart from the observation that the population has not
been constant.
In a study covering a longer period (1955 - 71), Osagie (undated)
obtained an income elasticity of 0.9. His dependent variable
is constant (1962) price import while the independent variables
are constant (1962) price GDP, relative prices and total import
tariff collected deflated by the CPI. But the income elasticity
again is below unity and nowhere as near the 2.6 figure obtained
by UNCTAD.
To round up the analysis, separate demand functions were estimated
for the public and private sectors to determine if there are any
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differences between the income elasticities of demand in the
two sectors.
(i) PUBLIC SECTOR
log Z - 2.47 + 0.53 log Y - 0.653 log P + 0.293 log F 1
(3.1) (5.1) (1.71) (4.9)
R2 = 0.979 D-W - 1.4 F(3,16) = 302
(ii) PRIVATE SECTOR
log = -1.16 + 0.88 log Y^ - 0.55 log P^ + 0.19 log E^_^
(1.53) (9.8) (2.47) (4.76)
R2 = 0.992 D-W = 1.96 F(3,16) = 821
By way of general comment, one may say that relative prices
are not as important to the government as the level of foreign
reserves (which is consistent with the use of a foreign exchange
_2
budget )judging from the R and especially the D-W statistic.
The model does not explain the behaviour of public sector demand
for imports as well as it does in the case of the private sector
Given this observation, it is clear that the private sector has
a higher income elasticity of demand for imports than the
private sector.
3.4 SUMMARY
All the coefficients of the variables in the preferred import
demand function are correctly signed and statistically different
from zero at traditional levels of significance. The results
show that the demand for import in Nigeria is a function of
- 337 -
aggregate demand, relative prices and the level of reserves in
the previous period. The calculated income elasticity is
between 0 and 1 while the price elasticity is about -0.5.
The results are broadly consistent with the foreign exchange-
constraint- on—import hypothesis. Given the existence of quan¬
titative restrictions on imports owing to foreign exchange short¬
fall on the one hand and an unwillingness to devalue on the other,
the relationship between import and income may not be unidirect¬
ional. Indeed, given the significance of producer goods, esp¬
ecially capital equipment and also maintenance items and compon¬
ents as well as industrial raw materials, all of which are largely
imported, there is a tendency for import to actually determine
output (Hemphill, 1974, p. 637). When manufacturers of products
which have a high import content are faced with severe foreign
exchange problems, they may be forced to reduce their capacity
C 3)
or even shut down completely, thus leading to a fall in output J .
This possibility raises the problem of identifiability i.e.
whether the estimated equation is that of a demand or supply
function. If the latter is the case, then the estimated elast¬
icities are even higher than actual elasticities so that the
conclusions above with respect to income elasticities are still
valid. But then it is no longer possible to obtain straight¬
forward income elasticities of the demand for imports.
Now that some theoretical aspects of the balance of payments
have been considered, one is in a position to assess the balance
of payments measures taken by the Nigerian authorities.
- 338 -
4. AN EVALUATION OF NIGERIA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POLICIES
Judged against their objectives, these measures must be reckoned
as having failed, especially if the summary measures of the non-
oil account as reported above are used. In order to facilitate
the appraisal of the policies, they are divided into three:
fiscal policy in a macroeconomic context and monetary policy;
quantitative controls; and exchange rate policy.
4.1 EFFECT OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY ON THE BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS
The emphasis of the monetary approach to the balance of payments
is on the implications for stock equilibrium of the continuing
flow of financial assets necessary to finance a persistent foal¬
ed 4 )
ance of payments disequilibrium . It thus assigns a central
role to monetary variables in the determination of the balance
of payments. According to this approach, reserve accumulation
is positively related to the rate of growth of domestic income
but negatively to the rate of domestic monetary expansion. In
a situation where domestic income cannot be varied easily, the
rate of domestic credit expansion would have to adjust to equil¬
ibrate the balance of payments. Implicit in the approach is
the assumption of the ability of the monetary authorities to
control the level of interenational reserves by varying the
composition of the money supply through monetary policy.
The primary role assigned to the stock of money ensures that
the external account deficit is linked to the domestic budget
deficit. The connection between the money supply and the gov¬
ernment budget was explored in some detail in chapter 4. There
it was shown that the inability of the Central Bank to control
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the stock of money effectively stemmed in a large measure from
the fiscal operations of the Federal Government. Within the
framework established in chapter 3, government expenditure affects
the money supply in two ways. The first channel is the familiar
one whereby the government finances its budget deficit by borrow¬
ing from the Central Bank. The second mechanism is less con¬
ventional than the first and oeprates even in the absence of a
budget deficit. The government derives the bulk of its revenue
from levies on external trade. In the 1970's it was crude
petroleum that was the principal source (see App. 1). Earnings
from petroleum exports accrue directly to the government. The
associated reserve inflow is therefore sterilized and is monetized
only to the extent that the government injects this revenue into
the domestic income stream by drawing down its deposits with the
Central Bank to pay for its purchase of goods and services.
This has the effect of increasing high-powered money and hence
the money supply (given the money multiplier) in the manner
described in Ch. 3 .
Using the monetary approach as a standard, all the policies surveyed
in section 2 are inappropriate as they were concerned with the
flows of real quantities rather than the stock of money. The
approach leads to the view that tariffs - the main weapon utilized
by the government - can have only a transient effect on the bal¬
ance of payments (Mussa, 1976 pp. 333 - 51).
When account is taken of the argument developed in respect of
monetary policy, the monetary approach suggests a simple reason
for the inability of the authorities to check the deterioration
- 340 -
in the balance of payments in the second half of the 1970's and
early 1980's : the failure of policy to control the rate of
monetary expansion.
If this is so then the appropriate policy would have been to
reduce the rate of domestic credit expansion. That the balance
of payments continued to deteriorate in the late 1970's would
then be attributable to the relative impotence of the Central
Bank to effect a contraction of the money supply which was caused
by expansionary fiscal policy. Given the high fraction of an
increase in income that is spent on import, expansionary fiscal
policy tends to worsen the balance of payments. Furthermore,
this high ratio has the effect of reducing the expansionary
impact of government expenditure on output and employment by
reducing the expenditure multiplier in an income - expenditure
model.
The conclusion then is that fiscal and monetary policy operated
in a way that did not encourage the elimination of the balance
of payments disequilibrium experienced by the country. This
is not to say that the authorities were unaware of all the causes
of disequilibrium. As stated earlier, the sharp deterioration
in the balance of payments in 1964 led to the first use of active
monetary policy. The principal cause of the ineffectiveness
of the policy was fiscal policy as shown above and in Ch.4 .
Since the authorities stated that direct fiscal measures were
used to correct the balance of payments in view of the failure
of monetary policy, it is necessary to assess the success or
otherwise of those measures.
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4.2 QUANTITATIVE CONTROLS
This term is used to cover such measures as tariff policy and
direct controls - quotas, embargoes and foreign exchange controls.
But the main concern here is with the fiscal measures.
On direct controls there is little to say apart from the fact
that the result depends on the ability of the authorities to
enforce the controls effectively. For instance, if a good
is subject to a quota system (which implies that the amount
permitted to be imported is less than the quantity demanded)
then the effect is a reduction in the total import bill_, assum¬
ing everything else remains the same. The same is even more
true for a ban. Given the same level of exports, this leads
to an improvement in the balance of payments. However, there
are reasons to expect that the success of the authorities in
enforcing an import ban or quota will be less than absolute,
especially in Nigeria. Even with the system of import licensing
in operation, a licence can be obtained for the importation of
one commodity but used for a different one, thus by-passing the
(5)
ban or quota . An even more obvious method of rendering
direct controls ineffective is smuggling about which the auth-
/ g \
orities have complained several times . As an illustration
of this point, consider the following situation. In 1978, the
following items were banned : beer and stout, furniture, carpets,
ready-made garments and fresh milk (CBN, Report, 1978, p. 6).
The imports of the same commodities between 1977 and 1979 are
as shown below (in millions of naira):
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1977 1978 1979
Beer and stout 72.4 5.5 2.5
Furniture 15.8 12.6 6.1
Carpet 10.4 6.9 3.9
Milk 97.8 112.4 134.5
Ready-made garments/clothing 103.8 100.4 37.6
SOURCE: FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS, REVIEW OF EXTERNAL TRADE
1979, pp. 16, 17, 22 and 24
Although the imports of most of these items fell in 1978 and 1979,
they were nevertheless greater than zero. The import of milk
in general actually went up thus suggesting that either some
fresh milk was imported or consumers substituted other forms of
milk for it. In either case the ban did not have the desired
effect (as in the case of the other items). Therefore, the main
problem with direct controls is enforcement. But even where
controls are successfully implemented they tend to interfere
with consumer behaviour which may generate inefficiency in the
use of resources (of which smuggling is symptomatic).
Like most developing countries, Nigeria has an open, dependent
economy which is subject to a foreign exchange constraint. Also,
as in other developing countries, it is a long-term objective
of the authorities in Nigeria to reduce the degree of dependence
of the country on external trade as well as closing the 'trade-
gap'. The foreign exchange constraint was removed in the decade
following the end of the World War II by the primary 'export
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boom' of the period and again in the mid-1970's by the 'petroleum
boom' (see App. 1). However, these were temporary phenomena
that could not be sustained as evidenced by the subsequent balance
of payments difficulties.
Tariffs have been used extensively in Nigeria to restrain import.
The main determinant of the effectiveness of a tariff policy in
the present circumstances is the price elasticity of the demand
for imports. As in the case of the price elasticity of demand
for other goods, the elasticity is influenced by one important
factor which is the availability of close substitutes within the
same price range. In Nigeria, especially during the early
part of the review period, few imported commodities have close
domestic substitutes. Durable consumer goods are on top of the
list of imported items with no close substitutes while most
other items have no domestic counterparts that are comparable in
terms of price and quality. In this situation, one would expect
to find a low price elasticity of the demand for imports. The
findings in section 3 are consistent with this expectation. The
elasticities are relatively low. Therefore, subject to the
criticism of the results expressed,in section 3, one may say
that the values of the price elasticity of the demand for imports
<£S
are such that do not guarantee that increasing the tariff rates
would improve the balance of payments.
In addition to using tariffs to reduce imports, Nigeria has used
tariff policy as part of its inward^looking, import-substitution
industrial strategy. Basically, this involves the imposition of
relatively high import duties on finished goods competing with
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domestic manufactures and the granting of preferential duties
on inputs used by domestic manufacturers. The latter is trace¬
able to the Industrial Development (Import Duties Relief) Act
1957 under which import duties relief (up to 100% and for a period
not exceeding ten years) is granted to an industralist who
(70
satisfies one of three conditions . The scheme has been
I
found to be highly ineffecient (Phillips, 1969) but it has been
modified in recent times.
In addition to import duty reliefs, certain companies enjoy other
tax incentives. The income tax relief takes the form of a
complete exemption from income tax for a period of two or five
years, depending on the volume of investment. The aim is to
induce entrepreneurs to set up enterprises that will manufacture
import substitutes.
But again the effectiveness of this policy has not been clearly
demonstrated. A number of studies on the system of industrial
incentives and its impact in terms of encouraging domestic manu¬
factures in various countries have concluded that such incentives
do not play a significant role in attracting or inducing indust-
( g \
rial investment . In the case of Nigeria, a similar study
shows that 'the generous tax incentives ... appear to have had
only a marginal effect' (May, 1965, p. 253). Also, after analys¬
ing the data obtained from the relevant ministries and interviews
with a number of entrepreneurs, Phillips concludes that
'Income tax relief does not necessarily play a crucial
role in the investment decisions of pioneer companies
... most of the companies would probably have set up
without the incentives, and some of those denied it
went ahead nonetheless'
(Phillips, 196-8, p. 47)
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The policy is therefore inappropriate. If it succeeds in stim¬
ulating industrial output, it would still have an adverse effect
on the balance of payments. Partly as a result of its operation,
the composition of imports has shifted markedly since 1960 in
favour of producer goods. In that year, consumer goods imports
amounted to 53% of the total but fell to 25.5% in 1974. Over
the same period, producer goods - capital equipment plus raw
materials - enlarged their share from 43.1 to 68.9% (the residual
is made up of passenger car import). Yet it is the capital goods
category which has always received preferential tariff treatment
and foreign exchange allocation. Given that a capital goods
sector is virtually non-existent in Nigeria and expenditure on
foreign inputs constitutes about 75% of total raw materials cost
of the manufacturing sector (CBN, Report 1980, p. 18), it is
possible for increased domestic production of import substitutes
to worsen the balance of payments.
4.3 EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
This is the last set of policies to be considered. It is
customary to discuss exchange rate policy within the context
of a devaluation and this tradition is followed here for the
sake of convenience. In any event, the need for revaluation has
not been as pressing as that of devaluation.
Devaluation operates by changing the relative prices of tradeables
vis-a-vis non-tradeables. The immediate effect is to increase
the prices in domestic currency of exports and imports even though
these prices may be unaffected in terms of foreign currency. The
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higher domestic prices are expected to enable exporters to offer
higher prices to producers who, in turn, are expected to increase
the volume of production. In the shortrun, the effect of deval¬
uation on exports is positively related to the level of excess
capacity in the export sector as well as to the ease of shifting
resources from the other sectors to this sector. In order to
maintain the flow of resources to the export sector, it is nec¬
essary to keep the relative prices of exports at a higher level
than before the devaluation.
As has been pointed out (Bhagwat and Onitsuka, 1974, p. 415), the
effect on export supply of a devaluation is different from that
of normal fluctuations in external prices. Given a fixed exchange
rate, producers base their production decisions on the expected
foreign prices of their products. These prices may rise or
fall but a devaluation makes the direction of change certain.
The favourable expectations generated by a devaluation are re¬
inforced if the authorities simultaneously take measures which are
inducive to export expansion. Therefore, in normal circumstances,
a devaluation is expected to have a favourable effect on exports.
But no such statement can be made with respect to imports. In
the first instance, the higher import prices are expected to have
a negative effect on the demand for imports ^ and encourage the
substitution of domestic for imported goods. But as imports
are a positive function of income, the higher level of income
induced by the expansion in export tends to raise the demand for
imports. The net effect of these opposite forces cannot be
determined a priori. However, for a developing economy like
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Nigeria's, the net effect is probably positive. It will be
recalled that producer goods take well over half of the total
import bill in Nigeria and that the domestic production of these
goods is a negligible proportion of total requirements. The
resulting increase in the import of producer goods necessary to
satisfy the extra domestic demand may more than offset the decrease
in imports brought about by their higher prices. Moreover, the
exercise in section 3 shows that one cannot take for granted that
the price elasticity of the demand for imports is sufficiently
high to offset the increase in producer goods import. For these
reasons, a devaluation may have a perverse effect on imports.
This is almost certain if the devaluation is followed by trade
liberalization.
The Nigerian authorities did not use devaluation as a tool of
policy until February 1973 (see section 2.2). The first opport¬
unity for devaluation came with the 1967 sterling devaluation.
The official settlements deficit was N20 m at the end of 1966 and
N62.2 m a year later. The current account deficit was N184.2 m
and N166 m in the corresponding periods. The level of foreign
exchange assets fell from N172.6 m at the end of January to
N103.7 m at the end of October 1967, just before the devaluation
of sterling. By the end of the year, the level of reserves
stood at only M77.1 m. Yet the country did not follow the deval¬
uation of the currency of its main trading partner.
The main reason given was that Nigeria's balance of payments
'was not in fundamental disequilibrium'
and that devaluation
'would not improve the competitive position of the
country's primary exports, the prices of which are
determined not by domestic costs but by world market
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forces'
(CBN, Report, 1968, p. 11)
But as seen in Section 2.1, the current account was in deficit
between 1955 and 1972. The disequilibrium argument therefore
is not particularly strong. The second part of the explanation
is thus regarded as offering a stronger reason for the non-deval¬
uation of the Nigerian currency. It was widely believed at
the time that the price elasticity of the foreign demand for
Nigeria's exports which were all primary products was low (except¬
ing petroleum). In such a situation, the resulting increase
in demand occasioned by the devaluation might be insufficient to
compensate for the fall in prices of exports in foreign currency.
On the supply side, there was the question of a long lag in
response to a price change. The main export crops at the time
were cocoa, groundnut, palm produce and crude petroleum. The
price of crude oil was denominated in dollars. Of the other
products, groundnut has the shortest gestation period of a year.
The gestation period for cocoa is seven years and is even longer
for oil palm. The influence of the length of gestation period
has been pointed out by Gervers who argues that 'the sudden
increase in cocoa output in 1961 was partially a consequence of
the consequence of high prices in 1954 which stimulated cocoa
plantings' (Gervers, 1963, p. 69). The shortrun effect of a
devaluation on exports would have been very small.
The argument above indicates that devaluation may not have the
expected effect on the import bill. The low elasticities sugg¬
ested by the exercise in section 3.3 imply that the import bill
may fall not appreciably. Furthermore, the import-substitution
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policy could result in a higher inflation rate than would have
prevailed in the event of a devaluation. Higher input prices
would be the source of this inflationary tendency.
Finally, 1967 was the first year of the civil war during which
the importation of arms increased sharply. A devaluation would
then have increased the domestic currency value of expenditure
on arms. For all these reasons, and given the already stringent
controls on consumer goods imports surveyed earlier, it is con¬
cluded that it was a rational policy not to have devalued the
Nigerian pound in 1967.
Four reasons were given for the 10% devaluation of the Nigerian
currency in February 1973, They are numbered here for each
of reference :
'(a) to prevent the country's import bill from rising
to unmanageable proportions (b) to ensure that the local
currency value of exports did not fall (c) to protect the
products of local industries from excessive competition
from imports and (d) to discourage increased outflow
of capital'
(CBN Report, 1973).
From the results obtained earlier in relation to the price ela¬
sticity of the demand for imports, it is doubtful if a deval¬
uation of only 10% could have had a significant effect on the
import bill given that other countries, including some important
trading partners also devalued by that amount or higher. Explan¬
ation (a) is therefore not a plausible one. (c) and (d) may be
defended from a point of view different from that implied by the
authorities. As seen in the previous section, the objective
embodied in (c) was already being pursued through a different
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set of measure^, This is the import substitution policy which
involved imposing very high rates of duties on imported finished
goods which competed with domestic manufactures while simultan¬
eously granting concessionary rates of duties to importers of
producer goods. Also, earlier in 1972, the Nigerian Enterprises
Promotion Decree 1972 was promulgated by the Government. Accord¬
ing to this decree, certain categories of business enterprises
were to be owned exclusively by Nigerians while the indigenous
equity participation in the remaining enterprises was fixed at
a minimum of 40 and 60% respectively. Alien entrepreneurs were
expected to sell their equities to meet the statutory require¬
ments. Anticipating the possible adverse effects of the result¬
ing capital outflow, the government laid down very stringent
conditions regarding the repatriation of the proceeds from the
sale of businesses (CBN, Report, 1973, p. 14). These would have
been sufficient to prevent an undesirable degree of capital
outflow. However, the use of devaluation to achieve the goals
stated in (c) and (d) is a welcome development since it reduces
reliance on direct controls which are inevitably inefficient.
As for explanation (b), there is little ground for argument since
it is a direct consequence of devaluation.
In sum, the decision to devalue the naira in 1973 on its own was
rational. But it is doubtful if it had the intended effect. In
the following table, oil transactions have been excluded from the
balance of payments statistics on the ground that the devaluation
did not affect them as they were denominated in a foreign curr¬
ency .
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1971 340.4 1028.5 -688.1 -830.0
1972 258.0 944.9 -686.9 -935.0
1973 384.9 1183.8 -798.9 -1286.1
1974 429.1 1684.9 -1255.8 -1994.6
1975 362.4 3603.5 -3241 .1 -4026.4
1976 429.5 5053.5 -4624.0 -5538.8
SOURCE : CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA ANNUAL REPORT 1973 - 78
The table shows that the value of non-oil export rose in 1973
and 1974. But this increase cannot be attributed to the deval¬
uation. While the index of average weekly prices (c.i.f.) in
London of Nigeria's major agricultural export commodities (1960
= 100) rose from 91.8 in 1972 to 160.6 in 1973 and 227.2 in
1974, the index of output of agricultural export commodities
(1960 = 100) actually declined from 84.2 in 1972 to 68.8 in 1973
and rose slightly to 71.1 in 1974. As is clear from the table
above, the trade and current account deficits widened progress¬
ively over the years.
Two reasons may be adduced for the ineffectiveness of the 1973
devaluation. The low shortrun elasticity of the supply coupled
with an allegedly equally low price elasticity of the demand for
the country's non-oil export commodities played an important role
in the failure of export volume to expand in response to the
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devaluation. Secondly, it was shown in Ch. 2 that the govern¬
ment pursued an expansionary policy during the period in question.
Furthermore, the general increases in wages and salaries were
effected during the same period. This, of course, serves to
illustrate the point that devaluation alone cannot solve a
country's balance of payments problems; it needs to be supp¬
orted by other policies.
4.3.1 THE CASE FOR AN APPROPRIATE EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
The discussion above relates to two specific instances in which
the authorities contemplated devaluation as a balance of pay¬
ments measure. The following paragraphs deal with the use of
exchange rate policy in a more general context.
In many developing countries outside Latin American, there is a
marked reluctance on the part of the authorities to use currency
depreciation, especially in its starkest form of devaluation,
as a means of strengthening the balance of payments (Bird, 1983,
p. 461). Nigeria is not an exception to this general rule.
Since a domestic currency was introduced in 1959, there has been
only one case of devaluation which has already been considered.
This was in spite of the apparent 'fundamental disequilibrium' in
the balance of payments over a long period of time as noted
earlier in the chapter. Moreover, the devaluation was triggered
by that of the major reserve currency ^ the US dollar - which
was followed by the devaluation of sixty-^four other currencies
while some important currencies (Italian lira and the Japanese
yen along with the pound sterling, Canadian dollar, the Irish
pound and the Swiss franc which were already floating) were
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floated. The effective rate of devaluation was therefore sub¬
stantially less than the nominal rate of 10%. Since then, no
attempt has been made to devalue the naira on the ground that a
devaluation would compound the country's economic problems.
The examination of the validity of this argument is the purpose
of the rest of the section.
There are some indications that the naira is effectively over¬
valued. This proposition will be illustrated with the following
simple model. Assume country A is small in the sense that it
cannot influence its terms of trade. Assume further that :
it is initially in full equilibrium at a fixed exchange rate;
the world inflation rate is zero; and the country starts to
expand the domestic component of the monetary base at a given
rate. Then, given full convertibility, an excess supply of the
domestic currency will develop i.e. domestic residents trade
excess domestic money for foreign goods and assets. Under these
conditions and constant demand for money, a persistent balance
deficit.
of payments will ensue with continuous domestic credit creation.
The extent to which this situation can continue will depend on
the level of foreign reserves and how far the authorities are
prepared to allow the depletion of reserves. Sooner or later,
the government is compelled to introduce foreign exchange controls.
In order to make controls effective, A may then centralize its
reserves with an official agency.
This scenario is typical of developing economies. As Krueger
(1982, p. 1060) has pointed out;
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'Exchange control has been a frequently-used device
in developing countries to contain the excess demand
for foreign exchange. In general, governments
adopting exchange controls have devised rationing
rules by which to allocate scarce foreign exchange
among potential claimants. The domestic monetary
authority, while still creating credit, imposes
exchange control to ration the limited supply of
foreign exchange, requiring that all foreign ex¬
change receipts be surrendered to the government.
To allocate the foreign exchange thereby attained
there are two possibilities: (1) the government
auctions off the foreign exchange receipts to the
highest bidders; or (2) the government adopts a
rationing (licensing) device to allocate scarce
foreign exchange reserves'.
It thus follows that the existence of increasingly tight foreign
exchange controls as existed in Nigeria suggests that the dom¬
estic currency is overvalued. The causes of the overvaluation
of the currency include the unprecedented high rates of domestic
monetary expansion and inflation in the 1970's. In 1977, 1978
and 1979 the annual rate of inflation in Nigeria averaged 19.3,
18.7 and 11.1% respectively. The corresponding rates in indu¬
strial countries (as defined in IFS) which were the country's
principal trading partners were 8.4, 7.2 and 9.1%. Nigeria's
balance of payments deficit widened from N527.2 m in 1977 to
N1293.6 m in 1978. The domestic budget deficit also rose from
M781.3 m in 1977 to N2290.7 m in 1978. Yet, the naira apprec¬
iated in terms of the US dollar (see App. Table 6.3) and other
major currencies during this time. The external value of the
naira therefore appeared to be negatively related to reserve
movement, the rate of inflation and the domestic budget deficit.
Another sign of the overvaluation of the naira is the widening
gap (in relative terms) between the official and the free market
rate as measured, for example, by the rates prevailing outside
the legal framework. Two factors enabled the government to
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maintain the external value of the currency at artificially high
levels while postponing a balance of payments crisis to the early
1980's. These were erratic movement of the earnings from oil
and stringent exchange controls.
The overvaluation of the naira is not in doubt; what is dis¬
putable is the extent of the overvaluation. But that issue is
not of immediate importance here. The main concern is why
the currency was allowed to be overvalued. The usual argument
against devaluation as a balance of payments policy in Nigeria
is that a depreciating naira would not be in the interest of
the economy because of the following considerations. First,
petroleum, the main export item, is not affected by a deval¬
uation. This is because its price is denominated in a foreign
currency. Furthermore, the prevailing institutional arrange¬
ments in respect of the other significant export commodities
which are primary agricultural products may make devaluation
inappropriate. It will be recalled that devaluation exerts
a favourable impact on exports through price incentives which
eventually lead to a higher level of exports. But the market¬
ing of many primary products in the world market is subject to
international commodity agreements which discourage signatories
from enlarging their shares through price competition (Bird,
1983, p. 464). For these reasons, it is argued, a devaluation
is unlikely to have a significant favourable impact on exports.
Second, import prices in domestic currency will rise following
a devaluation. This will tend to exert some upward pressure
on the price level which is against the government's objective
of price stability. Inflation may result from higher import
prices or excess wage claims which may eventually lead to a
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devaluation-inflation spiral (Ozumba, 1978, p. 14). Also, as
producer goods account for over half of total import, another
important objective of policy-economic growth - may be adversely
affected. Moreover, import substitutes have a high import con¬
tent as explained earlier : manufacturers import almost all their
capital goods; many use mainly imported raw materials; while
others hire foreign experts or make use of foreign loans (Mawuli,
1975, p. 69). These factors may operate in a way that the total
value of import in domestic currency rises with a devaluation.
Finally, as seen in section 3.1, for devaluation to have its
maximum potential effect on the balance of payments, it may be
necessary to take supportive deflationary fiscal and monetary
measures. But these may not be suitable for an economy with
considerable unemployment and a lower than desired rate of
economic growth.
In the shortrun, then, a devaluation is an ineffective policy in
Nigeria. However, the argument is incomplete in at least two
respects. In the first instance, it concentrates on the short-
run and fails to pay adequate attention to longer-run consider¬
ations. Secondly, it ignores the fact that devaluation impinges
on other objectives of economic policy in addition to the bal¬
ance of payments.
It was explained in Ch. 2 that the emergence of oil as a prin¬
cipal foreign exchange earner is a recent phenomenon. Before
the emergence of oil Nigeria depended on other primary, mainly
agricultural products. Prominent among them were cocoa, ground¬
nut, oil palm produce, cotton and rubber. Some of these crops
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have been studied and some estimates of supply elasticities
(9)
are available although the estimates are contradictory
As in the case of many primary products, the supply elasticities
of these crops are generally below unity. However, they are
significantly above zero while some have elasticities not far
b c<~
from unity (e.g. palm oil and tocabbo) and that of rubber is far
in excess of unity (1.75). The influence of the marketing
arrangement must also be taken into consideration : the boards
paid producers prices which were well below the prevailing world
ones. After reviewing the evidence on supply response, Rwegasira
(1984) concludes that
'In brief, the main findings from the studies in sub-
Saharan Africa indicate that, in a good number of cases,
own-price elasticities are positive and significant even
in the shortrun, albeit not large; that, in general,
price elasticities over a long period tend to be larger
than those in the shortrun; and that, furthermore, the
production of some crops can rise without an equivalent
fall in those grown for food. The conclusion to be
derived from the above survey is simply that exchange-
rate changes whose price effects are successfully passed
on to producers can help increase the output of individual
crops and minerals'
(P- 457)
From this review it is clear that one cannot justifiably assume
that on balance a devaluation would leave exports unaffected.
It was earlier stated that the 1973 devaluation did not have
the expected effect on exports. However, this is not inconsist¬
ent with the points just made. This is because the devalu¬
ation in 1973 was not accompanied by appropriate policies.
Although the naira was devalued by the full extent of the dollar
devaluation by the end of 1974 the naira had appreciated consid¬
erably vis-a-vis the dollar as the authorities ceased to observe
any margin that year. It was also in 1974 that the country
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witnessed a massive growth in export earnings and government
revenue. This removed the need for financial discipline and,
as shown in Ch. 2, government expenditure was allowed to rise
to an unmanageable proportion. Furthermore, the largest wage
claims in the country were settled early in 1975 - only two
years after the devaluation. All these had the effect of
robbing the 1973 devaluation of its potential effect.
If devaluation could in fact stimulate export it would be contri¬
buting positively to another objective of economic policy in
Nigeria. It would create favourable conditions for economic
diversification (a declared objective) by encouraging the dev¬
elopment of alternative export commodities besides oil as well
as domestic import substitutes.
Given that a currency is overvalued, the reduction in the degree
of overvaluation through devaluation or depreciation is likely
to have a salutory effect on resource allocation. Currency over¬
valuation tends to understate import relative to export prices.
Imports are made cheaper in domestic currency than their true
relative prices while domestic goods are correspondingly over¬
priced. By bringing the exchange rate closer to its true value,
the inefficiency generated by the distortion of relative prices
may be reduced. For instance, as imported raw materials costs
rise as a result of a devaluation, domestic producers of such
commodities which can be grown locally (e.g. wheat and coffee
in Nigeria) are given an incentive to raise their output.
Furthermore, a more appropriate exchange rate policy would tend
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to reduce the need for exchange controls. It has already
been stated that the external value of the naira so far has been
maintained at an unnaturally high level through reserve depl¬
etion and stiff foreign exchange controls which interfere con¬
siderably with the utility-maximizing behaviour of economic
units.
Finally, in addition to adopting a policy which leads to the
exchange rate getting out of line with its 'true' or free market
values, the Central Bank uses an inconsistent formula for deriv¬
ing the exchange rate of the naira. It is generally true that
the construction of an index number raises the problem of weight¬
ing. In the present case, it appears that something is fund¬
amentally wrong with the weighting of the currencies used in
determining the exchange rate of the naira. The exact weights
are not made public but it is known that the US$ is given a
weight which is apparently out of proportion to its relative
(10)importance .
4.3.2 POSTSCRIPT ON EXCHANGE RATE POLICY :
THE CHOICE BETWEEN DEVALUATION AND OTHER POLICIES
Exchange controls have a number of advantages over devaluation
and are more widely used in developing countries. The principal
merit of exchange controls is that they 'exert a prompt, direct
and predictable effect on imports; they do not rely on the inter¬
mediation of a price change and therefore on the size of price
elasticities to improve the balance of payments' (Bird, 1983, p.
476). Also, exchange controls theoretically are more flexible
than devaluation. Controls can be used to restrict imports
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more selectively than other methods like devaluation which operate
through the market mechanism. In Nigeria, as seen previously,
controls have been used to discourage the importation of comm¬
odities which the authorities regarded as 'luxuries' while
priority is accorded to those deemed as 'essentials' or 'necess¬
ities'. Consumer goods in general have also been discriminated
against in favour of producer goods. Furthermore, controls
can be used to minimize their undesirable effects on a designated
income group unlike devaluation which indifferently affects all
income groups. Finally, devaluation relies on deflating aggre¬
gate demand. But since controls affect imports directly, they
do not necessarily lead to a decline in real income.
Devaluation, on its part, has an edge over exchange controls in
some respects. Controls require some form of administration
such as planning and implementation. The physical administrat¬
ive cost could be high. Moreover, as they interfere with
consumer behaviour there is no guarantee that they will be
effective (see section 4.2). The existence of controls implies
an excess demand for the commodities in question. Unless coupon-
book rationing is adopted, importers and traders will earn an
economic rent which is financed by consumers as they bid up the
available supply. If the controls are accompanied by an effect¬
ive ceiling and the domestic currency is overvalued (which is
almost almost certain to be the cause of the imposition of controls
in the first instance) smuggling of the affected goods will be
encouraged. Furthermore, as Killick (1978) has argued, the
system of exchange controls nurtures malpractices such as corrup¬
tion and the declaration of false information on the quest for
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larger allocations of foreign exchange.
Finally, a basic weakness of controls is that they are not long-
term solutions to a problem of disequilibrium. This is because
they suppress rather than solve the problem. As Mawuli (1975,
p. 66) has put it
'Import licensing and exchange controls cannot be
relied on to solve a balance of payments problem
permanently. At best, they are stop-go measures
that can create an artificial balance which will
require increasingly extensive controls until some
better solution to the problem is found'
Even in the shortrun it is by no means clear that controls would
improve the balance of payments (as distinct from the balance
of trade). In the case of Turkey, Krueger (1975) has found
that the balance of payments deteriorated after controls were
imposed. Yet, experience has shown that developing countries
with substantial exchange controls have found it difficult to
dismantle them. Thus the distortion in relative prices caused
by currency overvaluation (for which the controls are designed
to defend) persists for lengthy periods. This has the effect
of denying the country concerned access to 'soft loans' such as
provided by the IMF. This institution has developed a policy of
requiring devaluation as a precondition for a loan. Many coun¬
tries which require such loans (Nigeria inclusive) are, of
course, reluctant to meet the condition,
4.4 NIGERIA'S EXTERNAL RESERVE POLICY
In Ch. 3 it was shown that the authorities regarded the equiv¬
alent of two months' import bill as the minimum tolerable level
of foreign exchange reserves. While that level provides the
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lower limit of reserves the policy is silent on what action
should be taken whenever the level of reserves is above the
limit. From all available evidence, the authorities have no
preference for any specific level of reserves. Instead, the
implication that can be drawn from official statements and
policy actions fs the maximization of the net inflow of reserves.
But this does not provide any clear working guidelines and,
in any event, reserve flow is largely out of its control except
as far as imports are concerned.
The nearest thing to a reserve policy is the use since 1971 of
an annual foreign exchange budget to spend in the year in question
to determine
and^how far trade liberalization can be carried out. The weak¬
ness of this ad hoc measure became clear in 1974 when net reserve
inflow reached an unprecedented level. Apparently, the author¬
ities did not know how to manage that level of reserves and
their case was not served by the instability of exchange rates
that started as far back as 1971. The government was there¬
fore compelled to set up an 'Investment Management Committee'
in mid-1975. The Committee was charged with advising the auth¬
orities on how best to deploy the foreign assets. Its recomm¬
endations were not made public so it is not possible to say
whether or not they were accepted. But the severe balance of payments
problems that began in 1978 indicate that an optimal rate of
depletion of the reserves was not followed. The absence of a
long term reserve policy has been criticised by Onoh (1983, pp.
80 - 81) who argues that
'There is no external target for the country and there
are no plans for realizing any reserve target. External
reserve levels realize themselves somewhat accidentally,
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as was the case in 1974, rather than through deliberate
policy. There are no plans on how best to invest
external reserves more productively. Instead of co¬
ordinated reserve plans Nigeria engages in the annual
review of the balance of payments position to deter¬
mine whether to liberalize or restrict imports and
whether to increase or reduce travelling allowances,
etc. If the external reserve level of Nigeria
shows signs of strain, Nigerian authorities embark
on panic monetary, fiscal and other economic inter¬
vention measures in an effort to correct the situation
and stabilize reserve levels. Monetary and fiscal
policies are juggled in the hope of correcting the
situation but quite often the unco-ordinated measures
only succeed in aggravating the situation'
The use of annual review of the balance of payments position
to determine the policies to be taken has disadvantages.
Expectations may not be realized and the measures which were
originally considered appropriate may turn out to have undes¬
irable effects. Secondly, it fails to realize that the pre¬
vailing conditions are the outcome of past policies, i.e.
it does not pay sufficient attention to the lag in policy. As
a result, the measures may not be allowed to have their intended
effect as happened in 1979 and 1980 when the unexpected improve¬
ment in exchange!' earnings led to the removal of controls and
other expansionary measures such as the doubling of the minimum
wage. Finally, it introduces a great deal of uncertainty into
the economy. Consumers and producers are uncertain of what
measures will be taken - which commodities will be taxed and by
how mcuh and what incentive schemes will be removed or introduced.
This may lead to much speculation which may not further the gov¬
ernment's objectives of economic policy. As a result of all
this, it is concluded that a stable, long-term policy would be
preferable to the present system..
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5. CONCLUSION
Nigeria has had a chronic balance of payments problem over the
period stretching from the 1950's to the early 1980's. The
disequilibrium was temporarily corrected by the petroleum boom
of 1973 - 75 and 1979 - 80. The main weapons used for adjust¬
ing the balance of payments were direct and fiscal controls on
imports and foreign exchange transactions. In order to appraise
these measures, it was found necessary to apply some yardsticks
against which to judge them. Using the monetary approach to the
balance of payments, the inability of the authorities to elimin¬
ate the deficit was attributed to their failure to control the
rate of domestic credit creation which had already been analysed
in Ch. 4. But the monetary approach is limited in its appli¬
cation to Nigeria by certain factors : it neglects the goods
and financial markets which also influence the balance of pay¬
ments and concentrates on the money market; one of its crucial
assumptions - a stable demand for money function - is unfulfilled
in Nigeria (from Ch. 3); and it assumes that there are no
structural rigidities in the economy which is contrary to what
obtains in Nigeria and most other developing countries. As a
result, it was found necessary to use an alternative to the
monetary approach which is the absorption approach which was
the mainstream balance of payments theory during much of the
review period. It was found that the direct and fiscal controls
were not as effective as the authorities would have desired
because of many factors. The demand for imports had a low
price elasticity and this tended to lower the effectiveness of
quantitative controls such as tariffs. Direct controls such
as quotas, loans and import licensing could not be effectively
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enforced. But the fundamental defect of these measures is that
they cannot produce a lasting effect on the balance of payments.
A potentially more effective weapon, devaluation was not actively
used. The currency was evidently overvalued but it was de¬
valued only once and by only 10%. The year 1973 marked the
beginning of the inflow of foreign exchange on a scale previously
unknown and it was a time when the currency was allowed to app¬
reciate. However, from 1977 when the need for depreciating
the naira arose, it continued to appreciate. The overvaluation
of a currency, it was seen, imposes a cost on the economy. This
cost has many elements. The most obvious is the cost of admini¬
stering the exchange controls that are necessary to maintain
the value of the currency at its artificially high levels.
Others are the adverse effects of these controls on the economy.
It was seen that the non-use of the devaluation weapon was due
to the view that exports would be largely unaffected while import
prices would rise. The review of available evidence showed
that the notion that devaluation would not affect exports is
disputable while the effect on imports (by raising their rel¬
ative prices closer to their true values) could be beneficial.
Other considerations - mainly long-term in nature - indicated
that devaluation could be a viable alternative to exchange
controls.
The exercise has some policy implications. First is the iden¬
tification of the fundamental source of the balance of payments
problems which is excessive growth of aggregate demand. Aggreg-
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age demand is in turn determined by the rate of domestic credit
creation which is itself a function of government fiscal activ¬
ities (Chs. 2 and 4). A necessary condition for restoring
equilibrium in the balance of payments then is the control of
the fiscal deficit in particular and government expenditure
(including incomes policy) in general.
A second implication is the need to try market-related measures
and to de-emphasize fiscal and direct measures. But the use
of policies which work through the price mechanism (principally
devaluation) should be accompanied by appropriate fiscal and
monetary policies. This proviso is important because, given
the rate of devaluation, there exists a rate of expansion of
the domestic component of the monetary base which will wipe
out any shortrun balance of payments effects of devaluation.
This is also true of expansionary fiscal policy which ultimately
is reflected in domestic credit creation.
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FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER 6
1. As in Chs. 2 and 3, the additive and multiplicative forms
of eqn (1) were estimated but in each case the performance
of the latter was superior to that of the former. As
the multiplicative version has the further advantage of
yielding elasticities directly, only the loglinear est¬
imates are reported.
2. Controls affect the quality of import data in two ways.
(1) Measured imports do not reflect the intensity of
demand which is repressed. (2) Stiff import controls
tend to encourage illegal activities (e.g. smuggling)
which are, by definition, unrecorded. Separate demand
functions were estimated for each single-digit SITC
Commodity Sections. Section 7 (Machinery and Transport
Equipment) turned out to have the best fit. As commod¬
ities in that section are relatively bulkier and there¬
fore more difficult to smuggle than commodities in
other sections and as section 7 commodities have been
subject to less stringent import control than others,
the results for the different sections are consistent
with the hypothesis of an incorrectly measured dependent
variable.
3. This has been the experience of the country since 1978.
See CBN, Report, 1981, p. 19
4. On the monetary approach to the balance of payments, see
Johnson (1976a), Zecher (1976), Mussa (1976) and criticisms
by Magee (1976) and Currie (1976).
5. This is a point that is emphasized by Falegan (1978),
p. 16.
6. Consider the following statement by the Central Bank in 1981:
As in the previous few years, manufacturing production
was inhibited by the shortage of raw materials, disrup¬
tion of electricity supply and increased smuggling.
In particular, smuggling effectively hampered the
ability of the various industries to compete in the
domestic market, to the extent that some firms
had to reduce their levels of production and lay
off workers'
(Annual Report, 1981, p. 19). In 1978, it had stated:
'In order to encourage local production, several
imported items were banned'
(Annual Report, 1978, p, 6),
7. 'The first is that without the import duty relief his
costs would be such that his products could not compete
with imported equivalents, or he could not develop an
adequate market in the country. The second is that
the rate of duty on his imported materials is higher
than the rate of duty on the imported finished goods
produced with the same materials. And thirdly, he
- 368 -
must satisfy that the goods to be imported are capital
goods or parts thereof'
(Phillips, 1967, p. 318),
8. Examples of such studies include Heller and Kauffman (1963),
Ross and Christensen (1959) and Joel (1971).
9. Examples of price elasticity estimates include:
(i) Cotton : 0.23 to 0.38 (Oni, 1969a); 0.67 (Diejo-
maoh, 1972): (ii) Groundnuts : 0.24 to 0.79(01ayide,
1972); (iii) Cocoa : 0.45 to 0.80 (Behrman, 1968); Palm
kernels : 0.22 to 0.28 (Oni, 1969b); 0.25 (Diejomaoh,
1972). Palm oil : 0.42 - 0.70 (Oni, 1969b); 0.41
(Helleiner, 1966); 0.81 (Diejomaoh, 1972). Tobacco :
0.60 to 0.82 (Adesimi, 1970). Rubber : 0.04 to 1.75
(Olayemi and Olayide, 1975).
10. The following exchange rates were reported in West Africa
(1984):
Date: 17 October 1984
Sterling/dollar rate : £l = $1.2063
Central Bank of Nigeria quoted rate : Ml = $1.3029
Rate implied by cross rate : £1 = NO.9259
Rate actually quoted by the Central Bank : £1 = N1.0667
The inconsistency in these rates is self-evident.
14
/} _ (p • EXPORT OF HA3QR COMMODITIES AS 7. OF THE TOTAL
Year Cocoa Ground| Palm Cot¬ Rub¬ Crude|
nuts | oil ton ber oil |
1960 21.7 16.6 | 23.6 3.7 8.4 2.6 |
1961 19.4 21.4 | 19.1 6.4 6.3 6.6 |
1962 19.8 22.9 | 15.3 3.5 6.7 10.2 |
1963 17.1 22.7 | 16.0 5.0 6.2 10.7 |
1964 18.7 19.8 | 14.8 2.9 5.6 15.0 |
1965 15.8 17.8 | 14.9 1.2 4.1 25.4 |
1966 9.9 19.4 | 11.8 1.2 4.0 32.3 |
1967 22.4 18.7 | 3.7 1.7 2.6 29.7 |
1968 27. 1 24.8 | 4.8 1.6 3.0 17.5 |
1969 19.2 16.2 | 3.2 1 .1 3.0 41.2 |
1970 16.8 7.5 | 2.7 1.5 2.0 57.6 |
1971 12.0 3.4 | 2.2 0.9 0.9 73.6 |
1972 7.8 2.5 | 1 . 1 0. 1 0.5 82.0 |
1973 5.8 3.0 | 0.8 0.2 0.9 83.1 |
1974 3.2 0.4 | 0.7 0.0 0.2 92.6 |
1975 4.2 0.0 | 0.4 0.0 0. 1 92.7 |
1976 3.6 0.1 | 0.4 0.0 0.2 93.7 |
1977 4.9 0.0 | 0.4 0.0 0. 1 92.7 |
1978 6.7 0.0 | 0.2 0.1 0.2 89.1 |
1979 4.4 0.0 | 0.1 0.0 0. 1 93.8 |
1980 2.4 0.0 | 0.1 0.0 0.0 96.1 |
1981 0.9 0.0 | 0.1 0.0 0.0 98.2 |
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7.0 53.0 | 60.0 30.0 10.0 | 40.0 _ 100 I
10.0 46.0 | 56.0 32.0 11.0 | 43.0 1.0 100 I
8.7 44.8 | 53.5 22.8 22.0 | 44.8 1.7 100 I
7.2 33.3 | 40.5 31 .0 27.0 | 58.0 1.5 100 I
5.8 23.0 | 28.8 37.7 31.0 | 68.7 2.5 100 I
7.8 21.4 | 19.2 37.2 33.0 | 70.2 0.6 100 I
8.4 20.1 | 28.5 48.2 23.2 | 71.4 0.1 100 I
8.9 30.7 | 39.6 33.5 26.8 | 60.3 0.1 100 I
12.2 32.2 | 44.4 31 . 1 24.4 | 55.5 0.1 100 I
Source : Central Bank of Nigeria, qftAnnual Reports, 1965-81;
Aboyade (1966), Table 1, p.8, for 1950 and 1960.
-Jfo&LS. A-(o-3 EXCHANGE RATE OF THE N AIR A AGAINST S AND SDR
A P&A OF <$, f>-£A P£A\ SJDR PER |
rj~rv\ A rvA-iRA ArP) l p. A
^ | rJA-i |
A V£M ■ E-rxJlD A | £ AJD |
1955 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 I 1.4000 I
1956 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 | 1.4000 I
1957 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 | 1.4000 |
1958 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 | 1.4000 |
1959 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 | 1.4000 |
1960 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 | 1.4000 |
1961 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 | 1.4000 I
1962 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 I 1.4000 |
1963 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 | 1.4000 |
1964 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 | 1.4000 |
1965 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 | 1.4000 |
1966 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 | 1.4000 |
1967 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 | 1.4000 |
1968 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 | 1.4000 |
1969 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 I 1.4000 I
1970 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000 I 1.4000 I
1971 1.4030 1.5200 1.3989 I 1.4000 I
1972 1.5200 1.5200 1.4000 I 1.4000 I
1973 1.5200 1.5200 1.2750 I 1.2600 I
1974 1.5904 1.6228 1.3224 | 1.3254 |
1975 1.6248 1 .5957 1.3382 | 1.3361 |
1976 1 .5959 1 .5853 1.3823 | 1.3645 |
1977 1 .5514 1.5352 1.3288 | 1.2638 I
1978 1 .5745 1.5444 1.2576 I 1.1855 I
1979 1 .6591 1.7841 1.2842 I 1.3543 I
1980 1.8297 1 .8367 1.4058 | 1.4401 I
1981 1 .6292 1.5701 1.3817 | 1.3489 |
1982 1.4854 1.4920 1.3455 | 1.3525 |
. I





As set out in the introductory chapter, the principal aim of
the study was to evaluate macroeconomic policy in Nigeria over
the period 1960 - 81. Results of the analysis show that the
performance of policy has been less than successful. Neither
the balance of payments nor the rate of inflation appeared to
have been positively influenced by policy. Furthermore, the
rate of growth of output was determined more by external factors
than domestic policy. Many factors contributed to the unsat¬
isfactory performance of macroeconomic policy. By far the most
important of these was the Federal Government fiscal operations
coupled with the improper use of some weapons of control. Others
include:
(1) the absence of a consistent macroeconomic policy, and
(2) the constraints imposed by the structure of the economy.
These points are explained in turn.
7.1 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL ACTIVITIES AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY
The general theme of the study is that most macroeconomic problems
which beset the Nigerian economy during the review period had
their root in the fiscal activities of the Federal Government and
its policies. First, the growth of expenditure was allowed
to run out of control (Ch. 2). Then, the public debt was
monetized (Ch. 4). The latter ensured that domestic credit
creation was closely linked to the public sector borrowing
requirements which, given the former, led to excessive credit
expansion.
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The monetization of the public debt, of course, stemmed from the
interest rate policy of the Government. It was shown in Ch. 4
that the hallmark of the country's interest rate policy was the
fixing of various interest rates at apparently sub-equilibrium
levels. The reasons given for the low interest rate structure
were the desire to keep down the cost of government borrowing and
to stimulate investment. The explanations were shown to be
untenable because, among other things, (i) when the Government
did not need to borrow (roughly from 1972) and was indeed a net
creditor to the banking system, interest rates were not de¬
regulated. Instead, they were revised downward in 1975: the
minimum lending rate from 4^ to 3$%; the Treasury Bill issue rate
from 4 to 2|%; and commercial bank lending rates from a range
of 7 - 12 to 6 - 9% p.a. Yet, the annual rate of inflation for
the year was 33.7%. All interest rates in the economy were there¬
fore below the inflation rate as they were during most of the
review period. (ii) The ability of low interest rates to stimul¬
ate investment is questionable.
The consequences of administering interest rates are clear:
the effectiveness of monetary policy is reduced. Interest rates
can no longer act as indicator or target of monetary policy.
Of greater significance is the fact that as the authorities were
not prepared to let interest rates rise to the level that would
make the holding of government securities attractive to the
public, it was difficult to find willing buyers of the assets.
The Central Bank then found itself the major purchaser of what
it set out originally to sell. Given this monetization of the
public debt, government expenditure had the effect of expanding
the domestic component of the monetary base which the Central
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Bank could therefore not control effectively. A direct conse¬
quence of increasing government expenditure then was the expan¬
sion of the money stock. By raising aggregate demand, this con¬
tributed to the inflationary process and the balance of payments
difficulty, hence the conclusion in Chs. 5 and 6 that a solution
to these problems would require the control of government expen¬
diture in general and the fiscal deficit in particular.
When interest rates are pegged, the money stock is determined
endogenously, the most important factors being the fiscal deficit
and reserve flows which can no longer be sterilized. Therefore,
had the government followed a more flexible interest rate policy,
the scope for monetary policy would have been wider as some
hitherto inapplicable weapons (e.g. open market operations)
become feasible, thus enabling the monetary authorities to
exercise greater control over the money stock.
Interest rate policy was not the only weapon which was misapplied.
The case for the inappropriateness of the government's exchange
rate policy was argued in Ch. 6. The main weakness of the policy
was the apparent overvaluation of the currency with inefficient
direct fiscal measures being used to prop up its value at above-
equilibrium levels. But such policies were doomed to fail as
they did; such measures did not go to the root of the problem
which was a fundamental disequilibrium in the balance of payments
and so could not find lasting solutions. The government thus
failed to use the opportunity of the Mid-1970's (when it accumul¬
ated a historically high level of foreign exchange reserves) to
attempt a trade and exchange liberalization which would have
reduced the level of control-induced inefficiency in the economy.
- 372 -
7.2 ABSENCE OF AN ARTICULATED MACROECONOMIC STRATEGY
Another major weakness of macroeconomic policy in Nigeria is that
the government did not appear to have a coherent policy. Instead,
it seemed to have adopted an ad hoc attitude to economic policy
by tackling problems as they arose without any clear long-term
plan or guiding principles. This can be illustrated best by
drawing an analogy between the periods 1948 - 54 and 1973 - 76.
During both periods, the resources available to the government
increased beyond any previous realistic expectations. In both
periods, too, the source of the unprecedented growth was the export
sector. Therefore, there was (relatively speaking) a massive
net inflow of foreign exchange assets. But here the similarities
end. In the former case, the export sector was indigenous;
in the latter it was largely foreign-owned and controlled. In
the one case (1948 -54) foreign exchange was accumulated rather
than spent. Foreign reserves were invested in overseas assets
which yielded interest in addition to the principal thus increas¬
ing the value of the public saving. In subsequent years, when
the market for the country's export commodities became depressed,
the government fell back on its accumulated external reserves.
Although the original objective of using the accumulated surpluses
of the marketing boards to stabilize the prices received by the
producers was eventually abandoned, the result nevertheless was
the availability of resources in difficult times.
In the other case, the position was radically different. As
more resources became available, planned expenditures were pro¬
gressively revised upward while increasingly more ambitious
projects, the economic justification of which was dubious, were
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undertaken as shown in Ch. 2. The size of the public sector
investment programmes under the Second National Development Plan
1970 - 74, was doubled as a result of the unexpected improvement
in the Government's financial position; the size of public sector
commitment under the Third Plan 1975 - 80 was over seventeen times
that of the Second Plan and yet the two were separated by a space
of only five years. But as shown in Ch. 2these expectations
proved to be too optimistic and drastic, panic measures had to be
instituted from 1978. In other words, the Government failed to
provide for the rainy day as it did in the 1950's. The particular
case of the absence of an external reserve policy was demonstrated
in Ch. 6.
Some consequences of the absence of a consistent macroeconomic
strategy were pointed out in the text, especially in Chs. 2 and
6. They include the following. When revenue is spent as it
is earned under the guise of the drive toward accelerated economic
growth; (i) there is little time for adequate feasibility studies
of the projects concerned; as a result, some unviable projects
are started and others which are white elephants (and would not
have been contemplated upon in normal times) are also executed;
(ii) the increase in government resources may be temporary, thus
resulting in projects being abandoned for insufficiency of
resources; and (iii) the recurrent component of public outlays
which is more difficult to reduce that") the capital component is
given a boost. By flushing external reserves down the import
drain as soon as they were earned, the government raised the flow
of imports above sustainable levels. The link between import
and export was of course due largely to the use of an annual
foreign exchange budget by the government.
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7.3 STRUCTURAL AND OTHER CONSTRAINTS
Although the authorities contributed considerably to the relative
ineffectiveness of macroeconomic policy as seen above, some
circumstances were beyond their control. But even here they
are partly to blame: an adequate allowance was not made for the
limitations of policy imposed by external factors. The con¬
straints are those created by the structure of the economy and
the financial system as discussed at length in
Chapter four. Specific examples may help to clarify the point.
It was explained that, as in most developing countries, a capital
goods industry is virtually non-existent which implies that these
goods have to be imported. Furthermore, the bulk of raw mater¬
ials is imported. Given a negligible short-run response of
agriculture, the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, an expansion¬
ary policy is unlikely in the short-run to lead to an increase
in employment and output. The effect of such a policy is more
likely to be split between a deterioration in the balance of
payments and a rise in the price level,the proportion being
determined by the initial level of foreign reserves and how far
the authorities are prepared to let it fall. Similarly, the
response of the level of activity in the petroleum sector (which
dominates the current account of the balance of payments, and
government revenue) to domestic policy is minimal. Finally,
given the low level of linkages between the various sectors of
the economy, the effect of government policy on one sector, say,
agriculture, is not easily transmitted to the rest of the economy.
What all this implies is that traditional cures to short-run
macroeconomic problems are not directly applicable in Nigeria.
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In particular, output is not an increasing function of government
expenditure.
A second structural limitation on policy concerns the financial
system. In Ch. 4 it was shown that the financial markets are
highly imperfect. They are fragmented and dominated by a few
commercial banks while some important institutions are either
absent or at very early stages of development (e.g. discount
houses and building societies). These imperfections led the
Government to regulate the stock exchange closely, thus contribut¬
ing to the imperfection. Consequently, these markets cannot
act as reliable guide for economic policy. The administration of
interest rates discussed above helps to increase the degree of
imperfection.
7.4 CLOSING REMARKS
The argument advanced in this thesis is that the ineffectiveness
of macroeconomic policy in Nigeria is attributable to excessive
growth of public expenditure, the monetization of the public
debt, and the structure of the economy. But the lion share of
the blame goes to the first two factors. Therefore, in order
to improve the performance of policy, it is necessary to (1) curb
the growth of government expenditure and (2) de-monetize the public
debt by giving the monetary authorities the power to determine
what proportions of the fiscal deficit should be financed by new
issues of money and by bonds.
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APPENDIX 1
THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY 1960 - 81
INTRODUCTION
This appendix is designed to describe some features of the
Nigerian economy which were used repeatedly in the text.
The emphasis is on the quality of the database and the stru¬
cture of the economy.
1. POPULATION
The true population of Nigeria is not known although censuses
have been held at different times in the past - in 1911, 1921,
1931, 1962, 1963 and 1973. The 1931 census, for example, put
the population at 20 m. But this was not a proper census.
Full enumeration was carried out in a highly restricted number
of places. The population estimates were based mainly on tax
records of adult males (Ekanem, 1972, p. 40). The 1952 - 53
census yielded an estimated population of 31.5 m. Again the
census was not properly conducted, being spread over four years
(1950 - 53). (Aluko, 1965, p. 376). The regional estimates
were therefore likely to contain some inaccuracies. To com¬
plicate matters further, individuals were suspicious of the
motives of the census. While some believed that the census
data were to be used as a means of collecting heavier taxes
and providing names for military service, others objected to
the counting of their wives and children for fear of famine, ill-
luck or other misfortune (Ekanem, 1972, pp. 41 - 42). The
results were therefore subject to underestimation.
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But in the 1960's, attitudes towards population underwent a
radical change as a result of the politicization of population
statistics from 1954. When federal government was established
in that year, population was made the basis of political repres¬
entation at the federal, regional and local government council
levels; social services, the location of key industries, the
allocation of federal revenues and the distribution of other
government amenities also came to be based on population.
These were the aspects that were stressed by politicians on
the campaign that preceded the 1962 census. As a result, indiv¬
iduals became overenthusiastic to be enumerated and made sure
they were counted at least once in their districts of origin
irrespective of their place of residence. As the actual count
took place between 13 and 27 May, there was sufficient opport¬
unity for double-counting. Furthermore, the Federal Census
Officer in his report on the census complained of inflation of
figures for certain parts of the country where increases of
100 - 120% over the 1953 figures were recorded (Nigeria, 1963).
When the provisional figures were released, it was clear that
the population of the North was lower than that of the East and
West combined. A supplementary count was then ordered which
resulted in the addition of 9 m to the figures for the North
(Ekanem, 1972, p. 44). Also, whole villages which had never
been counted before were 'discovered' while certain areas alleg¬
edly included their cattle population in their figures. (Kirk-
Green and Rimmer, Following the controversy that
ensued, the results were scrapped.
The results of the repeat exercise of 1963 were also greeted
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with a great deal of controversy. The total population was put
at 55.7 m. This gives an annual rate of growth between 1953
and 1963 of 6%. Either the former was underestimated or the
latter was overestimated.
A census held in November 1973 was cancelled because the nation
could not agree on the distribution of the population which was
put at slightly under 80 m. Thus, despite the doubts on the
1963 census data (the Eastern and Mid Western Regions rejected
them and the East even took the case to the Supreme Court but
lost because the latter argued it had no authority to entertain
the suit),they continued to be the latest available.
2. EMPLOYMENT
As stated in the text, the rate of employment is a foreign term
in Nigeria as the basic statistics do not exist.
3. OUTPUT
3.1 MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS
The problems of valuing output are well known and for a develop¬
ing economy such as Nigeria's, they assume an even greater dim¬
ension. The problem peculiar to the measurement of income in
developing countries are well documented in the literature (e.g.
Samuels (1963), esp. the article on Nigeria by Okigbo (1963);
also Prest and Stewart (1953) and Okigbo (1957)),
The major source of the specific problems of national income
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accounting in Nigeria is the quantitatively very significant
'Crops grown for domestic use' component (Berry and Liedholm,
1970, p. 81), sometimes called subsistence production which, by
definition, is not traded. Even though the relative import¬
ance of this sector has been declining, with the progressive
monetization of the national economy, it is still high and, in
any case, the rate of decline is not known.
With the exception of marketing board purchases (of export crops),
most estimates of agricultural production are based on an assumed
output per man. Clearly, this quantity is highly subjective
while the population itself is unknown.
Apart from the mining, financial and, to some extent, the manu¬
facturing sectors, the output of the other sectors is also
difficult to measure. The existence of a large informal sector
(defined in Ch. 4) renders the valuation of manufacturing output
more difficult than one would think.
Ultimately, the special problems of measuring the national income
of Nigeria reduce to the non-availability of relevant data.
Even where some data is available, it may not be reliable or
timely. This applies especially to official statistics. Many
factors contribute to this situation :
'Not only is false information gathered as a result of
misunderstandings, fear of tax authorities, uncertainty
about or dislike of government interference and the
desire to mislead competitors, but also information
may be carefully falsified as a result of official
corruption which is so incredibly common, official
negligence or simple inexperience of reporting officers'
(Eke, 1966, p. 337)
One may also add the desire to make data conform to expectations
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or theory in order to make it look respectable.
The foregoing discussion implies that the national income est¬
imates of Nigeria may be subject to a wide margin of error.
In particular, given the discussion of population statistics
above, the use of per capita income is highly questionable.
The first attempt at valuing the national income of Nigeria
was made by A.R. Prest and I.G. Stewart (Prest and Stewart,
1953). This covered the year 1950 - 51 undertaken by E.F.
Jackson and P.N.C. Okigbo (1962). The Federal Office of
Statistics has published regular annual national accounts stat¬
istics since 1958.
3.2 STRUCTURE OF OUTPUT
Despite the errors all the estimates of the GDP inevitably con¬
tain, there is little doubt that the Nigerian economy is pre¬
dominantly agricultural. The 1950 estimate by Prest and Stewart
shows that agriculture (defined to include Farm Crops (N591.8 m),
livestock products (N61 m), Forest Products (N149.8 m), and
Fishing (N12.6 m))contributed N815.2 m to the GDP of N1193.4 m.
The share of agriculture in total output was therefore slightly
over 68%. Subsequent estimates accorded agriculture that primary
of place, although its share in total product has been declining
continuously.
The contribution to the GDP of the three largest sectors of the
economy are set out in Table A-l. That of the manufacturing
sector is also included for the sake of comparison. The table
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shows that agriculture was not displaced until 1974 when its
share fell to 26.5% while that of the mining sector rose to
32.6% and that this situation persisted in some later years.
However, this impressive performance is due to some extent to
the rapid rise in price in the oil sector from 1973. Thus,
when the GDP is expressed in terms of 1973 factor cost, the
respective shares of agriculture and mining become 26.4% and
18.4%. The relative importance of these sectors warrant a
closer look at them.
3.2.1 AGRICULTURE
The second National Development Plan (1970 - 74) recognizes the
fact that 'agriculture is still the mainstay of the Nigerian
economy' (Nigeria, 1970, p. 103). Its overall importance in
the economy is greater than its share in the GDP would suggest.
In addition to providing the main food requirements of the
country and inputs for the other sectors, notably the industrial
sector (e.g. tobacco and cotton), it is the source of employment
for the bulk of the people. The proportion of the labour force
dependent on agriculture was put at over 80% in 1962 (Nigeria,
1962, p. ) and over 70% in 1970 (Nigeria, 1970, p. ) Also
taxes on agriculture constituted a significant fraction of gov¬
ernment revenue. Finally, agriculture provided the foreign
exchange earnings that helped the development of the economy
in the 1950's and 1960's. Before the advent of crude petroleum
as the major earner of foreign exchange in the early 1970's.
over 80% of Nigeria's exports consisted of agricultural products.
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Agricultural production in Nigeria, whether for exports or
domestic consumption, is organized on a small-holding, peasant
basis. Its chief characteristic is low output per man and
little monetary input. The subject is often discussed in
terms of production for export and for home use. Invariably,
attention is focused on the former category as 'nobody really
the
knows the size of /feubsistence output in Nigeria, whether in
absolute value in a particular year or its movement through
the years' (Aboyade, 1969, p. 140). Yet its share in total
output is probably in excess of 85% (Stewart, 1961, p. 19).
3.2.1.1 AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS
The fate of agricultural exports is depicted in Table# A—2—and
A— 4-(* Groundnuts and palm products exhibit the most dramatic
changes. Until 1972, the country was the leading producer in
Africa and the largest exporter in the world of groundnut.
Production has been hampered by such factors as virus diseases,
pest invasion, drought, smuggling and competition from other
crops. Export has been suspended since 1975.
Growing domestic consumption and failing output are largely to
blame for the decline of palm oil products. Export of palm
oil has been banned since 1978 because of shortages at home.
Figures in the table after that date refer to palm kernels.
Cocoa is the only agricultural product that has no firm domestic
market and this partly accounts for its survival,
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TABLE A-2 : EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, '000 TONNES
COMMODITY 1950 1960 1968 1974 1980
GROUNDNUTS 421 379 918 114 -
COCOA 100 154 206 179 167
OIL PALM PRODUCTS 583 601 162 18.4 49.6
BENISEED 14 27 14 0.3 -
COTTON 13 27 13 - 2.4
RUBBER 14 57 52 3.3 31
TOTAL AGRICULTURE
EXPORT AS % OF TOTAL
88.3 82. 1 62.4 4.7 2.4
SOURCE : CBN, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW; ANNUA REPORTS
3.2.1.2 AGRICULTURE AND GOVERNMENT REVENUE
Agricultural production for export was an important source of
revenue for the government, especially in the years 1950 - 62.
The government obtained revenue from this source in two ways :
direct taxation of the commodities and the pricing policy of
the commodity , marketing boards which were set up originally
as a means of controlling the marketing of agricultural exports.
The boards, however, adopted the policy of keeping the prices
they paid to the producers below the world market prices. The
surpluses generated in this way initially were intended for
stabilizing producer prices in the facing of fluctuating world
prices, thus insulating the producers from the direct effects
of changes in world prices. As a proportion of world prices,
producer prices ranged from 15.8% for cotton in 1950 to 87%
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for palm oil in 1954 between 1950 and 1961 (Onitiri and Olatun-
bosun, 1974, p. 182). In time the original objective was aban¬
doned and the surpluses were used to finance development (Helleiner,
1964; 1966). Thus, in 1954, following the constitutional dev¬
elopments of that year, the marketing boards which had been
organized on a national, commodity basis were regionalized and
their surpluses distributed to the regional governments.
In addition to these deductions, a produce purchase tax was
imposed on agricultural exports from 1953.
3.2.1.3 LINKAGES WITH THE REST OF THE ECONOMY
With the exception of the use of cotton and tobacco in the textile
and tobacco industries respectively, Hirschman-type linkages
(Hirschman, 1958; 1977) are largely absent.
3.2.2 THE MINING SECTOR
Two characteristics of this sector which were used extensively
in the text need to be emphasized here. These are its phen¬
omenal growth in the 1970's and the fact that it is the sector
with the weakest linkages with the rest of the economy.
The main item in this sector is crude petroleum. Other minerals
- tin ore, columbite and coal - which were produced in commercial
quantities until the mid-1960's have ceased to be of any import¬
ance. By the end of the 1970's they had virtually disappeared
from the export list. For example, in 1980, the export of tin
and columbite amounted to N9.8 m and NO.9 m respectively and no
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coal was exported. Total export stood at N14,077 m (CBN, Report,
1980, p. 89). Consequently, only crude petroleum is considered.
Oil was first produced in commercial quantities in 1958 when
its export amounted to Ml.8 m or 0.7% of total export. Pro¬
duction was hampered by the civil disturbance but picked up in
1969. In that year an annual rate of growth of export by
value of 237.6% was recorded. The corresponding figure was
183% in 1974 and 88% in 1979. These increases were aided by
the price increases that started from November 1973. The increases
amounted to 61, 183 and 88% in 1973, 1974 and 1979 respectively.
As a result, the value of exports rose from N1893.5 m in 1973
to N5365.7 m in 1974 and to N13,523 m in 1980. (Sule, 1982,
Tables 1, 2 and 3).
These developments enabled the sector to dominate all others
in many respects. Its temporary displacement as the largest
component of the GDP has already been mentioned. In 1965 the
share of oil in total export was 25.4%. It increased to 73.6%
in 1971. Since 1972 it has not been less than 82% and stood
at 98.2% by 1981. Finally, it occupies a dominant position
with respect to the revenue collected by the Federal Government.
Its supremacy in this sphere has remained unchanged since 1972
as Table A-3 shows.
Despite the significance of the mining sector, it constitutes
an essentially enclave economy within the national economy.
The term as used here is usually applied to the mining sector
of developing countries and may be defined as one whose impact
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on the disposable income of the nationals, other than the
indirect effects of the expenditure of government revenue
obtained from it, is relatively insignificant (Bosson and
Varon, 1977, p. 101; Emerson, 1982, p. 561; Gillis et al,
the
1978, pp. 6-8). In /^articular case of Nigeria, it has
been asserted that
'Its development, growth and expansion were not
determined by endogenous economic forces but by
the market forces operating externally. The pro¬
ductive organizations are all multinational corp¬
orations with similar and identical interests elsewhere
and all over the world. The investment requirements
of this giant sector are not met from the aggregate
monetary resources of the domestic economy'
(Okigbo, 1981, p. 14)
The bulk of crude oil in Nigeria is always exported. The entire
output was exported until 1964 when the first refinery started
production. The proportion of crude oil deliveries to the refin¬
ery to total output was under 3% until 1978, with a second ref¬
inery. Even with the opening of a third in 1980, the ratio
still remained under 7% (Sule, 1982, p. 15). In addition to
the absence of significant forward linkages, backward linkages
are also weak. This mainly is because the industry is highly
capital-intensive and requires correspondingly skilled labour -
two inputs that are not readily available locally. Thus, 'the
know-how, machinery and equipment and most of the managerial
personnel in use in the industry are imported wholesale' (Sule,
1982, p. 19). According to Iwayemi, the sector employs
less than 0.1% of the labour force. Furthermore, 'if government-
related payments are excluded, local payment (by the industry)
is less than 0.05% of the total expenditure' (Iwayemi, 1981,
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p. 13).
The oil industry is regarded as an enclave not just because of
its low linkages alone, it is insensitive to domestic policy
in another sense. Prior to the formation of OPEC in 1960,
'the oil companies fixed the quantity of oil to be
produced and fixed and varied the prices at which
the oil was sold with utter disregard of the inter¬
ests of the host countries'
(Nwankwo, 1982, p. 6).
One objective of OPEC which is relevant for the present purpose
is the co-ordination and unification of the petroleum policies
of member states. In 1970, this objective was broadened to
include a minimum income tax rate of 55%, the elimination of
existing disparities in posted prices and the maintenance of
uniform increases in posted prices. Nigeria joined this organi¬
zation in 1971. Before then the country had relied on the most
favoured nation principle by which the best terms offered to
any oil producing and exporting country became applicable to
Nigeria automatically (Lolomari, 1976). But when the country
joined OPEC in July 1971 it was obliged to implement the organ¬
ization's decisions. Now it is common knowledge that these
decisions include the rate of production and the quantity and
prices of exports.
3.2.3 THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR
As is evident from Table A-l, this sector is very small. It
is also characterized by the predominance of light consumer goods
and assembly. Consequently, value-added is relatively low.
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4. PUBLIC FINANCE
Since the government itself generates government finance stat¬
istics one would have expected these to be the most reliable
sets of statistics. In practice this is not so. The three
levels of government are required by law to present details of
their financial operations. But this often takes a long time
to materialize if it ever does.
The situation is even worse for the states. Since the creation
of new states in 1976 many states have not published their
accounts while some had even ceased publication before then.
The Central Bank often has to rely on newspaper publications
for compiling data on state budget estimates which should have
been ready by the beginning of the financial year (see, for
example, CBN, Report, 1980, p. 77).
Data on local government council finances are virtually unavail¬
able outside the ministries responsible for them in each state.
In its report submitted to the government in 1980, the Presid¬
ential Commission on Revenue Allocation notes that
'Even the figures that relate to governmental operations
are hard to come by. Some states have not published
their audited accounts for several years. There are
many that do not even have the report of their Accountants-
General ... It is difficult in these circumstances to
analyze government accounts of revenue and expenditure'
(Nigeria, 1980, p. ).
This was one of the reasons for restricting the analysis in the
text to Federal Government finance.
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4.1 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE
The growth of government revenue in the 1960's was unexceptional.
But in the 1970's considerable changes occurred. In 1970
revenue increased by 67% over the level in the preceding year.
The corresponding figure was 167% in 1974. This was due to
the unprecedented growth in revenue from oil in that year.
Aside from the spurt of 46% in 1979 and 40% in 1980, the rest
of the review period saw a deceleration in the rate of centrally-
collected revenue which declined absolutely from 1981 onward.
A characteristic feature of government revenue in Nigeria is
the predominance of a few revenue sources. In the 1950's and
1960's taxes on production and expenditure provided the bulk
of the revenue. As Table A-3 shows, indirect taxes (import,
export and excise duties) as a ratio of total revenue never
fell below 60% (from 1852) until 1970 when it stood at 58.3%.
The decline from that year was due to the influence of oil.
The main item in indirect taxes is import duties which alone
accounted for 53.8% of total revenue in 1961.
By comparison, direct taxes were unimportant before 1970. The
rise since then owes to the tremendous growth in petroleum profits
tax. Income taxes were particularly small relative to total
revenue. Non-tax revenue was also insignificant until the
rise of mining rents, royalties and fees (which constituted the
bulk of this class of revenue) in the 1970's.
In sum, the country depended heavily on indirect taxes in general
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and taxes on external trade in particular until 1970 when pet¬
roleum-derived taxes took over the lead. More details are
available in Tables At-3 and 2.1.
4.2 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
The trend in expenditure over the review period was similar
to that in revenue as Table 2.1 shows.
The composition of expenditure displays some distinctive fea¬
tures. First, current expenditure as a proportion of the total
rose from 58.9% in 1961 to its maximum of 77.1%. The rise in
the relative importance of current expenditure during this time
is partly explained by the political crises of the period when
the share of defence in the total rose sharply. The ratio
declined to 26.7% in 1977 before settling at 45.3% in 1983.
The fall over this period may be attributed to the de-mobiliz¬
ation of the Armed Forces and the launching of the three develop¬
ments plans referred to in Ch. 1.
The shortfall in revenue which became particularly acute in 1978
led to a decline in total expenditure. The brunt of the fall
was borne by capital expenditure which more easily could be cut
back.
The second feature of the expenditure pattern relates to the
distribution of current and capital expenditure. The share
of administration (mainly defence and security) in total expend¬
iture rose from 31.9% in 1961 to 72% in 1970 before declining
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to 31.4% in 1983. Its share in current expenditure was 43.2%
in 1961, 73,1% in 1972 and 48.6% in 1983. The shares of the
other sectors were correspondingly small. The distribution
of capital expenditure is similar except that expenditures on
economic services usually take the lion share. Social services
expenditure are on health and education while transfer payments
consist only of interest on the public debt and pension of
retired Federal Government employees.
The expenditure pattern is depicted in Tables A-4 and A-5.
What emerges from the tables is that administration accounts
for a large fraction of total expenditure. Yet, administration
is, in essence, equivalent to defence and security. Further¬
more, owing to the universal secrecy surrounding defence spend¬
ing, actual figures may diverge from those reported. In the
case of Nigeria, the Central Bank has heightened the suspicion
of the accuracy of published statistics by qualifying the data
on defence with 'recorded'. This gives the impression that
the data is not altogether reliable and if this is so, in the
absence of any other evidence, the situation may be taken to be
that of under-reporting in view of the criticism of the military
governments of the time for overspending on defence relative
to other services. Now, as it is well known, defence expend¬
itures constitute one of the most 'barren' classes of expendi¬
ture .
5. EXTERNAL TRADE
The foreign trade sector provided the main stimulus of growth
in the 1950's and early 1960's (Aboyade, 1966, p. 2). Also,
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the operations of the West African Currency Board made the
money supply entirely dependent on the balance of payments.
As well as generating income in the domestic economy exports
earned the foreign exchange that was used to finance imports.
Nigeria is an open economy whose transactions with the rest of
the world constitute a significant proportion of aggregate
economic activity. The ratio of exports to the GDP rose from
13.1% in 1950 to 15.1% in 1960, 31.1% in 1974, 32.5% in 1980
and declined to 23% in 1981. The corresponding figures for
imports were 9, 19.2, 9.3, 22.3 and 26.4%. The ratio of total
trade to the GDP thus ranged from 22.1% in 1950 to 54.8% in
1980.
A consequence of this increasing openness of the economy is
that it was becoming ever more sensitive to developments out¬
side the country. Unless some form of sterilization policy
was pursued in those circumstances, the level of economic act¬
ivity would tend to follow the tempo of economic activity in
the rest of the world.
5.1 STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE
5.1.1 EXPORTS
Nigeria is a classical example of a primary product exporting
country. In the 1950's, the bulk of its exports consisted of
agricultural products. By 1961 agricultural exports still
accounted for 89% of all exports. Non-agricultural exports
rose to a position of importance only with the production of
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crude petroleum in commercial quantities from the mid-1960's,
A number of commodities notably cocoa, groundnuts (peanuts),
palm oil and kernels, cotton and rubber - dominated Nigeria's
exports. Although the country was the world's leading exporter
of groundnut, palm kernels and columbite, the second largest
exporter of cocoa, and an important exporter of palm oil, rubber
and tin, it did not depend on any one single item to any signif¬
icant degree as it now does on oil. Table A-6 and A-7 illu¬
strates the nearly complete demise of the non-oil export sector.
5.1.2 IMPORTS
The significant point to note about imports over the review
period is its changing structure. The ratio of consumer goods
to total imports declined from 56% in 1960 to 39.6% in 1980
and rose to 44.4% in 1981. That of producer goods (capital
goods and raw materials) rose from 43% in 1960 to 71.4% in 1977
before declining to 55.5% in 1981 (see Table 6.2).
The structural change is due in a large measure to the import
substitution development strategy explained in Ch. 6. The
fall in the relative importance of producer goods from 1977
is not unconnected with the balance of payments problems of
the time. It is much easier to reduce the import of capital
goods than it is to curtail that of consumer goods, some of
which may be regarded as 'essential commodities'.
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| 1959 | 1283.6 22.0 | 95.6 63.7 | 1 . 1 1 4.7
| 1960 | 1414.6 26.0 | 107.6 62.9 | 1.2 | 4.8
| 1961 | 1453.2 42.6 | 123.4 61.5 | 1.8 | 5.2
| 1962 | 1605.8 54.0 | 146.4 61.8 | 2.1 | 5.6
| 1963 | 1673.8 54.8 | 163.0 61.0 | 2.0 | 5.9
| 1964 | 1676.4 73.2 | 173.6 58.0 | 2.5 | 6.0
| 1965 | 1691.6 143.0 | 214.6 54.4 ! 4.6 | 6.9
| 1966 | 1855.0 163.0 | 233.0 55.0 | 4.8 | 6.9
| 1967 | 1528.0 104.0 | 194.0 55.5 | 3.8 1 7.1
| 1968 | 1415.0 72.0 | 199.0 53.3 | 2.7 | 7.5
| 1969 | 1712.0 265.0 | 282.0 48.2 | 7.5 | 7.9
| 1970 | 2576.0 534.0 I 378.0 48.8 | 10. 1 | 7.2
| 1972 | 3093.0 1220.0 | 511.0 43.0 | 17.0 I 7.1
| 1973 | 3369.0 2021.0 | 497.0 30.0 | 18.0 | 4.4
| 1974 | 4942.0 6087.0 | 661.0 26.5 | 32.6 | 3.5
| 1975 | 5873.0 4668.0 | 1170.0 27.4 | 21 .7 | 5.5
| 1976 | 6783.0 6797.0 | 1464.0 24.8 | 24.9 | 5.4
| 1977 | 8074.0 7905.0 | 1555.0 25.2 | 24.7 | 4.9
| 1978 | 8339.0 8416.0 | 1785.0 24.8 | 25.0 | 5.3
| 1979 | 8981.0 11339.0 | 2037.0 22.5 | 28.4 | 5.1
| 1980 | 9620.0 11614.0 | 2354.0 22. 1 | 26.8 | 5.4
| 1981 | 10138.0 8997.0 | 2648.0 23.3 | 20.7 | 6.1
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/fVgL£ *» A- 3 CURRENT EXPENDITURE . HIILIONS OF NAIRA
| YEAR | ADMINI¬ | ECONOMIC | SOCIAL | TRANSFER | TOTAL |
1 1 STRATION | SERVICES j SERVICES | PAYMENTS | I
I
| 1961 | 42.7 | 14.2 | 22.3 I 19.7 | 98.9 |
| 1962 | 40.6 I 13.0 | 21.8 | 28.0 | 103.4 |
| 1963 | 45.6 I 12.1 | 21.2 | 40.8 | 119.7 |
| 1964 | 63.8 I 28. 1 | 19.0 I 31.7 | 142.6 |
| 1965 | 65.0 | 33.9 | 20. 1 | 37.9 | 156.9 |
| 1966 | 78. 1 I 25.8 | 18.2 | 55.2 | 177.3 i
| 1967 | 73.6 | 20.0 | 20.3 | 52.9 | 166.8 |
| 1968 | 125.8 I 17.6 | 13.5 I 59.9 | 216.8 |
| 1969 | 173. 1 | 22.6 | 12.2 I 79.1 | 287.0 |
| 1970 | 458.8 I 24.3 | 16.6 | 138.6 | 638.3 |
| 1971 | 338.4 | 31.4 | 20.4 | 102.6 | 492.8 |
| 1972 | 498.4 | 46.2 | 29.4 | 107.4 | 681.4 |
| 1973 | 454.3 | 52.4 I 31.1 | 106.6 | 644.4 |
| 1974 | 555.4 I 74.4 | 94.9 | 148.9 | 873.6 |
| 1975 | 1055.4 | 131.8 | 287.5 | 211.2 | 1685.9 |
| 1976 | 1012.2 | 141.8 I 634.6 | 383.8 | 2172.4 |
| 1977 | 1040.4 | 191.8 | 368.4 | 221.7 | 1822.3 |
| 1978 | 1259.5 | 206.3 | 529.6 | 899.7 | 2895.1 |
| 1979 | 999.5 | 113.4 | 511.0 | 735.7 | 2359.6 |
| 1980 | 1944.6 | 354.6 | 883.7 | 3240.1 | 6423.0 |
| 1981 | 2143.8 | 484.9 | 984.9 | 1463.9 I 5077.5 |
| 1982 | 2174. 1 | 431.4 | 986.1 | 1267.9 | 4859.5 |
| 1983 | 2567.9 | 380.0 | 904.4 | 1426.5 | 5278.8 |
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| 1961 | 10.2 39.6 | 11.4 5.9 I 67.1 |
| 1962 | 16.3 34. 1 | 10.0 3.5 | 63.9 |
| 1963 | 20.5 33.7 | 8.2 1.5 | 63.9 |
| 1964 | 24.9 40.0 | 9.9 0.9 I 75.7 |
| 1965 | 23. 1 43.6 | 9.4 3.5 I 79.6 |
| 1966 | 19.3 44.8 | 9.8 3.9 | 77.8 |
| 1967 | 38.1 48.9 | 4.2 0.1 I 91-3 |
| 1968 | 68.9 46.3 | 2.1 7.2 | 124.5 |
| 1969 | 60.0 27.3 | 2.0 2.3 I 91.6 |
| 1970 | 145.0 43.4 | 3.2 9.0 | 200.6 |
| 1971 I 63.2 58.2 | 13.2 11.6 | 146.2 |
| 1972 | 108.8 132.9 | 42.0 12.2 | 295.9 |
| 1973 | 133.8 249.5 | 40.4 11.4 | 435.1 |
| 1974 | 268.3 466.1 | 358. 1 131 .0 l 1223.5 |
| 1975 | 747.8 1314.7 | 927.4 217.8 | 3207.7 |
| 1976 | 795.4 2231.4 | 889.7 144.8 | 4061.3 |
| 1977 | 1013.4 3124.6 | 824.9 41.7 | 5004.6 |
| 1978 | 989.9 2949.9 | 1090.8 61.7 | 5092.3 |
| 1979 | 769.5 2812.1 | 613.3 24.7 | 4219.6 |
| 1980 | 1288.4 5059.9 | 1712.7 30.7 | 8091.7 |
| 1981 | 720.1 3629.4 | 1299.0 50.8 | 5699.3 |
| 1982 | 930.6 5217.9 | 1285.1 85.4 | 7519.0 |



































i SM I |
66.1 | 45.8 | 29.4 | 42.3
88.7 | 68.1 | 28.9 | 32.6
88. 1 | 77.5 | 29.5 | 41.4
97.4 | 70.6 | 28.0 | 59. 1
111.7 | 68.9 | 24.5 | 53.0
194.7 | 63.9 | 15.6 | 67. 1
233. 1 | 49.9 | 14.2 | 81.4
603.8 | 67.7 | 19.8 | 147.6
401 .6 | 89.6 | 33.6 | 114.2
607.2 | 179.1 | 71.4 | 119.6
588. 1 | 301.9 | 71.5 | 118.0
323.7 | 540.5 | 453.0 | 279.9
1303.2 | 1446.5 | 1214.9 | 429.0
1807.6 | 2373.2 | 1524.3 | 528.6
2053.8 | 3316.4 | 1193.3 | 263.4
2249.4 | 3156.2 | 1620.4 | 961.4
1769.0 | 2925.5 | 1124.3 | 760.4
3233.0 | 5414.5 | 2596.4 | 3270.8
2863.9 | 4114.3 | 2283.9 | 1514.7
3104.7 | 5649.3 | 2271.2 | 1353.3
3666.1 | 4592.3 | 1930.9 | 1475.3















| 1961 | 43.2 14.4 I 22.5 | 19.9 | 100.0 |
| 1962 | 39.3 12.6 | 21.1 | 27. 1 | 100.0 |
| 1963 | 38.1 10.1 | 17.7 | 34. 1 | 100.0 |
| 1964 | 44.7 19.7 | 13.3 | 22.2 | 100.0 I
| 1965 | 41.4 21 .6 | 12.8 | 24.2 | 100.0 |
| 1966 | 44.0 14.6 | 10.3 | 31.1 | 100.0 |
| 1967 | 44. 1 12.0 | 12.2 | 31.7 | 100.0 I
| 1968 | 58.0 8.1 | 6.2 | 27.6 | 100.0 |
| 1969 | 60.3 7.9 | 4.3 | 27.6 | 100.0 |
| 1970 | 71.9 3.8 | 2.6 | 21.7 | 100.0 |
| 1971 | 68.7 6.4 | 4.1 | 20.8 | 100.0 I
| 1972 | 73.1 6.8 | 4.3 | 15.8 | 100.0 |
| 1973 | 70.5 8.1 | 4.8 | 16.5 | 100.0 |
| 1974 | 63.6 8.5 | 10.9 | 17.0 | 100.0 I
| 1975 | 62.6 7.8 | 17.1 | 12.5 | 100.0 I
| 1976 | 46.6 6.5 | 29.2 | 17.7 | 100.0 |
| 1977 | 57.1 10.5 | 20.2 | 12.2 | 100.0 I
| 1978 | 43.5 7.1 | 18.3 | 31.1 | 100.0 I
| 1979 | 42.4 4.8 | 21 .7 | 31.2 I 100.0 |
| 1980 | 30.3 5.5 | 13.8 | 50.4 | 100.0 I
| 1981 | 42.2 9.5 | 19.4 | 28.8 | 100.0 |
| 1982 | 44.7 8.9 | 20.3 | 26. 1 | 100.0 |
| 1983 | 48.6 7.2 | 17.1 | 27.0 | 100.0 |
2
LE A-1 COMPOSITION OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE, PERCENTAGE SHARES









| 1961 | 15.2 59.0 | 17.0 | 8.8 | 100.0 |
| 1962 | 25.5 53.4 | 15.6 | 5.5 | 100.0 |
| 1963 | 32.1 52.7 | 12.8 | 2.3 | 100.0 |
| 1964 | 32.9 52.8 | 13.1 | 1.2 | 100.0 |
| 1965 | 29.0 54.8 | 11.8 | 4.4 | 100.0 |
| 1966 | 24.8 57.6 | 12.6 | 5.0 | 100.0 |
| 1967 | 41.7 53.6 | 4.6 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| 1968 | 55.3 37.2 | 1.7 | 5.8 | 100.0 I
| 1969 | 65.5 29.8 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 100.0 |
| 1970 | 72.3 21.6 | 1.6 | 4.5 | 100.0 |
| 1971 | 43.2 39.8 | 9.0 | 7.9 | 100.0 |
| 1972 | 36.8 44.9 | 14.2 | 4.1 | 100.0 |
| 1973 | 30.8 57.3 | 9.3 | 2.6 | 100.0 |
| 1974 | 21.9 38. 1 | 29.3 | 10.7 | 100.0 |
| 1975 | 23.3 41.0 | 28.9 | 6.8 | 100.0 |
| 1976 | 19.6 54.9 | 21.9 | 3.6 | 100.0 I
| 1977 | 20.2 62.4 | 16.5 | 0.8 | 100.0 |
| 1978 | 19.4 57.9 I 21 .4 | 1.2 | 100.0 |
| 1979 | 18.2 66.6 | 14.5 | 0.6 | 100.0 I
| 1980 | 15.9 62.5 | 21 .2 | 0.4 | 100.0 I
| 1981 | 12.6 63.7 | 22.8 | 0.9 | 100.0 |
| 1982 | 12.4 69.4 | 17.1 | 1.1 | 100.0 |
' 1983 | 17.2 66.0 | 16.1 | 0.8 | 100.0 |
3
TA'&-£ A'% COMPOSITION OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES. PERCENTAGE SHARES










| 1961 | 31.9 32.4 | 20.3 | 15.4 59.6 |
| 1962 | 34.0 28.2 | 19.0 | 18.8 61.8 |
| 1963 I 36.0 24.9 | 16.0 | 23.0 65.2 |
| 1964 | 40.6 31.2 | 13.2 | 14.9 65.3 |
| 1965 | 37.3 32.8 | 12.5 | 17.5 66.3 |
| 1966 | 38.2 27.7 | 11.0 | 23.2 69.5 |
| 1967 | 43.3 26.7 | 9.5 | 20.5 64.6 |
| 1968 | 57.0 18.7 | 4.6 | 19.7 63.5 |
| 1969 | 61.6 13.2 | 3.8 | 21.5 75.8 |
| 1970 I 72.0 8.1 | 2.4 | 17.6 76. 1 |
| 1971 I 62.8 14.0 | 5.3 | 17.9 77.1 |
| 1972 | 62.1 18.3 | 7.3 | 12.2 69.7 |
| 1973 | 54.5 28.0 | 6.6 | 10.9 59.7 |
| 1974 | 39.3 25.8 | 21.6 | 13.3 41.7 |
| 1975 | 36.8 29.6 | 24.8 I 8.8 34.5 |
| 1976 | 29.0 38. 1 | 24.5 | 8.5 34.8 |
| 1977 | 30.1 48.6 | 17.5 | 3.9 26.7 |
| 1978 | 28.2 39.5 | 20.3 | 12.0 36.2 |
| 1979 | 26.9 44.5 | 17.1 | 11.6 35.9 |
| 1980 | 22.3 37.3 | 17.9 | 22.5 44.3 |
| 1981 | 26.6 38.2 | 21 .2 | 14.1 47. 1 |
| 1982 | 25.1 45.6 | 18.3 | 10.9 39.3 |
; 1983 | 31.4 39.4 | 16.6 | 12.6 45.3 I
2
a ~ 1 RATIO OF EXPORTS. IMPORTS AND TOTAL TRADE TO GDP
toTal
TMJ> e
1 1960 I 15.1 19.2 I 34.3
I 1961 I 14.7 18.9 I 33.6 I
I 1962 I 13.0 15.6 i 28.6 I
I 1963 I 13.8 15.1 I 29.0 I
I 1964 I 14.8 17.5 I 32.4 I
I 1965 I 17.3 17.7 I 35.0 I
I 1966 I 16.8 15.2 I 32.1 I
I 1967 I 17.6 16.2 I 33.8 I
I 1968 I 15.9 14.5 I 30.4 |
I 1969 I 17.9 13.5 131.4 |
I 1970 I 16.8 14.3 131.1 I
I 1971 I 18.4 16.2 I 34.6 |
I 1974 I 31.1 9.3 I 40.4 |
I 1975 I 22.9 17.3 I 40.3 |
I 1976 I 24.7 18.8 I 43.6 I
I 1977 I 23.8 22. 1 I 45.9 I
I 1978 I 18.8 24.2 I 43.0 I
I 1979 I 27.1 18.7 I 45.8 I
I 1980 I 32.5 22.3 I 54.8 I
I 1981 I 24.1 27.6 151.7 I
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